Imagini ale paginilor
PDF
ePub

my ghost deigned no farther regard to the style of the version than a faint damning praise that galled worse than censure: but I doubt me if the Chevalier de Folard were, even in the flesh, a good judge of composition; and certes his sojourning in Limbo had not tended to improve his literature. But as his coolness could manifestly betoken only either extreme bad taste or bad humour, I magnanimously resolved to pass it unnoticed.

[ocr errors]

"Your English version," began my capricious instructor after a pause, "may serve our purpose indifferently well; though it might have been desired that you had left the racy style of our Gascon in its original form. On his whole narrative of the battle of Cerizolles, to offer a general tactical commentary, were perhaps not much else than to repeat the remarks, which were hazarded in our last Colloquy on the battle of Ravenna. For, at the distance of thirty years, there are here still presented the same vicious array of the infantry in deep phalangic masses on a single line; the same total neglect of any reserves; the same absence of strategical skill which left the decision of the victory to brute force; and, consequently, the same ferocious and pitiless slaughter. You have omitted to notice that the French army-so slowly was the unwieldy system of the last age relinquished-upon this occasion was still arrayed in order of combat, under the three divisions of VANGUARD, BATTLE, and REARGUARD: with this variation, however, from the usual practice, that instead of having cavalry and infantry intermingled in all, the van was composed wholly of foot, Swiss and Gascon; the battle of the heavy cavalry exclusively, led by d'Enguien himself; and the rear of the Gruyen, Provençal, and Italian infantry, with all the light horse, including the archers' attached to the companies of gens-d'armes. But in the fight itself, so formal an array became simplified into two great masses of infantry, and one of heavy horse; and the meagreness and want of tactical combination in this disposition may be judged in the result. The victory had wellnigh been lost by the cowardice of one of these masses of infantry, and was gained essentially by the bravery of the other, aided by the light horse who charged with it: while the battle or main body, composed of the renowned gens-d'armerie and gallant young noblesse of France, vainly exhausted the fury of their shock against the bristling mass of the Germano-Spanish foot, like the broken billows which recede from a rock of the ocean. On the side of the Imperialists, the arrangements were not less inartificial and unscientific: for all the resource of the Marquis de Guasto consisted in his expectation that his lanzknechts would overwhelm the Swiss, and his Germano-Spaniards prove more than a match for the Gascons. The single accident, by which the Gruyens were attacked instead of the Gascons, disconcerted his whole scheme, and sufficed to produce the loss of the battle. The detail of brutal carnage on both sides, exhibits a revolting picture of a system of warfare, in which a ferocity that denied all quarter was substituted for tactical dexterity; and the opposing masses were impelled on each other, upon no other principle than the certainty that the weightiest and the bravest would overwhelm and exterminate the other. At this battle especially, the merciless butchery perpetrated by the Swiss and Gascons upon the Germans, after the phalanx of the latter was broken and powerless, is a remarkable example of the spirit of cruelty which more or less characterized every combat of the age. For here were no

national or religious hatreds to gratify; and the men who remorselessly massacred each other, were on both sides principally mercenaries, without the slightest attachment to the cause of their employers, or the smallest interest in their quarrel. When we afterwards find it computed by Montluc, that from twelve to fifteen thousand of the Imperialists fell in this bloody encounter, and remember, too, that this was out of an army that of horse and foot scarcely numbered twenty thousand in all, we may enlarge upon a remark which I have already made, and be permitted to doubt whether the close encounters of the infantry of the sixteenth century were not far more sanguinary even than those of classical antiquity.

66

Though thus altogether, therefore," continued the Chevalier, "this battle of Cerizolles is merely in its tactical features a repetition of that of Ravenna, Montluc's relation is not without some circumstances of distinct and curious interest. The device to which both the commander of the German bands and Montluc had recourse in mutual ignorance of each other's purpose-I mean the introduction of a rank of arquebusiers in the phalanx between the first and second ranks of pikes-is remarkable, as among the earliest expedients for combining the advantages of a front of fire and of armes blanches, in the same mass of infantry. So also may be noted, as another attempt to repair the deficiency of the unsupported battle of pikes, the Marquis de Guasto's plan of attaching thereto three hundred arquebusiers as skirmishers: for than this no more was meant by the term of enfans perdus-which by the way, my friend, you have rendered but clumsily in calling a forlorn hope. The enfans perdus were usually either volunteers or men selected for their activity, who were thrown out from a column as skirmishers, like your modern tirailleurs; and you may observe, that on the occasion before us, the pursuing cavalry were effectually held in check by the fire of the arquebusiers so attached to the retiring mass of pikemen."

"The principal force of the arquebuserie on both sides had been separated however, Chevalier, from the pikes, and seems to have been employed altogether like modern light infantry in the skirmish for the house on the plain which preceded-the general action."

"Yes; and in fact, it was the usual practice to form the arquebusiers and pikemen in distinct order even in the same column. Thus, concerning the order of march of a detachment before the enemy we are told Ils mirent toute leur cavalerie devant, et vingt ou vingt-cinq arquebuziers seulement à la teste d'icelle, une grande trouppe à la teste de leurs picquiers et le demeurant à la queue, et ainsi commencerent a marcher tabourin battant.' And on another occasion, Montluc observes the same order, placing half the arquebuses at the head, and the other half to close the rear of a column of pikes. But without dwelling farther on these illustrations of the internal array of the foot, the most interesting feature in the battle of Cerizolles is its evidence of the still increasing power of that arm, as compared with the old heavy cavalry. The victory at Ravenna was gained almost exclusively by the French gens-d'armerie; but here, on the contrary, the efforts of that gallant body proved altogether impotent; and the battle of Cerizolles deserves a peculiar distinction in the history of military science, as the first great conflict, since the classical ages, which was lost and won entirely by the encounter of the infantry." H. R.

A WINTER MARCH IN CANADA, IN 1813.

THE encouragement given in one of the late Numbers of this Journal to all officers who may have been placed in unusual situations, or in such as may tend to convey any novel intelligence, emboldens me to offer a few observations from my Journal during the march of the 104th Regiment from Fredericton, in New Brunswick, to Quebec, and from thence to Kingston, in Upper Canada. I do not flatter myself that the reader will find anything highly instructive in this relation, but as our regiment was the first British corps that ever performed such a march during the height of a northern winter, a great part of it upon snow-shoes, it may, perhaps, be deemed not unworthy of insertion in this truly national Journal.

It cannot be denied, that at the breaking out of the war with the United States, in the month of June 1812, Sir George Prevost found himself very inadequately provided with troops to defend the extensive line of frontier under his command, being upwards of eleven hundred miles from Quebec to Michilimackinack; assailable at many points, particularly all along the river St. Lawrence from Cornwall up to Kingston, and along the Niagara frontier from Fort George to Fort Erie. His disposable force of regular troops did not inuch exceed 3000 men to guard all the important points of this very prolonged base; indeed, it was currently reported at the commencement of the war, that the highest authorities of the country were of opinion that Upper Canada would not be maintained with this inadequate force. However, the judicious and firm measures of the gallant Gen. Brock, assisted by the then formidable auxiliary Indian force, which the General well knew how to humour and to wield, saved the Upper Province from being occupied by the enemy in 1812.

The imposing preparations made by the United States for the campaign of 1813, induced Sir George Prevost to run the chance of weakening his force in New Brunswick, which was considered less assailable than Upper Canada. Sir George Prevost, therefore, determined that the 104th Regiment should perform a winter march from New Brunswick to Canada, which was effected as follows. Major-Gen. Smyth, who commanded in New Brunswick, had received private intimation that the regiment was to march for Canada, which he kept secret, though from the frequent drills and marches it performed by companies, or as a corps on snow-shoes, it was evidently being prepared for some movement. On the 5th of Feb. a garrison order announced the intended march. It was hailed by men and officers with enthusiasm, as an effort yet unknown in British warfare, and, therefore, well worthy of British soldiers to accomplish.

It must here be observed, that the regiment was admirably composed for the purpose, having been raised in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, principally in the latter province, from the descendants of the veterans who had served in the former war, a class of loyal settlers, equally attached to the soil and to Old England. There were also a considerable number of Canadians in it, so that these, as well as the New Brunswickers, being, as it were, indigenous to the country, were U. S. JOURN. No. 35. OCT. 1831.

N

thoroughly fitted to endure cold and hardships; good axemen, able to build a log-hut with an axe alone; good boatmen, good marksmen, many of them as expert as Indians in a canoe, and as alert as hunters on snow-shoes. The" morale" of the corps was not at all inferior to its "physique;" as there is a characteristic cheerfulness in the Canadian soldier, inherited from his French ancestry, which being both lively and good-tempered, tended much towards lightening the labours of a heavy march, or the hardships of a campaign, and accorded perfectly with the more dogged and varied characters of the English, Irish, and Scotch, which completed the regiment.

It may appear absurd to describe a snow-shoe to some readers, but as I have felt pleasure in learning what a palanquin is, those whom duty may have called into temperate or tropical zones may be glad to know what vehicle can support the weight of a man on the light and frail surface of his own height of snow, so as to enable him to walk with ease and comfort over it, and where, without such assistance, he would infallibly perish. The snow-shoe is made somewhat like a racket; the frames of my own were just three feet in length by fifteen inches in width, of hickory, (which is tougher and more elastic than ash,) with two cross-bars to connect and render them firm; the network to support the foot is of dressed Cariboo deer, or buffalo hide, strongly interlaced and drawn very tight: that which is perfectly dressed never slackens by moisture, but continues quite elastic, which is of great importance, for if the net of the shoe becomes slackened, the fatigue of the wearer is greatly increased from the want of elasticity in his shoe. At nine inches from the front of it is an aperture, behind the eross-bar, to allow the toes to play in, with a leather strap over it, to secure the toes from slipping, and the foot is firmly secured to this spot by a long bandage of list or cloth crossed over the toes and behind the foot, round the heel, that it may not slip. My shoes cost sixteen shillings the pair, and weighed one pound and a half when dry; they were full half a pound heavier if wet, when the strain caused by lifting them to those who are unaccustomed to snow-shoes, causes an intolerable pain in the tendon Achilles, which the Canadians call "le mal de raquetté;" in this case, the sufferer must halt for a while to ease his agony, in order to collect fresh resolution to bear it anew, for custom alone enables the muscles to support the exertion, especially if the snow is damp.

The moccasin, or slipper, to be worn with the snow-shoe, is also an article of consequence, for if it be not well prepared, it is speedily saturated in wet snow, which, in a long and cold winter's march, is absolute misery: this preparation is anything but agreeable, but as the knowledge of it might be useful to officers or soldiers who may have to perform a winter march in Canada, it is proper to state what experience has proved to be best.

The slippers, or moccasins, should fit comfortably over three or even four pair of woollen socks, to keep the foot both warm and soft; it should be made of moose-deer, or ox-hide well tanned, then soaked in strong brine for twenty-four hours, in order to soften the leather and keep it moist; when drained and half-dry, steeped in train-oil for several days, until completely saturated, and afterwards gradually dried at a distance

from the fire: thus prepared, they will last a great while without being penetrated by snow or water; even shooting shoes or boots dressed in this way, are softer and more useful to sportsmen, than all the antiattrition compositions that I have ever tried.

The officers provided themselves with flannels for clothing from head to foot, besides fur-caps, mits, and collars. The men were also provided with flannels, fur-caps, and fur-mits, but the moccasins that were issued to them were totally unfit for the purpose, being contract articles of hide that had never been properly dressed; moreover, few officers or men then knew how to prepare them.

The next article of importance in a winter march through the forests of America, is the Tobogin, or Indian sledge, for conveying baggage or provisions. It is made of a hickory or ash plank, scarcely a quarter of an inch thick, about six feet in length, and a foot in breadth, so as to fit the track of a snow-shoe. The head of the tobogin is turned up, like the fingers of a hand half shut, in order to throw off the snow: attached to it on each side are two light sticks, secured by thongs, which form the sides of the vehicle, which, when it is packed, prevent any thing from falling off it. We added a pole behind, in order to assist the man who dragged it in front, by another pushing it on or keeping it back when going down hill. Each tobogin was supplied with a large tarpaulin, cut so as to pack in the most snug manner, the men's knapsacks being laid on the bottom of them, and the arms stowed on the sides. The provisions were packed on separate tobogins, the daily allowance, a short one it is true, being one large biscuit and three quarters of a pound of pork to each man. allowance was thus shortened to lighten the draught, as the men had to drag seventeen days' provisions besides the articles already enumerated, and thirty rounds of ball-cartridge per man. A man can drag this carriage with a hundred weight on it easier than he can carry his knapsack.

The

The light company was also drilled to draw a three-pounder on a kind of sledge, as well as to manœuvre as light troops, but the lightbobs abominated being made dray-horses of, as they called it; indeed, it was very laborious work, though laughable, as the gun would sometimes sink so deep, that in attempting to get it up again, the men also sunk in or fell into the snow; but this gun-drag was finally given up as almost impracticable, except for a short distance.

On one occasion previous to our march, our worthy and indefatigable Governor, Gen. Smyth, who was drilling us, in his anxiety to correct some movement, forgot he was on snow-shoes, and moving too quickly, he tripped, suddenly vanished, buried under three or four feet of snow: several of us ran to the spot where the General lay to offer our assistance; the snow being very light, had instantly covered him, the spot being only marked by an indenture in the snow; it was totally impossible to suppress irresistible laughter, but our determined chief joined in the laugh against himself, and declared he would allow no one to assist him, but would then show us the proper mode of getting up out of deep snow, which he performed very neatly, having been in the country before with the Duke of Kent: after untying one of his shoes, he placed it down firmly in the snow, then laying his elbow on it, in

« ÎnapoiContinuă »