hilated. The Russian infantry could rarely find an opportunity of giving battle in the open field, but was generally forced to throw up fortifications, in order to withstand the abrupt and violent attacks of the Turks. The former experienced the greatest difficulty in attacking and storming fortified places and positions. The Turks seldom fight well in the open plain, but make a terrific resistance when protected by their ramparts. The storming of the fortifications therefore invariably cost the Russians a treble amount of men, and an immense number of superior officers, who fell each at the head of his troop. This enormous loss of superior officers was the more sensibly felt, as the Russians had not the power of immediately supplying their places, a difficulty not experienced in other civilized countries, where officers are taken from the middle classes of the population.

In general it may be said, that at the period to which we advert, the discipline of the Russian forces was such as might be witnessed in an army regenerated and re-organized during fifteen years of peace and parade-service. In the Russian bulletins, the enthusiasm of the troops was pompously eulogised. But for what can the Russian private soldier feel this enthusiasm ? For his honour? He knows not the meaning of the word, which belongs but to his superiors. For his country? He knows none; he has none: from the moment that he becomes a recruit, he is separated for ever from his native land, and irrevocably devoted to the service of despotism. From that moment his relations, his brothers, sisters, and friends, look upon him as a wretched instrument of their servitude and oppression; from that moment he possesses neither land nor property; even his children are not his own, but like himself are forced to become soldiers; he is dragged from Sweaborg to Tiflis, from Ochotsk to Polangen; and at the close of his career, his bones are buried in a foreign land. To this cause may be attributed the Russian soldier's want of genuine heroism. The courage with which he faces death is but the blind resignation of despair. It were absurd to argue that as a nation the Russians are deficient in courage; but all nations fight well when their interests are concerned: the Russian, therefore, cannot do less; and his interest is plunder, the hope of participating, after victory, in the wealth of rich and cultivated countries. But what advantages could the Russians expect in Moldavia and Wallachia-in Varna and Szumla-in Burgas and Adrianople-or even in Constantinople! A ravaged and depopulated country-the wretched food of their moveable stores-no repose during a march-no safety in their bivouacs-an active and vigilant enemy in their rear, flank, and front-and lastly, the certainty of always finding themselves, even after the most brilliant engagement, in the same position, or if possible, in a worse. The character of the Russians is not so much influenced by superstition as may be generally imagined. The Russian soldier willingly braves death for his Obras (idol, or image of a saint) when his devotion is reinforced by a gratuity in money, meat, or brandy; but for his Obras alone he marches slowly, and allows himself to be urged forward by the application of the cane or the knout.

Every step made in advance by the Russians cost them enormous sacrifices; every fruitless victory was purchased by them at the expense of thousands of their slain. If we consider the character of the

Turkish soldier, we shall find them composed of better elements. Though a soldier he is still a citizen, nay the best of citizens. In his faith he again finds his country. Mahometanism exercises a powerful influence over the individuality of the man, over his desires and feelings, and also over the hope of enjoyment which connects his earthly existence with a mysterious future. Thence arises the courage of the Turks during a struggle for the cause of their faith; thence their contempt for death, which is to lead them to the promised bliss; thence the enthusiasm with which, when bravely headed by their officers, they advance to meet the enemy. Moreover, the Turks, like most of the Asiatics, are remarkably abstemious; a little maize suffices to appease their hunger; but with that diet, a Russian stomach compressed into a modern uniform, is not so easily satisfied. Where a hundred thousand Turks would subsist with ease, half that number of Russians would die of famine.

As to the Russian cavalry it may be observed, that the Russian dragoon takes care of his horse, because strictly watched by his officers and non-commissioned officers; but when the latter are themselves fatigued, the soldier thinks no more of his horse. But the Turk, like every southern Asiatic, regards his horse with peculiar affection; the animal is his property; his master considers him almost as something sacred, and would sooner expose himself than his favourite steed to hardship and privation. The Cossacks too love their horses, but the attention which they bestow on the poor beasts proceeds solely from a hope of being enabled by their means to make forced marches, to surprise an unguarded foe, or to gain a considerable share of plunder. When that hope fails, they give themselves but little trouble, and in general, on such occasions, display that want of intrepidity, that meanness and worthlessness of character, by which highway robbers are distinguished.

Although the Russians, during the two campaigns, received reinforcements of new recruits and all that was disposable in the interior, to the amount of more than 220,000 men, so enormous were their losses, that at the termination of the second campaign, the army was reduced to about 50,000 men. The war, therefore, had cost the Russians upwards of 250,000 men, besides a number of their best officers; and these deplorable sacrifices, made for the purpose of obtaining a useless object, would have been insufficient to save the army from total destruction, had the Turks possessed a single general acquainted with military tactics. Never was an army so much exposed, by the imprudence of its leader, to inevitable destruction as the Russian force in passing the Balkan, and perhaps in the annals of war, it would be difficult to find a page fraught with the gross ignorance and stupidity displayed by the Turkish generals on that memorable occasion. The two campaigns had not only disorganized, but completely demoralised the troops. Besides, the enormous losses sustained in the material of the army, placed the Government in a situation of great difficulty. It was impossible to conceal the deplorable results of the campaigns, which visibly affected the people and the other divisions of the army, and which were attributed by public opinion to the incapacity of the foreign generals placed at the head of the troops. But the more the Russian public were shocked and dissatisfied with the measures of

Government, the greater share of protection and favour did the latter extend to the foreigners whose conduct had excited the discontent; and the removal of many influential officers was the natural consequence of the suspicions which had gained ground.

Such was the general situation of the Russian army when the revolution declared itself at Warsaw.

Persevering in his system of heedless and hazardous energy, the Russian General abruptly advanced towards Warsaw. Compelled to change his manœuvres five times; attacking the brave Poles at one moment on the left, at the next on the right; meeting on all sides with insurmountable obstacles, he died, leaving his army between two fires. His unpardonable error-a most fortunate one for the Polish cause was that he quitted Lithuania and Volhynia before he had assembled a formidable army, in order to cover those provinces, and another powerful force with which he might have advanced upon Warsaw. Had he taken those precautions, the Poles, reduced to the feeble resources of their petty state would, notwithstanding their heroic courage, have been unable to resist the forces brought into the field by Russia.

The Poles, on their side, committed a fatal error-one which has cost themselves a fearful loss of lives, and which their brethren of Lithuania have cause to rue still more deeply. From the commencement of the revolution, the Polish Government ought to have foreseen the necessity of profiting by the favourable disposition and fermentation in Lithuania and Volhynia, with a view either to establish the theatre of war nearer to the Russian frontiers, or to engage in their interests a population of eleven millions of Poles, besides gaining the advantage of considerable resources for war, and also of seaports.* The Russian corps were then in cantonments, isolated from each other, and might have been surprised and beaten in detail, had the Polish General displayed less hesitation. Six thousand men ought to have been detached by Augustowa, and the same number by Bozeer-littowsk, on the very day on which Warsaw was evacuated, and on which the other Polish troops had declared in favour of the revolution. With the exception of the central force, which should have remained at Praga, all the force that was organized should have joined the two advanced corps. These measures were neglected, till at length the intrepid Skrzynecki, by his admirable perseverance and energetic manœuvres, effected a plan of operation which, at the commencement, might have been accomplished with greater ease, and at a less expense of blood.

*The judgments which the author of this article passes on events are not regulated by their results. He was the first who, when the revolution at Warsaw was known, inserted several articles in the Morning Chronicle of December and January last, stating the absolute necessity which existed for the advance of the Poles towards the Niemen, Lithuania, and Volhynia.

RECOLLECTIONS OF A SEA LIFE.

BY A MIDSHIPMAN OF THE LAST CENTURY.

ABOUT two years after the death of my father, a respectable old officer, who knew my family, was appointed to command a ship, which was to be fitted out for the express purpose, as he supposed, of being employed with the North Sea fleet. The name of this sort of home service reconciled my mother to accede to my wish of going to sea; though, indeed, the kind old lady never could refuse anything that I persisted in. Accordingly, in April 1795, I joined His Majesty's ship G―, in company with two other young protegés of the Captain.

The ship was not yet out of the hands of the dock-yard authorities. No men had been appointed to her, and although the officers had been appointed, they had not yet joined. Our Captain, who had come from Scotland at the same time as ourselves, in order to take command, desired us to remain on board, rightly judging that three raw Scotch boys were better there than cruising about Deptford. This was tiresome enough, but the scene soon changed. The continued hammering of the caulkers and other artificers from the dockyard, was mixed with the bustle of more general preparation. The First-Lieutenant joined; some draughts of men were supplied to the ship; and a party of Greenwich pensioners were allowed to work on board at daily hire. The operations were no longer upon the mere hull; the more complicated duties of preparing the whole machine began their progress.

The two youngsters already mentioned, and myself, were the only persons in the shape of officers, whom the First-Lieutenant, when he joined, found on board; so that, although we were ignorant of every thing, we were immediately put in requisition as his assistants, and sent off in boats with messages, or appointed to the charge of little parties of the men who were employed to get in the ballast at the lower-deck ports. I was highly pleased with the importance which this kind of command gave, and became anxious to get as much as possible done by the party in my charge. I divided them for this purpose into two parties, and endeavoured to excite emulation between them. The men, pleased or amused with their young officer, entered into the spirit of the thing, and tried which could get in most. Of course I fancied my own charge of more consequence than any thing else that was going on, and when all hands were called upon deck for some other duty, I remember running up to ask the First-Lieutenant if my parties might be spared, for I had got "a strive established between them." In this way we went on fitting out in the fine weather of a fine summer, in the river Thames, and I thought the sea-life the happiest possible; while my imagination was excited to its glories by the tales of the Greenwich pensioners, to whom I listened with avidity at every leisure hour.

It was late in the autumn before we were ordered round to Spithead, to make one of a large fleet which was then beginning to assemble, to form an expedition for an attack on the enemy's colonies in the West Indies. The fleet were under the orders of Admiral Christian. On our arrival at Spithead, in H. M. S. G-, her lower-deck guns were ordered to be dismounted and put down in the hold, to make U. S. JOURN. No. 34. SEPT. 1831.

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room for some of the troops, which it was intended should be embarked on board of her, to save, so far, the expense of hiring transports. Her guns were to be remounted on her arrival in the West Indies. She was peculiarly adapted for this kind of service, being one of those capacious Indiamen which were purchased for the navy about this time, and fitted out as men-of-war. Our Captain, however, thought it derogatory to him that his ship, commanded by an old officer, should be so employed.

That any employment must be honourable which could save to the country the expense of hiring one transport, or more, while, with the saving, the required service could be much better performed, involves a principle that was not so well understood in those days, as it has been since the time when Lord St. Vincent carried the extreme of the maxim so far, as to employ captains in their barges to pick up floating pieces of oakum. This reference is sufficiently intelligible to my naval friends, as relating to one of those extreme measures by which Lord St. Vincent sometimes caricatured the orders he gave out, that he might thereby insure their being made clear to the dullest capacity. To the uninitiated, the reference may require explanation.

Before the time when Lord St. Vincent exercised a powerful sway over the naval service, and freely used his "hatchet "* to cut down all sorts of innovations and abuses, particularly in the civil departments of the service; and, for such purpose, it must be confessed that this instrument was better adapted than the " penknife" with which Lord Nelson cut through the obstacles that lay between him and an enemy;— before this time, I say, the preservation of the stores, supplied for the use of the navy, was not attended to with that care that so important a branch of the service demanded. Zealous officers there were who did attend to those matters, but it was not so much the fashion for captains to be conversant in them then as it became afterwards, and as, I believe, it continues to be, so that they themselves supervise every expenditure, and cause the stores to be nursed and husbanded; and when worn out for one service, to be applied to another, in such a way, that not a rope-yarn of the old cable shall be lost, through the gradations of small rope, spun yarn, &c. until it is finally exhausted in oakum to caulk the seams with. Previous to this time, for instance, many small ends of rope-yarns, which were cut off in working them up, only added to the load for the scavenger's basket, which grows in a most unaccountable manner every hour, and is thrown overboard as often as the decks are swept. Or, if such shakings were not allowed to be thrown overboard, they were often kept for the much more injurious purpose of allowing the boatswain to exchange them for brooms to sweep the decks with, of which it was asserted the supply from the dockyard was not sufficient. The boatswain could always find some waterman, who came off to the ship, ready for this kind of barter. This, of course, opened the way to a temptation for him to inclose valuable rope among his shakings, and to receive something more than brooms in return. The shameful laxity in the civil department also made it a very easy matter for Mr. Boatswain to settle this business with the clerks at the dockyards, who took an account of returned

See Capt. Basil Hall's "Fragments," vol. i, page 169.