clerk will read the Subcommittee amendment in the nature of a substitute. Ms. BLOOMER. "Amendment in the nature of a substitute. Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: Section 1. Short title. This Act may be cited as the-” Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the amendment in the nature of a substitute is considered as having been read. It is now open for amendment at any point. [The amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific appears in the appendix.] Chairman GILMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bereuter, to open debate on the bill. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today Macau is the last of the Portuguese overseas territories. It is an area of about 16 square kilometers-about one-tenth the size of the District of Columbia-and has a population of less than a half million, 95 percent of whom are of Chinese ethnic background. On April 13, 1987, Portugal and China signed a joint declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Portugal on the question of Macau, an international agreement similar to the 1984 United Kingdom PRC joint declaration on Hong Kong. The joint declaration specifies that Macau shall revert to Chinese sovereignty on December 20, 1999. Currently, the United States has no diplomatic or consular presence in Macau. U.S. interests in Macau are monitored by the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong. Unlike Hong Kong, Macau is only a minor U.S. trading partner. The United States provides no economic or military assistance to Macau, and Macau does not host any U.S. military personnel or installations. Macau's principle industries are clothing, textile, plastic products, furniture, gambling, and tourism. With respect to commercial immigration, cultural transportation, communication, and other links with the U.S. corporations and individuals, Macau currently benefits from most of the advantages under U.S. law that flow from its status as an overseas territory of Portugal. Most significantly, at the present time, Macau is subject to none of the legal constraints that limit U.S. commercial, cultural, or other relations with the People's Republic of China. In many ways, Macau's current situation is analogous to the situation in Hong Kong prior to its reversion to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. On March 31, 1993, China's National People's Congress adopted a Basic Law of the Macau Special Administrative Region of the PRC which is similar to the 1990 Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. In effect, the Basic Law will constitute Macau's post-reversion constitution and, as with Hong Kong, provide the governing principle is "one country, two sys tems.' Unless Congress enacts legislation like the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1994, Macau's legal status for the purpose of U.S. domestic law will be ambiguous and problematic. As of December 20, 1999, Macau will become-for purposes of U.S. law-largely indistinguishable from the PRC. In other words, U.S. laws that apply to China, including post-Tiananmen sanctions, export controls, and restrictions, will apply automatically to Macau. The legislation before the Committee would permit the United States to honor Macau's post-reversion rights as a separate member of the WTO (of which they are already a member) apart from the PRC as well as for other commercial purposes. By enacting the Macau Policy Act, we are trying to support the "one country, two systems" policy, not for the advantage of the Chinese but for our own advantage. It has worked, so far, relatively well in Hong Kong, and it is, therefore, serving as a model for Macau's reversion. My colleagues, I would remind you that you may disagree with the reversion of Hong Kong or of Macau to the PRC, but that is a decision that was made by the United Kingdom and the PRC and Portugal and the PRC. What we are trying to do through this legislation is maintain our relations with Macau in every respect possible. What we are doing is almost a ministerial function as we did last Congress with respect to Hong Kong. This legislation also ensures that an export control regime appropriate to Macau be devised, thus providing some protection against potential loss of sensitive dual-use technology. I will come back to that in a minute with an amendment. The President has given the ability to establish policies and regulations as he determines to be advisable in the national security interests of the United States. In the worst case scenario, if Macau proves itself not to be truly autonomous or if it leaks materials inappropriately, the Administration will have the ability to suspend its special treatment-whatever they might determine that treatment to be. The legislation also establishes reporting requirements so the Congress will be informed of Macau's continuing progress. In short, we are seeking to support Macau's reversion while simultaneously protecting our own national interests. I thank my colleagues on the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee for their support for it. It garnered support from both sides of the aisle. There were questions about it. I would like to emphasize that, in the case of Hong Kong, the Customs Service is as good or better than ours. They don't have as much technology as we do to perform their functions. We have had a very close and continued relationship with the Hong Kong Customs personnel and they have a different kind of export control regime at this point than we have, of course, with the PRC. Macau does not have a bureaucracy; they do not have a governmental system with a civil service that is anywhere close to the competence of that in Hong Kong. Some people think that Hong Kong, in fact, has the world's finest civil service. They pay enough that it should be the case. They have an anti-corruption section which is a model for every country. Macau just does not have that capability. No one would expect the Administration to develop the same sort of export control regime for Macau as now exists for Hong Kong. One of our staff members, Paul Berkowitz, has gone directly to the chairman of the Republican Policy Committee to create some concern about this legislation. I do not like the construction he has put on this because we are not establishing the same control re gime as we have for Hong Kong. We give the discretion to the President. However, to make sure that we expect to have a control regime at least equal to that which we have for the PRC, I have in caution drafted an amendment to ensure that that is at least the case; that it will not be less rigorous than that which we have with the PRC. I will be offering that amendment en bloc with another amendment which is a rather simple suggestion from the Portuguese Government that we reference the fact that Macau is the signature of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in the International Convention on Economic and Social Cultural Rights at the appropriate section. With that explanation, Mr. Chairman, if it is appropriate, I would like to call up two amendments to be considered en bloc and then would be happy to answer any questions on the legislation as amended if the Committee chooses to amend. Chairman GILMAN. I ask the clerk to distribute the amendments. The clerk will report the amendments. Ms. BLOOMER. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. Bereuter. "In section 2, insert the following after paragraph 3 (page 2, after line 25), and redesignate the succeeding paragraph accordingly: (4) The Congress takes note of Macau's signature of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. At the end of section 201(c) (page 6, line 17), add the following after the period: In no case shall such export control policies and regulations be less restrictive than those that apply to exports to the People's Republic of China." Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman. Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Bereuter. Mr. BEREUTER. Having heard the amendments read in its entirety and having given explanation, I think that no further explanation probably would be necessary for me at this point. I would yield my time and be happy to answer any questions or comments. Otherwise, I ask for the adoption of the amendments en bloc. Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman is asking for the adoption of the amendment. Before we do that, I want to thank the gentleman from Nebraska for introducing this resolution and addressing Macau's reversion to Chinese sovereignty in December this year. H.R. 825, the U.S.-Macau Policy Act of 1999, appropriately and necessarily addresses the interests of our Nation in maintaining mutually beneficial ties with the Portuguese port city of Macau after the transfer of sovereignty. This is important legislation. I commend Mr. Bereuter's staff for crafting good measures but I do have some concern that we do adequately address U.S. interest on export controls. That issue is critically important to American national security. Considering China's aggressive military technology and their acquisition campaign and its record as one of the world's worst proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, we must make certain that militarily significant American technology is not making its way illegally to the Chinese people Libera This concern is brought even into sharper focus by the fine work done by the Select Committee led by our colleague, Chris Cox, in the arrest a week ago of a Chinese national attempting to smuggle a gyroscope out of the United States and into China. That gyroscope is a vital component in missile guidance systems, although that Chinese businessman insisted that the part was for use in a railroad project. One Federal official said that using this kind of gyroscope for a railroad, and I quote, "would be like flying a Navy F-14 TomCat fighter jet to the grocery store." The Cox report shows that these sorts of activities should be of great concern to our Nation, particularly considering China's military modernization and the increasing threat to forward-deployed U.S. forces in East Asia, its adventurism in the South China Sea, and the shifting of military balance across the Taiwan Strait as detailed in the Defense Department's recent report. We thank Mr. Bereuter for bringing this forward-looking measure before us. As of last evening, there were some additional concerns about the export control provisions in ensuring that they adequately protect U.S. security interests. And after we satisfactorily adjust this issue if not already-I look forward to bringing it to the floor at an early date for consideration by the entire House. Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, would you yield? Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Bereuter. Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you can see from that language in the second part of my en bloc amendment, in order to provide maximum comfort to people who express the same views as you have legitimately expressed, we indicate that in no case will the export control regime be less restrictive than that regime currently applying to PRČ. As the Chairman knows, I was a Member of the Cox Committee and, by training, I am a counter-intelligence agent. I think no one other than Mr. Goss knows more and has more interest in counterespionage and counter-intelligence than the two of us, and we do believe that adequate export control expertise in Hong Kongwhich does not exist and will not exist, I am sorry to say, in Macau for the moment (maybe never) has helped us actually in our antiproliferation issues with respect to third countries. The amendment addresses the gentleman's concern, and I thank him. Chairman GILMAN. Are any Members seeking recognition on the amendments? Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman. Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Gejdenson. Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, not to delay the debate, I just have one question, Mr. Bereuter. We obviously have a somewhat different regime for Hong Kong, as you pointed out, being confident that their bureaucracy is capable of executing a serious regime to control high technology exports. What would happen if Macau, which we hope maintains as much independence as possible, were to develop an adequate regime? Would his amendment, then, preclude the United States from coming to any agreements with Macau different than those with the PRC? Because the language seems to indicate to me, at least, that it would always be basically dealt with as an integral part of the PRC. Mr. BEREUTER. The gentleman is correct. It locks in that the controls be no less restrictive than that applies to PRC. I will tell you that there is zero chance that Macau will ever have a level of expertise approaching that of Hong Kong, and I do not ever expect them to have a greater expertise than the PRC. Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you. Could I ask the lady representing the Administration maybe to come forward and we will hear from her Chairman GILMAN. Ms. Larkin, would you indicate your name and title for the record? Ms. LARKIN. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Barbara Larkin. I am Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs. Mr. GEJDENSON. And do you have a view on this amendment? Ms. LARKIN. Yes, Mr. Gejdenson. The Administration would strongly prefer the original bill language and would oppose the amendment that was offered en bloc. The reasons for this are primarily two. One is we feel that it would undercut the autonomy of Macau by lumping them in a group with China and treating them for all practical purposes as China for purpose of export control. The second reason is that it would undermine any leverage that we have to cause Macau to improve its export control. The original bill called for the Administration to propose an export control policy with Macau within 90 days and we would very much like the opportunity to discuss that with Macau and negotiate a system that works for Macau as well as for us. But we believe that this legislation would undermine our ability to cause them to make any improvements. Mr. BEREUTER. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. GEJDENSON. I would be happy to yield. Mr. BEREUTER. I understand the Administration's point of view. I am comfortable with permitting the Administration to make a decision on this Macau legislation but the kind of concern raised by Mr. Berkowitz with the Cox Committee and others is something I am trying to accommodate Chairman GILMAN. Would the gentleman yield? Chairman GILMAN. I take issue with the gentleman in raising the name of any staff member. Staff works under my direction, has the discretion to raise issues with Members, and staff, with other Members of Congress, work toward the improvement of our legislation. The Committee staff should not be singled out for criticism by others or otherwise by any Member during the course of our debate and I take full responsibility for their actions. If you have a problem with any staff member, please consult with me off the dais and we will be pleased to discuss it with you. Please proceed. Mr. BEREUTER. Would the gentleman continue to yield to me? Mr. BEREUTER. I took a step out of a drastic measure, I brought to the Chairman a problem in the past, and it continues. In any case, the point that the gentleman has made and that the Adminis |