As outlined in Section II, a critical factor in determining the validity of a given coercive process, in view of the consequences causes, are the values of the society within which it occurs. For the purposes of this study, values may be regarded as the worth, merit or import ascribed to various social and individual interests. A system of values is the relative interrelationship of individual and social interests to which worth, merit or import is ascribed.

A system of values is shaped by the collective ideals, attitudes, customs and habits of members of that society which are manifested by assigning or ranking priorities of the attributes deemed important to the individual and to social interaction. The sum total of these considerations results in the development of intrinsic common standards based on subliminal moral, ethical, epistimological or social policy oriented considerations.

Ultimately this process leads to the acceptance or rejection of a given practice on the basis of its impact on those interests whose standing has been ranked by social consensus. Accordingly, an examination of which practices deserve to be labeled << torture » requires reference to the values of a given society which in turn, necessitates careful consideration of how these values are shaped and how they may be brought to bear on a particular practice. At the outset, one should be aware that the relativity of values depends on the contextual juxtaposition of diverse social and individual interests to which different worth is ascribed. Thus, while values in the context of an inquiry about << torture » may appear to refer exclusively to the individual human interest sought to be protected, they are also very significant in those instances where such interests are in conflict with other social interests.

This problem of conflicting interests and their corresponding assigned values requires consideration of four issues:

1) The function and potential impact of values;

2) The distinction between individual values and social values;

3) The distinction between social values at the national level and social values at the international level; and

4) The relationship of the values asserted in condemnation of torture to those asserted in rationalization for torture.

B. - Individual Values and Value Theory

Values, rights, and moral principles are intimately related concepts and yet require clear separation and definition in order to understand the great leaps of progress and subsequent retrogression of the World Community in dealing with human rights on an international scale (1). Since values and the valuing process are the basic tools with which people create and maintain morallegal system, it is appropriate to consider values and moral structures as such before looking more closely at particular values reflected in international human rights documents and the mechanisms of their implementation.

A value may be thought of as a centrally important belief or judgment about either conduct (how one should or should not behave) or goals (whether particular end-state are worth or not worth having) (2). Thus, values can be subdivided into those which are instrumental (modes of conduct) and those which are terminal (end-states) (3). Being honest and working hard are varieties of conduct values while peace and security exemplify end-states. To a limited extent, knowledge of terminal values alone such as « peace » is sufficient to predict behavior, i.e., participation in peace marches (4).

Applying these concepts to torture, instrumental values would include respect for human dignity, compassion, patriotism and obedience to superior orders. Terminal values would include individual integrity, freedom from suffering, public order and governmental stability. The first two terminal values are predictive of behavior antipathetic to torture, whereas the latter two could be viewed as predictive of behavior supporting torture.

Values do not operate on individuals in a unitary and static manner. Rather, an object value such as « freedom » is seen in a particular context of situation such as «< state of National emergency ». Were these object and situation variables unitary and highly interdependent, there would be little surface inconsistency in behavior. However, both aspects, object-values and situationvalues are arranged in hierarchies which are shaped and limited by cultural, institutional and social factors (5). Whether an individual places personal liberty above police protection in a hierarchical value system will depend on the security of the societal situation. Alternatively, where one places personal obedience to the law in a value hierarchy depends on the society's application of the law over all members in an equitable manner (6).

In the context of torture, such a hierarchical ranking could be decisive: one might be for or against torture based on whether one holds individual integrity more important than public order or vice versa.

Given the organization of values into hierarchies of object and situational importance, it is readily apparent that as values are considered imperative to action, a study of the evaluating process requires a constant balancing of the underlying hierarchies of action alternatives and social situation (7). Such a theoretical frame-work permits a working hypothesis that people do not act contrary to their values. Rather, if an individual acts inconsistently with one superficially obvious value, it means that he has acted in accord with another which overrode the former in importance in the specific context. One must merely identify the object value in the particular situation with which behavior is consistent (8).

It is possible, however, to introduce into an individual's value system contradictory values. Such change can be induced by providing new information, altering ideological and political positions, or introducin changes in the operating environment of an economic or technological character (9).

Where the new information is such that a value inconsistent and irreconcilable with an accepted value emerges, the person endures a state of cognitive dissonance (10). Dissonance occurs when one element follows functionally from the contrary of the other. For example, if an individual traditionally values reasoned deliberation in decision making and he is confronted with the desirability of spontaneity in the same situation, he will endure a degree of cognitive dissonance proportional to the importance of the dissonant elements in the relationship.

Such dissonance could arise where the public order is severely threatened so that persons who highly value individual integrity become absorbed with the need for pragmatic action. against << enemies » of public order, possibly including torture to learn the plans of such « enemies ».

States of dissonance have motivational properties reflected in the tendency to reduce dissonance when it occurs. A person will attempt to justify commitment to a value to a degree proportional to the amount of discrepant information (11). (That a person tends to bring his cognitions into correspondence with impinging reality is a fundamental assumption underlying dissonance theory.) According to Rokeach, it is generally accepted that in order for change in values to occur there must first be a state of cognitive inconsistency or cognitive dissonance. Therefore, when change has occurred, one may look at the anterior values for those elements of dissonance which produced the change. An extreme discrepancy, however, between end values

and contingent instrumental values produces great cognitive strain which requires cognitive reorganization and at a certain level creates withdrawal from the system of valuation itself. Thus, concepts as broad as defections from religion or national Marxism can be considered under the rubric of value theory (12).

While the locus of evaluation in the « mature » individual remains with that individual, the valuing process itself is fluid and flexible depending on the context of the moment (13). When values are considered as inherently benefit-oriented, the usefulness of this fluidity (as opposed to rigidity) in the valuing process becomes clear. Nonetheless, values are reasonably stable instrumentalities for reasoning about benefits (14). As Rescher (15) has said, the whole structure of value rests ultimately on what is beneficial to the individual.

1.- Distinguishing Between Individual and Social Values

Individuals acquire values through a process of identification with models, initially their parents. As they develop, they become increasingly capable of accepting value-models from outside the family (16). West (17) has stated that man, as a domestic animal, identifies with his community once that community is defined and through that identification acquires community values. A value becomes a value of society, i.e., generally diffused throughout the society, commonly through the successful promotion by a dedicated minority (18). When that value is held in common by a sufficient number of community members to be considered a shared conception of a desirable mode of conduct, it has become a societal value (19). According to Longman (20) << Values are the standards by which objects, persons, or actions are judged. Values define the nature of reality. Values then serve as regulatory mechanisms which enable societies to adapt to the environment and maintain those types of interpersonal relations conducive of the particular type of adaptation. Finally, values mediate the relation of the individual to society and, therefore there are strong emotional attachments... to the values of the group ».

«

While the expression « the values of society » is often used, it is important to keep always in mind that values do not exist in a vacuum but operate solely through the individuals who hold them. The fiction of a corporeal « society » as a being distinct from its members can be as obfuscating as that of the << State >> as an entity totally distinct from the people who comprise it. As the State takes its life from its people, society derives its values from its members. However, although social values are derivative

of individual values of society's members, to become social values, individual values must be widely enough shared that they constitute a common interest.

In order for a society to function at an optimum level, it must place greatest emphasis upon common interest values such as justice, and equality while channeling competitiveness into institutionalized and harmless settings. Such is a rational social order (21).

The ramification of this principle in the field of torture is a tendency to emphasize the common interest value of public order while delimiting the degree of individual integrity consistent with social cooperation. The legal norms through which abstract values become guides to behavior regulate the individual's freedom with binding force only to the extent that they correlate with current value judgments within the society (22). Stone (23) sees the acceptance and observance of law. McDougal (24) is concerned with the protection and implementation of the community's goal values or end-states. He suggests that the laws of a State must be congruent whith the values of its constituents to preclude coercion.

A parallel arises with criminal law where it is generally assumed that conduct prohibited and sanctioned is essentially that which embodies social values.

Thus laws prescribing crimes traditionally reflect moral or social values (25), but in contemporary criminal law this matter is treated as a question of criminological policy rather than as enforcement of morality (26). The prohibition of torture is therefore an individual and social value, and also a social policy as discussed in Section V.

2. The Framework of Social Values

Study of value structures within a society and within the larger World Community is an exceedingly complex task. McDougal, Lasswell and Chen (27) suggest that systems of identification of values today cross the monolithic unity of state parochialism, thus laying the basis of internationally perceived and recognized values. On the level of the individual, hierarchies of object and situation values acquired through identification interact in shaping both verbal and non-verbal behavior. Through a process of diffusion, values are transmitted throughout a society and find expression in the legal documents of the State. Beyond the States are regional and global organizations which are attempting to identify and ultimately protect basic human hights. That these rights are not derived from the State but inhere in the human condition is fundamental to the very existence of human rights at the level of international law (28).

One technique which simplifies such an overwhelming task