not idle, and aware of the great superiority of the Austrians in point of numbers, made every possible disposition, as soon as he discovered Melas's real designs, for preventing the Austrians, as long as possible, from crossing the river into the plain, in hopes that he should by this means give time for the return of Desaix, which would enable him to cope with his experienced adversary upon less unequal terms.

At six o'clock in the morning of June 14th, 1800, Gen. Melas's intentions of a general attack upon the army of the French Republic were announced by the cannon of Alexandria. The corps of Lieut.Gen. Victor was in position in front of Marengo; that of Gen. Lannes on his right. These two corps together amounted to about 18,000 men, which, with the Consular Guard, were all the force which Napoleon had at his disposal on the spot where so important a crisis was approaching. Desaix was near Novi, several miles south of Marengo, at the time he received his recall. At the commencement of the cannonade, Gen. Kellerman, with his brigade of cavalry, was directed to act under the orders of Lieut.-Gen. Victor, who, by well-concerted and extraordinary efforts, was preventing the enemy from effecting his object of debouching and deploying on the plain. He contrived, notwithstanding vast inferiority of numbers, to keep them in check during the whole morning, and by the imposing attitude which he maintained, and by means of several charges of cavalry, led by Generals Champaux and Kellerman, he repeatedly succeeded in driving back the Austrians upon the marshes of the Bormida. Towards eleven o'clock in the forenoon, the fire of the Austrians slackened; they ceased their attempts at advancing, and the action seemed at a stand. This state of inactivity caused some astonishment in the French army: it was occasioned (as afterwards appeared) by a general movement of the Austrians towards their centre, in order to the concentration of their whole force, preparatory to a vigorous effort for debouching into the plain. The French cavalry took advantage of this temporary cessation of hostilities to relieve their tired horses by dismounting.

At one o'clock the Austrians resumed the offensive, and a large body of their cavalry was seen emerging from the woods of the Bormida. Gen. Kellerman quickly ordered his brigade to remount, and perceiving the enemy taking the direction of the village of Marengo, he also moved towards it. On arriving at the village, he found Gen. Gardanne, whose brigade was there posted, and warning him of the impending attack, recommended his making instant preparation for repelling it, but received in reply the discouraging information that the whole of the ammunition, both of the infantry and artillery under Gen. Gardanne's command, was expended. Under these difficult circumstances, without the means of arresting the progress of the enemy, or even of checking the advance of his cavalry, it was deemed unavoidable to commence a retreat, in order, if possible, to place the infantry under cover of some vines a short distance in the rear. Whilst Gen. Gardanne proceeded to effect this movement, the enemy's cavalry, watching their opportunity, made a sudden and furious charge, which threw the 8th Dragoons, employed in covering the retreat, into complete disorder. Gen. Kellerman, who was with his second line formed in reserve, instantly charged the enemy's successful squadrons in his turn, and with such effect, that they were forced to seek protection

behind the fire of their infantry by a precipitate flight. This momentary advantage gave more time to Gen. Gardanne to withdraw his troops, a movement which was becoming every instant more critical.

The Austrian infantry, in heavy and formidable masses, which had been collecting towards the centre, was now pressing on, while the greater part of their cavalry was drawing off to a considerable distance on the right towards Novi, in order, as was supposed, to leave the ground clear for the advance of the attacking columns. Nothing could be more ill-advised than this movement on the part of the Austrian cavalry, and, in fact, it proved the eventual cause of their losing all the advantages which their infantry had hitherto gained. Their numbers, which amounted to nearly 10,000 men, appeared almost sufficient, as they spread their numerous squadrons across the plain, to have swept the whole of the French army before them. It must be confessed that the Austrian infantry were advancing in the full tide of success, and that their meeting with a reverse seemed at the time most improbable; but for the cavalry to move off to so great a distance from a rash confidence in the promising aspect of affairs, was an error of judgment for which it is hardly possible to find an excuse.

Gen. Kellerman, with the harassed remnant of his brigade, which having been almost constantly engaged since daybreak, had suffered severely, maintained his post in front of Marengo as long as possible, in order to cover Gen. Gardanne's retreat, and to gain time. At length he was compelled by the enemy's advancing fire of cannon and musketry to fall back, and followed only by the Austrian infantry, their cavalry having so unadvisedly quitted this part of the field, succeeded in crossing the plain to the rear without the least disorder, though with no more encouraging circumstance than the distant sight of the French battalions behind him in full retreat, and part of Gen. Mounier's division, which still seemed resolved, though now abandoned by the rest of the army, to keep its ground at Castel Ceriolo, a post on the right of the original position of the French.

It was near five o'clock in the evening before the French cavalry obtained a short respite from their fatigues by gaining the village of St. Juliano, two leagues in rear of the original field of battle; they there found Gen. Boudet's division of infantry (part of Gen. Desaix's corps) formed in line near the village, and on the south side of the Tortona road, having been hastily recalled, as before stated, from Novi to support the retreating troops. It was at St. Juliano that Colonel Savary came to Gen. Kellerman, and delivered to him from the First Consul, whose aide-de-camp he then was, an order to march on the right flank of Gen. Desaix's corps, and to support him in the fresh conflict that was about to take place. This was the only communication that Gen. Kellerman received from the aide-de-camp Savary that day, who returned to the First Consul immediately he had delivered his message.

The whole of the French infantry now about to reassume the offensive did not amount to more than 4000 men, being by no means

This fact is particularly dwelt upon in refutation of the illiberal attempt of Gen. Savary, in his Memoirs, to claim for himself the merit of having advised the charge in question while communicating the orders of the First Consul to Gen. Kellerman at this moment.

the whole of Gen. Desaix's corps, but only Boudet's division, at the head of which Desaix had placed himself; almost all the remainder of the army had been so scattered by the desperate fighting, which had continued with little cessation since daybreak, that it was impossible to say what had become of most of the troops. In some accounts published of the action, it was asserted that there was a change of front about this period of the day, but this was altogether erroneous, for from the dispersed state of the army there was no longer the material for executing such a manœuvre. Desaix's corps was, in fact, become the last resource of the French army, exclusive of about 500 cavalry collected from three or four broken regiments.

It was at the head of this small force that the brave Desaix, by order of Napoleon, was to advance against a victorious army of full 20,000 infantry, coming on flushed with success over an extensive plain with no obstacle to impede their march. With dauntless resolution he placed himself in front of his men and commenced his advance from St. Juliano: the enemy's leading skirmishers were soon driven back on the village of Cassino-Grosso. As the French column moved along the main road, Gen. Kellerman led his cavalry forward through some vineyards on the right, being partly concealed by open groves of mulberry trees; at the same time he kept a watchful eye towards the road, and waited in anxious expectation for the approaching collision of Desaix's main body with the enemy's column.

*

At Cassino-Grosso the Austrian skirmishers had fallen in upon their supports, and here it was that the small but determined band of Desaix came full upon the Hungarian Grenadiers, who led the advance of the Austrians. The 9th light infantry, deploying into line upon the march, sustained the first shock of the onset, and overwhelmed by the weight of the opposing mass, wavered for a few instants under the tremendous fire of their opponents, and then falling into disorder suddenly gave way and retired in confusion, sweeping away with it the rest of the line. It was at this moment (as it is supposed) that Desaix was killed by a musket shot through the head in attempting to rally his troops. The Hungarian Grenadiers, carried away by the impulse of success, and rushing forward without pausing to reload their muskets, heedlessly followed their flying enemy, leaving altogether unperceived and unnoticed upon their flank the cavalry of Gen. Kellerman, which, as we have before explained, was partially concealed by a sort of open orchard of mulberry trees. Instantly Kellerman saw his advantage; the moments were too precious to be lost in the usual preparations for attack: to wheel by divisions to the left, and penetrating with his narrow column through the trees, to fall like lightning upon the flank of the Hungarian column, dividing it in two and scattering it in confusion over the plain, was the work of less time than has been taken in describing this extraordinary exploit.

A flourishing dying speech, about not having done enough for the page of history, was, by some subsequent accounts published of this battle, put into the mouth of Desaix after he had received his death wound. It is for those who have been actors in such scenes to judge whether a true soldier like him was most likely to die, in so very critical a moment, with a fine oratorical address upon his lips, or with some short and decisive commands tending to repair the desperate state of disorder of those around him.

The grenadiers, thus taken by surprise by an unseen enemy, whose numbers were magnified in their eyes by the fury of the assault, did not even attempt to rally, and their overthrow was rendered irretrievable by the want of all command, the Lieutenant of the leading division of the dragoons having, in the moment of onset, singled out Gen. Zach, the Austrian commandant, seized him by the waist, and thrown himself with him to the ground. No less than 6000 men, under the influence of sudden consternation, threw down their arms and surrendered prisoners of war, and the panic being rapidly spread to the rear, the whole Austrian army gave way and retired in confusion. It happened fortunately for the French, that Gen. Melas, the Commander-in-chief of the Austrians, an excellent and experienced old officer, but worn out with age and long service, after putting his heavy columns in motion, and having seen them advance without, as it then seemed, the remotest probability of their being even partially checked in their victorious career, had considered the battle as gained, and had gone back to Alexandria, leaving directions for following up that victory, which he so confidently anticipated, to Gen. Zach, the chief of his staff, and in fact the leading person at head quarters. This officer having been seized and captured, as we have before seen, at the moment of the overthrow of the Hungarian column, the Austrian army were absolutely left without any one to circulate the necessary directions for restoring order, and rallying them on some position in their rear. Nearly an hour elapsed before Gen. Kellerman could collect about two battalions and a very small body of horse, including the Consular Guard, with which to follow the Austrians at a sufficient distance to keep up their disorder, without discovering to them the weakness of his own pursuing force. All succeeded to the fullest extent of his wishes, and the enemy fell back upon Alexandria in a condition of the most absolute defeat.

Such is the relation of the circumstances attending the celebrated charge of Gen. Kellerman; but will it be believed, that the First Consul, who was by that brilliant action saved from a reverse which never could have been recovered, (because the Austrians were actually nearer the French frontier than his own army,) will it be believed that, from a feeling of jealousy, he received Gen. Kellerman at his head-quarters in the evening with coldness and reserve, and paid him no farther compliment than "Vous avez fait une assez bonne charge?"

Of the real value of this assez bonne charge can there be greater proof than the known facts, that on the day after the battle the French army could only muster 6000 men of all arms, that Gen. Melas, little knowing the weakness of this wreck of his opponents, immediately entered into a capitulation, and that in the course of a few days nearly 60,000 Austrians, under the provisions of that capitulation, were escorted by detachments through the French lines to take up their prescribed boundary behind the river Mincio.

It must not be supposed from the narration, of which we now draw to the close, that Gen. Kellerman ever attempted to detract from the merit of his companion in arms, the gallant Desaix; on the contrary, Kellerman has ever been the foremost to declare, that his prompt arrival, his bold advance against the victorious enemy, and his dauntless efforts to stem the overwhelming rush of their attack, in which attempt he met his glorious death, fully deserved the grateful tears of

his country and the honour and respect with which every true Frenchman must ever dwell on the memory of the brave Desaix. On the other hand, if ever there was a man who would have done the like justice to the efforts of Gen. Kellerman it was this same Desaix ; but it better suited the views of the First Consul to share the glory of his success at Marengo with the dead than with the living warrior. The services of Kellerman, though constantly afterwards required and employed in above sixty battles and in negotiations of no small importance (witness that of Cintra) were kept in the shade, while the name of Desaix was set up as the idol of the military enthusiasm of France.

SERVICE AFLOAT DURING THE LATE WAR.*

BEING THE PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF A NAVAL OFFICER.

LIFE on board ship has been defined by Dr. Johnson as no better than "imprisonment with the chance of drowning;" but, however this may apply to particular cases, a little practical experience, or, as Jack would say, a short spell on board a man-of-war to finish his education, would have shown the numerous exceptions to this rule, and obliged the cynical moralist to qualify his sweeping assertion by admissions less derogatory to nautical existence. With all its désagrémens, there is not only much that is agreeable, but for the young and enterprising it possesses charms of a nature that those only who have essayed them can appreciate. Who that has ranged the trackless paths of ocean in some crack cruising frigate, the mind bent on actions of high emprise, cracking on in pursuit of an enemy, or with the objects or conclusion of a cruize or voyage before him, but has felt

"The exulting sense, the pulse's maddening play?"

And who but has found there an enviable home, in which the restraints of even a Spartan discipline are tempered by moderation and reasonable indulgence, and with messmates among whom a fraternal unanimity prevails? To all but the imbecile, habit soon renders tolerable the most trying of those physical inconveniences incident to the struggle with the elements; and in the ever renewed excitement of its vicissitudes and endless novelties, the elasticity of youth forgets, or defies its perils and hardships. Besides which, as the old song has it,

"If we've perils at sea boys we've pleasure on shore."

What class of men cling more pertinaciously to their profession than the hardy sailor, whose whole life at sea is a continued struggle with: danger and privation? On the other hand, looking only to its exceptions, as in the case of many an unfortunate wight, without

* Continued from page 823, Part II. for 1830.