whole 40 from paying, and thereby lay a
Foundation for a further Rate. The Per-
fons favoured by the Churchwardens, and
who figned their Rates and Accounts, shall
now be ready as Evidence to fupport both,
and be admitted as good Witnesses in Law,
their Evidence appearing to charge them-
felves; and if the Perfons aggrieved do A
complain and appeal, where can they have
Witneffes, fufficiently informed of Facts,
to be legal Evidence to detect these Frauds?
'Tis true, a Rate or Tax voluntarily to
charge one's felf seems very plaufible, and
to imply a real Neceffity for laying it;
yet may it be nothing but a Combination
between the Churchwardens and the smaller
Occupiers, to raise a Contribution for their B
own private Advantage: And thus, as a.
bovefaid, a Number of thefe smaller Occu-
piers fhall, instead of paying to the Rate
themselves, receive Money, and be well
entertained, for voting a Burden upon o-
thers. Can any Thing be more abfurd,
than that 2 out of 40 fuch Men, which 40
together occupy no more than one fingle C
Farmer, fhall have it in their Power to lay
a Tax on that one Farmer, altho' he pays
40 Times more than each of them, and as
much as the whole 40 are charged with,
whether they pay or not? And that 19
more of the 40, joining with the former 2
Men, fhall lay an unneceffary Tax on the
20 Farmers for their 2000l. per Annum ?

must be fo too. As the larger Occupier will always be induftrions to prevent the Mifapplication of his own Pound, he must confequently be industrious to prevent the Mifapplication of the other's Shilling.

Churchwardens, by the 43d of Elizabeth, are always to be Overfeers; they make Rates in their fingle Capacity of Churchwardens, and they may again make unneceffary and exorbitant Rates as Overseers of the Poor, by taking, in Conjunction with them, one or two of the Overseers appointed by the Juftices. To prevent thefe Abuses, therefore, none but substantial Inhabitants, and Perfons duly qualified, ought to be chofen into fuch an Office, where there is Room to act fo at large in a double Capacity. The greater Occupiers are fo fenfible of the Abuses thrown upon their Properties, by the Combination of the Churchwardens with the meaner Sort of People, that they would be glad to raise all the neceffary Money on themselves, and entirely exempt fuch mean Inhabitants from paying any Thing at all, would they not interfere in chufing bad Stewards for them: And fuch Offers have in fome Places been made, and rejected; for mean Inhabitants will not be fatisficd with being exempted from paying to Rates; they have other Advantages in View; they have a Fellow. feeling with their Churchwardens; they are employ'd by them; they fhall do unD neceffary Work, and charge their own Quantity and Price for it; they shall riot at a Parish Expence; they fhall procure large Collections for their Friends and Relations, out of the Monies received by Poor Rates; and many shall be exempted from working, and receive Money to live idly upon. Churchwardens fhall let Parish Lands to their Friends at under Rents, or Occupy them themselves at what they fall pleafe to allow, or without allowing any Thing at all; and a Majority shall justify all Acts. They are well acquainted with Tricks and Contrivances to cheat; they are the fole Masters of the Properties of a Parish; they can diftrefs fome to oblige others; they can fucceffively make Rates, F and fupport both Rates and Accounts at Law, without being at any Expence themfelves; for they fhall make new Rates to defray all their Law Charges, and bid Defiance to the only Persons who really pay to them, by accounting to one another to the End of the Chapter.

The Argument, that one Man's Shilling, according to his Occupation or Circumftances, is as much in Proportion as another Man's Pound, will not hold good: If he who is to pay Is. has thereby the Disposal of the other Man's Pound, he may contrive to purloin and fave his own Shilling out of the other Man's 20; and tho` Is. may be to the one, as much as 20s. are to E the other, his 1s. will go but one 20th Part of the Way of the other's Pound: And if Is. be so much to him, may he not be tempted to imbezzle the many whole Twenties he thall receive of the greater Occupiers? And as to the Poor Rates, if I poor Perfon can be relieved with is. 20 poor Perfons may be relieved with 205. The greater Occupier, therefore, who relieves 20 poor Perfons, whilft the meaner Occupier relieves no more than 1, ought furely to have Weight, in Proportion to the Number of the Poor he relieves, for the Choice of fuch Stewards as he fhall think will difpofe of his Money moft properly, and account moft justly for it: And if the larger Occupier thinks it fafe to intruft Men G with his Pound, furely the meaner may fafely intruft them with his Shilling; for the meaner Occupier's Shilling cannot be mifapplied, but the larger Occupier's l'ound

In fome Parishes the Office of Church-
wardens hath been for many Years, or for
Life, in the fame Perfons, to whom fuch
Office hath proved a good Annuity at the
Parith's Expence.

Churchwardens, under Colour of their
Office,

on which it is laid; nor can it be raised without the Confent of King, Lords, and Commons: But by 43d Eliz. Overseers are impower'd to make Rates for what Sums they themselves think fit, without any Limitation whatever, as has been before obferved. And is not the Property of a whole Parish too confiderable to be lodged in the arbitrary Will of 5 or 6 Parish Officers, who may contrive to fhare the Plander of it? Reasonable Objections to Publick Accounts are generally made, to direct the Oeconomy and good Management of Publick Monies, and to avoid unnecessary Expences on ourselves and our Pofterity, by heavy Debts and Taxes; and would it not be right to keep Parish Officers to Oeconomy and good Management, and to prevent their lavishing and embezzling the Monies they raife, and giving in falfe Accounts for the fame? Or are they to learn the Art of mifapplying Money, and Account-making, in order to qualify themselves for higher Posts of Knavery? The Mifapplication of Monies Craifed by Rates, makes Men think the Money raised by every other Tax is alfo mifapplied, and creates in thofe who are not able to think abstractedly, a Diffidence and bad Opinion of Power, from the lowest even to the higheft Clafs of Government.

appointed by Men of Property; but they are impofed on Men of Property by the arbitrary Will of the Juftices, who generally have very little or no Property, but as generally have an Intereft in preferring particular Men into Office *. Yet hard as this may be, better is it than to have the

mote Parish Jobbs for each other. The Landlords are then made to pay for the Extravagance and Milmanagement of their Tenants, and therefore in fome Places do net clear 8s in the Pound by their Land; whereas, were the Management of Parish Officers laid under proper Restrictions, the Value of Eftates would naturally rife, and A Choice of Overfeers, as is now that of foon be recovered. A Rule for taxing would teach Tenants, when they take a Farm, to calculate the future Tax with fome Manner of Certainty; and they would then take it on themfelves, in Hopes to gain in making it lefs by their Conduct; they would then take Care that the Poor should be employed; they would be careful to prevent clandeftine Settlements, and all Abufes refulting from Carelessness and Mismaragement.

B

Churchwardens, left to Parishes at large, or to Select Veftries of mean Inhabitants, without any particular Qualification either in the Electors or in the Elected.

Of late Years great Power hath been vested in Juftices of the Peace, which hath occafioned the great Increase of their Number. By the 5th of his prefent Majesty †, the Qualification of a Juftice of the Peace is railed to rool. a Year above Incumbrances. Such Qualification is indeed no Proof of the judicial Abilities of the Perfons appointed for the Execution of that Office; but it is fome Security to the Country, that if a Justice of the Peace abufe or stretch his Power beyond the due Limits of the Law, he is, at leaft, by fuch Qualification, anfwerable fo far as his Eftate is worth, to the Parties that may be injured by him. But this is not to extend to any City, Town, or Liberty, having Juftices of the Peace within their Limits. As to Cities which are Counties, it may be right; but were it not paffed into a Law, would it not be abfurd to think a Qualification of 100l. per D Annum, neceffary for a Juftice of the Peace for a County, whofe Power extends only to Villages, &c. and the fame not neceffary in a Town Corporate, where a greater Number of People is collected within the Compafs of a few Acres, than within feveral Miles wherein a County Justice shall act? And fhall an unqualified Man have it in his Power to do infinite Mifchief within fuch narrow Compass, without having Abilities to make Recompence for the Mischief done Great Complaint hath been made, that rool. a Year is not a fufficient Qualification. Some Gentlemen have been for carrying it to 300l. others to 500l. a Year. By faid 5th Gen. II. no Attorney, Sollicitor, or Proctor, fhall be a Juftice of the Peace, during fuch Time as he shall continue his Practice. But all these may be Mayors, or Bailiffs of Corporations; and if fo, they are Juftices in Courfe. If they are dangerous in other Parts, why not in Corporations? Or is there a Reason why the Perfons and Properties of People, within the Limits of thefe Jurifdictions, should be lefs dear to the Legislature, and lefs within the Protection of the Laws, than

'Tis extremely ftrange, that in a Tax which every Day affects every Man's Property, Qualifications fhould remain unfixed, either as to the Electors, or the Officers eTected; especially as Qualifications have of late Years been found neceffary in all other C Cafes, and in mot of lefs Importance. Qualifications are required for Justices of the Peace; for Commiffioners of the Land Tax; for Surveyors of the Highways; yet none of thefe, by Virtue of their Office, have the Difpofal of any Monies coming into their Hands, except the last; nor are they allowed to make Rates for more than 6d. in the Pound for one whole Year. And is not a Qualification more requifite for the Choofers of fuch, as, by Virtue of their Office, under Pretence of their being for Church and Poor, have it in their Power, not only to impofe fuch Taxes as they fhall think fit, but have alfo the whole Difpofal and Management of the Monies when raifed? A Qualification of 10l. per Annum is E required for a Juryman, fince by his Verdict he may difpofe of the Property of others, tho' none can come into his Hands. Numbers of Officers and Checks are appointed for the collecting and receiving the Land Tax. Affeffors and Collectors of the Land Tax are liable to confiderable Penalties and Forfeitures for their Neglect; and great Care is taken by every Land Tax "Act, as well to fecure the Receipt, as the proper Application of the Monies levied. The Sum to be raised on every County, City, and Place, is afcertained, and no Officer can exceed that Sum. But thofe who pay the Poors Tax have not, by Law, the Choice of their Taxers or Taxgatherers; nor is it at prefent required G in Corporations, that they be chofen or

F

Large Occupiers in Parishes are generally better qualified to chufs their Parish Officers, Lan many faftices who now by Law appoint them.

+ Cb. 18.

thofe

thofe in Countles at large? But it may be
objected, that were a Law of this Kind to
extend to Corporations, it would in many
of them, in Effect, deftroy their Charters,
for that perhaps not 2 in 200 of thefe Cor-
poration Juftices have 100l. per unum in
Land. If these Corporation Charters are.
an effential Part of the Conftitution, and A
neceffary to the Support of the Liberty
and Property of the Subject, they cer-
tainly ought not to be wounded; and this
Objection has Weight more or lefs, as this is
the Cafe. But the Cognizance of the Poors
Lates is not derived to them by Charter, but
fuper-added by the Act that creates the
Tax; the Reason that this Law vests in
them the Power, cannot be found out at B
this Distance of Time; poffibly the Legif
lature did not maturely enough confider the
Attachment and Intereft, which these Cor-
poration Juftices, must naturally have in
Difputes arifing upon thefe Laws. But be
that as it will, 'tis evident, either that the
Corporation Magiftrates of that Time de-
ferved more Confidence, or that the then C
Legislature was not fo well acquainted with
them as our late Parliaments have been,
whofe Wisdom and Tenderness for their
Fellow-Subjects have by 9th Geo I. * car-
ried all Appeals concerning Settlements and
Removals from before thefe Juftices, to
thofe of the Counties at large, even where
the Difpute is between Parish and Parish
within the Walls of Towns Corporate.

The 21 Jac. I. ch. 23. for avoiding vexatious Delays, by removing fmall Caufes from thefe inferior Courts to fuperior ones, has made the Determination of Coporate Jurifdiétions in fuch fmall Caufes inal. But 'tis remarkable, that in all the Caufes comprehended within this Law there is a Jury concerned, and that even with a Jury, the Legiflature could not think it fafe to repofe in them a Truft even fo great as 5.; and 'tis very plain, the Rea on they are made final Judges in fome Matters of lefs Value, is, that the Expence of removing thofe little Caufes from before them to higher Courts, will amount to more than the Caufe of Action. This Law proves that the Legislature has thought, has known, that Matters of great Moment ought not to be trusted to the Determination of thefe Jurifdictions. And is there a Matter of greater Moment, is there a Tax that goes more generally, or more conftantly to Mens Properties, than that founded on the Poors Laws? More general no Tax can be; for every Inhabitant, that is not fo happy as to be intitled to receive, is liable to pay. More conftant no Tax can be; for every one that is liable is bound to pay fo often, and fo much, as a Set of Officers hall fay they have Occafion to receive. If all Caufes, where the Value in Dispute fhall be 51. or upwards, and all Caufes whatsoever that relate to Frechold, D ought to be, and are, by, or notwithstanding the last-mentioned Law, removable from fuch Judges as thefe; ought their Determination, and that without a Jury, to be final, where not only 5. but 500!. cr more, may be, and frequently is, the Matter in Question, and that concerning Freehold too? For furely this Tax does immedi ately affect the Land; and not only that, but where thefe Corporation Juftices may be Parties interested as Parishioners, as fupporting their own Acts, as Owners of Houfes leafed free from Poor Rates; and as they must, from the Nature of the Thing, be biaffed in Difputes between Freemen and Non-Freemen, and even between Freemen

Thefe Settlements and Removals are bran-
ched from the 43d of Eliz; but are very
inconfiderable both as to Frequency and
Charge, in comparison with the general Tax
of a Parish; fhall thefe Juftices then be
found improper judges of a fingle and in-
confiderable Branch growing from this Tax,
and yet remain the ultimate Arbiters and E
Directors of the whole Levies? The exprefs
Words of the laft mentioned Law, Sect. 6,
give an Appeal against the Acts of the Juf-
fices to the Seffions, concluding that at the
Seffion, where the Appeal would come,
there would be Juftices neutral to thofe
previous Acts, to be Judges of them:
Whence arifes this Evidence, that the Legif-
lature did not properly confider the Situ-
ation of Towns Corporate; for in many of
them there are no more than two Juftices.
To whom then can you appeal from their
Acts, but to themfelves? Here the Mean-
ing of the Act, and the Power of Appeal
given by the Words of it, are a flat Con-
tradiction. But where there are four Juf-
tices, the Event is the fame; for three of G
those four must concur to allow the Appeal
with Effect, fo that the two from whofe
Acts you appeal can fupport thofe Acts
throughout in Spite of Oppofition.

* Cha. 7.

F

and Freemen, as Interest shall lead them to favour or opprefs; for in many Corporations thefe Juftices ftarve or exift as they can or cannot fupport an Interest.

Let it be fuppofed, that a Set of favourite Freemen in a Parish fhall confpire to invade the Properties of the Farmers and Non-Freemen, and then let it be conner'd how level the Properties of the last lie to the Aim of the former in the abovelaid

Offices.

That thefe Juftices will nominate two, three, or four of their favourite Freemen into the Office of Overfeers, upon their Appli

Application, is not much to be doubted;
they thall then make a Rate for four, or
ten Times the Sum neceffary to the Main-
tenance of the Poor, (for four or ten are
equally in their Power) and may double the
Sum rated on the Farmer by an unequal
Tax on the Land. The Farmer fhall, as
indeed he neceffarily muft, refufe to pay: A
Five Minutes after fuch Refufal, thefe Offi-
cers fhall equip themfelves with a Warrant
of Diftrefs from theie honeft Magistrates,
and with this Authority fweep the Stock of
the Farmer, and fell even to Treble the Sum
rated. The poor Man, tho' already undone,
appeals; but to whom? why, to the fame
two Worshipful Magiftrates upon their Ho-
nourable Bench, where this honeft Rate is B

fure to meet with as honeft a Confirma-
tion; another and another Rate is made in
the fame Manner, and confirmed and con-
firmed till the End of the Year; and then
an Appeal is had to the Accounts; but be-
fore whom? before the fame Worshipful
Juftices, when the Accounts fhall likewife
meet with the fame honest Confirmation; C
fo that whatever Overplus fhall be really in
the Hands of thefe Officers, they fhall be
deemed to have no greater than they are
pleased to say they have. And indeed, as
the Cafe ftands, it is not material, whether
they admit they have any or not; for be it
large or small, 'tis all funk in their Hands,
'tis intirely their own; the Law indeed
does direct, that it fhall be paid into the
Hands of the fucceeding Overfeers; but in
what Manner is the Payment compellable?

D

By one Method only, viz. the Power of the faid Juftices, unlefs an Action at Law will accrue to the fucceeding Officers. But are not the old Officers fecure against both thefe Methods, fuppofing the last may be taken? That the Justices will not compel them to the Payment, is certain, from the Reafons before laid down; and 'tis as cer-* tain, that the fucceeding Officers will bring no Action; for they are under the Combination to reap the Harveft of the fame Oppreffion in their Turn. Now is it reafonable, is it fitting, that the Fruits gained by the Labour of the honeft, induftrious, and innocent Man, fhould thus fall a Prey in the rapacious Hands of fuch a People? And is not this fomething worse than open Robbery? It is true, Difputes concerning Taxes, from the Nature of the Thing, require a quick and fummary Decifion; but the Steps to Juftice ought to be regular, and the Judge impartial; but in thefe Places it is not fo, either in the one or in the other Respect. For the Injustice and Delay that make Judgment both bitter and four, as Lord Bacon expreffes it, inhabit in thefe Corporate Jurifdictions. The Injuf tice of thefe Courts has been fhewn, and the Delay is apparent, in that they generally are held at no ftated Times, but at the Will of the Juftices, who can, if they pleafe, protract them from the Time of the Diftrefs to the End of the Office. And as on the one Hand, they can deftroy a Man's Property, by molding their Injustice into a flow and languifhing Poifon; fo can they

There fhall be 10 Parishes in a Corporation, where there are 2000 Householders; of these 400 fhall be Freemen. If but 200 of them are neceffitous and want Places, or Opportunities to get Money, they need only apply to their Fuftices, and in two Years Time they may all be gratified. Four Overfeers may be appointed to each Parish every Year, and fix more Freemen may, until they get into Office, fupply the Overfeers with the Commodities they shall pleafe to want, under Pretence of being for the Poor: Thus, in one Year, 100 Freemen may be ferved, 40 by Rates and Accounts-making, and 60 by Overcharges for Goods: Thus, in two Years Time, the whole 200 may be obliged, and the Rotation continue: By fuch Practices fhall the landed Eftates be made tributary to 200 Freemen. Now what may the Lofs by this be to the Freeholders and NonFreemen, who are a great Majority, both in Number and Value? If the Occupations of the 2000 Houfebolders amount to no more than 10l, a Year each, one with another (which, as a maderate Computation, may be allowed, there being, in fome of the Parishes, many Farms and Lands taken into the Districts of the Corporation) the whole annual Rent, or Value, must then amount in the ten Parishes to 20,000l. If on this Rates be made, in fome Parifbes at 6s. in fome at 8s. and in others at 10s. in the Pound, they may be laid at 8 s. in the Pound one with another rubile Rates, at 4s. in the Pound, would, by boneft Management and proper Officers, be fufficient for the Maintenance of the Poor. Here then is 4cool. per Annum to be divided among 100 Freemen, that is, 401. to to each; but as their Turn to divide thofe Profits comes but once in two Years, it is but 201. a Year certain, one Year with another, to each of the 200 Freemen i Some of them indeed may not divide so much as others, but then what is faved on fome fill be got by others, who shall be the chief Managers and Dividers of the Plunder. How can the Juftices, who appoint fuck Men into Office at their Requeft, upon any Complaint made against the Exorbi tancy of their Rates and Accounts by the Non-Freemen, grant Relief avithout difobliging those they meant to oblige? Can it be expected they fhall condemn thofe they have chofen and appointed? And to rubom can you go for Redress? You cannot, as the Law ftands, go to Juftices at General Quarter Seffions for the County; and to thofe of the Body of Freemen you thould not.