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COMPARATIVE EXTERNAL CULTURAL AND INFORMATION DATA, 1975 1-Continued

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1 United States Information Agency-Office of Research (Unclassified) --External Cultural and Information Programs of Sclecied Countries in 1975.

2 No reporting on the subect categories.

* Include war emergency budget.

4 Pertinent data are not available..

In addition to the 103 cultural and press attaches, 23 officers hold dual cultural-press positions.

DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMC DEVELOPMENT: PROBLEMS AND

PROSPECTS

Paper by Edward G. Biester, Jr.

More than a decade of sobering experience has done much to enlighten Americans about the complex relationship between economic development and the growth of democratic institutions. In March, 1961, few of us questioned, or were uninspired by, President Kennedy's enunciation of the premises and goals of the United States' first comprehensive development program, the Alliance for Progress. "Our unfulfilled task", he declared, "is to demonstrate to the entire world that man's unsatisfied aspiration for economic progress can best be achieved by free men working within a framework of democratic institutions (and) we propose to complete the revolution of the Americas, to build a hemisphere where all men can hope for a suitable standard of living, and all can live out their lives in dignity and freedom. To achieve this goal political freedom must accompany material progress."

Fourteen years later, however, Secretary of State Kissinger's address before the UN Seventh Special Session (which, significantly, was the product of unprecedented consultation with Members of Congress) contained not a single reference to "democratic institutions" or "political freedom". Such an omission, I am certain, was neither unintentional nor simply a reflection of differences in style. In fact, fundamental changes in our perceptions and priorities explain the evolution of American policies related to the developing world.

A FRAGILE HOPE

In retrospect, the hope of encouraging democratic institutions along with economic development has proved to be more fragile than planners of the “Allianza" anticipated. It would be useful here to enumerate a few of the lessons learned since 1961, leaving the consideration of particular cases to our group discussion: (1) In many instances more "democratic" LDC's have found it terribly difficult to mobilize the resources and concurrently impose the discipline on both capital-owners and labor necessary for economic "take-off". Hence, the appeal of the single party or authoritarian model, or at least a more socialist development strategy.

(2) Economic growth may lead to an increase in social and political conflicts injurious to the growth of democratic institutions. This has been most often the case in Latin America, where a growing middle class and increasing organization of peasants and labor have led to military coups by threatened conservative elites or, alternatively, by aspiring “radicals”.

(3) Increasingly, LDC's perceive themselves as forming a Third World "bloc" which, at least in theory, must remain aloof from the "ideological" struggles of the superpowers. In other words, United States relationships with members of this "bloc" may depend less upon any political affinity (e.g., the sharing of democratic institutions) than on common economic interests and a mutual concern in avoiding the spread of superpower confrontations to the Third World. (4) Economic aid seems a particularly unwieldy tool for a "carrot and stick" approach to encouraging democratic development. While there is some chance that economic aid may help support a shaky "democratic" govenment, there is little evidence to show that the withdrawal of such aid, by itself, will topple a nondemocratic ene. Moreover, cutbacks in aid to an LDC gone authoritarian may drastically affect the poorest of that country, further inhibiting opportunities for growth which could hopefully create preconditions favorable toward a political liberalization of the regime.

AVOIDING ARROGANCE

To the above observations-which, in my view, argue against attempts to closely link economic development to political democratization-I would add a

general, but oft-forgotten, admonition: while we may venerate our peculiar conception of democracy, it is not a self-perpetuating system adaptable to any body politic. Attempts to define how and what sort of democratic institutions might be developed in country X, Y or Z will inevitably appear as evidence of American arrogance. At best, such concerns will seem pitifully irrelevant. One need only recall the caution of Mahatma Gandhi: "God, Himself, dare not appear to a hungry man except in the form of bread".

Having said this, it does not follow, however, that the political institutions of LDC's should, or can be, totally irrelevant to American economic assistance programs. Whether or not a recipient government can qualify as "democratic", its respect for human rights as defined, for example, by the UN Declaration, will often influence the flow of international economic assistance. The explanation for this is two-fold.

The first reason should be well understood by all legislators assembled here. Economic assistance from the industrialized nations to the LDC's involves more than the extension of technical cooperation or trade preferences; it involves, as well, a transfer of some real resources from "North" to "South". Thus, to the degree that our constituents are contributing a portion of these resources to international development, we cannot be insensitive to their deeply-felt concerns about gross violations of human rights by certain recipient nations. And for those who would doubt the sincerity of these concerns, I need simply point out that recently enacted legislation would require, in prescribed cases, the cut-off of all American economic assistance to nations engaged in such systematic violations. Short of a total cut-off, some nations such as Chile have witnessed reductions in aid as a direct result of their practices in this area.

DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

Second, one could hardly argue that the more authoritarian LDC's have a particularly good record in economic development. Practices such as arbitrary arrest and torture do not, in general, enhance prospects of developing a competent managerial class or attracting foreign investors. Perhaps the People's Republic of China need not be concerned about creating a proper climate for foreign investment; however, this may not be the case, for example, with India.

Admittedly, the task of translating our broad concerns with human rights into some effective action, even over the "long-term" of the development process, will remain a perplexing one. For reasons indicated above, progress in this area will be spotty at best. And while I do not believe that multilateral development organizations are, in every case, the best response to the economic challenges we may face, they may well be a more effective vehicle then bilateral programs in advancing the cause of human rights. Most importantly, donor nations working together in this area can demonstrate that their shared concern is not subject to misinterpretation or to playing-off one industrialized country against another. We of the industrialized world know all too well that man's inhumanity to man is not a simple function of our level of economic growth. But now that we have resolved to build a global framework for economic development and cooperation rather than continue the dangerous trend toward greater division between rich and poor, should we not renew a common effort to improve political as well as economic justice? To such a rhetorical question, one can always answer in the affirmative. A more awesome question remains for us to discuss: "How?”

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN

RIGHTS

Paper by Pierre-Bernard Cousté

human rights are as important to the life of a nation as economic wellbeing-they are not 'luxuries' only the rich can afford, but the basic entitlement of all people." Amnesty International, Annual Report 1974/75.

The numerous opinions expressed on our general theme reveal a basic agreement on the principles and values without which our societies simply would not exist. In recent statements both Mr. H. Kissinger and Mr. J. Carter have stressed the importance of the defense of human rights in international relations. The Secretary of State emphasized that one of the most effective weapons in the struggle against the degradation of human values is still the organized concern of the Community of Nations.

Mr. Carter declared that the United States and its allies should take the lead in establishing and promoting basic global standards of human rights. He feels that injustice in the world can be alleviated by our example, by the expression of our opinions and by the various forms of economic and political persuasion at our disposal. At the last meeting of the Organization of American States, Mr. Kissinger went so far as to say that "a government that tramples on the rights of its citizens denies the purpose of its existence”. (Time, August 16, 1976).

EXAMPLE, INTERVENTIONS, AND PERSUASION

All of us will undoubtedly support the statements quoted above. Indeed, the fact that we are debating this theme represents a step towards the "organization" of our common concern.

It is only fair that we should be expected to practice the example we preach. It is the very essence of our own internal democracy, of the development of our social democracy and our liberties. While condemning extortion and refusing the unacceptable, we must at the same time set an example and encourage others to follow it. Demonstrations of opinion, official and unofficial interventions and lobbying are just a few of the many ways in which we can make clear to others what the legal position is and what may be the political and other consequences of their actions. In the long run the procedure or method used is of little importance, though unofficial representations are perhaps more effective. The essential point is that the intervention must be decisive, must make it clear where responsibilities lie, and must be made before it is too late.

Economic and political persuasion can be used in many circumstances. Several of the developing countries with whom we cooperate asked us to show, by practical preferential measures in the trade and aid sectors that we encourage and favor those countries which maintain parliamentary democracy and civil liberties. We feel politically and morally justified in using all available forms of influence or persuasion on countries with which we have established special ties, to remind them discreetly but firmly of universal rights, or to induce them to show clemency and to grant political amnesty.

A RADICAL POLICY PROPOSED

In so far as there is a serious desire to establish "organized concern," the policy of supplying military equipment of any kind, to any country, must be abandoned. Depending on the regime involved, a distinction must be drawn between straightforward commercial consignments and other consignments such as arms and military equipment. A radical, long-term policy of this kind naturally requires genuine coordination to avoid competition and undercutting. Above all it requires firm convictions and consistency between objectives, statements and policies.

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As regards cultural exchanges, there must be a free flow and numerous contacts at international level among the democratic countries. Moreover, future leaders of developing countries should be given frequent opportunities to meet the leaders of established democracies. By exchanging experiences and forming a common, democratic vision of the future it will thus be possible to establish an "International" based on parliamentary democracy and civil liberties.

STRENGTHENING THE GUARANTEES OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and United Nations agreements are not enough to guarantee respect for rights and liberties. We must both extend international constitutional law and create new forms of guarantees. Relations between states are based on human rights. The rights of the individual and the possibilities of appeal must now be consistently developed, in line with the development of international legal and jurisdictional procedures. We must encourage our legal experts, diplomats and other officials responsible for international relations to develop and experiment with new procedures, which must be both effective and acceptable to all regimes. One possibility might be secret enquiries carried out by an international body and acceptable even to a totalitarian or dictatorial regime, in order to throw light on a complaint, an accusation or on information relating to human rights.

Public opinion is playing an increasingly important role in international relations, in particular by denouncing the violation of human rights. It is highly desirable that the public be made aware that their political leaders not only share its concern in this matter but are endeavoring to take concerted action and to establish a "common concern" with a view to restraining the unacceptable attacks on human rights.

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