book examining all the thousands of agreements they referred to and try to apply this rule specifically to them, but I am quite confident in that general statement I have answered any argument that they can bring forth.

Now, I would like to go into another subject that has been emphasized here. That is in the field of atomic energy.

In the vitally important field of international arrangements and legislation to protect this country from mass destruction by atomic weapons, Congress, on the absence of treaties, passed the Atomic Energy Act of August 1, 1946. The act established an Atomic Energy Commission to control the production and development of atomic energy in the United States.

The act declared the public policy of the people of this country to be, to provide for the common defense and security, to improve the public welfare, and to promote world peace.

It is specifically provided that the administration of the act shall be consistent with the foregoing policies "and with international arrangements made by the United States."

An international arrangement is defined by the act to mean "any treaty approved by the Senate or international agreement approved by the Congress."

Senator WATKINS. May I ask a question at this point?

Could not the United States enter into an executive agreement in view of this statement covering international control or inspection of atomic weapons?

Mr. FINCH. I could not answer that offhand, Senator. I should not like to commit myself offhand. I am answering the argument now that we could not enter into any treaty arrangement if you adopted our amendment without the consent of the 48 States of the Union. Senator WATKINS. It seemed to me that agreements in respect of atomic energy are of such importance they ought to be made the subject of treaty.

Mr. FINCH. I should not think the President would want to enter into a treaty of this character without Senate agreement. You would have to read the whole act and see.

I should think he would not have that authority if there were not some authority given to him in the act.

Senator WATKINS. The question becomes a very practical one when you consider the suggestions made by Mr. Baruch and by our own groups with respect to the control of atomic energy on an international basis and the Russian proposals.

I took it for granted the way they were proceeding at that time, they did not intend to submit it as a treaty even if they arrived at some arrangement with the Soviet Government.

They probably would make it an executive agreement and let it go at that.

Mr. FINCH. I should think the last quotation which I made would prevent the President from doing it by executive agreement on his own authority alone, because the last sentence I read in the act means: Any treaty approved by the Senate or international agreement approved by Congress.

It says nothing about an agreement by the President. ·

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I should think the inclusion of those terms would exclude any idea that the President himself would act without approval of the Congress. Senator WATKINS. You remember the public discussion on that and the statement by the Russians and ourselves indicated very clearly they were not considering it a matter of treaty, but probably some executive agreement arrangement.

Mr. FINCH. I should think in view of the act of Congress, in the absence of treaty defining the authority in this subject, the President would be bound by that act.

Senator WATKINS. What if the United Nations made that agreement?

Mr. FINCH. The United Nations has no legislative authority at all binding on the people of any of its members. It has no legislative authority at all.

That is why we had all this discussion about the Treaty on Human Rights, recognizing that the declaration by the United Nations had no authority within the jurisdiction of a constituent member of the United Nations, and in order to make that declaration binding on the United States as law, it was sought to take certain provisions from that world declaration and incorporate them in a treaty.

We all heard the other day Mr. Dulles saying that this administration did not intend to do that.

Senator WATKINS. With respect to certain treaties, but he may have his fingers crossed with respect to some others that he favors.

Mr. FINCH. The United Nations itself cannot by any declaration or resolution or draft treaty make law within the United States. When they do try to do it, it is through the treaty method because of our peculiar provision of our Constitution.

What we are trying to do now is to plug that gap so they cannot do it that way and would be obliged to resort to legislation by the whole Congress.

Now, after quoting this Atomic Energy Act, here is a declaration by Congress of its legislative power to implement international arrangements concerning the control of atomic energy either under the treaty or in the absence of a treaty.

Congress did not wait until we had a treaty on atomic energy before it passed legislation on the subject. It had already done it, and those who argue that this amendment will affect that are simply ignoring the facts in the case.

Consequently, it cannot be successfully maintained that the Nation's safety would be endangered by the adoption of the American Bar Association constitutional amendment.

Congress would clearly have the power to pass legislation to implement effective international inspection to guarantee that there would be no violation of disarmament terms and conditions.

I refer you to the statement of former Solicitor General Perlman made before this committee on March 4. In his statement Mr. Perlman called attention to a report opposing Senate Joint Resolution 1 made to the house of delegates of the American Bar Association at its midwinter meeting in Chicago, February 23 and 24 of this year, by the section of international and comparative law.

I am a member of that section and had no knowledge of the report referred to. I doubt whether many other members saw it before its presentation. Members of the committee on peace and law through

United Nations who were present at the Chicago meeting have informed me that the section's report was received on condition that it would have no prejudicial effect on the previous approval by the house of delegates of the constitutional amendment proposed by the American Bar Association.

No objection was raised in the House to the adoption of that motion. A joint committee of Congress was established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to make recommendations to Congress for further legislation.

If we ever have a treaty on atomic energy, such as those we have been talking about, it will be the duty of this joint committee of Congress to examine that treaty.

Senator BRICKER. It will be the duty of the Senate Members to examine that treaty.

Mr. FINCH. Yes, and to make recommendations to the Congress. But you would not need the treaty to pass legislation on atomic energy; you have already done it.

Why would people come here and say this amendment would stop you from doing something which you have already done?

Mr. SMITHEY. You speak of international inspection. What about ownership of the mines and the licensing of the use of atomic energy for peaceful pursuits by an international commission?

Mr. FINCH. I am glad to say that has been abandoned. I should think that would be another subject, and I think the objections to it were so strong that the Federal Government abandoned it.

That was in the first proposal known as the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal. They wanted to set up an atomic-development authority of, I think they said, 15 members, which would be supernational in function and jurisdiction.

Senator SMITH. In other words, that would be part of the world government?

Mr. FINCH. Yes. That is what the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal would have done. They would have deprived even the Congress of the United States of any authority in the matter, and it would have passed the ownership of the lands in the United States, which contained uranium, into the hands of an international body.

I discussed that matter with a very good friend of mine from the State of Colorado. He said, "Why, if that law were enacted, we would take away from private ownership three-fourths of the land in Colorado and vest it in an international commission."

That was so absurd I think the administration had to abandon it. But that is the line of thinking of these men who are obsessed with the idea of international government and it bears, that one, the signatures of Dean Acheson and Mr. Lilienthal.

Senator BRICKER. That is the same principle of the Baruch plan. Mr. FINCH. That was in the original plan, but I think they abandoned that.

I think all they are arguing for now is that we must have some sort of international inspection so that a treaty on atomic energy would not be a mere scrap of paper. I see no objection to that, if we agree to some form of international control of atomic energy under some law of Congress authorizing a commission of that body to come around and see that we observe the law providing safeguards are placed so that they cannot get access to secret information.

Mr. SMITHEY. Before you conclude they have abandoned that proposal, I would like to draw your attention to page 5 of the supplementary statement presented to the committee by Secretary Dulles.

Now in all fairness to Secretary Dulles, he said he had not read this, that it had been prepared by Mr. Phleger of his legal staff, but in there this statement appears on page 5:

The Baruch proposal for atomic disarmament was based on control at the source and inspection by an international agency which would possess powers over the process and ownership of atomic facilities. The United States proposed this solution for the problem created by the progress of atomic science. It met with widespread approval by the free nations, but was blocked by Soviet opposition. Section 2 of the proposed amendment referring to Senate Joint Resolution 1, if adopted, would not only prevent our advocating such a proposal; it would prevent our agreeing to such a proposal if advanced by others. I am wondering, in view of that statement, if they have abandoned

it.

Mr. FINCH. I have not followed those negotiations in detail, and if they make any such proposal as that, I am in favor of Senate Joint Resolution 1 and Senate Joint Resolution 43 stopping it. I think that would be one reason why we should adopt the amendment.

Senator WATKINS. I was going to ask you that question. Would not the adoption of either one of those proposed amendments effectively block it?

Mr. FINCH. Yes; it would effectively block turning over to a supernational atomic commission. I think we ought to have the amend

ment.

Senator BRICKER. It would not affect in any way the international relationship.

Mr. FINCH. No.

I would like to see an international agreement now say we will abandon atomic energy as it means mass destruction in war. I should think we ought to be willing to have some system of international inspection to see that not only we carry it out, but that Russia carries it out.

Russia has been the one objecting to that.

Senator WATKINS. Could it be possible, looking from the other nation's point of view, that is one of the reasons why Russia objected to such a proposal?

Mr. FINCH. I think so.

Senator WATKINS. Whatever provision we might have had with respect to the complete control of atomic-energy sources in this country would have been the same thing in Russia?

Mr. FINCH. That is right.

We want inspection primarily because we want to go over to Russia to see that they are living up to that treaty.

As I understand the subject, the development of atomic energy goes up to a certain point where it is useful for peaceful purposes. We do not want to stop that, but if you go beyond that point, you get into the area of using it for explosive purposes, and that is what they want to stop.

That can be controlled by inspection to see that your plants are not built for the purpose of going beyond that point for peaceful pur

poses.

Mr. SMITHEY. Before we leave this question of whether the administration has abandoned the portions of the atomic-energy proposals

relating to land ownership, mine ownership, and the licensing of atomic energy for peaceful pursuits, let me draw your attention to page 25 of the statement before this committee by the Attorney General last Tuesday:

One cannot help but speculate upon what such a constitutional amendment will do

And there he refers to Senate Joint Resolution 1 again—

to any effort of the United States to achieve genuine international control in important fields relating to peace and safety of the world. For example, the United States proposal of 1945, rejected by the Soviet Union, of an international agency for the control and development of atomic energy included broad powers in the international agency for the management and ownership of all atomic activity potentially dangerous to world security as well as power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities.

Mr. FINCH. I would simply answer in the same vein I have already stated, if that is the present contention of this administration, I think that is an additional reason why we should adopt the amendment.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have dealt on page 16 with the question of an international criminal court. I covered that yesterday. Instead of going over that again, I would like to submit for the record another article which I wrote covering that subject very comprehensively in the American Bar Association Journal for August 1952.

In that journal Judge Parker, who is for the international criminal court, gives his reasons why we should have it, followed by an article by me why we should not have it.

The CHAIRMAN. We will see that that is printed in full.
Senator SMITH. Both articles are going in?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; right at this point in his remarks.
(The material referred to follows:)

AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE CASE FOR ITS ADOPTION

(By John J. Parker, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit)

(In this issue of the Journal, we publish two opposing views on the proposed draft statute for an international criminal court. The draft statute, which was drawn last year by a committee appointed by the General Assembly of the United Nations under the chairmanship of George Maurice Morris, former President of the American Bar Association, is hailed below by Judge Parker as a great forward step in the establishment of law in international affairs. On page 644, George A. Finch, editor in chief of the American Journal of International Law, presents the case for those who fear that creation of an international criminal court is a serious menace to the rights of American citizens, guaranteed by the Constitution. At the midyear meeting, the house of delegates voted to take no action on the proposal at this time.)

A great step forward in the development of international law was taken when the Committee on International Jurisdiction appointed by the General Assembly of the United Nations met in Geneva in August 1951 and agreed upon a draft statute for the creation of an international criminal court. It should be a matter of pride to the lawyers of this country that George Maurice Morris, of the District of Columbia, a former president of the American Bar Association, was chosen to act as chairman of the commission and that under his virile leadership agreement was reached upon the terms of a statute which should be highly satisfactory to those who believe in the reign of law in the world community. As the commission met, there were those who were saying that it was impossible to create a court of this character. The draft statute is a triumph of American leadership in a delicate area of international affairs and one which will mean much to the future peace of the world if it is given the support which it deserves by the people of this country.