the hands of the Lebanese Government but the Syrian Government. Is that accurate?

Mr. PIPES. Yes, it is.

Mr. RAHALL. Would that also then carry over into U.S. Government assistance to Lebanon? Would you not advocate such, using the same fear?

Mr. PIPES. Yes, sir, I would advocate against such aid.

Mr. RAHALL. So I guess then the converse of that is, by punishing Lebanon, we are going to whip them into, what? Kicking the Syrians out? Or whip them into what? What are we trying to do? Mr. PIPES. No, sir, I am not advocating punishing Lebanon. Indeed, in my last paragraph

Mr. RAHALL. Then how do we get assistance to them?

Mr. PIPES [continuing]. I advocate ending the travel ban. I think our government policy should be aimed at fostering the independence of Lebanon again. I do not believe that is helped by recognizing a pseudo-governmental structure. I think it is helped through commerce and private relations, family, cultural, and religious ties.

I advocate that the U.S. Government basically avoid the so-called Government of Lebanon, and make it clear to that government, to the residents of the country, to the Syrians, that we do not see this as a legitimate authority.

Mr. RAHALL. So would you advocate maybe going through nongovernmental units?

Mr. PIPES. I would indeed, yes.

Mr. RAHALL. U.S. assistance that way, as we have been doing? Mr. PIPES. I would have far less reservations about that, yes, be it with private organizations, religious organizations, or commercial ones. A whole range of nongovernmental opportunities exist.

Mr. RAHALL. What about continued or increased U.S. assistance to the Lebanese Army?

Mr. PIPES. I would be very wary of that, sir. I think that the army is, in effect, an arm of the Syrian Government.

Mr. RAHALL. Even though they have made tremendous progress, as we heard the State Department testify and numerous objective outsiders testify, that the Lebanese Army has built itself into a professional fighting group today, across sectarian lines, and not as it was in the past?

Mr. PIPES. I am not in a position to judge how the Army is doing on a logistical level or on the level of practical matters, but I would say that, as a fighting force, it is ultimately at the beck and call of the Syrian authorities. They tell the Lebanese authorities who tell the Army what to do. Therefore, we should be very cautious about building it up. The more proficient, efficient, and effective a fighting machine it is, the more problems we may be creating for ourselves in the future.

Mr. RAHALL. Would you agree with the policy of removal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon, as the American Task Force for Lebanon advocates?

Mr. PIPES. I would.

Mr. RAHALL. Mr. Nassif, let me ask you a couple questions. First, I am glad you came up to me before the hearings and apologized for your testimony. It is rather harsh and makes some pretty damning statements, and I am not sure it is in the best interests

of all of our goals, which is to see Lebanon free of non-Lebanese forces, to see the Syrians removed from that country, as well as Israelis. Such statements as you make-I am not sure lead toward a reasoned resolution and reaching of that goal.

For example, you say the fact of the matter today in Lebanon is that the State itself is the largest mafia in the land.

I take total exception to that statement. I don't care what-and you lay out quite a few alleged facts-what the facts appear to be, to make such a statement in a public arena, about the land of my grandfathers, about the land that I am proud to say is such and is my heritage. I just take total offense at that type of statement. How do you advocate U.S. policy toward Lebanon?

Mr. NASSIF. Let me tell you one example.

Mr. RAHALL. Besides kick the Syrians out.

Mr. NASSIF. Let me tell you one example. Last week the government, the so-called Harawi Government, passed a law to put customs duties on cars from 30 percent to 200 percent. Any car above $25,000, you would pay 100 percent customs duties on it. So automatically the price of cars after that decision will double in price in Lebanon.

Every minister went and told his own people secretly, you know, like a day or two or 1 week before the decision, to go and buy cars. This is the kind of Lebanon we have today. If you read the newspapers, every day in Lebanon, you have hundreds of examples. It is sad. Lebanon never had this kind of corruption in its history.

Mr. RAHALL. Where is that money going? How do you know that? How can you say it is corruption?

Mr. NASSIF. Everybody is accusing everybody. The head of the Parliament is saying this is unacceptable, for the people to go and buy the cars.

Mr. RAHALL. I am not going to defend every action of the Lebanese Government. I have problems with it as well. There are many governments today that you can perhaps find instances about which you can make such statements, taking it totally out of context. I think the decisions they made perhaps are not decisions I would make if I were in that same place.

But I don't think we can make such broad statements, painting with a broad brush, if we are really serious about trying to get them back on the right track. I think a more reasoned approach would be the method to follow.

Do you advocate the U.S. Government trying to help the Lebanese Government, or how do you advocate us getting aid to Lebanon?

Mr. NASSIF. We always testified before the Appropriations Committee and asked that money should be increased to Lebanon, but money should go through private assistance organizations and through the education institutions, like AUB or other educational institutions, nothing to go through the Lebanese Government. Mr. RAHALL. So you are supportive of continued funding? Mr. NASSIF. Of course.

Mr. RAHALL. Increased aid for AUB and LAU and the institutions of higher learning.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. LaHood.

Mr. LAHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank all of the panel members for their leadership over the number of years that you have been involved in these issues, and for being here today.

I had the occasion to see your documentary, Mr. Anderson. I thought it was just superb. It is very well done, and I think really it highlights for Americans who are confused about what is happening in Lebanon some of the more significant things that are happening there. And I guess PBS will try and air that later on this year; is that right?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir, they will air it this summer.

My only regret about it is, it was far too short to cover a very complicated and interesting country.

Mr. LAHOOD. Mr. Pipes, what leads you to believe that the Lebanese Army is controlled by Syria?

Mr. PIPES. Well, sir, I see the Lebanese Government making decisions only that meet with the approval of the Syrian Government, and I see the Lebanese Armed Forces under the control of the Lebanese Government. So, one removed, it is under the Syrian Government.

Mr. LAHOOD. Who do you think General Lahoud takes his orders from, the President or the Prime Minister?

Mr. PIPES. General Lahoud is not in the Lebanese Army, so he does not take orders from either of them.

Mr. LAHOOD. Who do you believe is running the country of Lebanon, the President or the Prime Minister or the Parliament or the Speaker of the House or President Assad, or who?

Mr. PIPES. Well, roughly the 90 percent of Lebanon that is north of the very southernmost part is, in my estimation, ultimately under control of the Syrian Government. It has various vehicles for that control, including the Government of Lebanon, but I think the key decisions are made in Damascus-not for that little part in the south, but for the rest of the country.

Mr. LAHOOD. So you are saying that President Assad is really running Lebanon, in your opinion?

Mr. PIPES. If I might use an analogy, the government of, say, Czechoslovakia or Poland, had certain areas of autonomy. Not every decision was made in Moscow, but, roughly speaking, all the important decisions were made in Moscow, and the less consequential ones or the more routine ones, the more automatic ones, were made in Prague or Warsaw.

I would say similarly the routine decisions, the ones known to create no offense, are made in Beirut or elsewhere in Lebanon, but the key decisions and the guidelines are clearly coming from Da

mascus.

Mr. LAHOOD. Let me ask all of you to comment on this. If, in fact, the State Department lifts the travel restriction, which we all hope that they do, and that Secretary Albright does that, what is the No. 1 problem-set that aside. What is the No. 1 problem or the No. 1, I guess, thing that can really help Lebanon more than anything else, aside from that problem, in terms of rebuilding the country, rebuilding the economy, creating the kind of opportunity, economic opportunities, that I think all of us hope for in terms of jobs and business and so forth?

I ask all of you to comment on that.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. LaHood, I think one of the most constructive things that America could do in its policy toward Lebanon, is to recognize and respect that there is a Lebanese Government, which was elected by the people of Lebanon, in a flawed but mostly democratic process, and that it will be up to that government to decide when to demand the Syrians leave.

We can encourage them, we can express our views on the matter, but they are going to ask the Syrians to leave when they decide that that is both practical and desirable.

Other than that, we can assist them in trying to rebuild their country and to strengthen democratic institutions, which they are trying to do.

I must say, sir, I was a bit puzzled by the picture of Lebanon that was drawn by some of the other people who were speaking, because I didn't recognize it as the Lebanon that I saw last August.

If Mr. Pipes thinks that Lebanon is as quiet as a desert, he obviously hasn't talked with very many Lebanese in public. In fact, there is an active political ferment going there. People are not afraid to speak their minds on the street. The newspapers are under some restrictions. Criticism of Syria is not encouraged. But other than that, they are quite free and open and combative.

The picture is not anywhere near as grim as they would have you believe. There are no secret policemen standing on the street corner trying to overhear your conversation. The Lebanese are actively engaged in trying to decide their own destiny and are not afraid to give their opinions about it.

I am not a naive visitor; I am an experienced foreign correspondent who has been in many countries where people are afraid to speak their mind. I know what it sounds like and feels like. That is not Lebanon today.

Mr. PIPES. Before I answer your question, Mr. LaHood, if I might, I would like to comment that Mr. Anderson's depiction of Lebanon reminds me of many experienced visitors to Poland during the Cold War years and reporting back the true political life that exists in Poland. I just don't think that was the case there, then or now, in Lebanon.

But to answer your question, I believe the single most useful thing we could do would be to articulate directly and explicitly that the U.S. Government condemns the continued occupation of Lebanon. I am not advocating that we do anything, such as use force. I just think a very clear articulation of that message would be extremely useful for all concerned.

Mr. TANOUS. Congressman LaHood, I think that in the scenario you painted, where the travel ban no longer exists, the most important thing the United States can do is to help Lebanon grow in integrity and strengthen Lebanese institutions.

I think some of the testimony we have heard smacks of throwing the baby out with the bath water. I want to see the baby grow and thrive so that the Syrian presence, which is of concern to all Lebanese, becomes moot and becomes impossible to sustain, because at that point, Lebanon will be strong and the Syrians will have no ex

to the Syrians. But it can only do so with a strong and viable Leb

anon.

The idea that we are going to withhold aid and assistance to Lebanon and make the Lebanese suffer because it might send the right message to the Syrians is not, in my opinion, very constructive.

Mr. NASSIF. Congressman LaHood, the real ruler in Lebanon today is Ghazi Kenaan. He is the head of the Syrian intelligence network in Lebanon. You see all of the leadership in Lebanon go, daily or weekly, and he arranges for them to go, to Damascus. So it is all a facade in the country.

What the United States could do, the United States could push for genuine reconciliation in the country. There are still a lot of leaders living in exile, you know. The country is still not at peace with itself.

I have here three pictures sent yesterday by a leading journalist in An-Nahar newspaper. This is the leading newspaper in Lebanon. Fifteen members of the Syrian intelligence personnel attacked him in his house. They beat him up. And those are the pictures. I would like them to be put in the record, if possible, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, we will include them in the record. Will you identify where they were taken?

Mr. NASSIF. They were taken in Paris. This guy escaped Lebanon and arrived in Paris like 10 days ago, and he asked for political asylum in France. For an article he wrote in the paper, they attacked him in his house.

Chairman GILMAN. In Paris?

Mr. NASSIF. No. They attacked him in Beirut, but he escaped Beirut after that.

Chairman GILMAN. When did they attack him in Beirut?
Mr. NASSIF. A month ago.

Chairman GILMAN. What do the photos show?

Mr. NASSIF. It showed traces of torture on his body.

Chairman GILMAN. Those were taken after he got to Paris?
Mr. NASSIF. Yes.

Chairman GILMAN. We will admit them.

Mr. NASSIF. He went into a coma for like 3 days, he went to the hospital, and from there it was arranged, his escape out of the country.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the photos will be added to the record.

[The photos referred to appear in the appendix.]

Mr. LAHOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. LaHood.

I have a couple of brief questions. One of the underlying causes of Lebanon's civil war back in the seventies and eighties was a rupture in relations between the Lebanese Christians and the Muslims, but the civil war was ended years ago. Can you give us an assessment of intercommunal dialog in Lebanon today?

I address that to all of the panelists.

Mr. ANDERSON. Sir, I was somewhat amazed during my visit at the general lack of hatred between the various groups in Lebanon, after having observed a large part of the civil war and seeing them do terrible things to each other. I was quite amazed to find most of that hatred, not all of it, gone.