of a larger force, the corps of the field army to which it is assigned would provide the necessary nuclear weapons support.

Mr. DEANE. Will the projected cut in the plane procurement affect the mobility of the airborne divisions?

Secretary WILSON. What do you mean by "Projected cut?" Where did you get that information?

Mr. DEANE. We were discussing earlier that the Air Force first requested some $20 billion and were cut down to $18 billion. I want to know if there is any deviation from the Air Force request which will affect the mobility of these airborne divisions.

Secretary WILSON. No, there has been no change in the fiscal year 1957 Air Force budget which resulted in a reduction of the Air Force's programed airlift capability for support of Army airborne operations. Mr. DEANE. How many troop-carrying planes do you have and how many do you propose to order during the fiscal year 1957?

(A classified statement was furnished to the committee.)

Mr. DEANE. Will there be enough to lift these three airborne divisions?

Mr. MCNEIL. Do you mean at any one time?

Mr. DEANE. You will answer that, I think, in terms of the Army, or the military requirements.

(Information was furnished for the use of the committee.)

Mr. DEANE. Can you lift an airborne division with the equipment to fight only with nuclear weapons?

Secretary WILSON. Army combat forces must be prepared to fight with nonnuclear as well as nuclear weapons. We plan to use whatever weapons will be to our advantage at the time. There may be occasions when it would be to our advantage to use nonnuclear weapons. Because of this, no combat organization is equipped solely with nuclear weapons. Present plans call for the new type airborne division to be transportable entirely by air. The other two airborne divisions are organized similarly to infantry divisions and have the armor, antiaircraft artillery, and heavy bridging equipment necessary to fight in sustained combat. In an airborne operation, the armor and other heavy equipment which are not air-transportable would follow by ship. In this event the airborne division would not have a sustained combat capability but could perform a normal airborne-type mission, relying on surprise to seize an important objective and hold that objective until linkup by other forces is achieved.

Mr. DEANE. If a division had to fight with conventional weapons in a place similar to Korea, would it have to be transported and supplied by the Navy, and if so, does not that affect the degree of mobility of the Army?

Secretary WILSON. The combat elements with light equipment can be transported and initially supplied by air, but the heavier equipment would have to be transported by the Navy and as a practical matter the sustained supply support would also be provided by the Navy. Airlift is distinctly premium-type transportation which is used only where necessary. This problem is taken into account in our planning and in our deployments.

Mr. DEANE. Is the Marine Corps to have an airborne division? Secretary WILSON. No. The Marine Corps does not require airborne divisions to carry out its missions.

Mr. DEANE. If not, then would you say that the value of mobility has not been applied to the Marine Corps?

Secretary WILSON. On the contrary. The entire effort within the Marine Corps has been to increase mobility by decreasing weight and bulk beginning with the individual rifleman and reaching up through the entire combat structure.

The perfection of the helicopter concept will permit the assault elements of an entire division to land, maneuver, and be supplied by helicopters.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF ARMED SERVICES

Mr. DEANE. Have the roles and missions of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines been examined with regard to (a) their capabilities and limitations in fighting unlimited wars; (b) their capabilities and limitations in fighting a limited general war; (c) their capabilities and limitations in fighting small or limited wars?

Secretary WILSON. Yes. These factors are taken into consideration each time our military forces and programs are reviewed and revised. This problem is basic to our entire operation, and it is under study all the time. As I told the committee in my opening statement, I am requesting the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments, in addition to their regular reviews, to make a special complete and careful evaluation of the size, nature, and composition of the forces likely to be required for the Nation's security during the next 3 years. The questions you have raised will, of course, again be considered in this new study.

DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY DETERRENT TO SMALL WARS

Mr. DEANE. Do you think it would be possible to develop a military deterrent to small wars which would compare in effectiveness with our nuclear deterrents to an all-out war?

Secretary WILSON. The problem of deterring small wars cannot be considered separately from the problem of deterring war generally. Nor can it be considered separately from our overall national security policies since it is not solely a military problem.

We have long recognized in this country that the security of the free nations, both large and small, can best be achieved through a system of collective defense in which each nation contributes those forces and resources best adopted to its particular situation. Under this concept the United States for many years has been helping many of the free nations of the world not only to strengthen their military forces but also to strengthen their economic structures.

This was necessary to the collective security of the free world because it is precisely those nations which are internally weak and disorganized that are most subject to subversion and local aggression. By helping these nations achieve economic stability and by helping them to equip and train the military forces needed for their internal security and for their effective participation in the collective defense, we help to deter small wars.

But even with this help none of the smaller nations of the free world could by itself withstand a determined military aggression from the Communist bloc. It must rely, as we, ourselves, have to, on the

collective strength of the free world, not only to beat back any local aggression but to deter the aggressor from broadening the conflict into global war. So our capability to deter large wars also serve to deter small wars.

Mr. DEANE. Do you have the military answer to any type of military aggression that the Soviet Union might undertake?

Secretary WILSON. I believe I have partly answered this question in my reply to your preceding question. Considering our military program as a whole and the military forces of our allies in the free world, together with the other aspects of our national-security policy, I believe we are doing everything we can do in this respect. We have a well-balanced offensive-defensive force in being which we are constantly improving through the development and integration of new weapons, equipment, and techniques, and we are strengthening our reserve forces as a backup for these active forces.

But I must say again that the Communist threat is not solely a military one and a purely military answer is not sufficient. Mr. DEANE. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. MAHON. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary and Mr. McNeil. We will adjourn until 10' o'clock tomorrow morning.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1956.

Mr. MAHON. The committee will come to order. We will resume our hearings.

Mr. Secretary, we regret very much to take so much of your time, but I know that you understand our problem here.

Mr. Flood, it is your turn to interrogate the witness.

Mr. FLOOD. Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

INFORMATION REQUESTED BY INVESTIGATORS

Mr. WHITTEN. Will the gentleman yield? I would like to hand to the reporter a list of dates on which information was requested from the military department by the investigators of the Committee on Appropriations. In this document is listed the date on which the request was made and the date when the information was received. I would like for this to go into the record at this point, and I reserve the right to ask further questions.

Mr. MAHON. We will put it into the record, but at the point where we discuss this whole matter later on this morning, if there is no objection.

Mr. WHITTEN. I would prefer that such information be inserted at this point but yield to the statement of the chairman.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Secretary, this is the year of Mozart, so I guess what you are hearing now are "variations upon a familiar theme." It is going to be very difficult to ask you anything very original after the distinguished array of talent to which you have been subjected.

AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION LEAD TIME

As you know, we have had Admiral Radford "on board" for a couple of days, and, with particular reference to the air arm, I recall

one of your earlier appearances here. You told us how seriously concerned you were, and we were, with the question of lead time on the production of military aircraft. You made quite a point, and. I think, very properly, that if you found time in the midst of this fantastic job you have, that was one thing you wanted to get your teeth into, if it was at all possible.

Our information is: it is still just as bad a problem. Now, have you had any time on the side, or parenthetically, to get that one by the neck as an expert in that kind of thing? Have you had any chance to play with it?

Secretary WILSON. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. What, if anything, are you in a position to tell us? Is there improvement? Can there be in Government operations? What do you think?

Secretary WILSON. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Can you in a paragraph, or can you on the record, or do you care to indicate in what way the situation has improved, or in what way do you feel in the immediate years ahead we can look for a reduction, or improvement in lead time only?

Secretary WILSON. There are two parts to it. First, there is the lead time on items in production that are well established and from which the bugs have been eliminated. The sources of supply are there, the parts are all identified and the job is tooled. In a situation like that lead time does not need to be any greater than the time required for ordering the raw materials and handling the paperwork and getting the product out. If you get too much on order too far ahead-with the rapid changes in technology that are going on-you are liable to order some things that 2 or 3 years later you might wish you had not ordered. In that category we have reduced the lead time to the point where we can keep the operation going very smoothly. The manufacturers would all like to have more orders on their books. The presidents of the companies would like to make a report to their stockholders and say, "I have 4 years' business on the books." They do not have to have that much. So in that area we are avoiding the commitment of money too far ahead in order to get the costs and the prices down a little bit, as we place additional orders.

I

The other thing we have done is this: I have appointed a group, did it several months ago, to make a special study of what could be done to speed up the production of new things. That is a different matter, and it involves the identification of the requirements, some general specifications of what the requirements are, for building the prototype model.

First, they have to make drawings and sketches and someone has to make a commitment that they can meet the specifications, or suggest to the military department that, if they change a specification here or there, they can make a better machine. Then the question is how many people do you get in on it and how much time do you spend in your studies before you start to make the item. Then there is the question of deciding what should be done and how long it should take. Once you decide on what you are going to do and how you can reduce the time that it takes to do it, you can shorten the lead time. So we are working on both parts of the problem.

As the Congressman said, I should be able to understand the problem. I have worked a good bit on it personally and talked to people about it, including the manufacturers. So we do think that we can do better in the future. We think we have improved the situation a great deal up to now.

Mr. FLOOD. Well, I am satisfied that with your peculiar genius that you brought to the Government because of your business experience, that would perhaps be the greatest single contribution in fact anyone in the Defense Establishment could make a material improvement in the reduction of lead time. I know that you cannot run a Government like you can your business for 1 million reasons, but if no other one thing were done, that would be a great monument to your Government service.

PERSONNEL CEILING

Now, let me direct your attention to your original statement. I direct your attention, Mr. Secretary, to page 1 of your statement and that part thereof toward the bottom of the first page where you say:

The military personnel ceiling of approximately 2,906,000, plus certain specialized Army and Navy personnel.

I am concerned with the fact that is merely an authorized ceiling. Now, can you tell us how close to that ceiling is it the intention of the Department to come before the end of the fiscal year?

Secretary WILSON. That depends, for the most part, on how well our 6 months' reserve training program is going to develop. We have made provision in the ceiling strength so that, if enough of the boys enlist in the program to fulfill the requirments, the authority is available to provide the Army additional personnel to do the training. I think there are some 16,000 additional people that would be involved in this program. There is always this question of money for personnel since funds for this purpose are provided separately each year. You usually have a little left over because you do not quite dare run the operation down to the last two weeks and then not know whether you are going to have enough money to pay the men. But we can always ask for supplemental appropriations if the need develops. It would not amount to very much probably, and we hope we will not have to do it. We do not think we will, but when we give the services new assignments and we do not give them the additional personnel, they are sort of unhappy about it, because they have to go back and review and revise a whole lot of programs to get the needed personnel. It is an inefficient way to do it-to pinch out a few men here and there.

The way that we are going to operate is this: If we have people on assignments where their work is finished, we are going to take them out. We are going to do that independently of new assignments. However, if additional personnel are needed for new assignments, we have the authority now to take care of the requirement. We have a little flexibility in the program.

I would like to point out to you that the Air Force for almost 3 years has had a personnel ceiling considerably beyond the number of people they have actually used. Now all the services will have a little flexibility between the authorized ceiling and the number of people cur