Admiral TURNER. No. The Navy's current plan is to retain the 13 carriers we do have now, 12 deployable and one as a contingency reserve and training carrier. In 1985 this 13th carrier, the CORAL SEA, is planned to be dropped from the inventory. MIDWAY will then take her place as the contingency reserve and training carrier.

At that time our level would drop to 11, except the VINSON should be completed and will then keep us at 12.

PLAN TO DECOMMISSION LEXINGTON

Mr. SIKES. You are proposing to drop the training carrier, the LEXINGTON, and to train on the CORAL SEA, according to reports that have reached me. How will you train if the CORAL SEA is on a combat mission?

Admiral TURNER. Our plans, sir, are to assign the training role to existing fleet carriers, to guide the training requirement to both Atlantic and to fleet carriers as they are available and to make sure that they are scheduled

Mr. SIKES. You cannot fight a war according to the requirements to train aviators to fly on and off carriers; you have to assign combat ships to where the combat is, I would think.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, you are correct.

Mr. SIKES. How would you phase in the demand for pilots which would be greater in war than now? The demand for trained pilots would be a very important part of your naval program. If you phase out your training carrier, then in the event of war there would be no place to train people to land on and off carriers.

Admiral TURNER. I think in a wartime situation we would probably recall the LEXINGTON or keep the CORAL SEA or keep the MIDWAY in that patricular training function. I agree we would have to. Mr. SIKES. It would pose a serious problem?

Admiral TURNER. Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. I wonder if the Navy has thought that out very carefully or are you just thinking about budget?

Admiral TURNER. We are working on both problems, Mr. Sikes. At the moment that is essentially the plan, to share the training load in peacetime and to hopefully have the CORAL SEA or the MIDWAY have the ability to handle the role, unless they are deployed on a contingency basis.

Mr. SIKES. If funding were available to continue the LEXINGTON in commission for another year while you really research this problem, would the Navy be allowed to spend the money?

Admiral TURNER. I think that would have to be a decision that would have to be reviewed.

Mr. SIKES. You mean you have to get permission from upstairs, is that what you are saying?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Sikes, I think you know that Secretary Brown in hearings here committed himself to the submittal of a 5-year shipbuilding plan sometime in March. That document is in preparation now. I do not know the exact date, but it will be here in March. Mr. SIKES. I did not understand you. Would you repeat your statement?

Mr. MOORE. The statement was that Secretary Brown has committed the department to submit the 5-year shipbuilding plan to Congress in the month of March. It was not submitted with the budget. That shipbuilding plan I think will address your question.

Mr. ŠIKES. Well, how optimistic are you about the shipbuilding plan?

As I recall, a year ago we were planning on 30 ships for this fiscal year. Is that not true?

Mr. MOORE. That is correct.

Mr. SIKES. Now we have 15.

Mr. MOORE. That is correct.

Mr. SIKES. We are told that next year we are going to have 38, but these plans seem to change for the worse as the year gets nearer. Do you have any advance information on what the 5-year shipbuilding plan is going to be or how firm it will be after we get it, in view of past experience?

Mr. MOORE. As far as advance information, Mr. Chairman, I cannot give you, I do not know what the plan is going to be. There are several options that are being considered.

Mr. SIKES. There is concern on the part of this member of the committee about just how valid these plans are in view of our present experience. I think we need ships that you are not getting. I do not doubt for a moment that the Navy feels the same way, though you may not be able to say so.

Mr. MOORE. Sir, it has been characteristic of shipbuilding plans in prior years that, looking at that plan, one always plans to build more ships in the out-years than in the current budget year. That is characteristic of the budget if you look at it from fiscal years 1970 up until the present time.

Mr. SIKES. Regrettably that has been the case; as costs go up and the budget stays approximately level, something has to give. What gives is the defense of this country.

Mr. MOORE. Yes, sir, and what we are trying to do is submit a plan that is realistic, not only in terms of present budget year but the outyears. A plan that is not achievable is not a plan.

Mr. SIKES. All right.

COST TO REPAIR AND OPERATE LEXINGTON

Mr. BURLISON. How many dollars are we talking about with respect to extending the LEXINGTON for another year?

Admiral TURNER. She is in need of a period of repair work that would be estimated to take about $30 million.

Mr. SIKES. $30 million was to put her in condition to operate for the next three to five years, though?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. Not for one year?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Mr. SIKES. What would be the cost of operating it for one year?
Admiral TURNER. About $48 million.

Mr. SIKES. Would that include whatever minimal repair or overhaul would be needed at this time?

Admiral TURNER. She is now undergoing some minimal repairs, budgeted at $8.0 million to enable her to operate until March of next

year, sir. That will be sufficient until that point in time, but if she is then to go on further, we think she needs to have more work to her hull. That was the $30 million I was referring to.

So she is presently budgeted for one more year of operation and if we extend it one more year we should seriously consider a further series of repairs to her in order to enable her to be seaworthy.

Mr. SIKES. But it would not necessarily be $30 million. The $30 million Congress funded last fiscal year would be for a 5-year operation.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, so somewhere between the cost of the FY 1978 repairs and $30 million.

Mr. BURLISON. Very well. You may proceed.

FUTURE AIRCRAFT CARRIER FORCE REQUIREMENTS

Mr. MOORE. Our Service Life Extension Program will keep all of these ships in service through the end of this century, that is the 12 post-World War II carriers. Since a carrier will not be deployable during the two years required for Service Life Extension Overhaul, it may prove necessary to build another carrier as a "fill-in" in order to keep 12 deployable.

While additional carriers beyond 12 deployed would certainly be useful, if supplied with the necessary aircraft and protective and logistic forces, they would have relatively little impact on an early defense of NATO against the Warsaw Pact in the central region. Here I emphasize early defense and the possibility of a surprise attack.

Since this is a major focus of our current defense program and since a 12-carrier force is generally adequate for most other needs, we have not recommended diversion of fiscal year 1979 resources to increase carrier forces.

[The information follows:]

What aircraft should our carriers carry and how can we best defend them? Because carriers have a broad spectrum of potential missions and strictly limited space and support for aircraft, compromise is essential. Striking power is the carrier's whole raison d'etre. This means a strong force of capable, survivable attack aircraft, with essential strike support aircraft. All around, the A-18 is the best attack aircraft we see for the money and the F-18 is the best aircraft to escort the strikes. Under certain circumstances, some carriers may have to survive and operate in high threat areas, where they are exposed to attack in strength by missile-firing aircraft, submarines, and even surface ships. These carriers will need "first team" defense aircraft, even at the expense of some striking power. The F-14 is clearly the best available defensive interceptor currently available and is being procured in adequate numbers to meet requirements. The S-3A plays a key role in defending the carrier against submarines; the buy of this aircraft has been completed. The E-2C airborne early warning aircraft is essential for carrier defense as well as strike support, and its procurement is continuing.

Carriers operating in high threat areas need protection beyond that afforded by their own aircraft. To provide this we are procuring AEGIS guided-missile ships, nuclear submarines, land-based maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft, and anti-submarine escort ships and systems. (All these systems have other significant missions). When operating in groups for mutual defense, protected by these and other forces, and supported by C3 and warning systems, carriers should be reasonably survivable even in moderately high conventional threat environments. The majority of our carrier forces will not have a need to operate in such severe environments, however, and can be aedquately protected with lesser defensive forces and without severe sacrifice of striking power to carry defensive aircraft.

SUMMARY

Let me sum it up, Mr. Chairman. I believe the program that we are following to modernize our tactical air force is based upon a sound rationale, and understanding of where we are and an understanding of how we got here:

The high-low mix concept remains valid in maturity. It is permitting us to modernize the force at an affordable cost, not just in procurement but in O&M, looking to the out-years. The low part, that is the F-16 and the F-18, has tremendous growth potential through advancement in weapons and tactics and we talked about some of those, the air-to-air missiles and the air-to-ground missiles. The specialized Close Air Support Battlefield Interdiction aircraft are crucial to our capability to counter an armored Blitzkrieg attack against NATO in the central region. The AAH and A-10 are complementary and we have many opportunities for further improvement in their effectiveness and survivability, by solving the target acquisition problem, introducing the next generation of precision guided munitions, and by improving our counter air defense systems.

It is premature to make a firm commitment to V/STOLS. The question remains whether or not the unique characteristics and advantages of these aircraft justify their additional cost and complexity in comparison with contemporary CTOL concepts. The advanced V/STOLS, Types A and B, that might be deployable in the 1990s must be compared with advanced CTŎLS (here I include land-based CTOLS as well as seabased) that could also be available in that time frame using the same advanced technology for the airframe, the engine, and avionics. The future role of aircraft carriers will continue to be peacetime presence, projection of force during crises and conflicts outside of the NATO central region, and protection of the Sea Lanes of Communication from United States to Europe and elsewhere. The survivability of carrier task forces in some regions during a major conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is contentious, but in my opinion doubtful. We should plan to maintain roughly the present number of carriers and continue to concentrate our resources on Fleet Defense Systems to defend those carriers, including alternatives to sea-based defensive forces.

The payoff from improving our night and adverse weather capability is very high, especially for the counterarmor mission. We have some capability today against fixed targets. The key questions in this regard are whether or not a 2-place aircraft is necessary and what weapons should be developed. Can we do it with a single weapon? These issues should be resolved during fiscal year 1979 and a course of action defined in the fiscal year 1980 budget.

The critical issue in the counter-air problem is pre-launch survivability. We discussed this yesterday. We must continue to expeditiously modernize our active air defense systems, implement passive defense measures, improve our counterattack capability or offensive counterair capabilities in whole to include the use of ballistic missiles against Warsaw Pact main bases.

I mentioned yesterday the possible use of the PERSHING missile, the PERSHING II variant, with the conventional anti-airfield attack munitions system.

We must solve our problems in command, control, and communications, and in identifying friend or foe. We must initiate development of a counter command and control capability so that we can disrupt a massive surprise raid by the Warsaw Pact air forces.

In all of these initiatives, it is essential to level the resources of our allies and improve NATO defenses uniformly, not just the United States elements. Greater cooperation in development, co-development, co-production and operations of the forces, with interoperability, is imperative and we are aggressively pursuing that. Early emphasis in our NATO initiatives is being placed on aircraft cross-servicing, so that our aircraft can land at an allied base and be rearmed, refueled, and sent back to fight; overall readiness of all of our forces and command, control, and communications interoperability, so we can talk to everybody else and vice versa.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, we ask for your support in our pursuit of all these initiatives.

Mr. BURLISON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for a very comprehensive statement. I am sure that your supporting witnesses have statements of great value and interest to the subcommittee. However, our subcommittee is operating under very severe time restraints and, unless there is objection, I believe I will suggest that those statements be included in the record at this point and that we proceed to questioning of the witnesses.

Mr. EDWARDS. May I ask one question before we do that?
Mr. BURLISON. Surely.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS

Mr. EDWARDS. Do any of the witnesses have any material points in their statements that are at variance with those of the Secretary? Are you generally in your statement supporting, what I assume to be the administration position as enunciated by the Secretary? General HENRY. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. EDWARDS. I guess silence means yes.

Mr. ADDABBO. Speak now or forever hold your peace.

Mr. EDWARDS. I do not see a lot of smiles.

General CANEDY. I think the United States Army has two points to make, if I may, sir, and it is not in opposition to the Secretary or the Office of Secretary of Defense.

We do have two particularly problems in the Army aviation program, one dealing with the Aviation Career Incentive Act of 1974 and one dealing with support of our flying hour program by this committee as cut last year and its impact on readiness.

Those are contained in my statement.

HEARING SCHEDULE

Mr. SIKES. Do you propose to hear the statements of the other witnesses or go directly into questions?

Mr. BURLISON. My suggestion, Mr. Sikes, was, because of time constraints, that we put the statements of the supporting witnesses in the record and then proceed with questioning.