that Lieutenant General Slay is not here at the moment but will be here this afternoon.

We are delighted to welcome all of you before the subcommittee, and invite you to proceed with your statement.

Before we do that, let me ask if Mr. Edwards has any opening remarks that he would like to cover at this point.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just very briefly, I have been extremely interested in the subject of tactical air. Basically what I have been trying to find out over the last few months, as many of you gentlemen sitting over there know, is this: Where are we and where are we going to be in the next 25 years as far as tactical air is concerned. I will have a number of questions along those lines.

I appreciate your coming and look forward to hearing your testi

mony.

Mr. BURLISON. We shall proceed.

Mr. Moore, we will be glad to hear your statement.

Proceed.

STATEMENT OF MR. MOORE

Mr. MOORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Edwards. I hope we can provide the answers that you are looking for. I am looking forward to this hearing. It is a privilege to be back with you today. As you can see, with my colleagues here, I have reinforcements over yesterday. First of all, I would like to introduce, personally, my colleagues here.

On my far left is Lieutenant General Tom Miller. General Miller is Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Marine Aviation. He is also Deputy Chief of Staff, Marine Corps, Aviation.

Secondly, Vice Admiral Fred Turner on my immediate left, who is a Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare.

On my far right is Major General Dick Henry, who is sitting in for General Slay this morning. General Slay is appearing at a TAC air hearing before the Senate. I believe it is the Senate Armed Services Committee. As you have indicated, he will be with us this afternoon.

Finally, Brigadier General Charles Canedy on my immediate right, who is the Deputy Director of Requirements, Army Aviation Officer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the Army.

It is a privilege to have these men with me this morning.

I will follow more or less the statement that has been handed out this morning as a revision to the one submitted earlier, Mr. Chairman.

Now and over the next few years, we face challenges, opportunities and decisions in tactical aircraft procurement, development and research that are extremely important to the long-term characteristics and capabilities of our airpower and thus to the defense and national security issues of our country.

We are at a turning point in many respects, although much of the defense tactical aircraft program and fiscal year 1979 budget request reflects the momentum of programs that began years ago and have been debated extensively within the department, in previous administrations, as well as this one. They have been debated in Congress and in public. It is, however, most appropriate to review for you the directions in which this momentum is carrying us and whether or not

these are still the right directions in today's world facing the threats that we face today and those we anticipate in the future. Gentlemen, I can assure you this new administration has certainly done so.

In this statement, I will first lay out the key tactical air issues that the department faced in putting together its first budget and the rationale for the decisions we have made. In discussing these issues, I believe the challenges we face today and will face in the future in view of the threat trends will be apparent. The discussion of the issues will, I hope, convey to you how advanced technology will permit us to continue dramatic qualitative improvements to our tactical airpower in the future if we go about exploitation of it properly. We also must place continued attention to unit acquisition and support costs will permit us to achieve and maintain adequate force levels.

KEY CURRENT AND FYDP

Let me first simply state the central issues and then go on to discuss each of them and how they were resolved before this budget was submitted or will be resolved in the near term or during the FYDP period of fiscal years 1979-1983.

1. Is the high-low mix concept still valid and in fact, is that what we will have in the mix of F-14s, F-15s, F-16s and F/A-18s that we've planned for?

2. Can our close air support aircraft survive against enemy air defense that exists on the battlefield today and effectively carry out their missions? Do we need both the AAH and A-10?

3. What should be the future role of aircraft carriers? How many do we need? What aircraft should they carry and how can we best defend them?

4. Do V/STOL aircraft offer sufficient advantages in utility, effectiveness or basing flexibility to offset their higher complexity and cost-which appears to be a certainty?

5. How can we best achieve a greater night/adverse weather fighting capability? And this is one which I won't dwell on today because we covered it fairly thoroughly yesterday, and that is, what is the best mix of defensive missiles, offensive missiles, defensive aircraft, offensive aircraft and passive defense for NATO central region counter-air?

Mr. Chairman, this is clearly not a complete list of the issues. I think I have included the more important ones. I have not explicitly included such important areas as air defense suppression, which must be carried out on the battlefield in order for our tactical aircraft to successfully carry out their missions, electronic warfare, theater nuclear forces, command control and communications, surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence-related systems, which is all important if we hope to be able to use both the present and the next generation of precision-guided munitions. I have not included tactical airlift and other combat aircraft support issues, training, tactics and reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM). All of those are important. I will try to focus, in the limited time available, on the most important issues and those that I believe will be of most concern to the subcommittee.

May I go on now and discuss each of these major issues in turn?

HIGH-LOW MIX

The High-Low Mix concept emerged out of the late '60s after a largely unsuccessful pursuit of all-purpose aircraft (e.g., the TFX). We do have the F-111, and it is a capable aircraft. It doesn't achieve the all purpose goals which we had in that era.

As you may recall, competitive prototyping was carried out in the early '70s, largely under Secretary Packard's initiative, leading to the development of the F-16 and the YF-17 which in turn has taken us to the F/A-18 aircraft that we have under development today. Some critics still argue that the low part of the mix is so expensive that the concept has been violated. I hope that I can dispute that today. The facts on costs when properly stated and analysis of military effectiveness backed up by flight tests we have done on the prototype programs as well as the F-14 case, the development program, strongly support today's conclusion that the lowest cost way to modernize the current Air Force and Navy tactical air forces and to meet our force structure objectives with a balanced superior capability is with the combination of the F-15/F-16 in the Air Force, the F-14, the F-18, and the A-18 in the Navy.

COMPARING AIRCRAFT COSTS

In comparing the costs, there is a wrong way and a right way. The comparison has sometimes been made the wrong way in the press. For example, because of different inflation effects in costing the program, it is wrong to compare the program unit costs of two different aircraft in then-year dollars if the time spans don't cover the same years, and this is certainly true if you are looking at the F-16 in comparison to the F-15 and more so if you are looking at the F-18 in comparison with the F-14. Confusion results also from the number of different ways the cost of a single aircraft can be defined and the source of the estimate if we are talking about future costs. As far as sources are concerned, the contractor is one source. The service program manager is another source. Our own independent costing group in OSD is still a third source.

[The information follows:]

The following table shows the wrong way and right way to compare these costs:

I have marked with an asterisk the wrong way, which is to compare then-year costs for aircraft which will be produced over different time spans. This should be obvious. I show the costs for the flyaway unit

costs, which is the lowest number you generally see in looking at costs. That is the cost of the basic airframe, engine, avionics, and so forth, when the airplane is rolled out of the factory.

I also show the higher procurement unit cost, which includes spares and other elements of cost, but not the RDT&E.

The program unit cost is the total cost of that program, including RDT&E, and all of the support equipment and spares and so forth, and that is the highest number that you will see.

We might leave that up there while I go on with the statement.

F-15/F-16 MIX

The F-16 program is proceeding successfully on schedule and was approved by the DSARC in October 1977 for full-scale production in the company of foreign members from the European production group. The unanimous decision was made to proceed with full-scale production of the F-16. We will take deliveries beginning in August of this year for the operational testing phase of this program. we will take first deliveries for operational use of the aircraft.

The performance of the F-16 is excellent. It has been demonstrated. The projected acquisition and O&M costs, the high reliability, availability and decreased maintenance manpower justify, I think, your continued full support of this excellent program. Studies that we have carried out in OSD, and that the Air Force has carried out, indicate that the F-15/F-16 mix is a very cost effective solution to counter the rapid buildup of modern Soviet tactical aircraft, and this buildup was discussed yesterday, and I think probably today there will be further discussion of that. Furthermore, and this is all important, we are gaining in this program the advantages of some commonality between the F-15 and F-16 in terms of the engines and standardization/interoperability with some of our NATO Allies (Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway).

Let me turn now to the more contentious question of the F-14 and F/A-18 mix.

F-14/F-18 MIX

I want to emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that there is a pressing need to modernize naval and Marine Corps aviation by replacing the aging F-4, A-7, and possibly the A-4 aircraft in both the fighter escort and attack roles. The F-18 has been developed for this purpose with emphasis on lower acquisition costs, but equally important, lower O&M costs and higher availability. Production of the F-18 and F-14 aircraft will provide the degree of operational flexibility needed for adequate military effectiveness at a cost that will allow modernization of the entire force. We all agree that the F-14 is a proven performer. That is why we wish to continue to buy significant numbers in future years. Of course, the total number that we buy is governed by the size of the carrier force and the mix of aircraft assigned to such ships, and we seek the optimum mix in terms of cost and effectiveness.

Mr. BURLISON. Mr. Moore, in the middle of the paragraph there, speaking of the F-18 higher availability, what do you mean specifically by "high availability"?

.

Mr. MOORE. Sir, I mean the availability that is reflected in the mean time, the mean flight time in hours, between failures, and the mean time to repair the aircraft.

Mr. BURLISON. You may proceed.

Mr. MOORE. That is the fraction of the time that it is available to operate and carry out its missions. The F-14 weapons system, which includes a long range, very capable radar system and the long-range PHOENIX missile is the best long-range interceptor in the world. It also has an excellent air superiority capability as a combat fighter, but that aircraft is very expensive, and it is a complex aircraft to buy, to operate and to maintain.

NAVY CAPABILITIES AGAINST BACKFIRE BOMBER

In a NATO conventional war with the Warsaw Pact in the central region, the principal and most difficult mission of the Navy would be to protect the sea lanes of communication from the U.S. to Europe, and probably also from the Persian Gulf to the U.S. and the Persian Gulf to Europe. The threats to those sea lanes are primarily Soviet submarines with torpedoes and cruise missiles, and Soviet long-range naval aviation; i.e., the Backfire bomber carrying standoff missiles. and the antiship role poses a very severe threat to our carrier task forces. Our current view is that the Backfire is the most severe threat to the carrier. It certainly is the newest element of that threat, that is, the Backfire with the missile, but it is far from being

the only threat that we have to worry about.

The best present sea-based air counter to the BACKFIRE directly is the F-14 with its PHOENIX, but it also needs the E-2C airborne early warning system in order that the F-14 can be launched off the deck and intercept the BACKFIRE before the BACKFIRE launches its standoff antiship missiles. The E-2C is essential. Those will particularly stress the deck-launched interceptors, which will include the F-14 and hopefully also the F-18.

A strong fleet air defense capability, in addition to the F-14, is essential to defend against the BÂCKFIRE launched missiles, and the 13 other types of antiship missiles that can be launched from the air, or from submarines or from surface ships. This is the rationale, the foundation, for the AEGIS fleet air defense system, the Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System (SIRCS), which is a total system including a new anti-aircraft missile. It is the rationale for the long, medium and the short-range missiles we are acquiring and developing and also for the so-called close-in weapons systems (CIWS), the last ditch defense capability which will be done with an antiaircraft gun system called PHALANX. We are going into production in the near term with PHALANX.

In this overall picture there is an important role for the F-18 in defending against cruise missiles, although initially the F-18 with only the AIM-7F SPARROW missile, and the AIM-9L SIDEWINDER air-to-air missiles will not be as effective an interceptor as the F-14 against the BACKFIRE. When the BACKFIRE carries the the F-18 will have a capability to intercept the other air-to-surface and surface-to-surface antiship missiles that exist in today's threat. As we introduce improved and