world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned."* "In Adam all died." When mention is made of the first and second Adam, and the one is called the figure of the other, there must be a resemblance between them; and in what does it consist? In every respect but one, they are dissimilar. "The first man was of the earth, earthy; the second man is the Lord from heaven." The first man entailed guilt and death as the fatal inheritance of his children; the Second Man communicates righteousness and life. The contrast is stated at considerable length by Paul, in the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. But the first Adam was a figure of the second, if he was a public person, a federal head. On this supposition we perceive the resemblance; but it fails if there was no covenant with our great progenitor, and the words of Scripture convey a false idea. Jesus Christ, who was the Surety of sinners, might be with propriety called the Second Adam, if the first Adam was the representative of his seed; but if there is no legal relation between him and them, the appellation is not founded on truth.

I have endeavoured to prove the fact, but I do not pretend fully to explain it. President Edwards, in his book on Original Sin, which is an admirable work, and one of the ablest and most triumphant refutations of error which is to be found in our language, in answering the objection, that to deal with Adam and his posterity as one, was to act contrarily to truth, because they were not one but distinct, enters into a long dissertation upon the subject of identity. He shows that the identity of creatures is not an absolute, independent identity, like that of the Creator, who is the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever, but a dependent identity founded on an arbitrary constitution. It is owing to this constitution, that an old tree is the same with the seedling which sprung from the soil some hundred years before, and that the human body, which undergoes innumerable changes, is the same in old age and in infancy. To the same cause we must attribute the identity of all created beings, for they do not exist now, because they existed the last moment, as if nature went on in its course mechanically, or by its intrinsic power; but their preservation is equivalent to a continued creation. In the same way we explain the identity of the soul, and its uninterrupted consciousness; it being impossible to assign any satisfactory reason, why a man is conscious that he is the being that he was forty years ago, but the divine constitution. The conclusion which he draws from these premises is, that the objection, which maintains that to consider Adam and his posterity as one was contrary to truth, is built upon a false hypothesis; because it is a divine constitution, which makes truth in all matters of identity. But, with the leave of this great man, the cases are not analogous. In the case of created beings in general, identity is their continued existence; but in the case before us, it is the conjunction of separate beings by a legal union, which affects their moral state and final destiny. It is evidently a different thing to prolong the existence of a creature, and give it a consciousness of being the same at successive periods, from the connecting of many individuals together, so as to identify their actions and interests. The one is a physical, and the other a moral union, and therefore the one does not serve in any degree to illustrate the other. The difficulty remains as it was. The question is not about the power, but about the justice of God, not what he could do, but what it was consistent with his character to do; and the result of this metaphysical inquiry into identity is to prove, what we understood as well before, that the oneness of Adam and his posterity was founded on the will of God. What we wish to know is, how this constitution can be reconciled with his righteousness and goodness; but it throws no light upon this subject to inform us, that the power which established identity in natural † 1 Cor. xv. 22. + Ib. 47.

• Rom. v. 12.

things, so associated Adam and his seed that they were to stand or to fall together. When we are asking, whether it was right in God to do so, we cannot be satisfied by being told that he was able to do it. It is undoubtedly enough that God has willed any thing, because it is certain, that he never wills what is unwise or unjust; but when our reasonings end in this point, we have unquestionably failed, if we set out with a professed design to solve the objections of infidelity, and to settle the wavering judgment on the basis of conviction.

The condition of the covenant was obedience to the law under which man was placed, and it is called the condition, because his right to the enjoyment of life was suspended upon it. The only precept mentioned in the narrative of Moses, is that which relates to the tree of knowledge. If he abstained from its fruit he should live, if he tasted it he should die. But if we consider, that the positive precept was given merely to make trial of Adam, we shall be convinced that his obedience was not limited to it, or, in other words, that it was not the only duty enjoined upon him. The moral law was not suspended, and this new precept substituted in its room, so that, in all other respects, he was for a time at liberty to do what he pleased. That law is immutable in its obligations, being founded on the nature and relations of God and man; and it is impossible, therefore, that a creature should, by any dispensation, be exempted from its authority for a single moment. It was written upon the heart of man at his creation, and remained there under this new arrangement, in characters as distinct and impressive as ever. But the precept concerning the tree of knowledge was properly the condition, because it was by it that man's respect to the authority which had enacted the whole law was to be tried. I shall not repeat what was formerly said concerning its fitness to answer the design. Adam was considered as a subject of the Divine government, and as a holy creature capable of performing any duty which his Maker should be pleased to enjoin. He possessed in full vigour the principle of obedience, and would not feel any duty to be burdensome, and still less one so easy in performance. It has been asked, Would the covenant have been broken by the transgression of any other precept of the law? We must answer in the affirmative, if the design of the positive precept was, to make trial of the obedience of Adam, for he would have been equally unworthy of happiness, and deserving of punishment, if he had renounced the authority of God in any other instance. The alienation of his heart from God would have been the same. The positive precept was not more sacred than the other precepts of the law. There is no sufficient ground for a positive affirmation; but it is possible, that this was the only precept in respect of which Adam was in danger of failing. As it was the proposed test of his obedience, it might be that here only he was left to himself. It is easy to conceive the Divine power to have guarded him against transgressing in any other matter. There is no absurdity in supposing that, while he was vulnerable in this point, he was defended every where else, against the assaults of the enemy; and that in this manner it was secured, that the precept relative to the tree of knowledge should prove, what it seems to have been intended to be, the only test of his allegiance to his Creator. This was the only particular about which there might arise a contest of his will with the will of God. I merely throw out this hint for consideration; but, if there is any truth in it, we get rid of the curious but useless inquiry, What would have been the consequence, if Adam had religiously abstained from the forbidden fruit, but had committed some other transgression?

In some systems, the condition of the covenant is said to have been perfect, personal, and perpetual obedience; but this statement is far from being accurate. I do not deny, that it required perfect obedience in the sense already explained. The whole law was concentrated in a single positive precept,

which put to the proof the principle upon which all obedience depends, profound submission to the authority of the Lawgiver; but if perfect is here used to signify universal in extent, as well as pure in motive, the obedience prescribed in the covenant was only perfect constructively. Adam had not to go through a course of all the duties, but to evince that he was ready to perform them as opportunity should occur, by attending to this particular duty. I grant also, that the obedience was personal, or, in other words, was to be performed by himself; but as no doubt ever did, or ever could, arise in any mind upon this point, it was altogether unnecessary to mention it. This is a truism; we cannot controvert it, but we deem it unworthy of notice, because it does not convey one particle of information. No person ever dreamed that Adam might have employed a substitute, or that he might have performed one part, and committed what remained to another. It is superfluous to say, that the condition was personal obedience. I deny also that it was perpetual obedience. The period of probation was not to be commensurate with his existence, nor indefinitely extended; there was a time fixed when the trial would end, and the reward would be conferred. To say that the obedience was to be perpetual, is contrary to the nature of a covenant, for in every transaction of this kind it is implied, that, when the stipulated service is finished, the promise will be fulfilled. But, when the term perpetual comes to be explained, we find that it does not signify perpetual, but temporary, and is employed to teach us that Adam was to continue to obey till the trial was ended. But why is a word used, which suggests an idea contrary to truth, and different from what the speaker or writer intended? Why should that be called perpetual, which would have probably terminated in a few days or weeks? Besides, if the meaning is, that man was bound to obey during the term prescribed, this notion is implied in the word perfect, for that obedience only is perfect which is sustained as long as the obligation to perform it lasts. Here then, we have an instance of repetition, under the name of distinction.

I have dwelt longer upon this account of the condition of the covenant than was perhaps necessary, because it is frequently met with, and may be adopted without examination. The words perfect, personal, and perpetual, have been sounded in our ears from our infancy, and we may repeat them without stopping to inquire, whether they have been selected with judgment, and give a true representation of the case.

Obedience was previously due by our first parent to his Maker, upon whom he was physically and morally dependent. It is implied in the just conception of a creature, that, as he holds life and all his faculties from his Creator, he is bound to live for him alone; and that, after having done all that is possible with his powers and in his circumstances, he is an unprofitable servant. His Creator has gained nothing by his services, and consequently owes him no recompence. Hence it appears that, in the actions of a perfect human being, there could be no intrinsic merit; that no claim could be founded on the real value of the actions; that there was no proportion between their worth and a reward, which it behoved justice to recognise. They therefore greatly err, who maintain, that the obedience of Adam would on its own account have entitled him to happiness. The merit of condignity, as it has been called, exists only in the dreams of Papists, and men like them, who forget that God cannot become a debtor to his creatures, but in consequence of his free and gracious engagement. But there may be such a thing as pactional or conventional merit, that is, merit arising not from the natural worth of the actions of creatures, but from a voluntary stipulation, by which God, independent and all-sufficient, has agreed to consider their obedience as a reason why he should bestow new benefits upon them. This was the only merit of which Adam was capable. God put it in his power to acquire a conventional right to life.

If he had performed the condition, he might have claimed it, not with the bold ness which one man may use in demanding the fulfilment of a bargain, by anoti.er, because he has law and justice on his side, but with an humble sense that in himself he deserved nothing, yet with full confidence in the Divine faithfulness and goodness. There would have been no ground for self-gratulation or exultation; but there would have been ground for admiring and praising the liberality of his Maker, who had bestowed an immense reward for services which he might have exacted without making any return; and here we should remember and apply the words of the Apostle, "If Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God."* In his presence, they who never sinned, as well as they who have been redeemed by grace, must cast down their crowns, and acknowledge that they have nothing but what they have received.

The obedience of Adam would have been considered as virtually the obedience of his posterity, for he would have performed it, not in a private, but in a public capacity. I do not mean, that God would have viewed his posterity as having actually obeyed, any more than that, when he justifies believers in Christ, he views them as having personally fulfilled the righteousness of the law. But what had been done by the common representative of the human race, would have been reckoned or imputed to them; so that, by the same act, their happiness and his would have been secured. If God had said to him, “Live, for thou hast faithfully obeyed my command," he would have said at the same time, "All thy descendants shall live." They would have come into existence pure and happy, and would have continued in this state without danger, or the possibility of a change. But, let it not be supposed, that they would have been released from an obligation to personal obedience. Adam himself would not have been released from it. All men would have been bound to fulfil the will of God throughout their whole duration; but obedience would not have been the condition on which their hopes were suspended. It would have been the willing and affectionate recognition of his authority, and an expression of their gratitude for his infinite goodness, in giving them existence, and making it blessed.

LECTURE XLVI.

ON THE FALL OF MAN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

Penalty of the Covenant of Works, Death, Temporal, Spiritual, and Eternal-Promise of the Covenant-Seals of the Covenant.

HAVING considered the parties in the covenant, and the condition, I should proceed to the promise, which is next in the natural order, and is the only part remaining to complete a federal transaction. A penalty, I formerly remarked, is not essential, as covenants may be conceived, and are sometimes made, the violation of which terminates simply in their abrogation; but in the present case, it arose from the nature of things, it being impossible that, if man transgressed the law of his Creator, and a law which he had come under a voluntary obligation to obey, he should be permitted to escape with impunity. As the promise is not mentioned in the original transaction, and is in. Rom. iv. 2.

Vor I-59

ferred from the penalty, it will be proper to begin with the latter: "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die."

The literal sense of this denunciation is so obvious, that one should have thought it impossible that there could be any dispute about it; but the perverseness of man has endeavoured to perplex every principle of religion, and has controverted, not only points which are obscure and mysterious, but the plainest declarations. If words can have a definite meaning, these import that the death of the body was to be the penalty of transgression; but this has been denied. Pelagius, who rejected the doctrine of original sin, and held that the fall of Adam affected himself alone, found it necessary to reconcile the prevalence of death among his descendants with his system; and hence he maintained, that even to Adam, death was not a punishment, but a natural effect resulting from his constitution. In other words, he was mortal from the beginning. He is represented by his contemporaries as having said, that Adam would have died, whether he had sinned or had not sinned, and that he died by a necessity of nature. Socinians, who have introduced almost every heresy into their creed, have adopted this opinion of Pelagius; "All die by Adam," says the founder of the sect, "because he was mortal; and for this reason, those who are born of him must also be mortal. The first man was taken from the earth, and was therefore earthy. This happened before the fall, and, therefore, before the fall his body was, by its own nature, liable to dissolution. Before he sinned, he had a body corruptible, vile, and infirm." Human impudence cannot well go farther than, in this bold and undisguised manner, to contradict the express declaration of Scripture. When a person ventures to deny what is self-evident, we are at a loss how to proceed; whether to reply to him, or to treat him with silent contempt. It may be sufficient, in the present case, to repeat the words of God to Adam, without quoting other passages in confirmation of their meaning: "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." Can any thing be plainer, than that, if he did not eat, he should not die? Can we suppose, that God threatened as a consequence of transgression, what would take place in the course of nature? that Adam was deterred from disobedience, by the annunciation of an event which would befal him, although he performed his duty? If men will make themselves ridiculous, by venting opinions stamped with folly and absurdity, let them beware of exposing their Maker to contempt.

Arminians admit, that temporal death was, in a certain sense, the consequence of sin; when Adam fell, he was laid under the necessity of dying. They hold, however, that his body was naturally frail and mortal; but that he would have continued to live, if he had obeyed his Creator. They choose to say, that we were laid under the necessity of dying, to intimate that he was not made mortal by sin, having been so from the beginning; but that after he sinned, death, which he would have escaped, if he had acted a dutiful part, was unavoidable. Upon this hypothesis, death cannot be strictly called a penalty, or new evil which owed its existence to sin, for Adam was naturally subject to it; but it assumed the form of a penalty, by being denounced as what would certainly take place, in case of disobedience. In a word, this is a proper commentary upon the threatening. Thou art mortal by thy original constitution. I will prolong thy life, if thou retain thy integrity; but if thou transgress, the law of thy nature will be permitted to operate, and thou shalt return to the dust from whence thou wast taken.' It is sufficient to say, that for this opinion there is not the slightest foundation in Scripture; that it is contrary to the natural import of the threatening, which suggests, that the evil denounced was a thing to which man was not previously liable; and that it differs from the sentiments which have been entertained by christians in general, and by the Jews, if we may judge from the words of one of their ancient