Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of HungaryCentral European University Press, 1 mar. 2016 - 336 pagini Having won a two-third majority in Parliament at the 2010 elections, the Hungarian political party Fidesz removed many of the institutional obstacles of exerting power. Just like the party, the state itself was placed under the control of a single individual, who since then has applied the techniques used within his party to enforce submission and obedience onto society as a whole. In a new approach the author characterizes the system as the ?organized over-world?, the ?state employing mafia methods? and the ?adopted political family', applying these categories not as metaphors but elements of a coherent conceptual framework. The actions of the post-communist mafia state model are closely aligned with the interests of power and wealth concentrated in the hands of a small group of insiders. While the traditional mafia channeled wealth and economic players into its spheres of influence by means of direct coercion, the mafia state does the same by means of parliamentary legislation, legal prosecution, tax authority, police forces and secret service. The innovative conceptual framework of the book is important and timely not only for Hungary, but also for other post-communist countries subjected to autocratic rules. ÿ |
Din interiorul cărții
... government First Fidesz government (with coalition partners), Prime Minister Viktor Orbán Socialist government, until 2008 in coalition with liberals Hungary enters the European Union Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány Prime Minister ...
... government—and even used their limited powers to rap Hungary on the knuckles a few times—but these friends of ... Fidesz political party came to power in 2010 with a constitution-making majority, Hungary's public and private spheres were ...
... Fidesz's constitutional majority, the party could—and did—change the constitution at will. Twelve amendments of the ... government's first term of office ended in 2014. Anytime the government hit a constitutional roadblock, they simply ...
... Fidesz-loyalist judges so that they could form a working majority through ... government orchestrated a coordinated attack on all of the independent ... government threatened family members, lovers and friends when a particular target of ...
... Fidesz's popularity slumped to below 20% in 2012, after the new constitution came into force, and it appeared that there was no way that the party could win another election. The Orbán government's rewriting of the election laws ...
Cuprins
1 | |
15 | |
from the functional disorders of democracy to a critique of the system | 57 |
4 Definition of the postcommunist mafia state | 67 |
a subtype of autocratic regimes | 73 |
6 The legitimacy deficit faced by the mafia state and the means to overcome it | 209 |
the ideological arsenal | 231 |
8 The Criminal State | 255 |
9 Pyramid schemesthe limits of the mafia state | 269 |
Annexes | 297 |
List of accompanying studies | 304 |
Former publications | 306 |
Index of Names | 309 |