equipment in use in diesel-powered passenger units involved in these accidents has proved satisfactory under normal operating conditions in various classes of service over a considerable period of time. The report also indicated that there was no appreciable deceleration of the train before the accident occurred at Swampscott. At Swampscott the engineer sounded a whistle signal in response to the flagman's stop signals when the train was approximately 750 feet from the point of collision. Tests have shown that if the brakes of the train involved had been in proper working condition the train should have stopped, and the accident been avoided. At Revere the stopping distance of the train may have been extended as a result of the functioning of the anti-wheel-slide devices. In addition, the Commission has received reports from time to time that the brakes in use on these passanger units are seriously impaired under certain adverse weather conditions. In its accident report the Commission recommended that the Association of American Railroads conduct a series of tests sufficiently comprehensive to determine the operational characteristics of the type of brake involved in these accidents under adverse conditions. Although the report of the Commission was issued on May 6, 1956, to date the AAR has not followed this recommendation. The AAR notified the Commission that the Canadian Pacific Railway planned to conduct brake tests early in 1957 on the type of equipment involved. It was believed that these tests would be made in order to comply with the Commission's recommendation. While the tests were started February 15, 1957, the engineer refused to set up the equipment properly or to simulate the conditions necessary to comply with the recommendation. Set forth on page 10 of the supplemental statement are figures purportedly taken from an official report of the Commission showing that over a 5-year period an average of 1.38 cars per 100 cars inspected were found to have inoperative or allegedly inefficient airbrakes. We are unable to determine how this average was computed. A tabulation of cars inspected and found defective is shown in the reports of the Section of Railroad Safety to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Using figures contained in these reports for the 3-year period 1954-56, during which a total of 669,057 cars was inspected on both arriving and departing trains, the defects found, including cars set out for repair and those repaired while in the train, were as follows: (These tables include, in addition to other data, tabulations of excessive piston travel.) Brakes inoperative in addition to cutout brakes.. Cars set out of departing trains because of defective airbrakes....... Total cars defective_---- 6, 792 39, 014 9, 661 14, 003 69, 470 On this basis 10.38 cars per 100 cars inspected were found to have inoperative or inefficient brakes in contrast to the average of 1.38 cars as stated by Mr. May. The following figures for the same period taken from the same reports respecting the Southern Railway are based on an inspection of 12,030 cars in departing trains. The defects found were as follows: Brakes inoperative in addition to cutout brakes_-_. Cars set out of departing trains because of defective airbrakes_ Total cars defective__‒‒‒ 6 617 170 742 1, 535 This would indicate that 12.76 cars per 100 cars inspected in departing trains of the Southern Railway were found to have inoperative or inefficient brakes in contrast to Mr. May's figure of .04 cars per 100 cars inspected. In our view this does not indicate any lack of need for legislation because of any near perfect 5-year record. The supplemental statement stresses the fact that inspection of a particular train was made at Cleveland, Ohio, an intermediate terminal for that train. Inspections are made at intermediate terminals in order to determine the condition in which trains are departing from the preceding initial terminals when our inspectors are not present. Obviously, all the defects in the train referred to in our statement could not develop in the movement of the train from the initial terminal to Cleveland. The carrier did not set out or repair the defective cars in the train before departure from the initial terminal as they probably would have done if a Commission inspector had been present. The Commission is fully aware of the demands of modern railroading on air brake systems. By its order of May 30, 1945, the Commission required the installation of brakes and appliances in conformity with certain specifications and requirements on all cars used in freight service, except those equipped with passenger-car brakes. Thereafter, the carriers applied the present "AB" airbrake on their freight cars. We are firmly convinced that since the Commission does not have authority to prescribe rules, standards, and instructions for the installation, inspection, maintenance, and repair of these brakes, it cannot fully meet its responsibility for safe railroad operation. The poor condition of airbrakes, as found by our inspectors, results either from lack of discovery or lack of maintenance. Practices which relegate safety to second place in favor of competitive position are inherently dangerous and should not be permitted. Respectfully submitted, OWEN CLARKE, Chairman. APPENDIX A S. 1490.-Estimated cost of registration of private and exempt carriers Motor carriers safety regulation to be served on each registering carrier (100,000 at $0.13 each)__ Postal cards, 500,000-.. Elliott stencils (100,000 at $9.90 per thousand)_ Total, printing and supplies___ Equipment (desks, chairs, cabinets, etc.) Penalty mail (100,000 at .03 cents each and 100,000 at .09 cents each). $13, 000 800 990 14, 790 4, 965 12,000 10, 245 Total, first full-year costs... 42, 000 APPENDIX B Table showing conformity by the several States with Interstate Commerce Commission motor carrier safety regulations and the regulations governing the transportation of explosives or other dangerous articles (Apr. 1, 1957) NOTE.-Number of passenger trains and/or freight trains operated not available. STATEMENT OF JOHN V. LAWRENCE, MANAGING DIRECTOR, AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC. Mr. LAWRENCE. My name is John V. Lawrence. I am managing director of the American Trucking Associations, Inc., with offices at 1424 16th Street, NW., Washington 5, D. C. As the members of the subcommittee know, the American Trucking Associations, Inc., is a federation composed of organizations of all types of motor carriers in each of the 48 States and the District of Columbia. Our membership includes both private and forhire motor carriers of property. Our appearance today relates only to those bills indicated above (S. 1490, S. 1491, S. 1492, and S. 1463). We take no position with respect to S. 1386 or regarding those portions of S. 1492 which relate to rail carriers. ACTIVITIES OF THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY IN THE SAFETY FIELD As the national representative of the trucking industry, ATA has as one of its primary purposes the promotion of highway safety within the trucking industry and among highway users in general. Its activity in the field of safety is widespread but the following represents the heart of trucking industry safety efforts: 1. ATA coordinates industry safety activities. 2. It develops and promotes standards for the selection, training, and supervision of drivers and other employees. 3. ATA represents the industry in matters of Federal safety regulation in cooperation with the Interstate Commerce Commission and other Federal agencies and on national committees and organizations working in the field of safety. 4. It acts as a clearinghouse for the interchange of ideas and information in the trucking industry through its nationwide council of safety experts and through its work with a national education group which sponsors courses in numerous colleges and universities. 5. ATA stimulates safe driving and use of industry safety standards through competitive programs, award programs and through special emphasis campaigns. |