The argument that because Section 2169 is in terms made applicable only to the title in which it is found, it should now be confined, to the unrepealed sections of that title is not convincing. The persons entitled to naturalization under these unrepealed sections include only honorably discharged soldiers and seamen who have served three years on board an American vessel both of whom were entitled from the beginning to admission on more generous terms than were accorded to other aliens. It is not conceivable that Congress would deliberately have allowed the racial limitation to continue as to soldiers and seamen to whom the statute had accorded an especially favored status, and have removed it as to all other aliens, Such a construction can not be adopted unless it be unavoidable.

The division of the Revised Statutes into titles and chapters is chiefly a matter of convenience, and reference to a given title or chapter is simply a ready method of identifying the particular provisions which are meant. The provisions of Title XXX affected by the limitation of Section 2169 originally embraced the whole subject of naturalization of aliens. The generality of the words in Section 2165 "An alien may be admitted__. was restricted

by Section 2169 in common with the other provisions of the title. The words "this Title" were used for the purpose of identifying that provisions (and others) but it was the provision which was restricted. That provisions having been amended and carried into the Act of 1906, Section 2169 being left intact and unrepealed, it will require something more persuasive than a narrowly literal reading of the identifying words this Title" to justify the conclusion that Congress intended the restriction to be no longer applicable to the provision.

66

It is the duty of this Court to give effect to the intent of Congress. Primarily this intent is ascertained by giving the words their natural significance, but if this leads to an unreasonable result plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole, we must examine that matter further. We may then look to the reason of the enactment and inquire into its antecedent history and give it effect in accordance with its design and purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the literal meaning in order that the purpose may not fail. See Holy Trinity Church v. United States 143 U. S. 457; Heydenfeldt v. Davey Gold Mining Co. 93 U. S. 634, 638. We are asked to conclude that Congress without the consideration or recommendation of any committee, without a suggestion as to the effect, or a word of debate as to the desirability, of so fundamental a change, nevertheless, by failing to alter the identifying words of Section 2169, which section we may assume was continued for some serious purpose, has radically modified a statute always theretofore maintained and considered as of great importance. It is inconceivable that a rule in force from the beginning of the Government, a part of our history as well as our law, welded into the structure of our national polity by a century of legislative and administrative acts and judicial decisions, would have been deprived of its force in such dubious and casual fashion. We are therefore constrained to hold that the act of 1906 is limited by the provisions of Section 2169 of the Revised Statutes.

Second. This brings us to inquire whether under Section 2169, the appellant is eligible to naturalization. The language of the Naturalization Laws from 1790 to 1870 had been uniformly such as to deny the privilege of naturalization to an alien unless he came within the description "free white person." By Section 7 of the Act of July 14, 1870, c. 254, 16 Stat. 254, 256, the naturalization laws were "extended to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent." Section 2169 of the Revised Statutes, as already pointed out, restricts the privilege to the same classes of persons; viz.: "To aliens (being free white persons and to aliens) of African nativity and persons of African descent." It is true that, in the first edition of the Revised Statutes of 1873, the words in brackets, "being free white persons and to aliens," were omitted, but this was clearly an error of the compilers, and was corrected by the subsequent legislation of 1875 (c. 80, 18 Stat. 316, 318). Is appellant, therefore, a "free white person," within the meaning of that phrase as found in the statute?

On behalf of the appellant it is urged that we should give to this phrase the meaning which it had in the minds of its original framers in 1790 and that it was employed by them for the sole purpose of excluding the black or African race and the Indians then inhabiting this country. It may be true that these races were alone thought of as being excluded, but to say that they were the

only ones within the intent of the statute would be to ignore the affirmative form of the legislation. The provision is not that Negroes and Indians shall be excluded, but it is, in effect, that only free white persons shall be included. The intention was to confer the privilege of citizenship upon that class of persons whom the fathers knew as white, and to deny it to all who could not be so classified. It is not enough to say that the framers did not have in mind the brown or yellow races of Asia. It is necessary to go farther and be able to say that had these particular races been suggested the language of the act would have been so varied as to include them within its privileges. As said by Chief Justice Marshall in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat, 518, 644, in deciding a question of constitutional construction :

It is not enough to say that this particular case was not in the mind of the convention, when the article was framed, nor of the American people, when it was adopted. It is necessary to go further and to say that, had this particular case been suggested, the language would have been so varied, as to exclude it, or it would have been made a special exception. The case being within the words of the rule, must be within its operation likewise, unless there be something in the literal construction, so obviously absurd, or mischievous, or repugnant to the general spirit of the instrument, as to justify those who expound the constitution in making it an exception.

If it be assumed that the opinion of the framers was that the only persons who would fall outside the designation "white were Negroes and Indians, this would go no farther than to demonstrate their lack of sufficient information to enable them to foresee precisely who would be excluded by that term in the subsequent administration of the statute. It is not important in construing their words to consider the extent of their ethnological knowledge or whether they thought that under the statute the only persons who would be denied naturalization would be Negroes and Indians. It is sufficient to ascertain whom they intended to include and having ascertained that it follows, as a necessary corollary, that all others are to be excluded.

The question then is, who are comprehended within the phrase "free white persons"? Undoubtedly the word "free" was originally used in recognition of the fact that slavery then existed and that some white persons occupied that status. The word, however, has long since ceased to have any practical significance and may now be disregarded.

We have been furnished with elaborate briefs in which the meaning of the words white person is discussed with ability and at length, both from the standpoint of judicial decision and from that of the science of ethnology. It does not seem to us necessary, however, to follow counsel in their extensive researches in these fields. It is sufficient to note the fact that these decisions are, in substance, to the effect that the words import a racial, and not an individual test, and with this conclusion, fortified as it is by reason and authority, we entirely agree. Manifestly the test afforded by the mere color of the skin of each individual is impracticable, as that differs greatly among persons of the same race, even among Anglo-Saxons, ranging by imperceptible gradations from the fair blond to the swarthy brunette, the latter being darker than many of the lighter hued persons of the brown or yellow races. Hence to adopt the color test alone would result in a confused overlapping of races and a gradual merging of one into the other, without any practical line of separation. Beginning with the decision of Circuit Judge Sawyer in In re Ah Yup 5 Sawy. 155 (1878), the federal and state courts, in an almost unbroken line, have held that the words "white person were meant to indicate only a person of what is popularly known as the Caucasian race. Among these decisions see for example: In re Camille, 6 Fed. 256; in re Saito 62 Fed. 126; in re Nian, 6 Utah 259; in re Kumagai, 163, Fed. 922; in re Yamashita, 30 Wash. 234, 237; in re Ellis, 179 Fed. 1002; in re Mozumdar, 207 Fed. 115, 117; in re Singh 257, Fed. 209, 211-212; and Petition of Charr, 273, Fed. 207. With the conclusion reached in the several decisions we see no reason to differ. Moreover, that conclusion has been so well established by judicial and executive concurrence and legislative acquiescence that we should not at this late day feel at liberty to disturb it, in the absence of reasons far more cogent than any that have been suggested. United States v. Midwest Oil Co. 236 U. S. 459, 472.

The determination that the words "white person are synonymous with the words "a person of the Caucasian race simplifies the problem, although H. Doc. 600, 68-2-5

it does not entirely dispose of it. Controversies have arisen and will no doubt arise again in respect of the proper classification of individuals in border line cases. The effect of the conclusion that the words "white person 99 mean

a Caucasian is not to establish a sharp line of demarcation between those who are entitled and those who are not entitled to naturalization, but rather a zone of more or less debatable ground outside of which, upon the one hand, and those clearly eligible, and outside of which, upon the other hand, are those clearly ineligible for citizenship. Individual cases falling within this zone must be determined as they arise from time to time by what this court has called, in another connection (Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104) "the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion."

The appellant in the case now under consideration, however, is clearly of a race which is not Caucasian, and therefore belongs entirely outside the zone on the negative side. A large number of the Federal and state courts have so decided, and we find no reported case definitely to the contrary. These decisions are sustained by numerous scientific authorities, which we do not deem it necessary to review. We think these decisions are right, and so hold.

The briefs filed on behalf of appellant refer in complimentary terms to the culture and enlightenment of the Japanese people, and with this estimate we have no reason to disagree; but these are matters which cannot enter into our consideration of the questions here at issue. We have no function in the matter other than to ascertain the will of Congress and declare it. Of course, there is not implied-either in the legislation or in our interpretation of it-any suggestion of individual unworthiness or racial inferiority. These considerations are in no manner involved.

2. TERRACE ET AL V. THOMPSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF WASH

INGTON

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Washington

Argued April 23 and 24, 1923. Decided November 12, 1923.

Mr. Justice Butler delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellants brought this suit to enjoin the attorney general of Washington from enforcing the Antialien Land Law of that state, chapter 50, Laws 1921, on the grounds that it is in conflict with the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment, with the treaty between the United States and Japan, and with certain provisions of the Constitution of the state.

The appellants are residents of Washington. The Terraces are citizens of the United States and of Washington. Nakatsuka was born in Japan, of Japanese parents, and is a subject of the Emperor of Japan. The Terraces are the owners of a tract of land in King county which is particularly adapted to raising vegetables, and which, for a number of years, had been devoted to that and other agricultural purposes. The complaint alleges that Nakatsuka is a capable farmer and will be a desirable tenant of the land; that the Terraces desire to lease their land to him for the period of five years; that he desires to accept such lease, and that the lease would be made but for the act complained of. And it is alleged that the defendant, as Attorney General, has threatened to and will take steps to enforce the act against the appellants if they enter into such lease, and will treat the leasehold interest as forfeited to the State, and will prosecute the appellants criminally for violation of the act; that the act is so drastic and the penalties attached to its violation are so great that neither of the appellants may make the lease even to test the constitutionality of the act, and that, unless the court shall determine its validity in this suit, the appellants will be compelled to submit to it, whether valid or invalid, and thereby will be deprived of their property without due process of law and denied the equal protection of the laws.

The Attorney General made a motion to dismiss the amended complaint upon the ground that it did not state any matters of equity or facts sufficient to entitle the appellants to relief. The District Court granted the motion and entered a decree of dismissal on the merits. The case is here on appeal from that decree.

Section 33 of Article II of the Constitution of Washington prohibits the ownership of land by aliens other than those who, in good faith, have declared intention to become citizens of the United States, except in certain instances not here involved. The act provides in substance that any such alien shall not own, take, have, or hold the legal or equitable title, or right to any benefit of any land as defined in the act, and that land conveyed to or for the use of aliens in violation of the state Constitution or of the act shall thereby be forfeited to the state. And it is made a gross misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, knowingly to transfer land or the right to the control, possession, or use of land to such an alien. It is also made a gross misdemeanor for any such alien having title to such land or the control, possession or use thereof, to refuse to disclose to the Attorney General or the prosecuting attorney the nature and extent of his interest in the land. The Attorney General and the prosecuting attorneys of the several counties are charged with the enforcement of the act.

1. The Attorney General questions the jurisdiction of the court to grant equitable relief even if the statute be unconstitutional. He contends that the appellants have a plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law; that the case involves but a single transaction, and that, if the proposed lease is made, the only remedy which the state has, so far as civil proceedings are concerned, is an escheat proceeding in which the validity of the law complained of may be finally determined; that an acquittal of the Terraces of the criminal offense created by the statute would protect them from further prosecution, and that Nekatsuka is liable criminally only upon his failure to disclose that fact that he holds an interest in the land.

The unconstitutionality of a state law is not of itself ground for equitable relief in the courts of the United States. That a suit in equity does not lie where there is a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law is so well understood as not to require the citation of authorities. But the legal remedy must be as complete, practical and efficient as that with which equity could afford. Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276, 281; Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1, 11, 12. Equity jurisdiction will be exercised to enjoin the threatened enforcement of a state law which contravenes the Federal Constitution wherever it is essential in order effectually to protect property rights and the rights of persons against injuries otherwise irremediable; and in such a case a person, who as an officer of the State is clothed with the duty of enforcing its laws and who threatens and is about to commence proceedings, either civil or criminal, to enforce such a law against parties affected, may be enjoined from such action by a federal court of equity. Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U. S. 453, 456; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 37, 38. See also Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 155, 162; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 592; Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. R. Co., id. 499, 506; Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 293; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 621; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Andrews, 216 U. S. 165; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 241; Davis v. Farnum Manufacturing Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 217.

The Terraces' property in the land include the right to use, lease and dispose of it for lawful purposes (Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 74) and the Constitution protects these essential attributes of property (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 391) and also protects Nakatsuka in his right to earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. Truax v. Raich, Supra; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390. If, as claimed, the state act is repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, then its enforcement will deprive the owners of their right to lease their land to Nakatsuka, and deprive him of his right to pursue the occupation of farmer, and the threat to enforce it constitutes a continuing unlawful restriction upon and infringement of the rights of appellants, as to which they have no remedy at law which is as practical, efficient or adequate as the remedy in equity. And assuming, as suggested by the Attorney General, that after the making of the lease the validity of the law might be determined in proceedings to declare a forfeiture of the property to the State or in criminal proceedings to punish the owners, it does not follow that they may not appeal to equity for relief. No action at law can be initiated against them until after the consummation of the proposed lease. The threatened enforcement of the law deters them. In order to obtain a remedy at law, the owners, even if they would take the risk of fine, imprisonment, and loss of property, must continue to suffer deprivation of their right to dispose of or lease their land to any such alien until one is found who

will join them in violating the terms of the enactment and take the risk of forfeiture. Similarly Nakatsuka must continue to be deprived of his right to follow his occupation as farmer until a land owner is found who is willing to make a forbidden transfer of land and take the risk of imprisonment. The owners have an interest in the freedom of the alien, and he has an interest in their freedom, to make a lease. The state act purports to operate directly upon the consummation of the proposed transaction between them, and the threat and purpose of the Attorney General to enforce the punishments and forfeiture prescribed prevent each from dealing with the other. Truax v. Raich, Supra. They are not obliged to take the risk of prosecution, fines and imprisonment and loss of property in order to secure an adjudication of their rights. The complaint presents a case in which equitable relief may be had, if the law complained of is shown to be in contravention of the Federal Constitution.

2. Is the act repugnant to the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment?

Appellants contend that the act contravenes the due process clause in that it prohibits the owners from making lawful disposition or use of their land, and makes it a criminal offense for them to lease it to the alien, and prohibits him from following the occupation of farmer; and they contend that it is repugnant to the equal protection clause in that aliens are divided into two classesthose who may be and those who may not become citizens-one class being permitted, while the other is forbidden, to own land as defined.

Alien inhabitants of a state, as well as all other persons within its jurisdiction, may invoke the protection of these clauses. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 336, 369; Truax v. Raich, Supra, 39. The 14th amendment, as against the arbitrary and capricious or unjustly discriminatory action of the state, protects the owners in their right to lease and dispose of their land for lawful purposes, and the alien resident in his right to earn a living by following ordinary occupations of the community, but it does not take away from the state those powers of police that were reserved at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 663; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 683; In re. Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 449; Lawton v. Steel, 152 U. S. 133, 136; Phillips v. Mobile, 208 U. S. 472, 479; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 622, 623. And in the exercise of such powers the state has wide discretion in determining its own public policy and what measures are necessary for its own protection and properly to promote the safety, peace, and good order of its people.

And, while Congress has exclusive jurisdiction over immigration, naturalization, and the disposal of the public domain, each state, in the absence of any treaty provision to the contrary, has power to deny to aliens the right to own land within its borders. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483, 484, 488; Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U. S. 333, 340; Mr. Justice Field speaking for this Court (Phillips v. Moore, 100 U. S. 208) said (p. 212) :

"By the common law, an alien cannot acquire real property by operation of law, but may take it by act of the grantor, and hold it until office found; that is until the fact of alienage is authoritatively established by a public officer, upon an inquest held at the instance of the government."

State legislation applying alike and equally to all aliens, withholding from them the right to own land, cannot be said to be capricious, or to amount to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty or property, or to transgress the due process clause.

This brings us to a consideration of appellants' contention that the act contravenes the equal protection clause. That clause secures equal protection to all in the enjoyment of their rights under like circumstances. In re. Kemmler, Supra; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 662. But this does not forbid every distinction in the law of a State between citizens and aliens resident therein. In Traux v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, this Court said (p. 337):

*

"In adjusting legislation to the need of the people of a state, the legislature has a wide discretion and it may be fully conceded that perfect uniformity of treatment of all persons is neither practical nor desirable, that classification of persons is constantly necessary. * * Classification is the most inveterate of our reasoning processes. We can scarcely think or speak without consciously or unconsciously exercising it. It must therefore obtain in and determine legislation; but it must regard real resemblances and real differences between things, and persons, and class them in accordance with their pertinence to the purpose in hand."

The rights, privileges and duties of aliens differ widely from those of citizens; and those of alien declarants differ substantially from those of nondeclarants.