other) only anxious to secure his approbation for himself and his condemnation of his antagonist In the meantime, the treaty of July 6th became known in Greece, and the General was desirous of obtaining successes which might give the Greeks a title to better conditions from the Allies, and seeing that nothing was to be gained from interfering in their party quarrels, he withdrew once more to the Isthmus, having first addressed to the Legislative Body a protest against the conduct of the three Governors, which was soon after echoed by the Admirals of the Allied Powers.

From the commencement of the Revolution, the season for the gathering in of the currants had been the period for party strifes, every one desiring to appropriate to himself a portion of the rich harvest. This year those fatal contentions were avoided by the patience of the General; he spent many days in discussing, with the various persons concerned, the proper rates of partition, and he had once more an arduous duty to prevent the recurrence of those disorders, which would at so momentous a time have occasioned serious injury to the country.

The entry of the Greek vessels into the gulf of Lepanto, and a decided advantage gained by their two officers, Thomas and Hastings, at Salona, encouraged the Greeks; and Gen. Church having concerted measures with Lord Cochrane, marched as far as Vostitza, in order to proceed to Cape Papa, where he intended to embark for western Greece, but orders sent by Admiral Codrington, and delivered by Lord Ingestrie, forced him to delay that enterprise. Had he had sufficient men and means, he would have turned the battle of Navarin to advantage, but being deprived of all support, he was reduced to the necessity of waiting for the arrival of Count Capodistrias, who, it was expected, would assist his military operations. In November 1827, the General embarked with about 800 men for Dragamestro, on board the Greek steam-vessel, commanded by Capt. Hastings. He gained some advantages there, and the Turks abandoned the country in the neighbourhood of the Aspro-potamos. With the trifling means placed at his disposal, he continued to gain slight successes in the environs of Dragomestro, Macbala, &c.; and in May 1828, he made an attack by sea on Anatolico, the difficulties of which enterprise can only be conceived by those who know the localities. The soldiery were obliged to wade up to the middle in water and mud to procure their rations of bread. That attack failed from the blowing up of a boat containing the rockets, and Capt. Hastings, after a display of the most brilliant conduct, being wounded, it was found necessary

to retreat.

On fixing his head-quarters at Agio Sorti, the General experienced so much annoyance from three commissaries appointed by Capodistrias, and who seemed to have orders to oppose him, that he addressed a letter, from which the following is an extract, to the Count. The answer, from which I also add an extract, will best bear testimony to the services of the General.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SIR RICHARD CHURCH TO COUNT CAPODISTRIAS, FROM AGIO SORTI, 7TH MAY 1828.

"Au reste il parait que la Commission a des pouvoirs supérieurs à ceux du Général-en-chef-que c'est à lui à dire ce qui est nécessaire, et ce qui ne l'est pas pour l'armée, et qu'elle n'est en rien subordonnée au Général.—Enfin je vois qu'il est de mon devoir de vous prier d'envoyer quelqu'un à commander les troupes à ma place, car je ne me reconnais plus comme Général-en-chef, et il y a d'autres qui font d'observations semblables, d'abord en voyant les ordres à la commission adressés à l'armée sous les ordres du Général Church. Enfin j'avais pour quelque temps l'intention de demander s'il y avait quelque changement à mon égard, mais j'en vois à présent l'inutilité, et s'il vous plait d'envoyer mon successeur je lui remettrai le commandement immédiatement, car je dois quelque chose à moi-même, et je pourrai tout souffrir hormis humiliation non-méritée, mais en même temps je vous déclare que ce n'est que quand je ne peux plus, quand j'ai bû jusqu'à la derniére goutte la coupe amére de pénibles services en Gréce que je cede mon poste à qui

vous voudrez envoyer le prendre, et je rendrai bien vite compte de mon administra

tion et commandement."

EXTRACT FROM THE ANSWER OF COUNT CAPODISTRIAS TO GEN. CHURCH.

"Je me résigne sans découragement à toutes les difficultés nouvelles dont m'environne la perte qu' Ibrahim Pachà nous envoie de son camp. Je me résignerai de même au résolutions que voudront prendre les étrangers distingués au service de la Gréce. Mais vous, mon cher Général, vous ne serez pas de ce nombre, et je compte sur vous comme sur moi-même. Les intrigants, (et ce pays n'en manque pas) s'efforceront de vous faire envisager tout ce qui a été fait jusqu'ici par le Gouvernement à l'égard des armées comme n'ayant pour but que de vous faire retirer de votre commandement. J'en appelle à la loyauté de votre noble caractère. Auriez-vous une si pauvre opinion de moi pour me supposer capable d'un pareil dessein? Je vous le repète, je me respecte, et je vous respecte trop, pour descendre à ce sujet dans des details qui auro t l'air d'une apologie. J'ai besoin de votre bras, de vos lumiéres, et de tous les sentiments que vous avez voués à une nation qui s'honore de vous avoir confié la conduite de ses braves."

Had these words of the Count been followed up by a line of conduct corresponding with them, the General would have had no reason to complain-but he was constantly thwarted; the commissaries were withdrawn to make room for one who vied with them in his opposition to the General's measures, and whilst the Count urged him to push forward his operations as the "acte de possession" would greatly influence those who had to fix the limits, he withheld the contingency of troops which he had promised, and without which nothing could be undertaken of an important nature. The inhabitants joined the army, but orders were given to the commissaries to refuse rations to the new troops, although they wished for nothing besides. In fact, as it is not intended here to discuss the President's conduct, but only to point out the difficulties which Sir Richard Church had to contend with, I will account for them by saying, that the Count, even whilst writing the above lines, confessed to a friend, that he had no intention of leaving the army under the command of Gen. Church; and that this plan, which he follows on all occasions, as in those of Fabvier and Ipsilanti, is rather to force his officers to withdraw themselves, by exposing them to all manner of annoyances, than to openly deprive them of their authority. Bassano, who had served during the French war as a privateer, and had subsequently been the prisoner of Ali Pacha, but the vigour of whose youth had yielded to age and misfortune, was chosen to command the flotilla which was to co-operate with the General in the attack on Prevesa. The incapacity of that officer rendered the success less important than it might have been, but the small vessels commanded by Hydriot officers penetrated into the gulf of Arta, in spite of the fire from the batteries. Of the few troops which the General had under his orders, Gen. Dentzel, the chief of Sir Richard's staff, instigated by the hope held out to him of succeeding to the chief command, withdrew a large portion, but in spite of all opposition, the General, with surprising patience and perseverance, by sharing willingly in the many privations which his officers and soldiers had to submit to, and still more by the affability and kindness which particularly distinguish him in his intercourse even with the lowest man of the army, contrived to induce them to march against Vonitza-he himself was the first man who entered the town, in spite of the fire from the fortress, and the inhabitants and soldiery having capitulated, were safely conducted to Prevesa. At Coronisi he withstood the attack led on by the Seraskier in person, and before May 1829, he found himself in possession of all the southern line of the Gulf of Årta, and having encamped at Mairmoros, he fortified those difficult passes, rendering it impossible for the Turks at Lepanto, Missolonghi, and Anatolico, to procure any supplies or assistance from Joannina. Whilst he held those positions, he had frequent invitations from the Turks of Arta to come and receive the surrender of that fortress and town, but they added that, to keep up appear

ances, the number of troops he had to lead there should exceed their own. Indeed, many Turkish proprietors began to sell their land, houses and gardens; but the General in vain applied for means to allow him to take advantage of this favourable circumstance. Count Agostino Capodistrias was sent by his brother the President to receive the submission of Lepanto and Missolonghi, when the measures taken by Gen. Church had reduced them to the last extremity. This was so glaring an injustice to the army of Western Greece, that the General, seeing at the same time that he had accomplished the great aim of establishing a reasonable frontier, determined to proceed to Ægina for the purpose of personally representing to the President the wants of the army, and the necessity of doing justice to their arduous exertions. No compliments were wanting on the part of the Count; but business was put off under different pretexts; and when at last an audience was obtained, the observations of the General were listened to with a coolness amounting to perfect indifference, and the interview ended by Sir Richard's reproaching the Count with duplicity and disloyalty, and announcing to him his intention of laying before the National Assembly, from which they had both received their respective authorities, an account of his actions, and of his motives for abandoning the command of the armies of Greece. Packed and composed as that corrupt body was, it could not be expected that they would listen to a frank and loyal address, having for its object to impugn the conduct of the Provisional head of the Government. The address was referred to a committee, which pronounced it inadmissible, yet it was in part read, and then thrown out by the clamours of men, who were either blinded by personal interest, or terrified by the lustre of the bayonets which glittered on all sides of this National Congress. The address has already been at full length before the public; it stated the services of the military, and demanded rewards for them-gave a brief and modest comparison of the state of Greece at the time the General accepted the command, and when he divested himself of it; and it ended by the General's giving in his resignation, and accounting for that step by the impossibility of his uniting to forward, or tacitly harmonizing in the plans of the Provisional Government. His resignation was accepted, for Count Capodistrias completely ruled the measures of that assembly, and he retired to await at Ægina a change in the affairs of Greece.

The circumscribed limits assigned to the new state, once more called upon him to show that attachment to the liberties of a country, for which he had suffered so much and so long, and from which the indignities which the Government had offered him, could not force him to withdraw himself, until he saw the object for which he had made so many sacrifices, her independence, securely established. The candid and soldier-like feelings exhibited in the few observations which he has drawn up relative to the boundaries of the new State, evince a knowledge of all that belongs to the subject, and sentiments of the most noble nature. He exulted in the appointment of Prince Leopold to the new throne, because he knew, in common with all those who are really acquainted with the state of the country, how advantageous the change would be to Greece, how honourable to the Prince himself, and he has shared in the disappointment which the Prince's resignation excited among all ranks of persons in that country.

Gen. Church still remains in Greece, despising the petty annoyances which he occasionally meets with, and only awaiting a new order of things, either to again enlist in her service, or to return to a home from which his long absence best shows his devotion to the cause he has espoused.

I shall conclude by remarking, that Gen. Church's exertions have had no remuneration for their object. His rank in Europe had already been superior to that which he filled in Greece-his services have been unpaid-and the large advances which he has made have not been as yet returned to him G. L.

GEN. KELLERMAN'S CHARGE OF CAVALRY AT MARENGO.

In those eventful pages which record the military deeds of Buonaparte, there is hardly any name more frequently occurring than that of Kellerman. A child of the Republic, he rapidly fought his way to advancement, and his early reputation as a cavalry officer, placed him almost from the commencement of the campaigns in Italy, at the head of a brigade. In this command it was that he earned his never-fading laurels of Marengo, by the charge which decided the fate of that long and bloody conflict. From that time until the battle of Waterloo, we scarcely find a single action of importance without mention of Kellerman at the head of either a brigade or a division of heavy cavalry. That so many of his contemporaries and even several of his juniors should have risen to the rank of Marshal during the wars of the empire, while he, though always employed, was never suffered to rise beyond the rank of a general of division, must seem strange to those unacquainted with the true cause. His talents in the field are sufficiently attested by his many gallant and successful exploits. Though a cavalry general, corps of infantry were often placed under his orders, and his being appointed one of the commissioners in such a transaction as the celebrated Convention of Cintra, shows the confidence placed by his comrades in arms in his abilities of negociation. Still Kellerman was not allowed to rise, and although the following narrative will go far towards accounting for the reasons, it may be well to observe, that Buonaparte's personal dislike to him was notorious among the higher ranks of the French army, and was supposed to originate not more in an original jealousy upon the particular point in question, than in resentment at the temerity of Kellerman, who made no scruple at all times of attributing his want of favour to his own determined refusal to part with any of his first credit, and to his resolutely maintaining his claim to a large share of the success of Marengo. But as if this distinguished officer had not endured enough injustice at the hands of Napoleon, an artful attempt has been made by Gen. Savary (Duc de Rovigo) in his published Memoirs, not only to refuse the merit of the famous charge of Marengo to Gen. Kellerman, but to arrogate it to himself by the assertion, that he, who was then the First Consul's Aidede-Camp, had recommended the charge, happening to be at the time with the cavalry. Indignant at so base an endeavour to hand down the invidious distinctions of Napoleon even to posterity, Gen. Kellerman published a short, clear, and spirited narrative of his personal share in the victory of Marengo, and it is from that pamphlet, farther illustrated by several explanatory observations since made by the General, that the following account has been drawn out.

It may be well to recall to the recollection of the reader the movements which immediately preceded the battle of Marengo. Gen. Melas, the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, had, after the operations which ended in the surrender of Genoa, retired upon Turin, where he stationed his head-quarters, in the anticipation that Buonaparte, who was at Ivrea, would either advance upon Turin, or attempt to prevent the fall of Genoa. But he was deceived in his suppositions; for the

object of Buonaparte being to get possession of Milan, and there to meet a detachment of 20,000 men on their march from Gen. Moreau's army in Germany to join him, he broke up from Ivrea, and making a feint of attempting to pass the Po at Chivasso, by which he confirmed Melas in his error, he crossed the Sesia and Tesino, although slightly opposed at the passage of the latter by a detachment of Austrian cavalry, and effected his entry into Milan without farther obstacle. Having accomplished this, he turned his thoughts anxiously to the relief of Genoa, and with this view, putting his columns again in motion and forcing his passage across the Po, he attacked the village of Montebello, which was occupied by the Austrian corps of Gen. Ott, who was returning from the capture of Genoa, to form a junction with Melas in the direction of Alexandria.

The battle of Montebello added fresh laurels to the French arms, and it was from the prisoners of Gen. Ott's defeated army, that Buonaparte first learned the surrender of Genoa; and fixing his headquarters for three days at Stradella, immediately dispatched orders to Suchet to effect the passage of the Col di Cadibona, and so place himself in the rear of Melas's army, in hopes that the latter would advance and give him battle in his present position, in order to force his way to Mantua. Melas moved his head-quarters to Alexandria, as had been expected, but advanced no farther; and the First Consul, becoming uneasy lest he should altogether escape him by marching off to his left, and opening his communications with Austria by the seizure of Milan, or by moving to his right, and attacking and overwhelming the very unequal force under Suchet, advanced on the 12th to Voghera, and next day to St. Juliano, a village situated in the great plain of Marengo, about half-way between Alexandria and Tortona. Discovering no signs of the Austrians, the advanced guard pushed forward to the village of Marengo, and there found only a small post of the enemy, who immediately retired upon Alexandria with very little opposition. This confirmed the apprehensions of the First Consul as to Melas endeavouring to evade an action with him; and judging, from various circumstances, that he was probably moving off to overwhelm Suchet, he detached Desaix to the assistance of the latter, and also to observe the communication with Genoa. It was owing to this circumstance that Desaix, though messengers were sent to recall him in all haste as soon as the truth became known, was only able by great exertions to bring his troops into action after the battle of Marengo had lasted several hours, being full half a day's march to the southward at the time he received orders to retrace his steps.

Buonaparte had been entirely mistaken in supposing that Gen. Melas was desirous of avoiding a general action; on the contrary, he had resolved, after taking the opinions of a council of war, on attacking the French upon the plains of Marengo, where the nature of the ground gave him every reason to expect great advantages from the excellence and numerical strength of his cavalry. He actively employed the evening of the 13th of June in assembling his army under the walls of Alexandria, where they passed the night, separated from the intended field of battle by the little river Bormida, over which they threw three military bridges before daybreak, by which to debouch upon the plain and commence their attack. Buonaparte, on the other hand, was