followed by us on the north-west frontier, which, from its climate, is suited for the European constitution.

It is on the efficiency of the disposable field force that our reliance must ever mainly depend; but the importance of fortification should not be overlooked, the more so in India when the nature of our hold of that country is borne in mind.

Without entering into the inquiry of the practicability of a European power invading India, either from Persia, or the Caspian and Aral seas, it may be merely remarked, that since the publication of Sir J. M'Donell Kinneir, the different accounts which have been given respecting the countries to be passed through, and which will be found collated in a work by Colonel Evans, lately published, make the difficulties in some measure more and more to disappear, as we become more acquainted with the country. This is almost invariably the case in such circumstances; distance, and the discrepancy of accounts, give a bias to the natural disposition to exaggerate difficulties. The Russian government has certainly so far the idea of such an enterprise, that they have sent embassies or envoys to the Tartar tribes on the Oxus, to ascertain the nature and resources of these countries, and emissaries to the native governments on our frontiers, to learn their disposition towards us. The difficulties of Russia in her contests in Europe, may appear to make the time for such attempt distant, but these difficulties may be only temporary.

There seems an extraordinary apathy on our part regarding these countries; all that we have learned of them is by casual reports; and so far, indeed, we do know and appear to rely on the fact for security, that if the Russians did make such an attempt, the preparations requisite would give us timely warning, and we could send reinforcements by sea more quickly than they could perform the march by land; and with greater facility, even including the distance from the coast to the frontier. On the other hand, however, it should be recollected, that Russia would scarcely think of such an enterprise, unless when other wars occupied our disposable force; such, for instance, would have been the case had she carried it into execution at the time it was threatened in 1811, and which she might have done, had Bonaparte continued in his then line of policy, namely, on terms not only of peace, but friendship, and have coalesced with her, instead of forcing a war on account of his Berlin decrees. The successes of Russia against Persia, seem to have paralysed all power of the latter; and we cannot look forward to Persia as now being an ally of any utility, for which object so much treasure has been expended in the embassies and military mission maintained in that country. Of the remaining provinces of Persia which are worth possessing, namely, those near the Caspian sea, Russia might easily have possessed herself, and probably only then waited the consolidation of her conquests from Turkey to have done so. And since aggrandizement, under all the changes of the heads of the Government of that empire, has been the policy constantly acted on, it may be inferred, that when her present difficulties are overcome, or even should these difficulties terminate by depriving her of a large portion of her European territory, it would only make her pursue, with more energy, conquests on her south-eastern frontier, for which warfare her armies and means are, perhaps, better adapted: also, in extending her conquests on the south of the Caucasus and Caspian, it must be remarked,

that she is gradually establishing herself in those countries from which India has been so often successfully invaded, and to which base of operations, the Caspian, the Aral, and the Oxus, give her means of bringing forward from Europe the requisite supplies.

There can be little doubt that the Persian, the Affghaun, and Tartar tribes, would readily assist in such an invasion,-all notoriously addicted to predatory war, and buoyed with the prospect of conquest and plunder of such a country as India, always painted in the richest colours and whilst we allow native powers, however nominal, to exist within our territories in India, we can have no security against their joining against us, especially should any partial defeat attend our first operations, and in war no constant tide of success can be expected.

A great deal may be done towards securing our frontier: and of this the most evident step is, the extending it to the Indus, instead of allowing an independent power to remain in a position so particularly favourable to afford an enemy a resting-place to organize future operations. Such the Punjab appears to be, and from Mr. Elphinstone's account, the valleys or rather banks of its streams are very productive, and the climate good. The importance of a fortified position as a depôt in this part of the frontier, must be evident. In previous invasions of India, Attock has been the great point of passage, for which it is said to be particularly favourable, on account of the passage in the mountain of Cabul, which debouches towards it. Were we here to form a strong post, as, a citadel with an entrenched camp, so as to give security to our forces in that quarter and to its depôts, and in which to collect the resources of the country, the difficulties to an invader would be very great; for, from such a situation, we could first meet and harass him in the passes of the Cabul and Kosh Mountains, and, on passing the Indus, he could scarcely venture to advance without first reducing it; but to reduce a fortress so situated by siege, would require the transport of all the equipment from a distance, and across countries that render such an enterprise next to impossible. An enemy in such case would, therefore, be necessitated to leave a large portion of his army, to blockade or mask a fortress and force so placed, or to abandon his communications. Besides these advantages, a fortress would give shelter to, and, therefore, deprive him of a great portion of the resources of the country, and from the maintenance of our position in it, probably also prevent the people from declaring against us, and consequently thus deprive him of much aid and assistance.

This is, however, only an advanced frontier, and it cannot be expected that any serious invasion could be altogether defeated here. When Bhurtpore was taken, it was proposed to keep it up as a great depôt; the intention was, however, given up, and its works destroyed. A situation on a navigable river, and commanding its passage, would evidently be better both as a military position for operations, and for the facility of obtaining supplies. Such fortified points, if selected with judgment, would be of great value and importance for our occupation of India, independent of their use if the country was invaded. They require, however, a long time for their formation, and much expense, which it is not likely the East India Company will authorise, in their uncertain tenure of the direction of its government. The only fortifications we now have are at the presidencies.

An objection made to fortresses is the amount of garrisons they require; but with a citadel, or small inclosed work for the regular troops and chief stores, this is not the case; and even in a siege, a small proportion of regular troops to give countenance to the others is sufficient, as is well stated in the Memoirs of Napoleon, Liv. ix. in discussing the importance of his depôts at Paris and Lyons, and which would have been preserved if these places had been fortified, in 1814.

"Against such fortresses people exclaim, What! cover cities several leagues in enceinte? You would require 80 or 100 fronts of fortification; a garrison of 50 or 60,000 men, and 800 or 1000 pieces of artillery. But 60,000 men is an army. Why not rather employ such a force in the field?—This objection is made against all great fortified places. But it is ill-founded, for it confounds a soldier with an ordinary indívidual. The defence of such a fortress certainly requires 50 or 60,000 men, but not 50 or 60,000 soldiers. In periods of political misfortune and great national calamities, a country may want soldiers, but is never without men for its interior defence. 50,000 men, including 2 or 3000 gunners, would defend a capital, and defy its entry to an army of 2 or 300,000, whilst the same men in the open field would be routed by a charge of 2 or 3000 cavalry. Besides, all large towns being situated on rivers, are capable of covering a part of their enceinte by inundations, and it also generally offers certain commanding positions, which if occupied, render it impossible for an enemy to enter the place without first possessing himself of them."

The facility of recruiting sepoys, and augmenting them to almost any extent, is mentioned by Sir Thomas Munro, and was put in execution by him, to garrison the places in the Deccan during the Pindarree war.

"The want of regular troops obliged me to raise during the campaign, from 9 to 10,000 peons and 300 horse. At present they are distributed in the numerous forts and garrisons with which the country is covered."Munro, Vol. ii. page 271.

This facility of raising men would prevent such places becoming a drain for their garrisons on the field army under any circumstances.

Many other remarks made by Sir Thomas Munro were noted to have been brought forward, but this would lead to consideration of the internal state of the native armies at the different presidencies, with the pay and allowances to the different ranks, and the many staff and civil situations which are open to them. The effect of which latter is to make military duties the minor consideration, and is therefore so far detrimental to the army in withdrawing attention and energy from it. This will be taken up in a future paper.

There is one point, however, which has been only briefly noticed, namely, the deficiency of our information relative to the countries and tribes extending from the Indus to Persia, the Caspian and Aral Seas: From the travels of Mr. Elphinstone, Pottinger, and Foster, we have accounts of some of these countries; and lately from Mr. Morecroft and Fraser, the information they were able to collect respecting the tribes on the Oxus. There appears, however, to be little difficulty in passing into these countries, particularly if persons proceeded under the sanc tion of Government, and even for the extension of our knowledge in natural history and geography, such expeditions would be interesting-perhaps more so than those to the Polar regions or to the interior of Africa; whilst the importance is evident of obtaining every

information of the resources of countries, and of the inhabitants, from which our frontier lies in some degree open to attack. Even of the Indus itself but little is known, and the extent to which it might be used for navigation, perhaps for steam-boats, which would become an important consideration for the defence of that side of India, and there can be little doubt our frontier must ultimately be extended to it.

The present opportunity may be taken to offer some remarks on a point of importance, as bearing on the subject previously discussed.

The machinery for an establishment, the formation of which appears to be very impolitic, has been lately sent to India; and, indeed, it may be confidently said, that such would not have been thought of, under a different relationship of that colony to the Mother country than its deputed semi-independent government. The machinery alluded to, is a very superior boring apparatus for cannon, superior to any thing in Europe, and, indeed, sufficient for the supply of guns to our whole empire; whilst that still employed in our Royal Arsenal is of an old inferior description, not partaking of any of the great improvements which have been made in machinery in the last thirty years.

Whilst this establishment is forming in India, most of our workmen have been discharged in the arsenal at home, although it is evidently desirable to keep up a sufficient number, so as not to endanger our being at any loss in the event of war. Besides this, if we consider the manufacture of guns merely as a branch of trade, it is, in this point of view, desirable not to encourage such establishments abroad.

The intercourse with India is every day improving in expedition, but the consideration of time could scarcely have been a reason; and as the freight of guns as ballast would be trifling, that could not have been an objection. The possibility of our communication being for a time interrupted by an enemy getting the command at sea, is also very distant. Besides, therefore, the withdrawing the manufacture of such important implements of war from this country, when for so many reasons it is desirable to maintain and preserve them, the existence of such an establishment in India will place the natives, or any power who may in the chances of war get possession of the country, in a better state to maintain themselves against our endeavour to subdue them.

Nearly the same reasoning is applicable to another establishment lately formed in India, namely, the Mint, the machinery for which is very perfect, and applicable for many other purposes than the mere fashioning of metals into money. The Company's territory is the only colony where the coin has not been assimilated to home currency, by sending the British coin from this country, and making it the legal money in all transactions.

Contrast the above with our policy towards Ireland, where no establishment for the manufacture of warlike stores, either naval or military, exists; perhaps, in the state in which the population of that country has been for many years, such policy was warranted. It is to be hoped and expected, however, that this will not continue to be a reason, should a more liberal policy be acted upon, which may remove all animosities and jealousies when its influence has time to be felt by the people.

W. W.

THE SWORD AND THE PRIMER.

"Aber der Krieg auch hat seine Ehre

Der Beweger des Menschengeschicks,

Mir gefällt ein lebendiges leben,

Mir ein ewiges Schwanken und Schwingen und Schweben

Auf den steigenden, fallenden Wellen des Glücks."-SCHILLER.

"THE schoolmaster is abroad, and with his primer will soon put down the soldier and his bayonet." This, as you well know, gentle reader, is the most successful phrase that has been started, even in this age of phrases; and we confess it is one that we have always very much admired: it has both look and sound in its favour, fills up a vacuum to admiration in a radical gazette or harangue; contains about the number of words that a grave gentleman can conveniently carry in his head, in order to produce as an apt quotation apropos de bottes, at a reform meeting; and is, notwithstanding its pretty appearance of wisdom and philanthropy, as innocent of any tangible meaning as can possibly be wished for. "What, no meaning!" we think we hear our radical friend indignantly exclaim; "trust us, the phrase has far more meaning than meets the ear." That, we confess, is true; you attach, each in accordance with your own views, a conventional meaning to it, a proof that it contains none of itself, and you make it serve as a watch-word, which has the advantage of aiding to spread a delusion, which it is your object to render general. The plain and straightfor ward Radical, whose frankness we prefer to the Jesuitism of the Liberal, means, by putting down the soldier, to put down the most efficient supporter of kings, laws, and order; whilst the pure and simple Liberal, not the wolf in the sheep's-skin, thinks that it is the only way of bringing back the golden age; the said simpleton not having, whilst at Eton, been able to make out the first book of Ovid, part of which we shall, therefore, translate for his edification, or overset rather, as Gillies, the prince of modern translators, would probably term it.

The age of gold began: men were then just and virtuous without effort. (No bishops, deans, or prebendaries.) They knew neither fear nor punishment: no threatening laws had been engraven on brazen tables of brass, and no culprits were seen trembling before the eyes of judges, who were not then necessary for the maintenance of public tranquillity." (No wigs, no woolsack, no lawyers, no lord chancellors: the soldier it seems will not be the only person affected by a return to such merry times.) But farther: "Pines cut down on the mountains had not yet descended to the ocean in order to visit foreign climes." (No First Lord of the Admiralty.) "Men knew no other lands but those of their birth." (Thank God, no corps diplomatique.) "Cities were not encompassed by walls or fosses: there were neither brazen trumpets, nor helmets, nor swords; and nations were safe without the aid of soldiers."

"Sine militis usu

Mollia securæ peragebant otia gentes."

How delightful! And do you really think, oh, most simple of liberal men! that we soldadoes would prevent a return to such a pleasant state of things? By the beard of the Prophet, little you must know of either