a modification of Me, virtually affirms that the phenomenon is not a modification of anything different from Me, and consequently implies a common cognizance of self and not self; the act which affirms that this other phenomenon is a modification of something different from Me, virtually affirms that the phenomenon is not a modification of Me, and consequently implies a common cognizance of not self and self. But unless we are prepared to maintain that the faculty cognizant of self and not self, is different from the faculty cognizant of not self and self, we must allow that the ego and non-ego are known and discriminated in the same indivisible act of knowledge."-Pp. 156, 157.

Here he plainly assumes the point he alleges as a proof of the error of Dr. Reid's theory;-namely, that the modification of the mind in sight, the consciousness of which, he admits, is a consciousness of a non-ego, is identical with the external object itself of the perception, so that the one is the object of consciousness, as absolutely and directly as the other. But that is the very point denied by Dr. Reid. Sir William Hamilton should therefore have directly proved, not assumed it. Not a syllable, however, does he allege to show that the mind's consciousness in such an act, is not confined simply to the modification that takes place in itself, to the exclusion of the external object. As the mind's consciousness of the modification that takes place in itself in such a perception, is a consciousness of a non-ego, he cannot claim that there must, in addition to that, be a consciousness also of the external object, in order to a consciousness of a non-ego. And not being able to claim that a corsciousness of the external object is necessary, in order to a consciousness of a nonego he cannot claim as he does, that a consciousness of the external object is involved in, and identical with the consciousness of the modification of the mind in the perception. of that object.

He departs in this theory from his own definition of consciousness as a knowledge simply of what takes place in the mind.

"Consciousness may be compared to an internal light, by means of which, and which alone, what passes in the mind is rendered visible. Consciousness is simple-is not composed of parts either similar or dissimilar. It always resembles itself, differing only in the degrees of its intensity: thus, there are not

various kinds of consciousness, although there are various kinds of mental modes or states, of which we are conscious. Whatever divisions therefore of the mental phenomena may be adopted, all its members must be within consciousness itself, which must be viewed as comprehensive of the whole phenomena to be divided; far less should we reduce it, as a special phenomenon, to a particular class. Let consciousness, therefore, remain one and indivisible, comprehending all the modifications-all the phenomena, of the thinking subject."-Pp. 126, 127.

Here the objects of consciousness are defined as exclusively the modifications or operations of the mind itself that which lies in the circle of its own movements, whether the effect of the action on it of external causes, or the work of its own volition. To extend the sphere of consciousness beyond this limit, and place the external world as far as it falls under the cognizance of the senses under its jurisdiction, is not only to desert his definition, but is to ascribe another nature to the power itself, and make it equivalent to Reid's faculty of perception. Again he says:

"The expressions, I know that I know, I know that I feel, I know that I desire, are translated by-I am conscious that I know, I am conscious that I feel, I am conscious that I desire. Consciousness is thus, on the one hand, the recognition by the mind or ego of its acts and affections; in other words, the selfaffirmation, that certain modifications are known by me, and that these modifications are mine. But, on the other hand, consciousness is not to be viewed as anything different from these modifications themselves, but is, in fact, the general condition of their existence, or of their existence within the sphere of intelligence. Though the simplest act of mind, consciousness, thus expresses a relation subsisting between two terms. These terms are, on the one hand, an I or self as the subject of a certain modification, and, on the other, some modification, state, quality, affection, or operation belonging to the subject. Consciousness, thus, in its simplicity, necessarily involves three things: 1st. A recognising or knowing subject; 2d. A recog nition or known modification; and 3rd. A recognition or knowledge by the subject-the mind-of the mode of the modification."-P. 133.

No definition could be framed that would more expressly limit consciousness to the mind itself and its operations, and

exclude everything exterior to itself. To have extended the definition so as to include a consciousness of external objects, would have required a fourth specification, in which that element should have been explicitly stated.

But besides this, he expressly admits and maintains that there is a distinction of the greatest obviousness and importance between the mind's consciousness of its own processes in an act of perception, and the external object itself it perceives in that act.

"A fact of consciousness is thus: that whose existence is given and guaranteed by an original and necessary belief. But there is an important distinction to be here made which has not only been overlooked by all philosophers, but has led some of the most distinguished into no inconsiderable errors.

"The facts of consciousness are to be considered in two points of view, either as evidencing their own ideal or phenomenal existence, or as evidencing the objective existence of something else beyond them. A belief in the former is not identical with a belief in the latter. The one cannot, the other may possibly be refused. In the case of a common witness, we cannot doubt the fact of his personal reality, nor the fact of his testimony as emitted, but we can always doubt the truth of that which his testimony avers. So it is with consciousness. We cannot possibly refuse the fact of its evidence as given, but we may hesitate to admit that beyond itself of which it assures us. I shall explain by taking an example. In the act of External Perception, consciousness gives, as a conjunct fact, the existence of Me or Self as perceiving, and the existence of something different from Me or Self as perceived. Now the reality of this as a subjective datum or an ideal phenomenon, it is absolutely impossible to doubt without doubting the existence of consciousness, for consciousness is itself this fact; and to doubt the existence of consciousness is absolutely impossible; for, as such a doubt could not exist, except in and through consciousness, it would consequently annihilate itself. We should doubt that we doubted. As contained, as given in an act of consciousness, the contrast of mind knowing and of matter known, cannot be denied.

"But the whole phenomenon as given in consciousness, may be admitted, and yet, its inference disputed. It may be said, consciousness gives the mental subject as perceiving an external

object, contra-distinguished from it [the external object] as perceived; all this we do not and cannot deny. But consciousness is only a phenomenon; the contrast between the subject and object may be only apparent, not real; the object given as an external reality, may only be a mental representation, which the mind is, by an unknown law, determined unconsciously to produce, and to mistake for something different from itself. All this may be said and believed, without self-contradiction-nay, all this has, by the immense majority of modern philosophers, been actually said and believed.”—Pp. 188, 189.

He thus distinctly admits and affirms that the facts of consciousness, are to be considered in two points of view, either as evidencing their own ideal or phenomenal existence—that is, being a consciousness of the mind's own modifications or as evidencing the objective existence of something BEYOND THEM; and that, "a belief in the former, is not identical with a belief in the latter." A consciousness of its own modifications, then, is not a consciousness of external objects. The one takes place in the mind and exists there only; and the other is, by his definition, wholly beyond those modifications, and external to the mind itself.

He omits to notice, however, it should be observed, in his exemplification from perception, that the mind's consciousness of its own modifications in such an act is wholly distinct and different from its perception of the external object. He speaks as though the consciousness of its own phenomena, and its perception of something beyond those selfprocesses, were identical. Their identity, however, is disproved by the fact which he admits, that it is possible to deny the reality of the external objects of perception, while the facts themselves of consciousness cannot be denied. If the external objects perceived were embraced in consciousness, and among its most essential facts, how could their reality be denied or doubted, any more than the reality of the mind's processes by which it perceives them? It would plainly be as impossible to question their reality, as it would the reality of the mind's perception of them, or the reality of the mind itself.

He thus clearly admits and reasons on the fact that the external objects of perception are wholly different from the mind's own modifications in the perception of them, and

beyond those modifications, and thence deserts and contradicts his theory that the mind's consciousness of its own phenomena, is a consciousness of the external objects, to which, in perception through the senses, those phenomena are related.

In his next argument against Reid, he falls into an equally strange mistake;-affirming that we cannot know an external object unless we are conscious of it: thus confounding our perception of an object with the object itself; and affirming that our perception of it is not a medium to us of a knowledge of it.

"Reid's assertion, that we are conscious of the act of perception, but not of the object perceived, involves, first of all, a general absurdity. For it virtually asserts that we can know what we are not conscious of knowing. An act of perception is an act of knowledge; that we perceive that we know. Now, if in perception there be an external reality known, but of which external reality we are, on Reid's hypothesis, not conscious, then is there an object known of which we are not conscious. But, as we know only, inasmuch as we know that we know-inasmuch as we are conscious that we know we cannot know an object without being conscious of that object as known; consequently we cannot perceive an object, without being conscious of that object as perceived.

"But again: How is it possible that we can be conscious of an operation of perception, unless consciousness be co-extensive with that act; and how can it be co-extensive with the act, and not also conversant with its object? An act of knowledge is only possible in relation to an object; and it is an act of one kind or another only by special relation to a particular object. Thus the object at once determines the existence, and specifies the character of the existence of the intellectual energy. An act of knowledge existing and being what it is only by relation to its object, it is manifest that the act can be known only through the object to which it is correlative; and Reid's supposition that an operation can be known in consciousness to the exclusion of the object, is impossible. For example: I see the inkstand. How can I be conscious that my present modification exists; that it is a perception and not another mental state -that it is a perception of sight to the exclusion of every other sense-and, finally, that it is a perception of the inkstand, and of the inkstand only, unless my consciousness comprehend