man, of which he is sovereign master, so that he may will or not will as he pleases, we deny. "My counsel," says God, "shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure."* But he could not speak so, if his counsel depended upon a condition which might not be performed. He might desire the event for his own glory or the good of his creatures, and take measures to accomplish it; but, as the ultimate determination depended upon the human will, over which he had no control, it would be uncertain till the moment arrived what the issue would be. He might wish to save a particular person; but, as that person might believe or not believe, it could not be known beforehand how he would act, and the design of God with respect to him might be frustrated. If you assert conditional decrees, you must suppose that God is ignorant of the result, that the event is not in his power, or that he has determined nothing concerning it, and has left it to chance. But "known unto him are all his works from the beginning of the world." It is evident that they could not be known, if they had not been unconditionally decreed; because, on the contrary supposition, they would be the objects, not of knowledge, but of conjecture. "He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." But this could not be, if the will of his creatures sometimes counteracted his will, if the execution of his purposes was suspended upon a co-operation which it was in their power to withhold. It will be shewn afterwards, that those acts of the human will, upon which his decrees are supposed to be suspended, are under his direction, and are comprehended in his decrees; which, as we have already observed, while they appointed the end, also provided the means.

ture.

Here we come to a question which has engaged the attention, and exercised the ingenuity, and perplexed the wits of men in every age. If God has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, the whole series of events is necessary, and human liberty is taken away. Men are passive instruments in the hands of their Maker; they can do nothing but what they are secretly and irresistibly influenced to do; they are not, therefore, responsible for their actions; and God is the Author of sin. To this objection it is replied, that the divine decree is extrinsic to the human mind; that it exerts no force or influence upon our faculties; and that, while it insures the futurition of events, it leaves them to be accomplished in the exercise of our liberty. While it determines that some things should be brought to pass necessarily, it determines that other things should be brought to pass freely. God has decreed, not only that men should act, but that they should act freely, and agreeably to their rational naHe determined the act; but men being free agents, it was possible, in respect of their liberty abstractly considered, that they might act differently. When, however, you have reflected upon this answer, and stripped it of its technical form, you will find that it amounts to nothing. It just says, that, notwithstanding the decree of God, man retains his liberty of action; and, consequently, puts us off with an assertion under the pretext of giving us an explanation. Believing that all things are immutably fixed in the divine counsels, we wish to know how the predetermination is consistent with liberty. To what purpose is it to tell us, that God has decreed that some things shall take place necessarily, and other things freely? What information does this answer give us? what doubt does it solve? Still the question remains, How can those actions be free, which were so fixed that they could not be avoided? It is a more intelligible method to explain the subject by the doctrine, which makes liberty consist in the power of acting according to the prevailing inclination, or the motive which appears strongest to the mind. Those actions are free which are the effect of volition. In whatever manner the state of mind which gave rise to the volition has been produced, the liberty of the agent is neither greater nor less. It is his will alone which is to be considered, and * Isa. xlvi. 10. † Acts xv. 18.. + Eph. i. 11.

not the means by which it has been determined. If God fore-ordained certain actions, and placed men in such circumstances that the actions would certainly take place agreeably to the laws of the mind, men are nevertheless moral agents, because they act voluntarily, and are responsible for the actions which consent has made their own. Liberty does not consist in the power of acting or not acting, but in acting from choice. The choice is determined by something in the mind itself, or by something external influencing the mind; but, whatever is the cause, the choice makes the action free, and the agent accountable. If this definition of liberty be admitted, you will perceive that it is possible to reconcile the freedom of the will with absolute decrees; but we have not got rid of every difficulty. By this theory, human actions appear to be as necessary as the motions of matter according to the laws of gravitation and attraction; and man seems to be a machine, conscious of his movements, and consenting to them, but impelled by something different from himself.

Upon such a subject, no man should be ashamed to acknowledge his ignorance. We are not required to reconcile the divine decrees and human liberty. It is enough to know that God has decreed all things which come to pass, and that men are answerable for their actions. Of both these truths we are assured by the Scriptures; and the latter is confirmed by the testimony of conscience. We feel that, although not independent upon God, we are free; so that we excuse ourselves when we have done our duty, and accuse ourselves when we have neglected it. Sentiments of approbation and disapprobation in reference to our own conduct or that of other men, would have no existence in our minds if we believed that men are necessary agents. But the tie which connects the divine decrees and human liberty is invisible. "Such knowledge is too wonderful for us; it is high, we cannot attain unto it." If every thing in religion were level to the comprehension of reason, there would be no room for faith. It is better to believe humbly, than to reason presumptuously. And presumptuous all those reasonings may be called, which lead to the denial of the immutability of the divine counsels, or of the freedom of the human will; which make man a machine, and God the author of sin. It is worthy of attention, that the great objection against unconditional decrees, that they are inconsistent with the liberty of action, is not removed by denying them, if it be granted at the same time, that our actions are foreknown. The foreknowledge of God is not conjecture, or probable calculation, but distinct and infallible prevision of future events. Whatever is the foundation of his foreknowledge, what he does foreknow will undoubtedly take place. Here, then, the actions of men are as unalterably fixed from eternity, as if they had been the subject of an immutable decree. I would ask, therefore, how they are more free in one case than in the other? Absolute decrees are objected to because they render human actions necessary; that is, having been fore-ordained, they must take place, and cannot be avoided. But there is the same strong necessity, in consequence of fore-knowledge. Actions which were certainly foreknown, will certainly take place; and it is as impossible to avoid them, as it is to pluck the sun from the firmament. Thus, in endeavouring to escape one difficulty, we run into another equally formidable. Incidit in Scyllam, qui vult vitare Charybdim.

The rejection of absolute decrees is intended to pave the way for the establishment of that kind of liberty which consists in the self-determining power of the will, or is the consequence of the admission of such liberty. Arminians maintain, that after all motives have been presented to his mind, a man retains the power of complying with them or resisting them, that the will remains in a state of indifference, and inclines to the one side or the other by its own sovereign choice. Absolute decrees overturn this notion of liberty • Psalm cxxxix. 6.

from the foundation. It is evident that actions are not contingent; that is, it is not true that they may or may not be, if they are predetermined. But it is equally evident that they are not contingent, if they are foreknown. If God foresees that an event will take place, its future existence is necessary; that is, it is impossible that it should not take place. It was certain from all eternity that a good man would perform a virtuous action yesterday, as it is now certain that he did perform it. How, then, could that action be subject to the arbitrary decision of his will? How could it still be equally possible that he might or might not perform it? On the supposition of simple fore-knowledge, even without any positive decree, the Arminian notion of liberty falls to the ground. It were well if the abettors of this system would consider, that the consequences, with which they charge the doctrine of absolute decrees, arise equally from their own doctrine of fore-knowledge. The objection, that they necessitate human actions, would cease to alarm them, and their minds would be disposed to assent to the doctrine of our Church, that "God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass.'

LECTURE XXXV.

ON PREDESTINATION.

Predestination defined-Systems of the Supralapsarians, Sublapsarians, and Arminians-Decree of Election-Its Eternity, Sovereignty, and Immutability-Its connexion with the Mediation of Christ-This Decree not the Rule of human conduct.

THE preceding Lecture was devoted to the consideration of the decrees of God. I endeavoured to prove that there are Divine decrees, or that God has fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass, and to illustrate their properties or distinguishing characters. I shall now proceed to speak more particularly of those decrees which relate to his intelligent creatures.

They are commonly comprehended under the general title of Predestination. It is applicable, indeed, according to the import of the term, to all the purposes of God which determine beforehand what is to come to pass; but it is usually limited to those purposes of which the spiritual and eternal state of man is the object. It is evident from reason, that the Divine decrees relate also to angels, and it is inferred from that passage of Scripture in which the elect angels are mentioned. As they were created by the power of God, so it was not without an act of his will that some of them stood, and others were permitted to fall. We cannot suppose the angelical order to have been left out of his plan, any more than the human race, or created will to have acted with more independence and sovereignty in the one case than in the other. But, as the Scriptures have said little on this subject, we should have no assistance in pursuing the inquiry but the feeble light of our own minds, and should be encumbered by greater difficulties than those which attend the decrees of God in relation to man. We shall therefore pass to the consideration of the latter, on which our information is more ample, and which it is manifest are not, like the former, a subject of mere speculation; for, although the decrees are not a rule of conduct to us, they are calculated to awaken sentiments of piety, and are represented as furnishing ample grounds of admiration, gratitude, consolation and hope to believers.

The term, predestination, includes the decrees of election and reprobation. Some, indeed, confine it to election; but there seems to be no sufficient reason for not extending it to the one as well as to the other, as in both the final condition of man is pre-appointed, or predestinated. Upon a subject so abstruse, it is not wonderful that there should be a diversity of opinion, especially when, instead of implicitly acquiescing in the dictates of revelation, men begin to reason and to judge of the proceedings of an infinite Being by their own notions of wisdom and fitness. I shall lay before you a short account of the different systems which have been espoused by divines of different denominations.

The first is that of the Supralapsarians, who maintain, that, as what is last in accomplishment is first in the intention of a wise man, the object of God in his eternal decrees was the manifestation of his infinite perfections, and particularly of his mercy and justice, in the happiness of some of his creatures and the misery of others. To accomplish this design, he decreed to create man after his own image, but to place him in such circumstances that his fall would necessarily follow; to send his Son to die upon the cross for the salvation of those whom he had chosen, and to give them effectual grace to convert and sanctify them, while the rest should be delivered up to blindness and impenitence. According to this system, as the name of those by whom it is adopted imports, the Divine decrees had no respect to the fall of man, except as it was the means of executing them. Men were elected or rejected without any consideration of the fall, and were viewed by God, not as sinners, but simply as creatures. God thought only of his own glory, and all the events which take place in time, the creation of man, his apostasy, and his recovery, are so many steps in the process. While we must concede to this system the praise of consistency, by which I mean the regular disposition and close connexion of its parts, our minds revolt from the idea of such absolute sovereignty as appears in the destination of intelligent creatures to everlasting misery, not only before they had actually committed sin, but prior to the consideration of it. We startle at the thought of the destruction of immortal creatures being appointed by God, solely for the purpose of glorifying his name, and at the formal and direct introduction of sin as the fittest expedient for exhibiting him in his various characters of excellence to the admiration of the universe. We begin to grow giddy at the elevation to which we have ventured to soar. We experience a confusion of ideas, and know not well what to think. We are at a loss to determine whether justice in God be the same in kind with justice in man, and whether we should regard him as the affectionate and bountiful Parent of the human race, or as a despot, whose arbitrary will is his law, and who sports with their interests and feelings solely for his pleasure.

The Sublapsarians agree with the Supralapsarians in holding, that God has chosen some to life, and doomed others to death; that he decreed to send his Son to die for the former, and to give them his effectual grace; and that this purpose was eternal; but they differ from them with respect to the character in which the objects of his purpose were considered, affirming that they were regarded, not simply as creatures, but as sinners. God, having foreseen from all eternity that man, whom he intended to create after his own image, would fall from a state of innocence, elected some of the human race to everlasting life, and left the rest to perish in their sins. The advantage which this system proposes is, that, the objects of the decree being considered as guilty, the same objection cannot be urged against the rejection or preterition of some of them, as in the former case, where all were considered as innocent. It is alleged, indeed, by Supralapsarians, that it admits a conditional decree, predestination being founded upon the foresight of what man would do, and consequently, that it is encumbered with all the difficulties which accompany conditional decrees; or that the decree is conditional only in appearance, God having pre

viously decreed to permit man to fall. Future events cannot be foreseen, unless they be certain; they cannot be certain, unless God have determined to bring them to pass. If, then, the fall of man was certainly foreseen, it was infallibly decreed. It was fixed from eternity; it was a link in the chain of events, which was to terminate in the manifestation of the Divine glory. The Sublapsarian scheme removes no difficulty, but merely speaks in terms less offensive. It is virtually the same thing to say, that God decreed that Adam should fall, and then decreed to save some of his posterity, and leave others to perish; as to say that God first decreed to save some, and condemn others, and then, in order to accomplish this design, decreed the fall of Adam, and the whole human race in him. As both parties appear to hold the same ideas upon the subject, it does not seem to be material in what order they are arranged. Whatever truth there may be in such observations, the Sublapsarian scheme has a milder aspect; and although we cannot solve every difficulty, and reply to every objection, it seems wiser to adopt that mode of speaking on a subject so little understood, which is most consonant to our notions of the moral character of God.

The third system is that of the Arminians, or Remonstrants as they are also called, who deny absolute and unconditional decrees, and maintain, that whatever God has decreed respecting man, is founded upon the foresight of their conduct. Having foreseen without any decree, that Adam would involve himself and his posterity in sin and its consequences, he purposed to send his Son to die for them all, and to give them sufficient grace to improve the means of salvation; and knowing beforehand, who would believe and persevere to the end, and who would not, he chose the former to eternal life, and left the latter in a state of condemnation. There has been a diversity of opinion among the holders of this general system; and some of them, who have gone so far, in support of their idea of the freedom of the will, as to maintain that human actions, being contingent, cannot be certainly foreseen, have been led to affirm that the decrees of God respecting men are not eternal, but are made in time: that men are elected to eternal life after they have believed, but that, if they fall into a state of unbelief and impenitence, the sentence or decree is reversed. The doctrine of our church is so expressed, that, without putting any unnatural construction upon the words, it might be supposed to be agreeable to the Supralapsarian scheme. I refer to the third chapter of the Confession of Faith, and to the explanation of the decrees in the Larger Catechism. The Shorter Catechism may be supposed to be modelled after the Sublapsarian scheme, as the fall is mentioned before election, and election seems to be represented as an act of God, following in order the consideration of the fall We may therefore conclude, that it was not the intention of the Church to give any decision upon this controversy, and that every man is at liberty to arrange the decrees in that order which appears to him most agreeable to the language of Scripture, and to the views which it gives us of the perfections of God. And it is well, that there has been no attempt to dictate to us upon a subject so abstruse, and in a case where a difference of opinion may be held, not only with a good conscience, but without the slightest injury to the interests of piety and holiness. Supralapsarians and Sublapsarians are agreed in ascribing to God the glory of Supreme dominion and sovereign grace, and in acknowledging, that his unmerited love is the source of all our blessedness in this world, and of all that we hope to enjoy in the world to come; "for ot him, and through him, and to him, are all things.'

It will be the business of the subsequent part of this lecture, to shew that God did actually choose, before the foundation of the world, some of the human race to eternal life, and that he left the rest to perish in their sins.