66 Subfcriptions, which are a Reproach to Gentlemen of "Fortune, and a great Difcouragement to Learning and 66 Ingenuity: So far are we, I fay, from following this "fcandalous Practice, that our Members have all obliged "themselves not to lend a Book, that may be easily purchased, to any Perfon whatever, under the Penalty "of double the Price of the Book for every Perfon he lends it to; which Penalties are laid out in purchafing "fo many Copies of the Book, and thofe Copies are burnt at our next Club, as an Atonement to the Author. "AMONG others, we never fail to have your MAGAZINE "examined at the next Club after it comes down to this έσ City, and as feldom fail to order every Member to furnish himfelf with a Copy. But upon reading the "DEBATES of the POLITICAL CLUB, a Dispute often "arifes amongst us, what Party their SECRETARY is of? "Whether he be Whig or Tory, Patriot or Courtier? Nay, we can but feldom find out, whether he be, in his own "Way of thinking, upon the Affirmative or Negative Side "of the Queftion; for the Arguments on both Sides are generally fo fully ftated, and fo clearly put, that one is always apt to be of the fame Opinion with the last Speaker. This has raifed the Curiofity of our Club to "fuch a Degree, that they have defired me to write you "this Letter, and to ask, if you can fatisfy our Curiofity in this Refpect; which, among the reft, will much oblige, York, Nov. 14, 1745. SIR, Your bumble Servant, In Anfwer to this Letter, the SECRETARY to the POLITICAL CLUB has defired us to declare, in his Name, That he neither is, nor ever was of any Party; and that whatever may be his private Opinion, he thinks himself, in Honour, obliged to give the fullest and best Account he can, of every Debate be communicates, by our Means, to the Publick. THE JOURNAL of the PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES in the POLITICAL CLUB, continued from the Appendix, 1744. Conclufion of the SPEECH of L. Sergius Fidenas, in the Character of Sir John St. Aubin, fince deceased, begun in our Appendix to last Year, p. 657, in a Debate about the Hanover Troops. B UT thank God, Sir, we have feveral other Ways. fhall not say that we ought to think of making any Conquefts in Old Spain; but we might make fuch frequent, and fuch formidable Incurfions, and fo harrafs both the People and Armies of Spain, that that Court would foon find themfelves obliged, by the Clamours of their own People, to fubmit to reasonable Terms of Peace 1745 with us; and I must here obferve, that by employing our Troops in this Manner, we fhould have done much more Service both to the Queen of Hungary and ourselves, than by fending them to Flanders ; A but then our Minifters could have had no Pretence for taking Hanoverian Troops into British Pay, which was what they regarded more than the Service either of the Queen of Hungary or their native Country. The Hon. Gentleman fays, we B know by Experience how difficult and dangerous it is, to make any Attempt against the Spanish Settlements in America. Sir, are we to form any Judgment from our late ridiculous and ill-concerted Expedition? neither with Troops, Provisions, ArAn Expedition, which was provided tillery, nor Officers that were proper for the Purpose: An Expedition, that C A was B was fent to a Place, where, of all cannot I hope, Sir, I have now fully hewn, that we can have no English Reifon for continuing the War, or for advifing the Queen of Hungary to continue the War; and if we have D E o Englife Reafon for continuing the War, furely we can have no Reafon for continuing to give English Money for Hanover Troops. But it may be faid, that thofe Troops must be continued in our Pay tili Peace be actually concluded. Sir, I have two Reafons, which I think pretty fubftantial, even against this. The one F is, that our Minifters will never, I believe, confent to the Queen of Hungary's accepting of any Terms of Peace, as long as they are allowed to keep Hanover Troops in British Pay; and the other is, that I am fully convinced, that our Land Army, G more efpecially thefe Troops, have never been, nor can be, of any Service to the Queen of Hungary; there fore the keeping them in our Pay I was really furprifed, Sir, how the Hon. Gentleman could be fo weak as to make use of any Memorial drawn up and published by the Court of France, for proving, that our Land Army was of Service to the Common Caufe, by difabling France from fending proper Reinforcements to their Army in Germany, or to the Spaniards in Italy. If they had fincerely thought fo, they would not have said so, at least they would have guarded against its being publifhed; but as they knew the contrary, they faid fo, and published what they faid, in order to encourage us to spend our Money in maintaining an ufelefs Army upon their Frontier, inftead of fending that Money to the Queen of Hungary and King of Sardinia, for enabling them to increase their Armies, which, the French knew, might be of great Ule, and would be made the belt Ule of for preventing the Execution of their Defigns. This, Sir, our Minilters could not but fee as well as the French; for from the Eftimates it appears, that our Land Army has, and will coft us above a Million Sterling yearly. If this Money had been fent to the Queen of Hungary and King of Sardinia, it would have enabled them to add 50 or 60,000 Men to their Armies, and this would have been more than a Counter Balance for all the to our Generofity, they have, I hope, the Common Caufe and the Intereft of the Queen of Hungary fo much at Heart, that they would keep their Troops in the Army at their own Expence; confequently, if the Court of Hanover be fuch Friends to the Queen of Hungary as they pretend, the Allied Army can be no Way leffened by our difmiting their Troops out of our Pay; and if theit Friendship for the Queen of Hungary be pretended only in order to intitle them to have their Troops maintained by us, I am afraid, we have laid out, and fhall lay out our Money in that Way to very little Purpofe; for if the Elector of Hanover be indifferent about the Support of the Queen of Hungary, I much fear, that the King of England will not be very fanguine; in which Cafe it is not to be expected, that our Land Army will do much Service either to that Princess or the Common Caufe; therefore, I fhould be for difmiffing thefe Hanover Troops, if it were for no other Reafon but to try the Sincerity of the Court of Hanover, and confequently I must be against the Motion. Reinforcements the French could have fent either to Germany or Sadoy; for tho' they might, and did eafily affemble a Body of 40 or 50,000 Men to face our Army upon their own Frontier, they could not have fent near that Number into A Germany or Savoy, because they could not leave their Country quite deftitute of Troops. Common Senfe muft therefore instruct us in what was the Defign of the Court of France, when they drew up and published that Memorial; and befides, it con- B tradicts itself; for it fays, the Troops defigned for the Affiftance of the Spaniards were actually quartered in Dauphiny and Provence, which border upon Savoy, from whence they might have marched to oppofe any Attack in Flanders, with as much C Fafe, and in as short a Time, as they could have marched from the Provinces in which they were quartered. But that Memorial hints at the true Reafor why no French Troops marched to the Affiftance of the Spaniards: It fays, the Alliance between D Hungary and Sardinia was then fo flightly cemented, that it might be eafily diffolved. This, Sir, was the true Reafon, I really believe; for the French had no Inclination to break with the King of Sardinia, as long as they had any Hopes of gain- E ing him by fair Means; but as those Hopes feem now to be cut off by the famous Treaty of Worms, we fhall next Year fee, whether our Army in Flanders will prevent the French from joining with the Spaniards in an Attack upon his Sardinian Majefty's F Territories. But now fuppofe, Sir, that our Land Army could be of fome Service, yet in order to keep up that Army, I do not think it neceffary for us to keep the Hanoverians in Pay. The Court of Hanover are G certainly in the Right to take our Money as long as we are willing to give it; but if we should put a Stop B C Sir, we have invited here the Electors of Hanover, with great Rewards, we have given them Kingdoms to rule over; but, I hope, fenfible as I am of the great Benefits which have arifen from their good Government; I hope, I fay, we fhall never be fo paffionately fond of Hanoverians, as never to reft fatisfied, never contented, till we have hired their whole People to be Lords over us. In this Debate likewife, Pomponius no fuch Inftances of Hanoverian tho' flow in its Execution, is always Pufillanimity, Infolence, and Difobe- more certain in its Effects. A difdience, which are now fo glaring folute, hafty Conduct on our Part, in the Eyes of the whole World: is what the Foe muft wish to fec. We have now, in an Affair of the Good God! What Joy will it give laft Importance to this Country, the Enemy, when that important greater, perhaps, than ever came A Piece of News is carried to them before this Houfe, Experience for abroad, that it is the Refolution of a our Guide, and fhall we go con- British House of Commons, to take trary to Experience itfelf, to Ex- Confufion into their Army! perience, which teaches even Fools? Shall we take Troops into our Pay, who want perfonal Courage; who are fure to be wanting to their Duty in the Day of Battle; and who, instead of being an Affiftance, will betray us into Misfortunes, by difappointing us of that Strength, which we vainly rely on, by difordering our Army, inftead of fupporting it? But, Sir, fhould this Motion pafs in the Affirmative, what a Damp, what Dejection of Spirit, muft it caft on our Men, when they find themfelves forced by their own Countrymen, by this Houfe of Commons, to bow their Neck to the Hanoverian Yoke, and to fubmit to those Grie. D vances, which they have fo loudly complained of?The only Colour of Pretence, which I have heard alledged, is this, that it is now too late to hire other Troops; but will the Miniftry, who pretend it is too late to hire other Troops, pretend E too, that they were the only Perfons in the World, unacquainted with the Behaviour of the Hanoverians, during the laft Campaign? If they can't pretend this too, as well as that it is too late, what do they other than acknowledge, that they impofe a Neceffity, which they might have prevented, and premeditately force à wrong Measure on the Nation? But this fuppofed Neceffity, from the Latenefs of the Time, is abfolutely falfe, is a fundamental Miftake; for it is always too early to engage in a wrong Meafare: Nor, can any Thing be fo terrible to an Enemy as good Management, which, F Mr. Prefident, TH HE Queftion is, Whether the 16,000 Hanoverians fhould be employed in our Service abroad the next Campaign; or, in other Words, Whether we fhould furnish 16,000 Men lefs; and, in Confequence of that, have 22,000 Men lefs for the Support of the Common Caufe, than we had last Year? If we confider the Situation of Affairs with refpect to the Motives of the War, and the Succefs of it, it must be owned, without canvaffing whether more might not have been done, than was done laft Year, that the Affairs of the Queen of Hungary, by the Operations of the Campaign, are in a better, and a more hopeful G State, than the most fanguine Defires or Expectations could have promifed at the Opening of it. Prague, Egra, and all her Dominions have not |