tifies that the object of which we are conscious in perception [which we are conscious we perceive in that act] is the external reality as existing, and not merely its representation in the percipient mind. That this is the fact testified to by consciousness, and believed by the common sense of mankind, is admitted even by those philosophers who reject the truth of the testimony and the belief. It is of no consequence to us at present what are the grounds on which the principle is founded, that the mind. can have no knowledge of ought besides itself; it is sufficient to observe that this principle being contradictory of the testimony of consciousness, Dr. Brown, by adopting it, virtually accuses consciousness of falsehood. But if consciousness be false in its testimony to one fact, we can have no confidence in its testimony to any other; and Brown having himself belied the veracity of consciousness, cannot, therefore, again appeal to this veracity as to a credible authority. But he is not thus consistent. Although he does not allow that we have any knowledge of the existence of an outer world, the existence of that world he still maintains. And on what grounds? He admits the reasoning of the idealist, that is of the philosopher who denies the reality of the material universe-he admits this to be invincible. How then is this conclusion avoided by him? Simply by appealing to the universal belief of mankind in favor of the existence of external things-that is to the authority of a fact of consciousness. But to him this appeal is incompetent. For having already virtually given up, or rather positively rejected, the testimony of consciousness, when consciousness deposed to our immediate knowledge of external things-how can he ever found upon the veracity of that mendacious principle, when bearing evidence to the existence of external things? I cannot but believe that the material reality exists; therefore it does exist, for consciousness does not deceive us, this reasoning Dr. Brown employs when defending his assertion of an outer world. I cannot but believe that the material reality is the object immediately known in perception; therefore it is immediately known, for consciousness does not deceive us this reasoning Dr. Brown rejects when establishing the foundation of his system. . . . . . . . Why do mankind believe in the existence of an outer world? They do not believe in it as in something unknown; but on the contrary they believe it to exist only because they believe that they immediately know it to exist. The former belief is only as it is founded on the latter. Of all absurdities therefore, the greatest is to assert-on the one hand, that consciousness deceives us in the belief that

we know any material object to exist; and on the other, that the material object exists, because, though on false grounds, we believe it to exist."-Pp. 193, 194.

He thus maintains in the most specific and emphatic manner that our consciousness testifies to the reality of the outer material world, which we regard ourselves as perceiving through our senses; and that to contradict that consciousness, and impeach it of falsehood, is to deny the validity of the evidence on which we believe in the existence of the external world, and to pass on to the ground of idealism. But how does our consciousness testify to the reality of the outer world? Simply by testifying that our perceptions of outer material things are literal and truthful perceptions of them as genuine external realities; and not perceptions of what is merely representative and ideal. We believe that they are, and that we perceive them, because our consciousness is a specific consciousness that we perceive them, and that our perception of them is a perception of them as external and genuine realities. And this testimony being as absolute and authoritative as the testimony of consciousness is to any of our other mental processes, we can no more divest ourselves of our belief in the reality of the outer world, and force ourselves to act on the supposition that it is unreal, than we can divest ourselves of the belief that we exert the acts of perception of which we are conscious, and force ourselves to act on the supposition that we are not the subjects of them.

We might add many other confirmations of this fact, and confutations of the doctrine that in perception the mind is conscious of the material objects that are in contact with the organs, but these are sufficient. We have dwelt thus at length on it, from the conviction that his error misrepresents our nature in an essential particular, vitiates his own system, and overturns, if pursued to its legitimate issues, the whole fabric of truth.

It misrepresents our nature in the most extraordinary manner by exhibiting our knowledge of external things as intuitive instead of mediate. It makes consciousness the medium and sole medium of our knowledge of external things in identically the same way, as it is of our know

ledge of our own mental processes, and that is to make it intuitive. The knowledge we have by consciousness is in the most absolute sense intuitive. It is not in any measure mediate. It cannot be confirmed or weakened by anything out of the mind. No matter how the processes of the mind are excited, of which consciousness has cognizance, its knowledge of them, and all that they embrace, is obtained exclusively by its intuition of itself. It does not need to go out of itself for proof of the reality of the processes that take place in it. It could not find any exterior proofs of their existence if it sought them-for there are none. As they subsist in itself alone, so the proofs of their existence lie in itself alone. It sees them by feeling them as they take place in itself, and its sight of them is therefore in the most absolute sense intuitive. But to teach or imply that our knowledge of external things is intuitive, is to misrepresent our nature in the most consummate manner. The great characteristic of our nature is that we gain our knowledge of things external to ourselves through the medium of effects wrought by them in our senses, that differ wholly from those exterior objects themselves; and the glory of the wisdom, goodness, and power of the Almighty in framing our nature lies chiefly in the perfection and beauty of its adaptedness to that end. Nothing conceivable can transcend the directness, the rapidity, the certainty, the completeness with which it acts. The consciousness. that the effect is the perception of external objects and the knowledge of their reality is absolute. The mind is put in as perfect possession of that fact, as it is of the fact that it is the subject of the perception, and that it is itself an existence. And there is an ineffable beauty and wonderfulness in this adjustment of our nature. Nothing can exceed the grandeur of the intelligence and skill that is displayed in making light, which is diffused through all the spaces of the universe, the medium of perception, and so adapting the organs of sight to it that they have but to be opened and it instantly presents to the mind the whole circle of external objects, from which the rays that enter the eye are radiated, and possesses it of as indubitable a knowledge of their existence, forms, relations to each other in space, and, in a considerable measure, their nature, as it has of its own

existence and peculiar nature. And such is the principle also of our knowledge through the other organs of percep tion. The whole material universe is thus a vast engine, the very office of which is, through the adjustment of our senses to its forces, to reveal itself, and through itself to reveal God to us, furnish us with the requisite materials for the evolution and occupation of our faculties, present us with a theatre for our activity, and raise us to the knowledge and prompt us to the affections that become us as intelligences.

The number of effects thus produced on us through the eye and the ear only, in a day, an hour, or a few moments even, as when we gaze on a wide scene, transcends the powers of enumeration. Yet, though these are all unlike the external objects which excite them, and of whose existence and nature they apprise us, they are the means to us of as indubitable a knowledge of their reality, as our consciousness is of our own existence. To overlook this great fact, is accordingly to misconceive in the most unfortunate manner the office of the universe in reference to us, to misjudge our own nature, and to lose the vastness and grandeur of the wisdom and power displayed by the Almighty in the means he has provided for our instruction, culture, and happiness, as sensitive and intelligent beings.

It is to overlook the great fact also that all our methods of communicating and receiving thought through the medium of language proceed on the same principle-the effect, which is the medium of the thought, being of a wholly different nature from the thought itself. Thus both spoken sounds, and letters which are the representatives of vocal sounds, are mere signs of the things-whether material and spiritual existences, or thoughts and affections-which they denote or express, and signs that bear no resemblance to the things which they signify. And such must of necessity be the nature of any medium of conveying thought.

Thought itself cannot be the direct medium of its own transmission from one mind to another. Such a method would require that the mind receiving it should have a direct intuition of it, independently of means. But in order to that a faculty of omniscience would be necessary, which is impossible to creatures. And as all our thoughts, even

when not uttered, are clothed in language, we are proceeding through the whole sphere of our mental activity on the fact that the exciting causes of our thoughts and media of our knowledge must be of a wholly different nature from our thoughts and knowledge themselves. And as this is consonant with our nature, and has its ground in it, so the fact that the effects wrought in us which are the medium of our perception of external things, are wholly different from the things themselves which we perceive through them, is equally consonant with our nature, and has its ground in it. The principle reigns necessarily through the whole of our mental activity. To overlook it, is to overlook the most characteristic and conspicuous feature of our life as intelligences.

And finally, the denial of this principle in regard to our perception of external objects, not only contradicts our consciousness and experience, but is fraught with the subversion of all certainty of knowledge, and conversion of the universe into a mere series of ideas, a procession of empty and meaningless shadows. If, as our author's theory affirms, there is no immediate discernment and apprehension in our sense-perceptions of any external things, except those that are in contact with the organs of sense, and no knowledge gained thereby of any of the external objects, fields, trees, dwellings, human agents, which we regard as the real objects of our perceptions-then it is indubitable that our nature deceives us in impressing us with the resistless belief that they are realities, compelling us to proceed in all our agency on the conviction that they are such, and making our procedure on that belief the indispensable condition of our safety, usefulness, and happiness. No misconception, no delusion could be more absolute. But if we have no certainty of their reality through the testimony of our consciousness, it is clear that we have none through any medium whatever. No one assumes or imagines that we have or can have. A direct consciousness itself of the external universe, were it possible, would yield us no certainty of its reality, if our present direct and emphatic consciousness, that we perceive the external universe, does not give us that certainty. A consciousness of external things themselves, if supposable, could be no more absolute and a medium.