Mr. LEYDEN. I Would cite as a specific example the futility that I did in my testimony, sir, that it is, as far as my experience as chairman of the negotiating team for the past 2 years, an exercise in futility, and I think maybe general counsel might want to address himself to that. Mr. PEER. Mr. Chairman, the statistics which are offered are often offered by a partisan. We suggested in this instance, as a perfect example of how you can turn statistics around and use them for your own parochial interest-and as Mr. Leyden has indicated, the low percentage here is subject to varying interpretations, and we interpret the low percentages because unions see this as a total, complete exercise in futility. Mr. HENDERSON. I believe the staff has prepared other questions and I would ask that they submit them to you and your staff for response and inclusion in the record, but I certainly would like to just take a minute to ask if you would comment on your experience with Public Law 92-297 which this committee, as you know, reported and became law in the last Congress. Do you have any problems with that legislation? Mr. LEYDEN. I'd like to just preface my remarks by complimenting you, as part of that committee, and the Congress in its entirety for passing that legislation. It was the most monumental piece of legislation that the people I'm associated with have been beneficiaries of in my time. And because of the diligence of the staff people who are overlooking and overseeing the problems that we are encountering because it is new legislation, we have been able to resolve most of the problems that came up during the first 2 years. But it has been one of the few rewarding experiences with our relationship with FAA and I think it's specifically because of Congress' overriding concern and influence in this area. That legislation has worked out very well. Mr. HENDERSON. I certainly think you and your organization should be commended for the efforts that you made and I would hope that from time to time you would feel free to pass along to the committee if you do see problems arising. I think that any statement that you would make with regards to the effectiveness of the legislation, any comments that you might want to make with regards to the benefits that are actually accrued as related to the costs would be appreciated. I have some small inkling that the costs are perhaps higher than we anticipated and that unless we took case-by-case studies to show what did actually happen under the bill we might have some difficulty making a full judgment. But obviously, this does not in any way affect by basic support of that legislation and I thought that it was good and I'm glad to have your response on this. I just hope that in the administration of the bill the benefits will be such both to FAA and to the controllers that there will be no questions raised as to its full effectiveness and certainly if the legislation is not working well we would want you to be in touch with us. Let me thank you and your associates very much for your appearance here this morning and as we proceed in our deliberation and consideration not only will we pay close attention to your statement presented this morning, but certainly I anticipate we will be calling on you from time to time for assistance. Mr. LEYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HENDERSON. The subcommittee will stand adjourned. [Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] [The following information was furnished in response to questions from the subcommittee:] Q. Executive Order 11491 provides for an agency system of intra-management communication and consultation with its supervisors or supervisory associations H.R. 13, H.R. 9784, and H.R. 10700 are silent on such relationships. What are your views on the inclusion of this matter in labor-management relations legislation? How should the subject be handled? Reply PATCO is opposed to supervisory associations, per se, and to intra-management communication between management and supervisors on an organized basis. Supervisory associations, because of their close ties to management, have always received favored treatment from management. These associations have been allowed involvement in areas precluded to employee unions by the Executive Order by denying the fact that they are a labor union while performing a role identical to that played by a labor union. This chameleon-like quality affords these supervisory associations the rights of a union without the restraints that a bona-fide union must conform to. For these reasons, we are strongly opposed to allowing intra-management supervisory consultation in the form of associations. We also feel that there is no need for a provision in the proposed legislation for this purpose and support the silence of H.R. 13, H.R. 9784, and H.R. 10700 on this matter. It is difficult to imagine a situation where a supervisor, who is a member of management in many respects, would not consult and communicate with the rest of management in the course of his regular employment duties. Extra consultation on an organized basis would only prejudice and subvert the relationship between management and authentic employee unions. Q. You endorse the concept of some form of union security on page 17 of your statement. The NFFE proposed a "fair representation fee" which would serve the same purpose, but would be contingent upon an election by emplyees in the unit represented. May we have your views on this alternative? Reply PATCO opposes the proposal that union security be made contingent upon an election by the employees in the unit represented. This proposal begs the question of union security because the union is obligated to represent 2!! members of the unit and cannot elect to represent some and not all. Since our representation cannot be contingent on election, it does not seem fair to allow a "representation fee" to be contingent on any election. We do support the Canadian system of union security. There the union represents every controller in Canada and each controller pays the full rate of representation, even if he does not own a membership card. Q. In lieu of the right to strike, there appears to be a general concensus that a viable alternative is necessary, both to move negotiations forward on a timely basis and to settle negotiating impasses. An alternative suggested has been compulsory arbitration with the arbitrator free to determine the settlement or to select from the last position or offer of the parties without modification. May we have your view on the above and, additionally any other alternatives you may care to offer? Reply In lieu of the general right to strike. I feel that the next best alternative is a limited right to strike for Federal employees. This type of right to strike for would be limited by judicial action, i.e., a restraining order or injunction, if the court decides that the commencement or continuance of the strike poses a clear and present danger to the public health and safety. This right to strike could be utilized after the exclusive representative has exhausted all attempts at arbitration and there has been no satisfactory results. If this limited right to strike is not considered a viable alternative by Congress, then we would support compulsory, binding arbitration with the arbitrator free to determine a settlement from the best possible proposals on the entire gamut of negotiations of both sides. This gives the arbitrator the freedom and flexibility he needs for determination. We are opposed to the "last best offer" method because it binds the arbitrator to accept the total, absolute package of proposals last made by both parties. As stated previously, we feel the arbitrator should have the flexibility to select specific proposals without regard to when that proposal was made. Q. H.R. 13, H.R. 9784, and H.R. 10700 take varying approaches to broaden the matters and issues that are subject to negotiations between agency management and labor organizations representing Federal employees. What approaches would you suggest to broaden the scope of bargaining or labor organization participation to include regulations at the agency and Civil Service Commission levels, but not to include matters of law? Reply PATCO believes that subjects that are presently excluded from bargaining because they are matters of law, such as wages, should be subject to negotiations. This could be realized by specifically amending these laws in the proposed legislation and opening up the scope of bargaining to its fullest extent. The importance of this question can best be summed up by a quote from William J. Usery, Jr., Special Assistant to the President and Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, in a recent address to Federal executives "The reason there is little true collective bargaining in the Federal sector is because there is so little that can be bargained for. "Congress pre-empts the economic issues. Wages, pensions, medical care, vacations and holidays and insurance-all vital issues in the rest of the collective bargaining world-are determined by law. "The result, all too frequently, is a labor contract that simply restates what management will do, providing only the right to grieve should management violate its own rules." If the Committee, or Congress as a whole, considers this an impossible or unsuitable proposal, our position would be that negotiations should be allowed on all items that are not covered by statute and on those regulations implementing a statute where any question exists as to the meaning of that statute. There are numerous areas where the implementation of the statute by the agency has taken a direction substantially different from the one implied by the statute itself. Pre-implementation negotiation of the regulations would provide labor a greater sense of participation in the making of the rules governing their employment and, in the long run, would facilitate cooperation between labor and management in living under these regulations. In addition, the restraining influence of the "higher agency authority" must be abolished. There can be no faith in even a limited scope of bargaining if a parent agency, or another agency, can negate previously negotiated items by fiat. Merely widening the scope of negotiations without dealing with this problem of a "higher authority" does not assure the parties negotiating that what they have negotiated will not be overruled at a later date. Any legislation which hopes to widen the scope of bargaining must contain guidelines approximating the AgencyPrincipal relationship that is found in the Common Law if final responsibility is to be present at the bargaining table. The best mechanism for the negotiation of agency rulings or regulations, including those of the Civil Service Commission, which affect the employees of more than one agency, is the type of institution suggested by H.R. 10700, the Federal Labor Relations Board. We feel that the Board would be more impartial if the members were to be appointed by an individual other than the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and that the representation of labor and management be simplified by having a rotational representation system. A rotational system would allow only one member from any agency or union to sit on the Board for the specified time period alloted, thus giving smaller agencies and unions a chance to participate. Q. Your statement, beginning on page 8, says "management rights are an obstacle to professional input to the system." As I understand your position, you feel that unions should participate with management in technological decisions. Would you please elaborate on your views and position on this matter? Reply Our position is that employees have as much expertise and knowledge in the technical areas of their employment as management has. Employee experience should be a valuable source of input to management in these areas. Contrary to this common sense verity, management takes the position that employee organizations, the representatives of the employees and reservoirs of employee technical expertise, have no right to contribute their views in these matters; these matters are the responsibility of management and their sole prerogative. This position forestalls the productive role that employee organizations can play in improving the system. For a specific example of this problem, please refer to pp. 8-10 of John F. Leyden's statement before the Manpower Subcommittee of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee regarding H.R. 13, H.R. 9784, and H.R. 10700 on June 13, 1974. In addition, some types of federal employment, particularly air traffic control, contain a special relationship between man and machine, one in which both indispensable parts must be in perfect working order. In these cases, the employee has a much greater interest and involvement with the technical equipment with which he carries out his work. The employee is fully responsible for the serviceability of the equipment before use. The Federal Aviation Administration recognizes this situation and places the responsibility for the use of equipment squarely on the shoulders of the controller. To quote the FAA Handbooks for both en route and terminal air traffic control, FAA 7110-9C, Enroute Air Traffic Control Chapter 4, Section 1, Para. 610, and FAA 7110-8C, Terminal Air Traffic Control, Chapter 5, Section 1, Para. 1156: "PRESENTATION AND EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE "(Provide radar service only if you are personally satisfied that the radar presentation and equipment performance is adequate for the service being performed.)" It is this responsibility which necessitates an unusual amount of knowledge and understanding concerning technical matters on the part of the controller and any other employee faced with this situation. The present implementation of Radar Data Processing equipment is a case in point. The FAA, having spent a few hundred million dollars on developing the system, is now forced to rush the system into operation because of past political and budgetary commitments. Not only is the system still imperfect, but the employees, who must first judge the adequacy of the equipment and then utilize it, the controllers, do not fully understand how this complex, computerized system works. When do working conditions become technical matters? At present, the answer lies with the discretion of management. For management to exclude employee input from technical matters while forcing the employee to be responsible for the implementation of that piece of equipment is contradictory at best and dangerous to the public and the employee at worst. FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION TUESDAY, JULY 16, 1974 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 9:30 a.m., in room 210 of the Cannon House Office Building, Hon. David N. Henderson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. HENDERSON. This morning we are continuing our hearings on pending legislation regarding labor management relations in the Federal service. The testimony we have heard thus far from the administration and labor organizations has sharpened our focus on the critical issues facing us as we consider this significant legislation. Our hearings today and those scheduled for July 25 will provide the subcommittee with testimony on some remaining important issues that must be faced as we shape the legislation before us. With us this morning we have Mr. Frederick Walker with the Plymouth Brethren No. 4 of New York City, Mr. James Hill, representing the National Federation of Professional Organizations, Mr. Reed Larson of the National Right to Work Committee, and Mr. William Kraham of the National Association of Air Traffic Specialists. Before our witnesses begin this morning, I would like to ask unanimous consent that the statements received by the subcommittee from organizations representing vital interests in this legislation be inserted at an appropriate point in the record of these hearings. At the outset of these hearings, I indicated that the record would be open to include statements from organizations that would not be able to testify. Before each member this morning are statements received from the National Association of Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service County Employees, the National Labor Management Foundation, and the Joint Council of Unions at the Government Printing Office. Also, in conjunction with the testimony of the National Treasury Employees Union, Mr. Vincent Connery, the national president, submitted a position paper on labor management relations which should appear in the record following their testimony. Without objection, the statements will appear as part of the record at the appropriate point. (369) |