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matter stands at present. The verdict of the lawyer was a terrible blow to Mary, as it was to me. I wrote and told her about it-how the bill could never be filed; but added that there was no reason to despair, as the lawyers were hard at work, had got an idea, and were sanguine that eventually something could be done to release me; at the same time, she must consider herself free from any kind of engagement, more particularly as it appeared to me that we could neither meet nor correspond under existing circumstances. She wrote me back such a jolly letter, saying that, whatever happened, she would always love me the same, and never marry any other fellow, though of course she agreed with me that we could neither correspond nor meet unless some favourable change in circumstances took place, for which she would always pray.

"I've never seen her or heard from her since; and though I know

she's as true and constant as a rock, still, Donald, a fellow has his low fits when everything looks black; and for some time past I've been tremendously down on my luck— all from never hearing anything the least cheering, and having no communication with her; so that at last I began to persuade myself she had forgotten me altogether; and it was only when I heard she was wearing my locket that I felt, Perhaps it isn't all over with me yet!' There, Donald, that's my yarn-the confession of Adolphus Burridge. I imagine you're a sharp fellow. They say Scotchmen are clear-headed. Perhaps you may hit on a scheme. So keep thinking it over, like a good fellow, will you?"

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I duly promised; and as the day was now getting on, we remounted and rode back to camp, Burridge much relieved by his confession, and I deeply meditating on the strange tale I had heard.

KINGLAKE'S HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE CRIMEA.

PART II.

WITH the failure of the French attack on the Flagstaff Bastion on the 17th October, and the determination of Lord Raglan that, until they could assault that work, he would not storm the Redan, all hope of the immediate capture of Sebastopol departed.

The French engineers determined to carry on their attack on the Flagstaff Bastion by regular approaches. The English resumed their fire on the Redan on the 18th, but only to aid, by distracting the Russians, the operations of their Allies. On the morning of the 19th, as the French were in a condition to reopen fire, the bombardment was renewed from the whole Allied batteries. But again Todleben was too much for the French artillery. By working all night he was always able to meet his opponents with rearmed and repaired works in the morning. Thus the Redan had been ready for action when day broke on the 18th; and though it had been a second time reduced to silence ere the sun set, it was again armed for the strife by dawn on the 19th; whilst, to encounter the French attack, new and heavier batteries were yawning. So it resulted that this second artillery-duel ended as the first. Under the converging fire of weightier and more numerous guns, the French batteries on Mount Rodolph were a second time overmatched. By ten o'clock on the 19th two of them had been extinguished by explosions, and a third subdued by fire; by three in the afternoon they were all silent. During the whole day the English engaged the Redan, but without

decisive result; and thus day by day, until the 25th October, the fight went on. Each night both parties. repaired the damage of the day; each day the artillery destroyed the repairs of the night. But in this strife the Russians had the ascendant. By increasing the number of his traverses and the thickness and height of his parapets, Todleben reduced the Muscovite loss from 543 men on the 18th (when the English only fired), to an average of only 254 on each of the six succeeding days. By constructing new batteries in unexpected positions, he was ever raking and retarding the approaches of our Allies.

But now a new actor was about to come upon the scene-the Russian field-army-to make itself felt. Ere we turn to its operations, however, it is but justice to Lord Raglan to point out that upon the 23d October he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle :

"We have been fortunate in having very fine weather, and Mr Cattley encourages us to hope that this may last till nearly the middle of next month. Then we must be prepared either for wet or extreme cold, and in neither case could our troops remain under canvass, even with great and constant fires, and the country hardly produces wood enough to cook the men's food. Before concluding, I may be permitted to say a word with regard to this army. It requires, and should not be denied, repose. Although the marches have not been many, fatigue has pressed heavily upon the troops.'"-(Vol. iv. p. 6, 7.) And with this letter he enclosed a very clear and accurate description of the winter climate of the Crimea, drawn up by Mr Cattley, formerly consul at Kertch, and now

The Invasion of the Crimea: Its Origin, and an Account of its Progress down to the Death of Lord Raglan. By Alexander William Kinglake. Vols. III. and IV. Second Edition. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1868.

interpreter at headquarters. It cannot after this be said that the Commander of the British forces in the Crimea failed to give full and timely warning to the Home Government of what our soldiers would have to face if left to winter on the bleak plateau of the Chersonese. The failure of the bombardment on the 17th October first made it all but certain that we must winter before Sebastopol. On the 23d Lord Raglan sent home this strong appeal.

On the 7th of October a Cossack patrol were seen by our outposts beyond the Tchernaya, near the village of Tchorgoun. It was the first sign that Mentschikoff's army had resumed its sway over the Mackenzie Heights.* On the night of the 13th, three battalions, with a few guns and Cossacks, descending from these heights, established themselves permanently in that village. On the 18th, the day after the first bombardment, Lord Raglan was summoned to the edge of the plateau in his rear by the announcement that the Russians were moving, and from thence he plainly saw them marching in some strength along the ridge above Tchorgoun. It was Liprandi "poising his wings for the swoop which he afterwards made." By the 23d this detachment of Liprandi's in Tchorgoun had been reinforced to 17 battalions, 30 squadrons, and 64 guns; while another movable column had been organised on the Mackenzie Heights, consisting of 8 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 14 guns, under General Jabrokritsky, who was ordered to co-operate with Liprandi in any forward movement. The total strength of these two bodies was close on 25,000 men.

The scene of the memorable events which followed was the

plain of Balaklava. This lies about a mile north of the town of that name, and is about three miles in length by two in breadth. On the north it is bounded by the Fedioukine Hills, behind which flows the Tchernaya; on the south by the Kamara ridge and Mount Hiblak, with the sea beyond; on the east by Mount Hasfort and the hills towards Baidar; and on the west by the "steep buttresses of the Chersonese upland." Across the basin thus formed runs from east to west a low ridge of ground which divides it into two narrow valleys. This ridge is, for distinctness, called the Causeway Heights, from the Woronzoff road, which runs along it; and the valleys are named respectively the north and south valleys. Across the eastern end of the north valley runs an aqueduct and the Tchernaya, with Tchorgoun beyond it. At the eastern end of the south valley stands the prominent eminence called Canrobert's Hill.

Opening out into the western extremity of the south valley lies the narrow gorge in which is situated the town and harbour of Balaklava, shut in between the steep slopes of Mount Hiblak and the precipitous sides of the Chersonese. Mount Hiblak, which is connected with the Kamara Hills by a single narrow ridge overhanging the sea, was occupied by about 1200 marines, and defended by a breastwork with a few guns in position. Across the open gorge, from the base of Mount Hiblak to the village of Kadiköi, at the foot of the Chersonese, the line of defence was continued by a few small field-works placed on spurs thrown out from the heights on either hand. The open ground here was held by Sir Colin Campbell, having under him the 93d Highlanders, a battery of field

On the 28th September Mentschikoff sent two squadrons of cavalry and two sotnias of Cossacks to these heights; but this was merely a detachment for observation, not the military occupation of a great strategical point.-See Todleben, p. 267.

artillery, and two battalions of Turks. There was, besides, a frigate in the harbour, and some eighty invalids in the town. These defences constituted the inner line of Balaklava.

The outer line consisted of a work on Canrobert's Hill, at the eastern end of the south valley, and a chain of five slight redoubts on eminences rising at intervals along the Causeway Heights between Canrobert's Hill and the foot of the Chersonese. One flank of this line, therefore, leant on the Kamara Hills, the other on the plateau of the Chersonese; and it stretched right across the whole of the Balaklava basin, separating the two valleys and entirely blocking the way to an enemy approaching from either Tchorgoun or Baidar. Had this line consisted of strong works, well armed, and with a couple of divisions of infantry to support them, it would have been very formidable; but as it was, it covered an extent of ground utterly disproportioned to the small force told off for its defence. This was composed only of some four battalions of Turks, supported by the English cavalry division, 1500 strong, and a battery of horse-artillery. The works themselves were weak, and their armament slight. That on Canrobert's Hill was armed with three 12-pounder guns, and garrisoned by a Turkish battalion; the remaining redoubts were held each by a Turkish half-battalion, and the three next to Canrobert's Hill had a couple of 12-pounder guns on each; the other two had no artillery. These six earthworks extended over a line of two miles, and the main one on Canrobert's Hill was commanded within gunshot range by the unoccupied Kamara Hills. The plateau in their left rear was strongly guarded by Bosquet's corps of the French army; but "Canrobert's Hill was so distant from the ground whence supporting forces might be expected to come, as to offer the enemy a licence of some hours' dura

tion for any enterprise in the plain of Balaklava upon which he might think fit to venture."

To the general reader one of the most interesting parts of Mr Kinglake's work will be the character which he draws in much detail of Lord Lucan commanding the English cavalry division, and of Lord Cardigan in charge of the Light Brigade. As these officers exercised so powerful an influence on the engagement on which we are now entering, we will extract the most striking passages, premising that, in our opinion, they are fairly as well as powerfully drawn :—

Lord Lucan "enjoyed perfect health; he saw like a hawk; and he retained such extraordinary activity of both body and mind, that perhaps the mention of his actual age [fifty-four] makes it really more difficult than it might otherwise be to convey an idea of the tall, lithe, slender, and young-looking officer, pursuing his task of commander with a kind of fierce, tearing energy, and expressing by

a movement of feature somewhat rare which his mind worked. At every fresh amongst Englishmen the intensity with access of strenuousness, and especially at the moments preceding strenuous speech, his face all at once used to light up with a glittering, panther-like aspect, resulting from the sudden fire of the eye, and the sudden disclosure of the teeth, white, even, and clenched. . . A quarter of a century before, he had come back from the Danube campaign with a low opinion of the Russian cavalry, but with a high respect for the infantry-more especially, it seems, for the infantry when gathered in heavy column; and he not only carried those opinions with him to the Crimea, but continued, when there, to hold them unchanged, and even, perhaps-though unconsciously-to make them the basis of his resolves. Lord Lucan was an officer from whom much might be reasonably hoped, if the soundfrom the general force of his intellect, ness of his judgment could be inferred and if also it could be taken for granted that he would prove willing and able, after having long had his own way, to accept the yoke of military subordination in the field, and to bear it with himself to become an inveterate critic . . He suffered loyalty and temper. -an inveterate critic of the orders he received from Headquarters; and since

it happened that his criticism almost always ended in his coming to a strong disapproval of his chief's directions, he of course lost that comfort of mind which is enjoyed by an officer who takes it for granted that his chief must be right, and had to be constantly executing orders with the full persuasion that they were wrongly conceived. .. His composure under heavy fire was so perfect that, even in an army where prowess evinced in that way was exceedingly general, it did not escape observation. Yes, damn him, he's brave,' was the comment pronounced on Lord Lucan by one of his most steady haters."-(Vol. iv. p. 54-61.)

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Lord Cardigan" had a passionate love for the service-a fair knowledge, it is believed, of so much cavalry business as is taught by practice in England--a strong sense of military duty-a burning desire for the fame which awaits heroic actions and, finally, the gift of high courage. Lord Cardigan's valour was not at all of the wild, heedless kind, but the result of strong determination. Even from his way of riding to hounds, it was visible, they say, that the boldness he evinced was that of a resolute man with a set purpose, and not a daredevil impulse. . . He had been so constituted by nature, or so formed by the watchful care which is sometimes bestowed upon an only son, as to have a habit of attending to the desires and the interests of self with a curious exactitude. When engaged in the task of self-assertion or self-advocacy, he adhered to his subject with the most curious rigour, never going the least bit astray from it, and separating from it all that concerned the rest of creation as matter altogether irrelevant and uninteresting.

Others before him may have secretly concentrated upon self an equal amount of attention; but in Lord Cardigan there was such an entire absence of guile, that exactly as he was so he showed himself to the world. With attributes of this kind, he was plainly more fitted to obey than to command. Having no personal ascendancy, and no habitual consideration for the feelings of others, he was not, of course, at all qualified to exert easy rule over English gentlemen, and his idea of the way to command was to keep on commanding. Yet without the attributes of a commander, a man may be a resolute, faithful, heroic soldier; and that surely is the kind of glory-it is glory of no mean kind-which can best be claimed for Lord Cardigan. In despite of all the faults which he had manifested

to the world when appointed to the command of the Light Brigade, there still remained good grounds for trusting that, as long as he should be acting in the performance of what he might clearly understand to be his duty, he would perform it with precision, with valour, and, if need be, with unsparing devotion." (Vol. iv. p. 62-65.) He was fifty-seven years of age.

Neither Lord Lucan nor Lord Cardigan had ever before exercised any command in war, or led British soldiers in action.

Such was the stage and such the characters of some of the principal actors in the scene about to begin.

Liprandi, by Prince Mentschikoff's orders, now undertook a movement into the Balaklava plain. After carefully considering the position of the Allies, he determined to seize upon the outer line of defence, and that won, to gain if possible the camp of the 93d Highlanders, and that of the Turks near Kadiköi. Of course, if any opportunity offered for carrying Balaklava, the attack might be pushed home; but the overhanging position of the French on the edge of the plateau, and the power the Allies possessed of operating from thence on his flank and rear, did not render this likely.

With this object he divided his infantry into three columns. The central column, under General Semiakine, crossing the Tchernaya at the foot of Mount Hasfort, was to advance direct on Canrobert's Hill and the redoubt next to it: it consisted of eight battalions and twenty guns. The left column, under General Gribbé, was to move into the south valley by the Baidar road, seize the heights of Kamara, and from thence co-operate in the attack on Canrobert's Hill: it was formed of three battalions, a squadron, and ten guns. The right column, under Colonel Scudery, passing the Tchernaya at Tractir bridge, was to cross the north valley and attack the second redoubt

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