Forced marches is a vague term. I have seen the same troops afterwards make marches nearly double the length of those, without leaving a straggler behind, and without a fault, much less an excess, being laid to their charge; and the reason they did so was, that Gen. Craufurd, (whose ability was never questioned by me, and, therefore, required no defence from Gen. Alten,) struck by the excesses committed during the march to Vigo, had conceived, and organised, and enforced, a system of divisional discipline, which will remain a model for the imitation of all soldiers, whatever may be their nation. But to return to the forced marches. They were necessary to fulfil Sir John Moore's instructions. Now Gen. Alten was the senior officer of the two brigades; his interference was certainly not perceived by the British part of the force under his command, but he was undoubtedly the commanding officer, and, in that capacity, had direction of the whole march. Hence, if he thought the forced marches necessary, he should have interfered to prevent Gen. Craufurd from halting two or three times nearly every day for the purpose of punishing soldiers, and thus delaying the march several hours, with a view to establish that discipline by terror which ought to have been established by arrangement. If, on the other side, Gen. Alten thought fit to leave Gen. Craufurd the entire management of his brigade, there seems no reason why he should take offence at an observation in my work where his name is not mentioned. In conclusion, I have only to repeat, that, in my opinion, there never was "a worse conducted or more licentious march" than that to Vigo. I have now only to notice Sir George Murray's observations. It is difficult to discover exactly what they are meant for. If to give currency to Count Alten's narrative, their value is but small, seeing that Sir George knows nothing of the march, except from hearsay. If they are to vouch for the accurate memory of Gen. Alten with respect to the parting speech of Sir John Moore, that has nothing to do with the matter at issue. If they are to vouch for the characters of the Generals engaged, I am not aware that I ever impeached Gen. Alten's zeal or Gen. Craufurd's ability. But if they were meant, without committing Sir G. Murray to any specific fact, to give currency to an attack on my work, I can understand them. Having now, Sir, stated as much as I think fitting upon this occasion, I have only to remark, that at a future period, I may possibly endeavour to show my other opponents that their positions are not so strong as they may, perhaps, imagine. Meanwhile, Sir, I remain, with great respect for the impartiality with On the actions and merits of the French and English Cavalry. "Open be our fight and fair each blow, I steal no conquest from a noble foe."-Iliad, book vii. MR. EDITOR,-A writer who, in the July Number of the U. S. Journal, defends the cause of the cavalry against Colonel Napier, a task I had, under some modifications, proposed to myself, till I saw it taken up by so able a hand, makes a remark at page 363, that seems to call for some answer on my part. Speaking of what is said about cavalry charging infantry squares, in the article on Tactics, published in the Journal for May last, the cavalry's advocate observes: "But surely this writer forgets that much more depends on the horse than on his rider at such a moment, and that when once thoroughly confused and terrified, the animal becomes unmanageable, and no effort on the part of the rider can force him forward, or prevent his turning short round, and flying from the danger before him. It should be recollected that the fire of the infantry will inevitably produce some degree of confusion in the ranks of the cavalry," &c. &c. This accusation, as far, at least, as the forgetfulness goes, I am conscious. of not deserving, for in the article on Napoleon's expedition to Moscow, published in the last September Number of the Journal, I have anticipated the objection now urged. It is there stated, page 260, that— “Well trained cavalry horses are not frightened by the fire of musketry, but that, like all other horses, when galloping in a body, they naturally animate and urge each other forward: the men, on the contrary, when they neither know their strength nor their duty, very often are frightened, and are willing enough to throw the blame on the horses, who cannot well contradict them." During the few seconds that cavalry, charging at speed, can be exposed to the fire of the musketry, there is hardly time for the horses to become "thoroughly confused," and galloping in a body, their natural tendency always is to rush onwards. This, at all events, is a point of cavalry tactics that might and should, therefore, be decided. There is, of course, no necessity for actually charging men with loaded muskets, for as the march of intellect has not yet acquainted the horses with the danger to be apprehended from musket-balls, it is, of course, the noise and the fire only that they can be afraid of: and far more formidable-looking obstacles than infantry squares might easily be contrived and attacked, without danger to man or horse; and "my basnet to a 'prentice cap," that any squadron of any regiment in the service would ride over an array of fire-works and pasteboard soldiers, just as easily as they could, if they did their duty, ride over any battalion quarré of modern infantry. That some confusion may be occasioned in the ranks of the advancing cavalry by the fire of the infantry, I may grant, requesting the writer, however, to recollect, if he was present, or if not, to ascertain from others, how little, how almost imperceptibly little was the effect produced by entire volleys of musketry fired at Fuente De Guinaldo, and at Waterloo. On those occasions, far more confusion was produced by the horsemen not doing their duty, than by the loss they sustained. That some may fall is, of course, possible; that the fall of a front-rank man may overthrow a rear-rank man is also possible: no one denies its being a neck-breaking business; all that is maintained is, that in the present state of the infantry fire, very few, hardly any, do fall, and that all those who do not fall, should go on, certain to conquer by so doing. There was probably some confusion in the ranks of the 57th Regiment, when three-fourths of the men and officers of that gallant corps fell on the field of Albuera, and when one-half of Colonel Browne's flank battalion went down in their onset against a mass of French infantry at Barossa; the chances are, that the brave survivors did not altogether preserve the regularity of a parade movement. Yet they did not edge away from the fire of their enemies, but went on, and met in conquest the reward of their valour. Why then should the cavalry, who can be exposed to a single volley of musketry only, be justified in turning back? It will be seen by the extract above quoted that, in speaking of the cavalry, I had not forgotten the horses, though I am fairly open to the charge of neglecting, in the article on Tactics, to guard against the objection now brought forward by the author of the "Actions of the Cavalry." The truth is, that having before touched upon the subject, and intending at one time to have again returned to cavalry tactics, I thought I had said enough on that particular point in an article naturally of very limited extent. I now thank my gallant opponent, however, for giving me this opportunity of explanation, for I have at present relinquished my intention of touching on cavalry tactics, not only because I am ignorant of the new regulations about to be introduced, but because tactics seems an unfashionable subject. The science has often, indeed, decided the fate of nations and of armies, but then who would be known at Almack's as a tactician? In our ideas, it is connected with pipe-clay and blackball, a proof how much we know about it, and is, therefore, consigned to drill-serjeants and red-nosed adjutants; young men in these days deeming every thing, except les grandes opérations militaires, beneath their notice; entirely forgetting that strategy must go on crutches as long as the science of tactics is dead lame. As to the controversy generally between Napier and the cavalry, it may be observed, that the historian, in giving the preference to the French over our own cavalry, only states what he considers to be the opinion entertained by foreigners, without himself pretending to give any opinion on the subject, though his own view would have been far more valuable than any foreign authority he could possibly bring forward. If, without a close investigation, we were to judge as most men do, from general results only, we should, perhaps, give the preference to the French cavalry; for they not only aided on many occasions to achieve the victories gained by Napoleon's armies, but they still more frequently contributed to bring about the great results that sprung from those victories. Our cavalry, on the contrary, effected little, and except the gallant charge made by Le Marchant's brigade at Salamanca, and by Ponsonby's at Waterloo, it would be difficult to say that they produced any marked result whatever. But in fair fight, cavalry against cavalry, the success was invariably on the side of the British; and, all things considered, it could not well be otherwise. The French are not an equestrian people. The idea of Frenchmen following the hounds is not altogether comprehensible, and though many of the gentlemen of the ancien regime were good manège riders, the art seems to have gone out at the Revolution, and the Imperial cavalry were invariably bad horsemen. They were also indifferently mounted; and, strange to say, the cavalry of Napoleon, the great military luminary of the age, as people will call him, were not even taught the sword exercise. So ignorant, indeed, were the French officers of the real action of cavalry, that it was no unusual thing for them to receive a charge at the halt, de pied ferme, with pistol in hand, carbine presented, or sword pointed, thus depriving themselves, for the chance of what they could effect by a few paltry shots, of all the advantages naturally resulting from the strength and impulse of their horses. On the other hand, the boundless and irresponsible command of numbers made the French officers bold and enterprising, and these qualities, backed by men as eager for fame and spoil as the leaders, amply account for all the success and reputation acquired by the French cavalry. Our advantages and disadvantages are exactly the reverse of these. Our cavalry possessed, as men, the same advantage over their enemies that our infantry bad: they were besides good horsemen, for the English are naturally the best horsemen in Europe: they were far better mounted, and were mostly excellent swordsmen: above all, the onset, the closing, and the manly hand-to-hand combat of cavalry, is far more congenial to the spirit of our people and to our personal strength and activity, than the miserable trigger-pulling system of infantry warfare. If, with these decisive advantages, which all the whiskered wisdom from Petersburgh to Lisbon cannot dispute, the British cavalry made after all but a secondary figure during the war, and I pretend not to deny it, the causes of their failure must be sought for in circumstances over which the men and officers had comparatively but little control. Cavalry is essentially an offensive arm, and appears to advantage only under a bold and enterprising system of strategy, and ours was, owing to the feeble military policy of the Government, exactly the reverse. Before we took the field, a factious party had so completely browbeat the army and the military administration, that the first thought themselves almost incapable of any great professional exertion, and the second never dared, as was its duty, to encourage and call it forth. We were told to powder our heads, to square our hats, to know our places on parade, to get drunk on port-wine, if so disposed, but never to presume to think ourselves equal to the French, or to entertain a single military idea beyond the ordinary routine of garrison or field-day duty. That after such training, military talents should have sprung up in any branch of the service, is wonderful enough; that they would spring up last and least in the cavalry, whose very essence is daring and enterprise, must be sufficiently evident; and so, indeed, it proved. Foreign officers, who are totally incapable of understanding and appreciating our national character, and consequently unfit to command our soldiers, also imported and put into our heads some mistaken cavalry notions. Fancying that heavy men, mounted on slight blood horses, unequal to the weight they had to carry, constituted light cavalry, though they were, of course, the heaviest of the heavy, we almost entirely destroyed the old English light dragoons, who were equal to cope with any French cavalry, and substituted these new-fangled hussars, who, at the battle of Waterloo, the only occasion on which they were fairly tried, were not found over efficient in line fighting. This whim, after costing, like all military errors, the lives of brave men, has now fortunately passed away. We are numerically, indeed, too weak in cavalry, and too strong in the qualities requisite for forming good cavalry, to entertain an exclusive set of dandy skirmishers. The Turks made no distinction in this matter, and never asked whether the Russian cavalry opposed to them were light or heavy, but invariably made light work of the heaviest of the Muscovites whenever they could fairly close with them. Nor need we go so far for examples of what can be done by a really good light cavalry. On the retreat to Corunna, Capt. Jones, of the 10th, having only thirty men of his regiment with him, attacked a hundred men of the enemy, who were besides advantageously posted, and completely routed them: and shortly before the battle of Busaco, my gallant and lamented friend, Capt. White, attacked with his single troop of the 13th Dragoons, a superior body of the enemy, and not only overthrew them, but killed and captured every man of them. The cavalry have thus shown what they can do, and must be prepared, whether in great or in small parties, to act up to the standard they have themselves established. Having thus attempted to account for the superior reputation acquired by the French cavalry, despite their inferior qualities, I must here say a few words of the book that has given rise to this discussion. The third volume of Napier's History is, perhaps, the best of the three yet published; and if it have nothing equal to the noble eulogy on Sir John Moore, contained in the first volume, it is also free from such failures as the attempt to defend the convention of Cintra, a transaction I have often been disposed to place in a proper light. But the great advantage of this last volume will probably be found in the increasing interest of the subject: the British army is beginning to take a leading share in the contest, and the real actors in the long and terrible drama are beginning to appear upon the scene; and nobly has the gallant author done justice to their conduct, for his account of the battle of Albuera is decidedly the best account ever written of a modern battle. The very clearness, however, with which he describes the contest, leads to the failure of his subsequent attempt to clear Marshal Soult of the charge brought against him in your Journal for November 1829, of not having made a proper and skilful use of his numerous cavalry. Hav ing originally brought forward this accusation by collecting some of the feeble rays of light that modern military historians cast over the events of war, I am now enabled to substantiate it by the aid of Napier's splendid description of the battle, as well as by his attempted refutation of the charge itself. There were, according to Napier's own account, 4000 French and only 2000 allied cavalry in the field; of the latter, not one-half (only eleven squadrons out of forty-four) were British. The Portuguese cavalry were far inferior to their infantry, and could never be relied upon in the slightest degree: the Spaniards were, if possible, even worse. Of this feeble body, We except Baron Charles Alten. one Portuguese brigade was stationed on the extreme left: the 13th Light Dragoons were, strange to say, by Napier's plan, in front of the centre; and the rest, under Gen. Lumley, avowedly well posted, on the right, but having certainly not so many as 600 British sabres drawn. The French cavalry, with the exception of two light regiments that supported Oudinot's attack, were all assembled on the open ground on the left of their infantry, opposite to Lumley, and close to where the right flank of the British infantry passed in their second attack of the hill. Yet this formidable body of cavalry allowed a line of British infantry, reduced in the end to 1500 men, to come triumphantly and unassailed out of the most tremendous combat of infantry ever fought in modern times. The action too, being fought under the very bridles of this superior mass of inactive horsemen, six regiments of whom (the reserve under La Tour-Maubourg) never struck a blow during the action. But if they struck no blow for victory, they covered the retreat, upheld the crumbling fame of their leader, and, above all, protected the baggage, fit matters of consideration for men of such mighty military genius. “Oh, but,” says Napier, "La Tour-Maubourg could not have attacked Lumley with any prospect of success; the latter was well posted: the Aroya protected his front; he was also aided by artillery and infantry, and cavalry alone have little chance against the three arms united." Granted for the present, though the proposition is a sweeping one; but where was the necessity for attacking Lumley? And if the Aroya protected him from the French, it also protected the French from him; and would, consequently, have enabled them to detach a larger force against the British infantry, whilst engaged in the furious combat for the recovery of the hill, had the French leaders known how to avail themselves of their vast superiority. A few squadrons falling à bride abattue on the right and in the rear of the British, would, to all appearance, have turned the day against the Allies. That the squadrons making such a charge might have been exposed to a few rounds from Le Fevre's guns is very probable; they might also have encountered a volley from the flanking battalion of the Lusitanian Legion; but they would inevitably have overthrown the remnant of the British infantry, and have gained a victory that would most likely have changed the ultimate fate of the war; for it is now ascertained that the British fleet could not have remained in the Tagus, had the French obtained possession of the left bank of the river. I cannot conclude this letter, long as it is already, without expressing the satisfaction I have derived from the perusal of the different articles on cavalry action and equipment, lately published in your Journal; for not only do these articles bear proof of great ability, but they show that we are beginning to take a pride and interest in the fame and progress of our difficult profession, the proper study of which was far too long neglected and discouraged in this country. It was one of the great evils under which we laboured at the commencement of the war, that gentlemen thought themselves too fine to attend to minute professional details, and looked down upon elementary tactics and points of equipment, as something totally beneath their notice; forgetting that no man can become a great artist or artisan without a perfect knowledge of what can be effected by the tools he uses, or brought out by the materials he has to work upon. I am, Sir, &c. &c. J. M. P.S. In the last Number of the Westminster Review is the following passage respecting Napier : "In point of systematic knowledge of the military art, he is, probably, inferior to some of the more distinguished writers of the Continent, who, besides the benefit of regular scientific education, have enjoyed the advantage of serving in campaigns |