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THE

UNITED SERVICE JOURNAL,

AND

NAVAL AND MILITARY MAGAZINE.

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NATIVE ARMY AND GENERAL DEFENCE OF INDIA.

ANY observations relative to our Indian Empire are more likely to gain attention at the present moment, when so much discussion and inquiry are in progress for the object of ascertaining what alterations may be advisable in the manner of conducting its government, and settling its relation to this country. In what has hitherto, however, appeared, scarcely any allusion has been made to a point, certainly of the first importance, namely, the security of our possession,-and on what basis our hopes or confidence in that security rest. This leads to considerations which are not, perhaps, popular in this country, and, indeed, considerations to which few have turned their attention so as to be capable of judging and forming opinions, founded on correct data. Still, the immense extent of our territories, and the millions of their population, are seldom mentioned by any one without being accompanied by an expression of anxiety as to the continuance of our sway.

This feeling is frequently got rid of by terming it, an empire resting on the strength of opinion; to which term it is difficult to attach a definite meaning, unless it be the opinion of our ability to crush all attempts at insurrection-or, in fine, that we have complete military possession of the country that we have so at the present time admits not of a doubt, but whether the description of our troops, our military position in India, and our institutions and establishments there, are the best adapted to insure long continued possession and security against such contingencies, and such enemies, as may be looked forward to in the prospective difficulties and wars, which may be fairly supposed ultimately to arise, and bring that opinion of security and durability to a trial, are points which should be well considered and investigated, particularly at a time when the question of the renewal of the Charter will probably bring about important changes in its institutions, and the mode of governing the country. This should be more particularly done previous to introducing any alterations into the army; since some changes lately made in the numbers and appointments of the Bengal Division have been met with strong remonstrance, and caused discontent amongst the officers, apparently, indeed, quite disproportionate to their importance. This, of itself, is of little consequence, farther than showing the want of that military feeling and subordination which actuates the King's troops; and probably such U. S. JOURN. No. 34. SEPT. 1831.

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remonstrances would never have been offered had they been directly or even nominally under the King.

The different mutinies which have taken place amongst the native troops have been fortunately, hitherto, summarily suppressed. The policy may be well doubted, however, of maintaining so numerous a body of mercenaries, as 250,000, of one description; these also having customs and religious prejudices, which keep them so distinct from their British officers, as to admit of scarcely any community of feeling or intercourse beyond that which takes place on parade. This evidently affords much facility for conspiracy being extended to large portions of the army, and for the tampering of native chiefs, many of whom are still maintained in a certain degree of authority and independence in the midst of our possessions.

The mutiny at Vellore, in 1808, where the sepoys massacred their European officers, is well known. In Sir Thomas Munro's Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 36, a similar attempt is alluded to as having been made in 1822. He says,

"An anonymous letter, in the Hindoostanee language, was thrown into the lines of the cavalry cantonments at Arcot on the night of

urging the troops to murder their European officers, and promising them double pay. Such letters have been occasionally circulated since our conquest from Mysore in 1792. I do not notice them now from any belief that they are likely at present to shake the fidelity of our sepoys, but to show the motives by which they will probably be instigated to sedition when their characters shall be changed. But though I consider that danger as still very distant, I think we cannot be too early in taking measures to avoid it.”

The change of character here alluded to by Sir Thomas Munro is that likely to result from the circulation of newspapers and the increase of intelligence in India.

The cause of the late mutiny in Bengal still remains in some degree unexplained, many of the officers averring that the sepoys had wellfounded grievances, whilst others state that these were mere pretexts; the real cause being the horror they had conceived of the Burmese and of their country. That the mutiny was, however, of a most momentous nature, there can be but one opinion.

The "Monthly Review," No. 17, p. 196, says,

"The facts and extent of that mutiny have been variously misrepresented; but we have no doubt, from well authenticated particulars, that nothing less than the intrepid promptitude, and the necessary severity with which, when every milder proceeding had failed, the mutineers were attacked, and part of them put to the sword, could have averted the general revolt of the whole Bengal army."

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The article from which the above is extracted appears to h have remained unanswered, and it is understood to have been written by a person who had means of good information.

If we consider also the nature of any future wars which may be expected in that quarter of our Empire, it may be doubted whether the sepoys are adapted for carrying them on; for by the last Mahratta and Pindarree war we subdued, or reduced, such native powers in India as were still in a state to contend with us; we have therefore no future war of any importance to look forward to within the boundary of India. But it is only against such troops, namely, natives of India like themselves, and in their own climate, that the sepoys can be considered as

well fitted for war.

Even in the war with the Peishwah, which was against natives of India, we find Sir Thomas Munro requesting to have a proportion of Europeans, and giving for reason, that

"Europeans are necessary for the storming of forts, particularly when a part of the garrison is composed of Arabs."-Vol. iii. p. 110.

And in the work formerly quoted, page 211, it is stated, that

"In the assault of Bhurtpore, we know that not one of the native regiments could be induced to approach the walls until the European troops had surmounted the ramparts. In fact, both in the operation before Bhurtpore, and in the Burmese war, the native troops were of little more use than to swell the array of our lines."

The Mauritius and Java may be brought forward in favour of the sepoys. In both, however, a very large portion of the troops were Europeans, and the service was of very short duration, the actions fought on landing deciding every thing.

The sepoys have justly been celebrated for excellent qualities, as, for instance, patience and fortitude under difficulties and privations; but, on the other hand, if we analyze the account of the wars in which they have been employed, it will be found that they seem to possess passive rather than active courage: for instance, that in line they will remain steady under fire;-in a broken or close country, however, where skirmishers and small detachments are necessarily much employed, they are found wanting, and hence, in the late wars, it became necessary greatly to increase the proportion of British, on whom, indeed nearly all hard services, in situations even the most unhealthy, devolved. Thus, according to the work before quoted

after every

reinforcement,

"At the close of the wet season our army, could muster no larger a force than five thousand men. There were now present eight British regiments of infantry, whose original numbers would have been as many thousands; but such had been the ravages of death in their ranks, in a war of eighteen months, infinitely less by the sword than disease, that these eight European battalions could produce only three thousand bayonets."

The sepoys require, to keep them efficient, to have all those comforts about them to which they are habituated: when these fail-when their bazaar equipage is absent, as must often happen in a swampy country-they soon sink. Even in the climate of India, the superior stamina of the European soldier become conspicuous in long marches, continued for many days: in such cases they will outmarch the sepoys. From these remarks, it seems worth while to consider whether a proportion of our sepoy force might not be advantageously replaced by other mercenaries, whose constitution and physical energies are better adapted for the service and climate, in which, from the present state of our empire, they are likely to be required in future operations.

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The native powers have been in the custom of maintaining a portion of Arab troops, and in our wars with them it will be found, that it was from these we experienced most resistance, particularly in the defence of forts; of w which several instances will be found in the late war. The Arab, in physical strength and energy is equal to the European, and the successful formation of Arab regiments, drilled by European officers, has been shown by the Pacha of Egypt. It is true, however, that the Fellah is more tractable than the native of Arabia.

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French, indeed, under Bussy, just previous to our final success against him, had also commenced to form an Arab force. The Dutch employed Malay and Caffre regiments in their possessions in India, and from the period of our conquest of Ceylon, these troops have been retained by us in that island. The Ghourka would also furnish athletic and active troops. The half-caste population in India is very unimportant compared to what is generally imagined in this country, and they are chiefly employed as clerks, shopkeepers, and mechanics. From the lower grades, however, a few battalions might probably also be formed. It is ridicu lous to suppose that this population is dangerous to us; they are identified with our rule, and must remain attached to it. Instead of so large an army of sepoys, if a few battalions of each of the above were formed, the army would be more effective; for each nation has qualities fitting it for particular arms. The Arab would probably come next to the British, the Malays would form light troops, as also the Ghourkas: the Caffres, from their strength and character, would form corps to give labour.

The difference of language, religion, and customs in an army thus formed would be security against any combination in conspiracy, or of their being tampered with by native emissaries. They must be faithful to us under any difficulty, since the camp would be their home, and their officers the only persons of influence to whom they could look. They would be more expensive than sepoys, but not so much as the European, and a smaller number would be sufficient; they also would be disposable for any service, which the sepoys are not, except by volunteering and favour. The officers appointed to such troops would require to give more attention than to the sepoys, whose passive qualities make them particularly easily managed; this ought to cause no difficulty in the small force of each that would be formed. For the maintenance of discipline, it would be better to place them under the King's Government; and the same remarks apply to the whole native army. All distinctions of presidencies should also be done away, and particularly any advantage of allowances in one portion of the army over another.

One objection has been made to the employment of foreign troops in India, namely, the justice of giving employment to the natives, by forming our army from them. In answer to this, even 300,000, the largest amount of native troops at any period of the war, is a very small fraction of 80 or 100 millions, and a considerable portion of their present number would still be kept up. The sepoys are certainly the best adapted for those civil duties on which it becomes necessary to employ troops in enforcing the orders of the Government.

With an army in India, composed, as above stated, of different foreign contingents, and a quota of 25,000 British troops, which we now maintain there, namely, 20,000 King's and about 5000 European artillery and infantry in the Company's service, we might consider our possession of that country secure, as far, at least, as the having the command of an efficient army for field operations.

Sir Thomas Munro (page 189, vol. iii.) considers the proportion of British troops to the sepoys as too small, and that it should be "one to four, or, at least, one to five," as the best security against revolt. In the present state of Great Britain and Ireland, there is at least no difficulty in finding men, and if colonization be allowed, the system which Austria and Russia have adopted along parts of their frontiers, of settling colonies under military organization, might probably be advantageously

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