forms, and at length acquire an organization fitted to the action which their respective propensities led them to exert."

"We know a cause," says Dr. Paley, "adequate to the appearances which we wish to account for; we have this cause continually producing similar appearances; yet, rejecting this cause, the sufficiency of which we know, and the action of which is constantly before our eyes, we are invited to resort to suppositions, destitute of a single fact for their support, and confirmed by no analogy with which we are acquainted. The suppositions' here alluded to, all agree in one character. They all endeavour to dispense with the necessity in nature, of a particular, personal intelligence; that is to say, with the exertion of an intending, contriving mind, in the structure and formation of the organized constitutions which the world contains. They would resolve all productions into unconscious energies, of a like kind, in that respect, with attraction, magnetism, electricity, &c. without any thing farther." I shall resume this argument in the next lecture.

LECTURE XVII.

ON GOD.

Argument for his Being from the marks of Design in the Universe, continued-Argument from general consent; its just force-Argument from Historical Evidences of a Superintending Providence-Reflections drawn from the Existence of God-Eternity of God: proof of it-Different from the perpetual duration of creatures-Speculations respecting his Eternal Existence-Spuituality of God-Doctrine of Materiality; contrary to Scripture and Reason.

In the last lecture, I entered upon the argument for the existence of God, from the proofs of design which are discovered in the works of nature, and illustrated it at considerable length. I directed your attention to the evidence presented by our own bodily constitution, and by the organization of other animated beings.

Proofs multiply upon us when we extend our observation to the various parts of the universe, and are not less striking and convincing in inanimate objects. To begin with those which, although organized, cannot be considered as endowed with consciousness and a principle of activity, there is not a tree, or a plant, or an herb, however insignificant it may seem, in which the signatures of divine wisdom may not be perceived. In the structure of vegetables, there is an arrangement, different indeed from what is observable in animals, but affording proofs not less satisfactory, of wise intention directed to the same general end, the subsistence, health and growth of the individual, and the continuation of the species. There are vessels for drawing nourishment from the soil to which they are attached; vessels for conveying the juices to every part; vessels for admitting and expiring the air; vessels for the production of flowers and fruits. Between a vegetable and a stone or a clod, the difference is great, and can be accounted for only by the agency of an intelligent Being. In the latter we see simple existence; but in the former we perceive design.

When we survey the surface of the earth, and observe the disposition of its parts, it is impossible for any person in his senses to suppose that they were huddled together by chance. There are clear indications of a wise and benevolent plan. We see the earth in one place, stretching out into plains, and in anoth

* Paley's Theology, chap. 23.

er, rising into hills and mountains; and the reason of this diversity is apparent. The plains would be arid wastes, furnishing no sustenance for man and beast, without the higher parts, which attract the clouds, and imbibing their watery treasures, distribute them to the lower regions in springs and streams which fructify the vallies, and give drink to their inhabitants. The surface of the globe is divided into the sea and the dry land. The dry land affords firm footing\ to man, and all terrestrial animals, as well as produces the vegetable substances which serve them for food. The sea is an inexhaustible source of vapours which rising in the atmosphere, are there condensed, and descend in mists and rains; and at the same time, it facilitates the intercourse of nations, and the transportation of the productions of one region to another. Had there been no sea, the earth would have been a desert, the silent abode of desolation and death. Once more, proofs of design present themselves to us when we look beyond this earth, and contemplate the system to which it belongs. In the centre is placed the sun, and around him the planets, retained in their orbits by an invisible power, perform their unceasing revolutions, while light and heat flow from this inexhaustible fountain to cheer their inhabitants. In particular, with respect to our earth, no rational man can doubt that its double motion is the effect of design, who considers that, by turning round its own axis once in twenty-four hours, the succession of day and night is produced; and that its anuaal motion round the sun gives rise to the changes of the seasons.

But of examples of contrivance there is no end. A few are sufficient to satisfy a candid inquirer; but in proportion as they are multiplied the argument becomes stronger; because, while it is possible that chance might produce the appearance of design in a solitary instance, although it has never yet formed a watch, a house, or the simplest instrument of labour, it is contrary to the idea of chance, that such appearances should be uniform or frequent. Our argument then is, that where there is design, there must be a designer; where there is a plan there must be a mind in which it was conceived. The adaptation of means to an end presupposes a being who had the end in view, and perceived the fitness of the means. The universe is full of designs. They are visible in its general frame, and in its particular parts. The refuge of the atheist is to say, that the wisdom is in nature; but he speaks unintelligibly, and we are sure does not understand himself. Wisdom is an attribute of mind, and must reside in a being distinct from the universe, as the maker of a machine is distinct from the machine itself. That Being is God, "wonderful in counsel, and excellent in working."

IV. An argument for the existence of God is founded on the general consent of mankind. It has been believed in all ages and nations, and is therefore consonant to the natural unbiassed dictates of the mind.

The fact of a general consent is, in the first place, to be proved; and for this purpose, we appeal to the history of the human race, of which religion makes a prominent part. It is objected, that some nations have been found without religion, or any idea of a God; but we have two answers to return. In the first place, the allegation has been made upon insufficient grounds in some cases at least, upon a superficial acquaintance with certain tribes, by persons ignorant of their language, and who had no proper opportunity to investigate their customs and opinions; and a more intimate knowledge of them has demonstrated that the account was a hasty and unjust assumption. But suppose that there were some tribes who had no notion of religion, the strength of the argument would be little impaired; because we do not affirm that men have an innate idea of God, but that the idea presents itself, with the evidence of truth, to those who are capable of thinking as rational beings; and if in the persons supposed, reason has not been exercised, if it is almost in a dormant state, and they in fact differ little from brutes, it is no more wonderful that they have not discovered this truth, than it is that a blind man does not see. But it

may be said, that the existence of God has been denied by men, who had cultivated reason, and were dignified with the name of philosophers. It is not certain, however, that they really disbelieved it, although the love of singularity might lead them to say so; but if they really did disbelieve, we know that prejudice and sophistry sometimes pervert minds, which deem themselves completely free from their influence, and that there is no truth, not even the evidence of the senses, which some person or other, calling himself a philosopher, has not controverted. At any rate, they are but a few against many, a minority not to be considered, when opposed to the innumerable millions who have maintained the contrary doctrine. "Let it be supposed," says Bishop Wilkins, "that some men have declared a disbelief of the divine nature in general; yet as there have always been some monsters among men, in respect of their bodies, so may there be likewise in respect of their minds; and this is no prejudice to the standing laws of nature."*

It may be objected farther, that mankind have not agreed in the belief of one God, but of a multiplicity of Gods, and that, with the exception of the Jews, polytheism was the system of all nations in ancient times, as it still is, where neither Christianity nor Mahometanism has been introduced. But even among such nations, the general principle was admitted, that there is a nature superior to man, by which the universe was arranged in its present form, and its affairs are still administered: besides, it should be remarked, that although the doctrine of the unity was much obscured, yet it was not altogether obliterated; for even the grossest idolaters retained the notion of a supreme deity, called Zaus and Jupiter, by the Greeks and Romans, and described by the latter, as hominum Sator atque Deorum. Some of their philosophers approached still nearer to the truth, and conceived him to be exalted far above the gods of vulgar adoration, and as requiring to be worshipped, not by images and sacrifices, but by devout meditation and virtuous conduct.

The atheists of the school of Epicurus, accounted for this general belief by the principle of fear. Primus in orbe deos fecit timor. But this seems to be reasoning quite worthy of the system which it is brought to support. It puts the effect before the cause. Other men would have supposed that fear proceeded from the previous belief of a power or powers superior to mortals, which were able to injure them. Every other affection is excited by a suitable object; but in the present case, men by some inexplicable impression began to be afraid of something, they knew not what; and thinking this very unreasonable, as it undoubtedly was, set about finding out an adequate cause of their fear, and luckily lighted upon the idea of Gods, terrible beings whom it was hazardous to offend. We need say nothing more about this theory, however ingenious it might appear to its inventors.

Another attempt was made to account for this general belief, by ascribing it to the artifice of statesmen, who contrived in this manner to give greater authority to their laws, and to retain men in subjection by the sanctions of religion. But an assertion without proof, we are at liberty to deny. By what historical facts is it supported? Who was the first legislator, who propagated the story of the existence of the Gods? And how did he succeed in persuading a whole people to give credit to a dogma, of which they had no evidence but his affirmation, and had never heard a whisper before? If one legislator was the inventor of it, how did it come to spread rapidly over the whole earth? Or did all the princes and statesinen of the world assemble in congress, and having agreed upon this expedient for maintaining their authority, return to their respective countries to put it in practice? Was there in ancient times a holy alliance? And how did it happen that they became the dupes of their own stratagem, and believed in the Gods as firmly as their subjects?

*Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, Book i. chap. 4.
Р

VOL. I.-22.

With a few exceptions, the belief of a superior Being, obscured indeed by polytheistic notions, has prevailed among mankind. We do not appeal to this fact, as if the existence of God were to be decided by the number of suffrages, or rested upon the feeble basis of opinion. We would not represent it as conclusive in itself, independently of other proofs; nor is it the strongest argument in favour of the doctrine, but can be viewed only in the light of a subsidiary one. The amount of it is this, that there is something in the constitution of the human mind, which leads to this belief; or that it is the result of the due exercise of the rational powers, with which man is endowed. When we find men in distant countries, who had no intercourse with one another, born in distant ages, and differing widely in language, and manners, and modes of thinking, united in believing that there exists a great Being, who is the Maker or the Ruler of the world, what can we infer, but that the proofs of his existence are exhibited throughout all nature, and are so conspicuous as to be seen by every eye? The consent of nations corroborates the argument, which we have drawn from the marks of design in the works of creation; as it shews that the inference deduced from them is not a local prejudice, but a legitimate conclusion from the premises. "What nation is there," says Cicero, "or race of men, which does not entertain some notion of the Gods prior to instruction? When, therefore, this opinion is not established by instruction, or custom, or law, and all without exception firmly assent to it; it is necessary to understand that there are Gods, since we have implanted or rather innate knowledge of them. It is necessary that that, in which all naturally agree, should be true."*

V. The existence of God may be inferred from a variety of facts in the history of human affairs. Every argument which proves a superintending Providence, proves that there is an intelligent and active Being by whom the universe is governed. When we appeal to the order and regularity which prevail, and to the beneficial results of the operations which are incessantly going on around us, the atheist tells us that these are the laws of nature. But what it something, or nothing; a being distinct from the universe, or the universe itself? If nature means the universe, he has given us no information. We inquired how there is such order in the universe, and how such beneficial effects are produced; and he deems it sufficient to say, that such is the constitution of things. Such an answer we might receive from an ignorant man, whom we had interrogated respecting something which he did not understand. He would say, I do not know, but so it is. But surely we should never think of calling this man a philosopher. With the exception of professed atheists, all men have acknowledged a Providence; and events occur of such a character, as to lead the mind away from the mere succession of natural causes and effects, to the interposition of an almighty and intelligent Agent. When we see an undoubted instance of retributive justice—and such instances are not rare even under this mixed dispensation-we unavoidably think of an invisible Judge; and when we observe tokens of wisdom more than human, directing and controlling, and over-ruling events to its own ends, we have recourse to Him who works all things according to the counsel of his will. The atheist may talk of such events in the jargon of his system, but he cannot fully satisfy his own mind, and still less the minds of others. Hence it sometimes happens that, bold when there is no danger, but a coward when calamity and death seem to be near, he is dismayed at the tokens of a present Deity, and with a voice of terror, implores the mercy of the Being whom he lately scorned as a phantom.

Under this argument supernatural facts have been adduced as proofs of the existence of God. By these, we mean facts which cannot be accounted for *Cic. de Nat. Deorum, Lib. i. § 17.

by the known laws of nature. There may be facts of an extraordinary kind which cannot be called miraculous, because, although they show a deviation from the ordinary course, they do not imply a suspension of the laws, or the interposition of a power superior to them. They are the result of natural causes unusually combined; and in this way, we explain the production of monsters, and strange phenomena, which excite wonder. But if it can be proved, that on any occasion, a law of nature has been suspended or reversed, it is a legitimate inference that there exists somewhere a power by which nature is controlled. I allude to two kinds of facts as indicating the agency of a Being greater than nature and its laws, namely, miracles and prophecy; and in appealing to these, I tread in the steps of the most illustrious philosophers of antiquity, who considered omens, prodigies, and oracles, as proofs of the existence and providence of the gods. It would be preposterous at present to quote Scripture as authoritative, because we must first be assured that there is a God, before we can know that any book contains a revelation of his will. I refer to the sacred writings only as records, the genuineness of which has been fully established, and from which we learn that works, which may be strictly called miraculous, have been performed; and that predictions were delivered many ages ago, which have been subsequently fulfilled with the utmost exactness. If a miracle is an event which could not be brought to pass by any law of nature, it cannot be denied, that to give sight to a man born blind, to restore an arm or a leg which was wanting, and to still a storm by a simple command, were miracles: and what conclusion could those who witnessed them draw, or what conclusion can be drawn by those who are assured of them by competent testimony, but that there is a Being who sways the sceptre over the universe, and is possessed of power sufficient to the production of any effect? The same conclusion follows from prophecy, which, supposing knowledge in the prophet that does not belong to man, must have proceeded from an intelligent Being, to whom the future is as manifest as the present, and who possesses such dominion over physical and moral causes, over the material system, and the thoughts and volitions of men, as to accomplish with unerring certainty whatever he had foretold. That Being is God.

Such are the arguments by which we demonstrate this fundamental doctrine of religion. Some of them are conclusive by themselves; and when taken together, they compose a mass of evidence which must give complete satisfaction to every person who fairly considers them, and which nothing can resist but prejudice and obstinate incredulity.

Before I proceed further, I shall lay before you two or three reflections upon the truth which we have established.

First, the doctrine of the existence of God diffuses light and order over the whole system of creation. The atheist can account for nothing; his creed is embarrassed with inextricable difficulties. He ascribes eternity to beings who must have had a beginning; he speaks of contrivances which had no contriver; he sees many bodies in motion which observe a constant and regular course, but denies that there is a first mover. To him the universe is a riddle, and a mystery. A Deity explains the phenomena of nature. As soon as he is recognized, we have power which could call the things which are out of nothing; wisdom capable of arranging and governing them; and goodness, the source of the beauty which charms our eyes, and of the happiness which is felt through all the ranks of animated beings. I cannot conceive an atheist to experience any pleasure from the contemplation of objects in which he perceives no marks of intelligence and benevolence, nothing on which an enlightened and feeling mind would delight to dwell. But, to the religious man, nature is a mirror which reflects the glory of its Maker. It is animated by his presence; it brightens under his smile; it speaks of him to all nations, and proclaims him to be wise and good.