The Vicariate of Solidarity of the Chilean Catholic Church, for example, pronounced that, "Through the September 11, 1980 plebiscite, which took place under conditions that invalidate the results, the government formally legitimizes its political power and grants itself a legal cover to carry out unrestricted repression."

As has already been mentioned, the application of the human rights standards is often done unevenly. In order to illustrate our concern, a short analysis of several selected Latin American countries will follow:

EL SALVADOR: This section is much more detailed and comprehensive than in previous years, reflecting dramatically increased public and Congressional concern over the Salvadorean government's human rights record. A serious limitation, however, is that the government of El Salvador is not held fully accountable for violations committed by the security forces.

GUATEMALA: In the report on Guatemala, a country to which the Reagan administration recently ended the arms embargo in effect since 1977, largescale massacres by the government are not even mentioned. In addition, the responsibility of Guatemalan government troops for widespread violence in the countryside is minimized.

HONDURAS: Because of its proximity to Nicaragua, Honduras is charted to receive $40 million in military aid in FY1984, a dramatic increase from the preceding few years. Accordingly, the State Department's report on Honduras overlooks the impunity with which Honduran security forces operate and justifies the escalating human rights violations in Honduras as part of a vigorous anti-terrorist campaign. The section on Honduras also overlooks the illegal detention, arbitrary arrest, torture and disappearance of Salvadorean refugees. ARGENTINA: The report cites that torture is being investigated by a judge, but neglects to mention the continued use of torture on some persons abducted by security forces but not acknowledged by the government. Press restrictions, these "temporary disappearances, and threats against human rights workers, are given minimal importance, leading to somewhat misleading conclusions.

CHILE: The report states, "The human rights situation in Chile has improved significantly in comparison with the post-coup period, 1973 1977

Recent trends, however, show that the pace of improvements has slowed in the past two years. This evaluation of the general human rights trends in Chile begs the question. The conclusions drawn contradict the information given in the report itself.

URUGUAY: The overall conclusions in the section on Uruguay are grossly inaccurate and unsubstantiated by the data of the report. For example, on the November party elections, the report states, "During the campaign, freedom of assembly, speech, and press were liberalized." In the same report, it continues, "Despite the overall positive trend, the Government in 1982 reacted to press criticism with increased frequency and severity as the election period approached."

2. Section 502B

Section 502B restricts from military aid those countries whose govern

ments engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. U.S. military assistance, arms sales or economic support funds (ESF) must be terminated to any such country unless the president determines that extraordinary circumstances require the United States to continue these programs. Since taking office, the Reagan administration has supplied security assistance to countries noted for violations of human rights such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Haiti. The administration has actively sought to lift country-specific restrictions applying to Argentina and Chile, and it opposes country-specific language on El Salvador and Guatemala.

In the case of El Salvador, despite massive organized violations of human rights, neither President Carter or President Reagan saw fit to invoke that section of the law. President Reagan has declared U.S. military aid to El Salvador and the rest of the region as vital because of overriding United States national security interests.

debate.

The Reagan thesis about Central America goes to the core of the current Without going into the particulars of that discussion, I believe that it stretches the imagination a bit to believe that unless the U.S. places its mighty prestige behind the murderous Salvadorean regime, U.S. national security would be seriously jeopardized.

The administration has requested $110 million in military aid to El Salvador over the $26 million approved by Congress for the current fiscal year. For FY1984, the administration wants $86 million as a base level for military assistance to El Salvador. If the administration's conduct during the last 2 years can be said to establish a trend, then it is fair to say that more increases through reprogramming and supplementals can be expected. Guatemala was one of the few countries where Section 502B was applied by The egregious nature of violations in Guatemala

the Carter administration.

prevented even the current administration from renewing military aid. The atrocities committed by the Guatemalan security forces have been amply documented by a variety of human rights organizations.

Obviously satisfied

that the human rights situation had improved, the administration approved the sale of $6.3 million in military supplies and helicopter spare parts for Guatemala. Reaffirming their determination that human rights conditions were better, the administration is requesting $10 million in military aid and $40 million in ESF for Guatemala in 1984. These decisions clearly indicate that support for Rios Montt's government is growing although there is no conclusive independent evidence that Guatemala is reversing a twenty-five year pattern of unspeakable government cruelty toward the civilian population, especially the

numerous Indian tribes.

Haiti represents still another example of questionable judgment by

the Reagan administration. Military aid and ESF flow to Haiti in relatively large amounts despite continued reports of human rights violations.

Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires that all economic assistance be terminated to governments engaging in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights, unless such aid directly benefits needy

people.

Congress approved this legislation after it became painfully clear that the Ford administration was using economic aid to pursue strategic geopolitical goals, and not in the pursuit of strategic developmental and relief goals. It was felt at that time that the American people believed that economic aid was destined to provide some relief to the world's suffering poor not simply as an adjunct to U.S. foreign policy concerns.

This question is again germaine as the statistics suggest El Salvador is a major beneficiary of U.S. developmental assistance. El Salvador's poverty is a matter of the public record. No one could dispute El Salvador's The only question is the extent to which the AID

need for economic assistance.

program is an extension of the overall war effort. Can developmental assistance be utilized effectively in the midst of a war? These questions are likely to become more sharply focused as the Salvadorean government in conjunction with substantial U.S. support engage in an ambitious pacification program in some of the areas of greatest conflict.

4. Section 701:

International Financial Institutions

Section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act requires the U.S. Executive Director in the multilateral development banks (MDBs) to oppose loans to governments that engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights, unless the loan directly benefits needy people (basic human needs). Any changes in the voting policy require the White House to consult with Congress before the change is made.

In July 1981, the International Development Institutions Subcommittee held special hearings because of a change in voting policy which was made with only minimal notification of Congress. The administration decided to change a long-standing policy of opposing loans to Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina and Chile. In December 1982, the administration voted in favor of a rural

telecommunications loan to Guatemala, changing U.S. voting policy towards that country over strong objections from the Congress. While the policy changes have affected the U.S. votes in all of the MDBs, this testimony will focus on the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

Since the change in the policy, the U.S. has voted in favor of practically all IDB loans to all countries of Latin America, with the exception of Nicaragua. We interpret this policy, which allows non-basic human needs loans to proceed through the soft-loan window of the IDB, to violate the spirit if

not the letter of U.S. law.

From March 1982 through March 1983 total IDB loans to the four Southern Cone countries equaled $808 million. Of this amount, $683 million was given for non-basic human needs loans. The Fund for Special Operations, the "soft loan" window of the IDB where the U.S. has veto power, provided $110.97 million for projects not directly benefiting the needy.

During the same one-year period, total IDB loans to El Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti amounted to $201 million. Loans awarded for projects not directly benefiting the needy amounted to $155 million, with FSO monies accounting for $65 million. Guatemala received $46 million of which $18

million was designated for a non-human needs project.

Unlike Guatemala, El Salvador received no loans that directly benefited needy people from the IDB during the same 1982-1983 time period. The FSO accounted for $29.4 million of the $120.9 million of loans awarded.

The Executive Directors of the IDB approved the loans to Haiti totalling $35 million. Of this amount, $17 million was for non-BHN projects. FSO funds accounted for $17 million that was not designated for human needs projects. Had the administration followed the guidelines of section 701, the above three countries would have recived FSO funds solely for projects that directly