CHAPTER VII

THE DOCTRINE OF GRACE

THE word "grace (xápis) in the writings of St. Paul, when used in reference to God, signifies either "graciousness" as a personal quality, or "dealings with mankind in the spirit of graciousness." In either sense it signifies the specific characteristic, as St. Paul conceived it, of the dealings of God with man “in Christ "-the characteristic of free favour, of bountifulness with no condition except faith. Under the law the relation of God to man-so St. Paul theorized-was that of legal payment for works; in Christ the relation is that of mercy and grace. "The law worketh wrath. . . . For this cause it is of faith, that it may be according to grace." "If it is by grace, it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace.”

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But in course of time the word grace (gratia being the rendering in the Vulgate for xápis) acquired a slightly different meaning-not so much the ethical characteristic of God in His dealings with men under the Christian dispensation, but rather those actual dealings themselves conceived of as an influence of regeneration and moral improvement and help. Indeed the word "help" would be nearer the later significance of gratia, except that this Divine influence was sometimes thought of rather as a compelling force. St. Paul approximated to this later use when he wrote, "My grace is sufficient for thee." But gratia subsequently became

the technical term for Divine influence on human character and conduct.

The influence of the Holy Spirit on the soul was of course a well-recognized fact among the early Christians. But the problems concerning the relation of this influence to human freedom were hardly noticed. The main interest of theology lay at first in the person of Christ and the relation of Christ to God, not in the manner in which man is affected by God through Christ. A large measure of freedom in man to accept or reject salvation seems to have been widely assumed, and some moral goodness among pagans of preChristian times was admitted; but the implications of this were not worked out. The doctrine of grace first became elaborated in the controversy between Augustine and the Pelagians.

It will be convenient for our purposes to consider the issues of this controversy, and to estimate the doctrine of grace put forward by Augustine; for, grave as are the objections to which the Augustinian doctrine is exposed, subsequent ecclesiastical speculation has done little more than modify it in certain respects. And it was, moreover, the outcome of the attempt to explain with the current ideas certain intense religious and moral experiences.

The controversy appears to have started with the monk Pelagius taking offence at a prayer in the "Confessions" of Augustine: "Give what Thou biddest, and then bid what Thou givest." This, thought Pelagius, implies a denial that man is free and able to fulfil the Divine commandments. He inveighed

against the idea that man might be saved without effort of his own, as encouraging apathy and affording excuse for sin. He maintained that man never, at least in this life, loses the ability to do right.

Augustine in reply insisted on the depravity of man and his consequent inability to obey the Divine commandments apart from Divine grace. Pelagius admitted

the necessity of grace, but very inadequately, according to Augustine; for he understood by "grace" natural endowments such as free-will, and external aids such as the Divine commandments and the example of Christ. Apparently he did not admit "internal grace —that is, "the inspiration of love through the Holy Spirit." Augustine, on the other hand, not only asserted internal grace, but maintained that the human race was so corrupted in consequence of the sin of Adam that no man could of himself do anything for his own salvation. Divine grace must do everything.

The controversy between Augustinians and Pelagians became involved with questions as to the efficacy of baptism and the supposed derivation of mortality from Adam. But what at present interests us is that Augustine was practically forced by the logic of his position to develop a doctrine of irresistible grace and predestination. We may now briefly state the Augustinian doctrine of grace and predestination as it emerged from the controversy, and as it was twelve hundred years later clearly and definitely stated by Jansen, Bishop of Ypres.

Man was created with free-will-so runs the doctrine-the power of doing good or evil as he chosepossibilitas utriusque partis. Even in this condition, however, he required Divine grace to enable him to do good. But it was grace which did not necessitate good action, but merely grace without which good action could not take place-adjutorium sine quo

1 Ecce quomodo vult intelligi adjuvari eos qui sub lege peccant, ut per gratiam Christi justificati liberentur, tanquam eis non sufficiat sola lex, propter nimiam peccandi consuetudinem, nisi Christi accedat, non inspiratio charitatis per Spiritum Sanctum, sed intuendum et imitandum in doctrina evangelica virtutis ejus exemplum (“ De Gratia Christi,” § 43). In his etiam quatuor libris quæcumque pro gratia videtur dicere, qua juvamur ut declinemus a malo bonumque faciamus, ita dicit, ut nullo modo a verborum ambiguitate discedat, quam discipulis sic possit exponere, ut nullum auxilium gratiæ credant, qua naturæ possibilitas adjuvetur, nisi in lege atque doctrina (ibid., § 45).

aliquid non fit. In virtue of his free-will man on one occasion chose to do evil. Thereby his will became corrupted, and incapable any longer of choosing good; and this corruption of will was transmitted by the first man to all his descendants. In consequence this earlier kind of grace was no longer of avail; the will of man had become too bad to accept help merely offered to it. Wherefore the need of the redemption of mankind. Through the death of Christ a new kind of grace came into action-adjutorium quo aliquid fit-grace, that is, which compels the will to choose aright. Ultimately, no doubt, Christians will be restored to the condition of freedom. But during this present life the taint of inherited sin remains even in the converted, and is transmitted by them, through the act of procreation, which Augustine regarded as belonging to man's corruption, to subsequent generations.' And so no one can dispense with this compelling grace which comes through Christ. Augustine also calls it "medicinal grace," in contradistinction to the grace adapted to healthy human nature, which was given before the fall. Now, since the immediate cause of regeneration is this grace, continuance in sin is due to the lack of it. Hence the reason why some men are eternally saved, and some are eternally lost, is that the former receive the grace of God and the latter do not. It depends upon God, and God only, that these are saved and those are lost. His motives for choosing and rejecting are beyond human ken, and it were impious to inquire further. God has elected and predestined some to salvation and some to destruc* In tantum enim obest [carnis concupiscentia] natis, ut nisi renascantur, nihil possit prodesse si nati sunt de renatis. Manet quippe in prole, ita ut ream faciat, originis vitium, etiam si in parente reatus ejusdem vitii remissione ablutus est peccatorum, donec omne vitium cui consentiendo peccatur regeneratione novissima consumatur : id est, ipsius etiam renovatione carnis, quæ in ejus resurrectione futura promittitur, ubi non solum nulla peccata faciamus, sed nec habeamus ulla desideria vitiosa, quibus consentiendo peccemus ("De Peccato Originali,” § 44).

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tion. Upon the decree of God depends the ultimate fate of every soul. As to the justice of this, nothing can be brought against God; for all deserve to perish, since all are not only infected with original sin, but actually sinned in Adam, as St. Paul (according to the Vulgate) declares in the Epistle to the Romans. Accordingly the lost are justly punished eternally ; whereas the saved, deserving eternal damnation, owe their salvation to the Divine mercy ("grace" in the Pauline sense).

As infinity is not increased by the addition of a finite number, so is the injustice of punishing a soul everlastingly for the transgressions of a lifetime not increased by the fact that these transgressions were involuntary. But the idea of punishing at all for what cannot be avoided by the person punished strikes the mind as unjust, and we like not to believe God to be unjust. If some souls are predestined to a lower place than others in the final order of the Universe, why call this punishment? Were it not preferable, as in one tendency of scholastic theology, to maintain that the perfection of the whole demands degrees of excellence in the parts, wherefore some souls, for no fault of their own, are rightly denied the chance of attaining the best kind of life? So would theology have avoided the cant of calling the heritage of an ancestor's offence punishment by God.

But it should be noticed that this doctrine of predestination follows logically from two premises: that man is able to contribute nothing towards his salvation, and that in each human life the eternal destiny of a soul is determined for better or worse. It were possible, however, to maintain internal grace and yet escape the conclusion that God purposely abandons some to everlasting loss without allowing them an opportunity to reform-namely, in the following ways: It might be supposed that man's nature, although corrupt, was not so corrupt as to be unable to respond in