I believe that the Treaty is in the best interests of the United States and represents an important step in achieving arms reductions that strengthen U.S. and Allied security. Therefore, I urge the Senate's advice and consent to its ratification.

THE WHITE HOUSE, January 25, 1988.

RONALD REAGAN.

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Treaty). The Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) regarding the establishment of a data base, the Protocol on Elimination governing the elimination of missile systems, and the Protocol on Inspection establishing procedures for the conduct of inspections, with an Annex to that Protocol on the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members. The Treaty was signed at Washington on December 8, 1987. I recommend that the Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

In addition, accompanying this Report is the Agreement Among the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Basing Country Agreement). The Basing Country Agreement confirms that the inspections called for in the Treaty will be permitted by the five Allied Basing Countries. Also enclosed are the Notes that were exchanged between the United States and both the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia regarding inspections that will be carried out on the territory of those two countries. The Basing Country Agreement was signed at Brussels, Belgium, on December 11, 1987, and the Notes were exchanged on December 23, 1987, between the United States and the German Democratic Republic and on January 5, 1988, between the United States and Czechoslovakia. Identical notes are also being exchanged between the Soviet Union and the five Allied Basing Countries. I recommend that the Basing Country Agreement and the Notes be provided to the Senate for its information.

INTRODUCTION

The Treaty requires the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate, throughout the world, their shorter-range (500 to 1000

kilometers) and intermediate-range (1000 to 5500 kilometers) ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, along with the launchers for those missiles and unique support equipment and support structures. This marks the first time that the two principal nuclear powers have agreed to the elimination of an entire class of weapon-delivery systems.

The Treaty is the fruit of many years' labor and of this Administration's firm policy regarding the Soviet deployment of SS-20s threatening our Allies in Europe and Asia. It was negotiated in Geneva and at ministerial meetings in Washington, Moscow, and Geneva. In addition to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of State, representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense Intelligence Agency all played important roles in its development.

Throughout the negotiating process, we consulted extensively with our NATO and Asian allies, particularly the Western European Basing Countries in which missile systems, support structures, or other equipment subject to the Treaty are located: Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Contemporaneously with the negotiation of the Treaty, the United States negotiated the Basing Country Agreement with these countries, providing for their approval and assistance in the implementation of the Treaty's inspection provisions. We also regularly advised Congress, in Washington and during the Congressional Observer Group's meeting in Geneva, on the progress of the negotiations and on the objectives of the United States in negotiating the Treaty.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The Treaty had its genesis in the Soviet Deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles beginning in 1977. The SS-20 is an accurate, three-warhead, ground-mobile ballistic missile, whose deployment by the Soviet Union increased an already existing imbalance in favor of Soviet theater nuclear forces. These Soviet deployments not only directly threatened our NATO and Asian Allies, they also raised questions about the ability of the United States and its Allies, to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. In December 1979, after thorough consultations among the Allies, NATO reached what became known as the "dual-track" decision. On the one hand, NATO would proceed to deploy a limited number of U.S. Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe to maintain its deterrent capability. On the other hand, the United States would pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union with a view to establishing a balance in intermediaterange nuclear missile forces at a lower and equal level.

Under this Administration, the "dual-track" decision was reaffirmed, and on November 18, 1981, the United States proposed the "zero option" to the Soviet Union. Pursuant to this proposal, the United States would have cancelled its planned deployments to Europe of Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles if the Soviet Union would have agreed to eliminate all of its intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

Today, more than six years later, the U.S. "zero option" proposal constitutes the basis of the Treaty. The six years of negotiations, however, did not produce this result easily. For example, while the United States emphasized for years its preference for the "zero option," the Soviets at first insisted on retaining a residual force of intermediate-range missiles and on counting the independent British and French nuclear deterrents as though they were forces of the United States. The United States rejected that position. Moreover, the Soviets walked out of the negotiations in November 1983 when the United States began deployments of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. It was not until January 1985 that the Soviets agreed to return to the negotiations. They did not agree to the "zero option" until July 1987.

Soviet shorter-range missiles-the SS-12 and SS-23-can fulfill many of the same military missions as the Soviet intermediaterange missiles. Therefore, from the outset, the United States insisted upon concurrent constraints on shorter-range missiles in order to enhance the effectiveness of limits on intermediate-range missiles. In the Summer of 1987, after the Soviets proposed the elimination of shorter-range systems in Europe, the United States proposed that the shorter-range systems of both sides be eliminated on a global basis. In response to the U.S. proposal, the Soviets accepted the "zero option" for shorter-range missiles as well.

For much of the negotiations, the Soviet Union argued that the Treaty should focus only on missile systems located in Europe and that missiles located outside of Europe should be exempt from the Treaty or subject to less stringent restrictions. The United States, however, insisted on a "global" approach in view of the mobility and transportability of the Soviet missile systems. The Soviets eventually agreed to this approach.

During the last months of the negotiations, the Soviet Union insisted that U.S. warheads associated with the Pershing IA missiles belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany be included in the Treaty. The United states had insisted from the beginning of the negotiations that systems belonging to third countries would not be part of, or be affected by, the Treaty. On August 26, 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany announced that it would dismantle its Pershing IA missiles when the United States and the Soviet Union had eliminated all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles pursuant to the Treaty. This unilateral decision by the Federal Republic is completely separate from the Treaty. This decision represents a policy of the Federal Republic of Germany that is not legally binding upon the Parties to the Treaty. Following the Federal Republic's unilateral decision, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that they will eliminate their intermediaterange missiles by 15 days prior to the end of the three-year elimination period specified by the Treaty. At that period, the conditions established by the Federal Republic will have been met, and the existing program of cooperation will have therefore ceased. The U.S. reentry vehicles now associated with the Federal Republic's Pershing IA missiles will then be withdrawn and returned to U.S. territory. The United States will eliminate them in accordance with the Protocol on Elimination. The Treaty and its associated documents will not affect existing programs of cooperation.