Why were Communists allowed to remain in Government service after they had been exposed by committees of Congress, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other qualified agencies?

Who had the ultimate responsibility for a soft attitude toward the Soviet Union which turned the course of history against us after we had won the greatest triumph of arms in our history?

The subcommittee took testimony from Rear Adm. Adolphus Staton, retired, which contributes to the historical answer to these questions. Documents adduced during this testimony, which involved distinguished members of both political parties, were additionally illuminating.

Admiral Staton is a holder of the Congressional Medal of Honor. At one time he was assistant director of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Then, at the outbreak of World War II, he was called out of retirement to head the Departmental Qualification Board for Commercial Radio Communications Personnel.

According to Admiral Staton, this Board was set up as a result of a "one-man campaign to try to get more security for our radio communication" (H., p. 1309 ff.). The "one man" was Rear Adm. S. C. Hooper, who was responsible, during the Second World War, for the safety of communications at sea. The importance which Congress attached to this Board is indicated by the fact that the act which brought it into being was the first legislation passed on December 8, 1941, after President Roosevelt had notified Congress of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The only vote against it was cast by the late Vito Marcantonio, American Labor Party, New York, long regarded as the voice of communism in the House of Representatives.

The act stated:

It shall be unlawful to employ any person or to permit any person to serve as a radio operator aboard any vessel (other than a vessel of foreign registry), if the Secretary of the Navy has disapproved such employment.

The purpose, clearly, was to empower the Secretary of the Navy to remove subversive individuals who were serving as radio operators in the merchant marine. The method of making the act effective was through Admiral Staton's Board, which obtained information regarding possible subversives from the Office of Naval Intelligence. If the Board voted unanimously against the individual in question, he was removed from his ship, although he had a right of appeal which will be noted below.

Admiral Staton testified that the Japanese, pro-Nazi and Fascist radio operators were disposed of without difficulty. But the removal of Communists was a different story (H., p. 1310 ff.).

"We began to get violent protests from the Communists," said Admiral Staton. "They would come down personally and see me or the Secretary of the Navy (Frank Knox) or the President of the United States or Mr. Bard" (Assistant Secretary of the Navy) (H., p. 1314). Admiral Staton's story continues:

When these fellows began to go to the White House, then Mr. Knox got interested in the thing and he got his Assistant. He brought in a man as his Assistant when he became Secretary of the Navy by the name of Adlai Stevenson, and I had never heard of Mr. Stevenson before that. He called me up one day on the phone and asked if I would come over to his office (H., p. 1315).

He had 6 or 8 sheets of paper and on each one of them he had briefed one of the cases that our Board had acted on, and he had said “Admiral, I don't think you fellows have anything against those people, any of them" (H., p. 1316).

Senator BUTLER. Do you know who they were?

Admiral STATON. They were radio operators who my Board had passed on and discharged.

Senator BUTLER. I appreciate that, but do you know the names?

Admiral STATON. No; I never saw the names (H., p. 1316).

Senator HENDRICKSON. Were they discharged unanimously by your Board? Admiral STATON. Yes (H., p. 1316).

Admiral STATON. When Mr. Stevenson said that he thought we didn't have anything against them at all, I said, "Why, Mr. Stevenson, we are not charging these fellows with any crime. This is emergency legislation and I think that the only thing we are saying in effect, is 'you can't work in this job during this emergency' that these fellows are in convoy with our naval ships and carrying these valuable cargoes over to Europe in connection with the war and that we have felt that we didn't have to give the fellow a reasonable doubt under the common law of a crime, but we were resolving our reasonable doubt in favor of Uncle Sam." So he finally said, "Well, Admiral, I don't think we ought to be too hard on the Commies," and that was that (H., pp. 1316–1317).

THE MEETING WITH SECRETARY KNOX

Admiral Staton then identified the minutes of a meeting he had attended on May 19, 1942, in the office of the late Frank Knox, then Secretary of the Navy. This document is of such importance, that it is presented here almost in full.

MINUTES OF CONFERENCE REGARDING THE ADMINISTRATION OF AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY UNDER PUBLIC LAW No. 351 AND UNDER DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS BOARD ORDER NO. 3

A meeting was held in the office of the Secretary of Navy at 10:45, May 19, 1942, at the request of Rear Admiral Hooper, in order to discuss matters relating to the administration of authority of the Secretary of the Navy under Public Law No. 351 and under Defense Communications Board Order No. 3. The particular points on which decision was desired were whether the Departmental Qualifications Board for Commercial Radio Communications Personnel would discontinue to disapprove employment of Communist radio operators, and whether Communists should be accepted as members of Defense Communications Board Committees.

Present: The Secretary, Mr. Frank Knox; the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Ralph A. Bard; Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Adm. F. J. Horne; Rear Adm. T. S. Wilkinson; Rear Adm. S. C. Hooper; Rear Adm. Adolphus Staton; Capt. J. B. W. Waller; Lt. Comdr. F. C. B. Jordan; Lt. Comdr. F. G. Caskey; Lt. K. Baarslag.

At the Secretary's suggestion, Rear Admiral Hooper outlined the situation as he saw it. He showed how Congress had seen the necessity of legislation to safeguard the merchant marine against the dangers of subversive radio operators; how various laws were drafted, including H. R. 5074; how the language of some of this proposed legislation clearly showed that the intent of Congress was that adherence to Communist Party doctrine was to be considered as subversive to the United States; that this legislation was strongly opposed by Communist Party organizations (including the American Communications Association), but was supported by many other factions, including labor, as represented by the American Federation of Labor; and how our entry into the war crystallized matters by causing the final passage of Public Law 351.

Admiral Hooper then stressed the danger of Communist Party cells in the transportation and communications industries and in the armed services, and how the Communist Party was striving with all its power to establish such cells.

He said it was an obvious and primary military principle that these cells should not be allowed to exist for a minute in military or naval units; that the commercial communications systems were an important and integral part of the military and naval communications networks; and that it, therefore, became a duty of those officers in the Navy Department that were charged with the security of naval communications to bring the gravity of the situation to the attention of the Secretary. The contributory effect of foreign cells in a country's system of communication was amply demonstrated in the fall of Norway and of France, stated Admiral Hooper, giving details of each.

Admiral Hooper pointed out that the time to destroy such cells was the present, and that our temporary military alliance with the U. S. S. R. was no reason to condone the establishment of Communist Party cells in the United States. A change in the international political situation, though possibly not imminent, might occur at any time and without advance notice, at which time everybody would agree to the necessity of abolishing these cells, but it would then probably be too late for successful action. He emphasized the particular danger of a cell among radio operators and brought out the example of the Spanish Fleet at the very start of the 1937 revolution, when some 700 officers were murdered by the Communist Party cells in the fleet because of the fact that the radio operators delivered the announcement of the Communist revolution to their comrades rather than to the responsible ship's officers, which permitted the revolutionists to commit the crimes, the officers not expecting it.

Admiral Hooper further stated that the problem of purifying our communications systems was an internal matter which had nothing to do with our being a military ally of Russia; nor was it in any way an effort at union busting. To prove this latter fact, he pointed out that the American Federation of Labor, an important communications union, had heartily approved and endorsed the Navy's energetic action regarding subversive radio operators. That the American Communications Association was Communist Party controlled and the nucleus of the Communist Party cell in United States communications was a well-known fact in the industry, and was shown by the fact that 7 of its 10 officers were known Communist Party members, and by examining its record of 100-percent adherence to the Communist Party line in recent years. Admiral Hooper then asked the assembled officers if they had anything to add or modify as to the outline he had just given, but there were no suggestions.

The Secretary then spoke and said that he held no brief for the activities of the Communist Party, but that the President had stated that, considering the fact that the United States and Russia were allies at this time and that the Communist Party and the United States efforts were now bent toward our winning the war, the United States was bound to not oppose the activities of the Communist Party, and specifically, to not disapprove the employment of any radio operator for the sole reason that he was a member of the Communist Party or that he was active in Communist Party affairs. The Secretary further stated that this was an order and must be obeyed without mental reservation. Mr. Bard then said that he was on our side, but that he had seen Congressmen Bland and Ramspeck recently regarding the removal of active Communist Party members as radio operators, and they both thought it should not be done. Rear Admiral Hooper remarked that it was quite possible that the Congressmen did not have all the facts in the case.

Rear Admiral Staton then said that he was not officially concerned with the policy involved but that he believed that in view of this change in policy, the instructions to the board contained in its precept should be modified to conform to this change of policy. Specifically, the instructions now state that: "The board will determine *** whether such service by the person concerned would be detrimental to the national defense and national safety," and that the members of the board could not bring themselves to feel that the employment as radio operators of militant members of the Communist Party would not be detrimental to the national safety. He gave the Secretary a copy of the instructions in question and indicated where he thought that the instructions should be modified. The Secretary said that he would take the matter up with the Judge Advocate General as to the change to be made.

Rear Admiral Wilkinson then asked the Secretary if membership in the Communist Party constituted a general "whitewash" for all sorts of illegal and other subversive activities. The Secretary answered that it did not (H., pp. 1320-1321).

56025-55

The Senate of the United States and the people of the United States are asked to ponder the implications of this document. Particularly, they are asked to ponder the following paragraph:

"The Secretary then spoke and said that he held no brief for the activities of the Communist Party, but that the President had stated that, considering the fact that the United States and Russia were allies at this time and that the Communist Party and the United States efforts were now bent toward our winning the war, the United States was bound to not oppose the activities of the Communist Party, and specifically, to not disapprove the employment of any radio operator for the sole reason that he was a member of the Communist Party or that he was active in Communist Party affairs. The Secretary further stated that this was an order and must be obeyed without mental reservation" (H., pp. 1320-1321).

NO CHANGE IN WRITTEN ORDERS

As the minutes of the 1942 meeting make clear, Admiral Staton believed that the policy of his board, which was based on the intent of Congress, had been changed on orders from the Chief Executive. He asked for written instructions to ratify this change in policy and got a promise from Secretary Knox that the latter would "take the matter up with the Judge Advocate General."

Admiral STATON. Well, the first thing I remember happening was Mr. Bard sending for me. He had this precept, as we call it, the Secretary's instructions to the board, in his hand, and he said, "I don't think that this precept ought to be changed." I said, "Well, Mr. Bard, I do. I think you put us in an impossible position because we have been under oath administering the law as we thought the intent of the Congress was." *** So we had quite a discussion on a friendly basis and finally I said, "Well, Mr. Bard, why don't you do what the Secretary suggested, take it up with the Judge Advocate General?”

He said, "Well, that is a good idea. Do you want me to do it or will you do it?"

I said, "Well, I am down here to do your legwork for you. I will go down there and take it down to them and, if he and I don't agree, I will ask him to come back up here."

Mr. GRIMES. Now, in other words, you thought that there should be a written authority to your board to administer this law the way the President had said, and that you should have the protection of the written authority from someone since the change was plainly against what your board regarded as the intent of Congress; is that correct?

Admiral STATON. Well, I went down to the Judge Advocate General.

Mr. GRIMES. Who was he?

Admiral STATON. Rear Admiral Woodson. He is since deceased. So I gave him a general picture. I said, "We have run onto a dead center up here in regard to this admission of evidence about Communists, and Mr. Bard has asked me to come down here and talk it over with you."

I told him that the Secretary didn't want us to discharge Communists or suspected Communists.

So he read over this precept, and then, in the very paragraph that I had suggested to the Secretary as an appropriate place to put it, he wrote in there in pencil, "Membership in the Communist Party or suspected membership is not to be considered as evidence before the board."

So I said, "Initial it," and he put his W. B. W. on there, and I took it back to Mr. Bard and I said, "Here is what your Judge Advocate General thinks about the thing." He said, "My God, don't get anybody to sign that."

Admiral STATON. Then I went ahead again on the idea of being in this impossible situation, and so he then said-I know we had 2 or 3 interviews about

this thing, but I think this was pretty much after that incident-he said, “Admiral, if I were in your shoes, I would resign from the board."

Admiral STATON. I said, “Mr. Bard, if I felt like you say you feel about this thing, I would fire me from the board." I said, "I don't quit under fire and I am not going to give you fellows the satisfaction to find somebody in my place who will be a rubberstamp for you. I have been around too long not to know what this is about. If you fellows want to keep these Communists, do it on your own responsibility. Don't pass it on to the board." That was the intent of what I said to him. I said during one interview, "Mr. Bard, I am talking to you not as a naval officer but as a patriotic citizen of the United States, and, if I were in your shoes, I think I would march right into Mr. Knox's office and say, 'Come on, let's go to the White House and make the President change this order because it is all wrong'" (H., pp. 1322–1323).

Admiral

Shortly after this, according to Admiral Staton, the board was simply emasculated. No more cases were referred to it and it was finally dissolved, on the pretext of "eliminating unnecessary paper work." Admiral Hooper was retired for "physical disability.' Staton, himself, was also retired after almost a year had intervened during which he drew full active pay without performing any duties whatever (H. pp. 1325 ff.).

ROOSEVELT, KNOX, STEVENSON DOCUMENTS

The documents which later came into the possession of the subcommittee were:

(1) A memorandum, dated April 30, 1942, to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy from Ádlai E. Stevenson.

(2) A "confidential" letter to the President, dated May 1, 1942, and signed "Frank Knox."

(3) A memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, dated May 4, 1942, and signed "FDR."

They are reproduced here in full.*

The ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

APRIL 30, 1942.

Public Act 351 (approved December 17, 1941) makes it unlawful during the emergency to employ as radio operator on any American merchant vessel any person whose employment has been disapproved by the Secretary of the Navy. This act is administered by a five-man board consisting of Admiral Staton as chairman and representatives of the Navy Department, Coast Guard, and Maritime Commission. The board has considered some 90 cases and discharged 88 men. About 25 have appealed and 8 have been reinstated.

Appeals are heard by local boards convened by the commandants of the districts. The "defendant" is not informed as to the basis for his discharge. The cases involving cowardice, insubordination, drunkenness, and pro-Nazi sympathy present little difficulty. But most of the cases involve operators charged with Communist Party membership or Communist sympathy. The board automatically discharges any operator whose investigation record is sufficiently convincing on the score of Communist sympathy, irrespective of his competence and record of conduct in his job.

Many of the members of the American Communications Association (CIO), including the president, vice president, and possibly other officers, have been or may be discharged. The total number of radio operators on the ONI suspect list is about 600 and about 500 of them are "Communist" suspects.

I understand that the board rests its practice of automatic discharge of all alleged Communists on the policy of Congress expressed in various enactments prior to the Russo-German War, which forbid Federal employment of Communists, bundists, etc.

The documents were transmitted to the chairman by Secretary of the Navy Anderson with a letter dated April 14, 1954, which contained the statement that "This material has been declassified under the provisions of Executive Order 10501."