plain, as that the scheme of redemption, being founded in the sovereign will of God, and the purpose which he formed before the foundation of the world, could be known only by divine communication, and by its actual execution. Whether Job speaks of it or not, the following words will admit of an easy application to it. "Where shall wisdom be found? and where is the place of understanding? Man knoweth not the price thereof; neither is it found in the land of the living. The depth saith, it is not in me; and the sea saith, it is not with me." "Whence then cometh wisdom? and where is the place of understanding? seeing it is hidden from the eyes of all living, and kept close from the fowls of the air. Destruction and death say, We have heard the fame thereof, with our ears. God understandeth the way thereof, and he knoweth the place thereof. When he made a decree for the rain, and a way for the lightning of the thunder; then did he see it, and declare it; he prepared it, yea, and searched it out. And unto men he said, Behold the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil is understanding."*

It is not my intention, in these observations upon the insufficiency of reason, to insinuate that it ought to be entirely discarded from religion. You will ask then, what purpose does it serve? and to this question I shall endeavour to return an answer in the remaining part of this lecture.

Its first office is to judge of the evidence of religion; and while thus employed, it not only collects proofs from observation and experience in favour of the doctrines of natural theology, but examines the grounds upon which any new doctrine is said to be a divine communication. As various systems of religion have claimed to proceed from this high source, it brings them to the test. There are two ways in which this inquiry may be conducted. We may compare the system which demands our assent with our prior conceptions of the divine character and will, in order to ascertain whether it harmonizes with them, because it is certain that sound reason and a genuine revelation cannot contradict each other: Or, we may consider certain circumstances, extrinsic to the revelation itself, by which its pretensions to a supernatural origin may be determined. As I have not yet spoken directly of revelation, I am rather anticipating what would have been introduced more properly afterwards; but its connexion with the preceding part of the lecture is my apology for bringing it forward at present. The external circumstances to which I allude, are the character of the publishers of the system, the nature of their testimony, and the works to which they appeal in attestation of their mission; of all which, reason is competent to judge. The doctrines of the system may be so far beyond its range, that it shall be altogether incapable of deciding upon their truth or falsehood by an abstract contemplation of them; while the marks of truth with which they are accompanied may be of easy apprehension, and carry conviction to any ordinary understanding. He who is not able, by his own researches, to discover a truth, may find no difficulty in estimating the force of the proofs by which it is supported. We do not, then, retract what has been formerly said concerning the weakness of reason in matters of religion, when we constitute it judge of its evidence, in which there is nothing mysterious, nothing which is not as plain to a common understanding, as the subjects which the mind is called upon to consider in the common course of affairs.

The second office of reason is to examine the contents of revelation, to ascertain the sense of the words and phrases in which it is expressed, to bring to the illustration of it our previous knowledge of subjects connected with it, to trace the relation of its parts, and to draw out in regular order the system of doctrines and duties which it teaches. Our intellectual powers

*Job xxviii. 12. et seq.

must be exercised with a view to obtain a distinct idea of the import of any communication which our Creator has condescended to make of his will. If we had no more understanding than the irrational animals, we should be equally incapable as they of religion; and if we did not employ our understanding in the study of it, it would be addressed to us in vain. God, having given us rational powers, requires us to exert them in the search of truth; and they are never so worthily employed as in endeavouring to acquire just notions of his character, and our relation to him; of the duty which he has enjoined upon us, and the hopes which his goodness authorizes us to entertain.

You will perceive, that the province which we have assigned to reason does not constitute it a judge of religion. It is not the doctrines of religion which we submit to its test, but the evidence. Let it canvass the evidence, and proceed to settle by the laws of criticism and common sense the genuine import of revelation; but here it should stop. "Hitherto shalt thou come, and no farther." The wisdom of God must not be tried by the foolishness of men. In the former case, reason acts as a servant: in the latter, it assumes the authority of a master. Man exchanges the character of a scholar for that of a teacher, and presumes to dictate to his Maker. I will not receive such doctrines, because I cannot conceive how they can be true; the ideas which they associate, appear to me to be contradictory. "Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?" Presumptuous mortal! the range of thy thoughts extends only to a small portion of the universe; and of the objects which lie within this limited space, there is not one of which thou hast a perfect comprehension. And yet thou speakest as if thy mind grasped all possibilities. How canst thou tell what may, or what may not be, in the infinite essence of the Creator, or what counsels are worthy of that understanding which comprehends time and eternity by one act of intuition? "Who can, by searching, find out God? who can find out the Almighty unto perfection?"* He dwells in thick darkness; and the proper posture for thee is to fall down with humility and reverence before Him, whose judgments are unsearchable, and whose ways are past finding out.

LECTURE III.

SOURCES OF THEOLOGY: REVELATION.

Revelation, the second Source of Theology-A Revelation is possible; Objections stated and refuted That it is desirable, asserted and proved from the natural Ignorance and Guilt of Mankind-Probable Character of a Divine Revelation: it should be fitted to dispel moral Ignorance; it should be authoritative; but not free from Mysteries and Difficulties.

IN the preceding lecture, I stated that there are two sources from which we may derive our knowledge of theology, reason and revelation. Reason signifies the intellectual powers of man, exercised without supernatural assistance in the investigation of religious truth. I have endeavoured to ascertain what is the amount of its discoveries; and it has appeared, that the streams which flow from this source are neither clear nor copious. I shall not now recapitulate what was said, as there will be an opportunity to revert to it in a subsequent part of the lecture.

Let us proceed to speak of the other source of theology, namely, divine

* Job xi. 7.

revelation. I begin with a definition of the term:-revelation signifies information supernaturally communicated; and according to this general definition, it comprehends not only the discovery of truths which lay beyond the range of reason, but the publication, with new evidence and lustre, of such truths as are within its reach, but of which, in its present corrupt state, it had not been able to form distinct conceptions.

The first remark which I make is, that a revelation is possible. There is no reason to doubt, that he who had imparted to man a certain degree of light, by endowing him with intellectual powers, might impart to him a higher degree by some other means. In doing so, he would only act the same part with a person of superior talents and acquirements, who should make known to his pupils, by oral instruction, certain recondite truths which their utmost efforts could not have discovered. The subject may be illustrated by another comparison. Revelation is to the mind what a glass is to the eye, whether it be intended to correct some accidental defect in its structure, or to extend its power of vision beyond its natural limits. God, when he gave understanding to man, did not exert himself to the utmost of his power; nor did he come under an obligation never to enlarge this faculty, or to furnish it with extraordinary assistance. If man should sustain any injury in the intellectual part of his nature, there was nothing to hinder his benevolent Creator from repairing it; nor, if he should be brought into such circumstances that new knowledge was needed, was there any physical or moral cause which could prevent him from affording it. Revelation does not imply a reflection upon the original work of God, as if he had made man an intelligent creature, but afterwards found that the degree of intelligence was not adequate to the purposes of his being. The most zealous advocates for revelation maintain that reason, in its pure state, was perfectly sufficient for all the ends which it was intended to accomplish, and that the necessity of revelation arises from a new state of things, superinduced by man himself. He now needs more light, and it is the business of revelation to impart that light. All reasoning, the object of which is to establish the prior impossibility of a revelation, is manifestly absurd.

But attempts have been made to prove this point by arguments of a different kind. Doubts have been raised, whether a revelation could be made, because it does not appear how a person could be certain that it was a genuine revelation, and not a dream or an illusion of fancy. "Enthusiasts," it has been said, "who are prompted only by a wild imagination, and persons in a phrensy, or the raving fit of a fever, are as fully satisfied of the reality of the things represented to them, and convinced of the truth and soundness of their own notions, as those are whose senses are clear and perfect, and whose reason is in its full vigour." On this ground, it has been represented as not easy to conceive how the prophets and apostles, as we call them, could have been so confident as they were that God had in reality made any revelation to them. But this argument is so foolish, that it may seem equally foolish to give a serious answer to it. What is the amount of it? It is this,—that there is much imposture in the world, and therefore there is no truth; that many persons are deceived, and therefore no man can know that he is in the right. To what purpose tell us of the dreams of enthusiasts, or of men labouring under fever or lunacy? We are speaking of persons in the full possession of their senses; for those to whom divine communications were made, although powerfully impressed, and strongly excited to act under their impulse, were not agitated like the priests of Baal, or the Pythoness of Delphi, but retained the calm exercise of their faculties, and were able to distinguish among their thoughts those which could be traced to a natural cause, and those which proceeded from a higher source. Besides the objection is

founded on a supposition, than which one more absurd cannot be conceived, that although God might make a communication to the mind of an individual, he could not convince that individual that it was a communication from himself. He could infuse ideas into his mind, but he could not enable him to discern whether they were true or false, whether there was any thing real in them, or they were the shadowy creations of fancy. A man can assure his correspondent, that the message which he receives, comes from him, and not from another; but God, it seems, possesses no means of authenticating his declarations. It must for ever remain uncertain, whether they are the dictates of infinite wisdom, or the offspring of a disordered brain. The man who should think that there is any force or even any degree of plausibility in this argument against the possibility of a revelation, may be justly considered as destitute of common sense. I can hardly believe that any infidel was ever so stupid as to lay any stress upon it; and am disposed to suspect that it may be referred rather to the malice, than to the cool judgment of those by whom it has been retailed. We, indeed, cannot tell how inspired men distinguished divine communica tions from the suggestions of their own minds, for this obvious reason, that they have not informed us, and we have not experienced such communications. But our ignorance ought not to be opposed to their knowledge, and to the unquestionable fact, that God could stamp upon his communications infallible signatures of truth.

If

But although a person, to whom a divine communication was made, might be fully assured of the source from which it came, it has been objected, tha the assurance must remain with himself, as there are no means by which he can produce a similar conviction in others. To this argument it has been replied, that God might enable him to give such signs as should satisfy others that he is his messenger. But this answer, which seems to be perfectly rational, infidels are not disposed to admit, and they endeavour to evade it by various pretexts. Some of them argue as if miracles were impossible. they mean, that there is no power by which a miracle could be performed, we may close this controversy with them, because it is manifest, that they are atheists in their hearts, whatever hypocritical professions they may make of their belief of a Deity; if they mean, that God, having established the laws of nature, will never alter them, they assume a principle which they cannot support by a shadow of proof, and which we are at perfect liberty to deny. Is he bound by fate, like the gods of heathenism? or has he bound himself by an immutable decree? What should hinder him from occasionally changing his ordinary mode of operation, when some great purpose of his moral government will be accomplished by the change? Whether would wisdom be more displayed by pursuing a uniform course, without any regard to new combinations of circumstances, or by deviating from it, to meet the emergencies which might arise in the progress of events? It is not worth while to spend time in refuting a gratuitous assumption. If it can be shown, that a single alteration or suspension of the laws of nature ever took place, these profound speculations vanish into smoke.

But some, who admit that miracles are possible, maintain that they are not sufficient to prove a revelation, upon this ground, that there is no necessary connexion between truth and power. We acknowledge that the power of man may be, and often has been, exerted in favour of falsehood; but what has this to do with the dispensations of an all-perfect Being, in whose eyes truth is sacred, and of whom it would be blasphemous to suppose that he would interpose to lead his creatures into error? But the infidel will perhaps tell us, that this is not what he means. He suspects no intention in the Deity to deceive; but he cannot place confidence in the fidelity of his messengers; or, at least, he has no assurance that they would honestly deliver their message, VOL. I.-4

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and religiously abstain from adding to it, or taking from it. They may alter it to serve a particular purpose, and may employ the miraculous power with which they are invested, to give authority and currency to imposture. But, surely, as God is thoroughly acquainted with the characters of men, and foresees their future actions, we might assume it as certain, that he would not commit a trust so important, so intimately connected with his own glory, and the happiness of his creatures, to any person by whom he foresaw that it would be abused. The supposition of its abuse is a direct impeachment of the knowledge or the wisdom of God in the arrangement of his plan. Besides, no man who believes that God has power over his creatures, over their minds as well as their bodies, can doubt that he is able to exert, and would exert, a controlling influence upon his servants, which would prevent them from corrupting, and suppress all desire to corrupt, the revelation which they were appointed to deliver to the world. They would be thus far passive in his hands, that they could not frustrate his design in selecting them. It is vain to tell us that men are voluntary agents; for while we admit this truth, we know that their freedom does not render them independent of their Maker; that by some mysterious link, it is connected with the immutability of his counsel; and that their liberty is unimpaired at the moment when they are fulfilling what he had determined before to be done. But there is another consideration, which will still more clearly demonstrate the absurdity of the supposition, that men may apply to a different purpose the miraculous powers with which they are endowed in order to attest revelation. Infidels seem to suppose, that a man may possess the power of working miracles, in the same manner as he possesses the power of moving his arm; that, by the gift of God, it becomes inherent in him, and is as much subject to his will as any of his natural powers. But their ideas are totally erroneous. Even among Christians, there is perhaps an indistinctness of conception upon the subject; and they speak of the power of working miracles as if it were some divine virtue, residing in the person by whom it is exercised. But in this sense, the power of working miracles was never vested in any mere man. In every case, God

was the worker of the miracles; and all that belong to the prophet or apostle was to give the sign, or to pronounce the words, which the miracle immediately followed. No person ever dreamed, that, when Moses stretched out his rod over the Red Sea, he exerted a power by which its waters were divided; the account given by himself accords with the suggestions of reason on the subject: "And Moses stretched out his hand over the sea; and the Lord caused the sea to go back by a strong east wind all that night, and made the sea dry land, and the waters were divided."* The same remark may be made upon all other miracles, which were equally beyond the sphere of human ability. If this statement be correct, it follows that the case supposed is altogether, imaginary. No man could abuse the power of working miracles, because, to speak strictly, no man ever possessed it. The power was in God, and not in his servant; and could the servant wield the omnipotence of his Lord at his pleasure? No; he might give the usual sign, or pronounce the usual words, but, if it was his intention to deceive, no effect would have followed. This argument, therefore, against the possibility of a revelation, is as destitute of force as the others. It is founded in a confusion of ideas, in a gross misapprehension of the subject, and will cause no difficulty to those who consider that men were merely the instruments of the miracles which God was pleased to work by his immediate power.

Having shown that a revelation is possible, and pointed out the futility of the pretexts, by which a proposition so simple and obvious has been perplexed,

Exod. xiv. 21.