of the Representatives, as fully as under the existing system. Cases like the Vermont election contain this injustice, that the majority obtain the odd member by a vote less than that cast by the minority. Thus the total vote cast in Vermont was 41,537, and as 3 members were chosen, the quota or number of votes entitled to a member was 13,845. The Republicans cast twice this, thus entitling them to two members, and 3,931 over; the Democrats cast 9,916, and yet the third member went to the former instead of to the latter vote. An injustice like this the cumulative vote seems impotent to reach.

Another defect of the cumulative vote is that, in its present form at least, it cannot be relied on to work out a proportional representation unless some approximate idea of how parties stand can be obtained prior to the election. Where there are fusion tickets, or any other breaking up of old party lines, the result must necessarily be in doubt, and by not knowing for how many candidates to vote, a party may vote for too many, and thus, as in the case of the English School Board elections, so scatter its strength as to obtain less representation than its due, or on the other hand may underestimate its strength, and by piling up its votes on a few candidates, lose representation in that way. This would have been singularly manifest had the cumulative vote been in use in the municipal election of 1871 in the city of New York. Up to that time the city vote had generally been 110,000 Democratic to 40,000 Republican, but just prior to the election party lines were broken up to a great extent, and instead of the two old factions, two new ones, the Tammany and Reform parties, took the field. Politicians were at a loss to know how the vote would go, and had the cumulative vote been in use both parties must have made up their tickets in the dark. As having for years had an overwhelming majority, the Tammany men would doubtless have struck out for 10 of the 15 Aldermen, and the Reformers, as less confident of victory, would probably have thought best to cumulate their votes on, say, 6 candidates. Had this been done the Reformers would have piled up the great majority they really obtained on their 6 candidates and would have elected them all; but then there being no other Reform candidates, the Tammany men would have elected the other 9 alder

men and held three-fifths of the board with but two-fifths of the vote. Except where the relative strength of parties can be approximated, the cumulative vote cannot, therefore, be relied on in its present shape for a fairly proportionate representation. Where some such general idea is possible, and it is not often the case that the field is absolutely dark, the method can be made to work well. Even in its worst estate it has been found to give minorities some representation, and with time and practice remedies may be found such as will give it a uniformly smooth and just operation. Certainly it has been received with great favor in those two countries, England and the United States, where the needs and nature of representative government are supposed to be best understood. What is thought of it in this country the matter of this chapter will show, and in England it has received two strong indorsements from eminent writers on constitutional law. In his work on "Parliamentary Government considered with reference to Reform," Earl Grey says:

"The first of the reforms of a conservative tendency which I should suggest, and one which I should consider a great improvement under any circumstances, but quite indispensable if any changes favorable to democratic power are to be admitted, would be the adoption of what Mr. James Marshall has called the 'cumulative vote'-that is to say, the principle of giving to every elector as many votes as there are members to be elected by the constituency to which he belongs, with the right of either giving all these votes to a single candidate, or of dividing them, as he may prefer. ***The tendency of the alteration would be conservative in the best sense of the word."

And in his "Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform," John Stuart Mill says:

"I am prepared to maintain that the permission of cumulative votes, that is, of giving either one, two, or three votes to a single candidate, is in itself, even independently of its effect in giving a representation to minorities, the mode of voting which gives the most faithful expression of the wishes of the elector. On the existing plan, an elector who votes for three can give his vote for the three candidates whom he prefers to their competitors; but among those three he may desire the success of one immeasurably more than that of the other two, and may be willing to relinquish them entirely for an increased chance of attaining the greater object. This portion of his wishes he has now no means of expressing by his vote. He may sacrifice two of his votes altogether, but in no case can he give more than a single vote to the object of his preference. Why should the mere fact of preference be alone considered, and no account whatever be taken of the degree of it?"

CHAPTER IV.

THE LIMITED VOTE-ORIGIN-ADOPTION IN ENGLAND, NEW YORK, AND PENNSYLVANIA-PRACTICAL OPERATION-DEFECTS-THE PREFERENTIAL VOTE -M. ANDRE'S SCHEME-OPERATION IN DENMARK-MR. HARE'S SCHEMETHE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BILL OF 1872.

THE Limited, or as it is sometimes called the Restricted, Vote is a method of voting by which each elector has a less number of votes than there are persons to be elected, and must dispose of his votes as at present. If there are 3 representatives to be chosen, each elector has 2 votes, and can vote only for 2 candidates, one vote to each; if there are 5 Representatives, he has 3 votes, and can vote for but that number of candidates, and so on. One form of the Limited Vote gives each elector but one vote, which he casts for but one candidate, irrespective of the number of persons to be chosen, and is hence called the Single Vote.

The credit of first suggesting the Limited Vote is claimed for Lord John Russell, for Professor Fawcett, and for Professor Craik, of Belfast, Ireland; but the true original must be sought in the Norwegian constitution adopted October 7, 1814, which reads (cap. C., § 57) thus:

"In the cities one elector shall be chosen for each fifty inhabitants entitled to vote. These electors shall assemble within eight days after, at a place prescribed by the authorities, and elect either from among themselves, or from the other voters in their election district, thirty-seven representatives to meet and take their seats at the Storthing. * * * A city which constitutes an election district by itself shall in no case appoint less than three electors."

This is the exact idea of the three-cornered constituency proposition brought forward by Lord John Russell in the Reform Bill of 1854, and afterward embodied in the Reform Bill of 1867-8. It may be here added, that the general idea of Minority, or Proportional, Representation is further to be found in the Constitution of Norway, the same caption C., thus:

"SECTION 58.-In every parish in the country the inhabitants entitled to vote shall choose electors in proportion to their numbers. Thus, 100 shall

choose one: 100 to 200, two; 200 to 300, three; and so forth, in the same proportion."

At the session of 1867-8, the House of Commons passed a Reform Bill to extend the suffrage, and as amended (after a debate synopsized in Chap. II.) on motion of Lord Cairns in the Lords, became law. Lord Cairns' amendments were as follows: "At a contested election for any county or borough represented by three members, no person shall vote for more than two candidates," and "At a contested election for the city of London, no person shall vote for more than three candidates," there being nine constituencies entitled to three members, and one, London, to four. By "contested election" is to be understood not, as with us, an effort to invalidate an election before the representative body, so as to invoke the decision of that body as to which candidate has been legally elected, or an attempt to oust the sitting member in favor of a contestant, but merely an election where a formal poll is demanded. The election in Edinburgh, in 1868, for instance, was uncontested. There were two Representatives to be chosen, and but two candidates. The sheriff said, "Mr. McLaren and Mr. Miller have been proposed as candidates for the representation of the city. Has any elector any other candidate to propose? If not, I have to request, in the first place, a show of hands in favor of Mr. McLaren, and then for Mr. Miller." Five or six hundred hands were raised, and the sheriff then announced that "Mr. Duncan McLaren and Mr. John Miller have been duly elected Members of Parliament for the City of Edinburgh." And this was the whole of the election.

An "uncontested election" is, therefore, in British parlance what we term a "walk over." Where there are opposing candidates, the show of hands is appealed from, and the election then becomes contested and is decided by voting.

Referring to this adoption of the limited vote, the report made the United States Senate March 2, 1869, says:

On the 30th July, 1867, the reform bill being under consideration in the House of Lords, Lord Cairns moved to insert the following new clause, to come in after clause 8 of the bill:

At a contested election for any county or borough represented by three members no person shall vote for more than two candidates.

This amendment, after an elaborate debate, was adopted by a strong

66

vote: contents, 142; not contents, 51; and an additional amendm ́nt was then also adopted without a division, that “at a contested election for the city of London" (which is entitled to four members) no person shall vote for more than three candidates." The success of those amendments (which were concurred in by the House of Commons on the 8th of August) constitute an important event in the history of representative institutions, for they recognized and gave application to a principle of justice which will endure the test of trial and of time, a principle which will hereafter receive indefinite extension, and wherever extended will purify elections, insure contentment to constituencies, and elevate the character and improve the action of free government. Mr. Gladstone, speaking in the House of Commons, and confining his attention to his own country, declared that the proposition or principle contained in those amendments, if adopted at all, must be adopted with the certainty that "it must unfold and expand itself over the whole country and completely reconstruct the system of distribution of seats." And generally those who supported it in both houses of Parliament foretold and rejoiced in the prospect of its future expansion. Those amendments constitute the ninth and tenth clauses of the reform act of 15th of August, 1867, and their effect is illustrated by the parliamentary elections of 1868. We give the returns for certain districts:

Herefordshire, three members. Average Tory vote, 3,360; average Liberal vote, 2,074. Two Tories and one Liberal elected.

Cambridgeshire, three members. Average Tory vote, 3,924; average Liberal vote, 3,310, Two Tories and one Liberal elected.

The Liberals also obtained the third member in each of the Tory counties of Oxford, Bucks, and Dorset.

Liverpool borough, three members. Average Tory vote, 16,404; average Liberal vote, 15,198. Tory majority, 1,206.

But

In Liverpool the second seat, previously held by the Tories, was attacked by the Liberals; the result was a failure, as shown by the above vote. the third member was most justly secured to the Liberals under the certain operation of the limited vote, provided by clause 9 of the reform act. Under the operation of the same clause the Tories obtained the third member for Leeds, and they carried members also in Manchester and London. Blackwood's Magazine, a Tory organ (it has called itself "the oldest of the Tories"), although it admits that its party has suffered loss to the extent of at least four seats by the minority clause, says:

That to the principle of that clause, fairly and consistently worked out, it has no objection whatever.-Blackwood's Magazine, January, 1869.

This expression of opinion by a leading organ of the party which_suffered somewhat under the minority clause, is a valuable testimony in favor of the principle of electoral reform which that clause was intended to promote.

Another account of the operation of the Limited Vote is furnished by the London correspondent of the New York World:

The contest in London was very exciting, and by the operations of the law for the representation of minorities, the Tory minority not only succeeded in electing their one member, but came very near electing three out of the four candidates. There has not been a Tory elected here for very many years. There were four candidates to be elected the Liberals nominated four, the Tories only three. No voter, under the new law, could vote for more than three of the candidates. The Liberals brought 12,515 men to the polls, and, had these divided their votes in exactly the right proportion, they could have