would be almost an unmixed good to all, including the shop-girls and shop-men in the large establishments; it could only affect injuriously the smaller shops that supply the poorer classes, who can only purchase at special times.

There are other industries or services where the working hours are injuriously long as in the baking, the tailoring, and generally in the clothing trade, the railway, 'bus, and tramcar services. In the case of the railways a reduction would result in an increased staff at diminished wages, the rates not admitting of profitable increase; in the 'bus and tramcars it would result in higher fares, perhaps in some ceasing to run; while in the case of the East-end tailors the reduction of hours, excessive as they are, would throw many of them out of work, who would be opposed to it. In those trades or businesses which produce luxuries for the rich, the hours might be reduced with advantage; more would be employed, but the employers would not lose, as they could raise their prices, which would be cheerfully paid by people to whom high price is a matter of indifference, sometimes even of preference. But in all these cases the reduction, wherever desirable, can be secured by trades unions, except in the case of shop-assistants.

To recapitulate in the case of manufactures an eight hours' day would result either in reduced wages for the same number, or in the employment of a less number, from diminished demand through raised prices, unless labour were more efficient. There would also be the danger of losing our foreign markets, unless a corresponding reduction of time

was made by our competitors. In the case of a large number of commodities and services used at home but not absolutely necessary, where the demand expands or contracts with the price, reduced hours and raised prices would result generally in lower wages or lessened employment, though not equally so in all cases. In the case of necessaries for home consumption, reduced hours would raise prices, though not perhaps greatly in the cases of bread or clothes. In these cases, self-interest being assumed, unanimity amongst labourers is hardly to be expected. The unemployed would gain by an eight hours' day at the cost of the community, and chiefly of the employed; therefore legislation would be inexpedient. In the case of mining, the limitation of hours would, on the whole, be a decided gain. The only interest affected unfavourably would be that of the consumer, who should, however, be willing to forego something to benefit a large class of overworked labourers. It is not so certain that the State should effect the limitation, since a decided majority in combination could effect it for themselves, the employers' interest not being adverse in this case to that of the employed. In the case of the East-end tailors and others worked excessively long hours (or paid very low wages) the interference of the State would merely throw a number of them out of work, and would not be acceptable to them. The long hours or low wages here come from the fact that there are too many of them seeking employment. If the numbers were less, they could prevent the long hours or low wages. And even as it is, if they wanted less hours, they could

effect it for themselves by trades unions, and the refusal to work so long; but they could only do so at the cost of some of their numbers being thrown out of work. They cannot all, therefore, afford to go into trades unions to lower hours or raise wages, which would merely have for effect the exclusion of a number of them altogether. In this particular case it is the excessive competition from excessive numbers due to foreign immigration, which lies at the bottom of the long hours. Where the numbers are excessive, neither the State nor trades unions can prevent the evils, except by excluding some of the workers, that is, increasing the unemployed.

IT remains to consider how far the State might itself advantageously undertake a certain portion of the field of industry. At present it works satisfactorily, as well as successfully from the economical point of view, the postal and telegraph services, and it has recently extended the postal service so as to include the transport of small parcels; that is to say, it has to a certain extent become, in conjunction with the railway companies, a carrier of goods. To be a complete carrier even of parcels, it should own the railways, their rolling stock and other adjuncts; and the question arises, whether the Government might not undertake wholly the carriage of goods and passengers by purchasing the railways, and working them in the public interest? It is a kind of work peculiarly suitable for Government management, being largely of a uniform and routine character, not demanding from the general managers the complicated calculations and resources required in manufacturing industry, and for which work, however responsible or difficult, the Government could secure as capable managers as the companies. Besides, the

railway interest is of the nature of a huge though qualified monopoly; or rather there are as many monopolies as there are companies without competition. Hence the chief check on the monopolists' charges in freights and rates is their own sense of self-intest, which is by no means always coincident with the public interest or convenience. It is true that our great railway companies have not abused their position to the gross extent that the companies in the United States have done, but there have been abuses, and they are liable to abuse to a degree which would not be possible if they were under the control of the Government, with no other interest but that of the general public.

If the State undertook their management, the working expenses would probably be reduced by diminished salaries to directors for one item, and the gross receipts would probably be increased by the greater regard paid to the public convenience and comfort For this would increase the number of passengers, while the amount of traffic would not be decreased by fairer freight, which would facilitate trade. The result would most likely be a fair balance of net profits beyond their present amount, which would be for the public benefit, and which might be employed to reduce taxation, or in other ways. The purchase of the railways and their adjuncts would, however, necessitate the borrowing of some 700 to 800 millions sterling, the interest on which could be paid by the profits resulting, with something left to help to extinguish the principal, it deemed advisable. And the disengaged capital of