THE BRITISH CAVALRY.

THE ingenious author of several papers in your Journal, who signs himself J. M. after paying Vindex more compliments than he is at all conscious of meriting for his paper in defence of the Cavalry, froni the severe remarks made against its conduct during the late war, by Colonel Napier, has proceeded to some critical observations on that part of the paper in which a general allusion is made to the important question of the power of cavalry in attacking infantry when in a state of deliberate preparation, and awaiting the attack in good order.

From one of his own articles, J. M. quotes a passage, with a view to show that he had not forgotten the effect produced upon the horses by the fire of musketry, but he tells us, that giving full weight to that consideration, he still holds his position, "that well-trained horses can be brought by the impulse and boldness of their riders, to surmount their momentary terror and to rush with their whole force and spirit upon the bayonets of the infantry squares."

He argues that as the march of intellect has not yet made horses aware of the fatal accompaniment of the noise and flame, it can only be the latter that they are disposed to fear; and in order to prove that this last obstacle is not invincible, he proposes the experiment of representing the face of a square of infantry when firing, by means of pasteboard soldiers and a contrivance of fire-works. Over this fanciful array, he maintains that a squadron of cavalry might be made to gallop without difficulty, or, to use his own stronger expression, "just as easily as they could, if they did their duty, ride over any battalion square of modern infantry." Really, if this is a true view of the subject, the defence of Vindex was little to the purpose; and instead of Colonel Napier having said too much, it would appear he has not been half severe enough upon the cavalry; for, according to J. M. it is very plain, that, had our squadrons done their duty, the French infantry could never have shown their faces at all during the war, except behind retrenchments or under protection of the walls or cannon of fortified places. This new doctrine once established, that cavalry can at any time force their horses to gallop over infantry, as easily as a Hackney-coachman compels his jades to run the gauntlet of a few squibs and crackers on the 5th of November, it will follow that in-. fantry are scarcely of any farther use in modern warfare except as garrisons, and the sooner our Highlanders get their breeches and boots made the better. Like many new lights which have lately dawned upon the world, this theory can by no means be supported by reference to experience. During the late wars, there must have been many good squadrons of cavalry brought into contact, at one time or another, with infantry squares; and yet so few instances of success occurred, that those which did happen are triumphantly quoted by the parties who were engaged, as signal instances of gallantry and good discipline; witness the charge of Gen. Bock and the heavy Germans, of which so much has been justly said in praise.

It would appear, from some of his expressions, that J. M. is an infantry officer. Now does it not strike him as very extraordinary, that squares should ever be brought to offer any resistance whatever to cavalry, if the old officers and soldiers know, by experience, that they are in fact totally at the mercy of the enemy's cavalry, except when

under protection of embarrassed ground or retrenchments. Do they stand their ground on a mere speculation upon the quality of the cavalry opposed to them? Are they under the melancholy conviction that, if the advancing squadrons only do their duty, their own fate is sealed and irrevocable? Let us, on the contrary, appeal to any old officer of infantry, to bear witness to the confidence and firm security with which the old soldiers, when steadily formed in square, await the attack of cavalry, even jesting at the onset, which appears so tremendous, till it draws near, and then becomes so harmless and ineffective under the fire with which it is received. And this confidence in the old soldier can only arise from experience, because men of the same station in life, when forming part of a mob in a riot, are really much more alarmed at the approach of a dozen dragoons trotting down the street, than if they saw a whole battalion of infantry in array against them. Yet, when the matter is reasoned upon, we must recollect that if you were to put an active man alone in a field with a pitch-fork in his hand, and desire a mounted man with a common sword to attack him, the advantage would be infinitely in favour of the knight of the pitchfork, for if he only got one poke at the horse's nose, it is a thousand to one the animal could not again be induced to face him. Besides, however altered in his nature by the ill-treatment and mismanagement of mankind, there is no animal which is so inclined to avoid hurting another as the horse. Numerous instances might be adduced of whole columns of cavalry passing over fallen and wounded men without doing them injury, merely from the extraordinary care taken by the horses to avoid trampling or kicking them. It is said that at least a dozen squadrons passed over Gen. Blucher when lying on the ground at Ligny, (St. Amand,) without his receiving the smallest harm from the horses' feet.

There are of course, and always must be, cases where cavalry have a fair chance of overthrowing infantry in square; for instance, when their order has been severely shaken by the fire of cannon, when they have not had time to complete their formation, when a general movement of retreat on the part of the troops acting with them, or in their support compels them to keep in motion towards the rear whenever they get a moment's respite from the pressing attacks of the cavalry, and other similar occasions, where contingent circumstances give an advantage of some decided kind to the mounted force.

J. M. does not, it appears, quite distinguish the difference between the cavalry squadron being willing, and being able, to attack the square of infantry. He does not recollect in what a different condition they will arrive to what they started. To exemplify this, let us suppose that while approaching, the squadron is struck by about twenty-five musket-balls, a very moderate allowance. Suppose that in consequence six men and as many horses fall to the ground, into what sort of order will the squadron now be thrown? Look at a squadron, in the utmost state of good instruction and steadiness, passing in line at a common trot over broken and rough ground where a few files are occasionally obliged to fall back. Are they fit for attack in that state? And what sort of order will they be in if set a galloping over this embarrassed ground? Any cornet will be able to give a conclusive answer to the question. They will be in no order at all. And yet the confusion from difficulty of ground is not comparable to that which arises from the fall of several men and horses in a charge. No one, who has not seen it,

can probably be aware of the fatal effect produced by the struggles of wounded horses in the ranks at any time, and the great difficulty of getting the riders clear of those which fall. The proposed experiment of squibs and crackers, unless accompanied by a few pitfalls dug in the ground over which the squadron must pass, could convey no just idea, and give no satisfactory proof whatever in this case.

J. M. tells us in one part of his paper, that he had himself purposed defending the cavalry from the aspersions thrown upon their efficiency during the late war; but really, if half his theory could be proved, such an attempt would be as inconsistent on his part, as it would be vain and impossible on the part of any other person. If good-will alone is necessary for breaking infantry squares, who shall ever pretend to say a word in praise of our cavalry? Why were not the whole French infantry driven either quite out of the Peninsula, or starved into surrender, after seeking a temporary refuge in the strongholds and fortresses of that country? J. M. is certainly not the advocate the cavalry would be disposed to choose, if left to their option; observe his remarks" They effected little, and excepting the gallant charge of Le Marchant's brigade at Salamanca, and Ponsonby's at Waterloo, it would be difficult to say that they produced any result whatever." Again, he says, "at the battle of Waterloo, the only occasion on which they were fairly tried, they were not found over-efficient in line fighting." So much has lately been said of the different cavalry affairs in the late wars that to recapitulate them would be tedious, but it may be confidently asserted, that no bad case has been made out by the different defenders of the cavalry, and the new-fangled hussars may safely quote Morales and Orthes as creditable to themselves and their commanders. As to J. M.'s expression of line fighting at Waterloo, it is not very clear what he intends to convey; but he will find by reference to the French accounts themselves, that the cavalry which attacked at the end of the day were hussars, supported by light dragoons, and that the force opposed to them were infantry and cavalry, in squares and lines, supported by the artillery of the Guard. The result of this attack is too well known, and too candidly admitted by the French themselves, to allow of any question as to the conduct of the British light cavalry on the occasion, and ought to have eradicated the prejudices of even J. M. himself as to the new-fangled troops he speaks of with such contempt. And after all, has he not himself told us of an attack made by thirty men of these new-fangled hussars, under Capt. Jones in the retreat to Corunna, in which they completely overthrew one hundred men of the enemy advantageously posted, and with no excuse whatever for not making a better resistance?

J. M. seems to have fully adopted the mistaken notion, that because a regiment was called hussars it necessarily followed they had weak inefficient horses. This notion first arose from the injudicious fashion of getting the tallest men possible into the ranks of those corps, which certainly made the horses look out of proportion to their riders; but though some were, perhaps, too small, yet they were any thing but weak, and, from having so much blood, were able to endure much more fatigue and privation than horses, apparently stronger, but, with less breeding. In one of our regiments, which saw much service, a note was taken, at the commencement of one campaign, of the number of blood horses, of mares, and of what might might be termed punchy,

strong, compact, but ill-bred horses; and the lists when examined, after a season of much marching and privation, very clearly showed the superiority of the former class of animals.

Now, since J. M. has entered into the detail of the materiel of our cavalry, and has in some degree proposed to account for the inefficiency he lays to their charge, by representing their horses as being in some regiments unfit for their duty, it may be well to observe to him that there is a far more vulnerable point in their equipment than what he has pointed out. The arms of the cavalry throughout the war were probably the worst of any European service. In the infantry, and above all the artillery, every exertion has been used to bring the equipment as near perfection as possible. The musket might be made possibly a degree lighter, but the locks, barrels, and general fabrication are excellent, and in the world there is not so complete and serviceable a piece of military mechanism, if it may be so called, as our field-piece, with all its simple and well-fitted accompaniments. But in the cavalry, how different is the case! the sword, their peculiar weapon, is actually not near as good as it was two hundred years ago; take the swords of any old armoury and compare them with what the heavy cavalry took to the Peninsula. Even in half the pawnbrokers' shops you will find Andrew Farrara blades, with which the modern sword might be almost cut in two without injury to the edge of the former.

The carbines issued during the late war to our cavalry were, with the exception of a few regiments, as bad as possible, besides being (for the heavy cavalry) extremely heavy and unwieldy, with an enormous bore, so that if loaded with the full charge they would almost knock a man off his horse in the recoil. It was not till about two years ago that these matters were brought into notice, and a board of officers was assembled to report upon the carbines, and to suggest such improvements as might appear advisable. After many experiments, a very good pattern was fixed upon, and it is to be hoped that no mistaken economy will prevent the cavalry being before long supplied with proper and efficient weapons. Before taking leave of the subject, there is one farther point deserving of notice as regards the cavalry during the late war, viz. that their system of movement was difficult, complicated, and not well adapted to the field. To enter into details upon this subject, especially as it has lately attracted so much attention from the authorities, would be superfluous; but it will suffice to remark, that however scientific a tactician Dundas may have been (though a doubtful point) still his work was much more like a treatise upon cavalry tactics than a manual for the formation of young troops, and the instruction of young officers, which for the purposes of war is what is really necessary, and the want of which was so universally felt that nearly half-adozen different explanatory and elementary works have at various periods been issued to the army with a view to remedy the deficiency of the regulations of Dundas.

The practical knowledge of the board of officers now sitting upon the cavalry movements, will, no doubt, produce very useful results; and at all events it is certain, that where experience is allowed its fair weight in the scale, there is no fear of improper sacrifices being made to that tactical pedantry which too frequently causes the lessons so hardly obtained in time of war to be consigned to oblivion on the return of peace. VINDEX.

ON THE ARMAMENT OF STEAM-VESSELS; THE EFFICACY OF HOLLOW-SHOT AGAINST SHIPPING, AND THE SUPERIORITY OF GUNS OF LARGE CALIBRE AND DECREASED WINDAGE.

MUCH has recently been said as to the importance of applying steam to vessels of war, and of being prepared to meet the exertions which the French may make, and indeed are making, with a view to the existence of hostilities with this country; the arming of steam-vessels has not, however, been particularly adverted to, though it merits very serious attention. The French, on the contrary, have deeply considered this question, and appear to have arrived at a conclusion, the truth of which, to every reflecting mind, cannot long be questioned. Steam-vessels, of whatever description, will be best armed by a small number of guns, but these guns should be of such a nature as to afford the utmost effect; and, if possible, by their superiority over those in ordinary use to compensate for the decrease of number.

The propositions of Lieut.-Colonel Paixhans, of the French artillery, have for some years been before the public, and his ideas as to the construction of guns, by which to project shells horizontally, have been noticed and acted on by most, if not all the maritime powers of Europe. In England we have guns constructed on his plan brought forward by Gen. Millar, but after all it appears to be little more than applying to ordnance with trunnions the well-known principle applied to carronades, that of diminishing the windage to increase the initial velocity, thereby affording an opportunity of reducing the charge. We should be inclined to remark that M. Paixhans', and our new guns, may best be described as iron howitzers, the bore being longer than usual, and, as before observed, the windage decreased. The construction of the gun is, however, of little importance compared to its application. Now the practice made by the French marine at Brest against a ship-of-theline, at different periods, proves that an 80-pounder, the hollow shot of which is 84 in diameter, may, by a single discharge, cause the destruction of a ship of the first class, and that such result may be produced either from the bursting of the shell, and the instantaneous injury thereby caused, or from fire; and it farther shows, that in every case in which a shell struck the vessel, the injury created was very important. The joint Committee of Naval and Artillery Officers in their Report on the effect of M. Paixhans' 80-pounder, observe:

Il est évident que l'effet produit a été terrible, et tel qu'on pense qu'une ou deux bombes de cette espèce, éclatant dans une batterie, y causeraient un désordre capable de faire abandonner, du moins de compromettre la défense du bâtiment atteint."

And this Committee of fifteen officers unanimously considered that the employment of these guns in steamers would be of an incalculable utility.

In our own service, a 12-inch gun, of ten diameters, windage 15 inches, charge 11 pounds, elevation 1°, range 400 yards, was fired six times against the section of a ship's side, the fac-simile of a ship-of-war; four shells struck the section, and produced an effect such as to convince every person present, amongst whom were officers of the navy, master-shipwrights, and ship-carpenters, that no vessel could have floated with such injuries; the whole of the interior was covered with splinters, one weighing fifty pounds was picked up at a considerable distance; the knees of the vessel were broken to pieces; one shot alone broke several; the knees protruding beyond the ship's side, and leaving a tremendous opening.

As to the range of these projectiles, it is perfectly satisfactory; and, notwithstanding the reduced charges, exceeds that ordinarily obtained with the common guns of the largest calibre, and with a charge equal to one-third the weight of shot.

Expériences faites par la Marine Française, par H. P. Paixhans, LieutenantColonel d'Artillerie. Bachelui, Paris.