THE TREATY: ITS STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

The Treaty obligates the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range groundlaunched, weapon-delivery, ballistic and cruise missiles, their launchers, and specified support structures and support equipment. The Treaty requires periodic data exchanges and gives each Party the right to carry out verification measures, including on-site inspections.

The Treaty consists of four documents, which set forth the basic obligations and the means of implementing those obligations. These

are:

The Treaty Articles, which obligate the Parties to eliminate all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems within three years and 18 months, respectively; not to possess such missile systems after elimination; not to produce or flight-test such missiles in the future; and to carry out provisions to facilitate effective verification of the terms of the Treaty;

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data, which contains the data, including site diagrams and photographs that are integral parts of the MOU, exchanged between the Parties prior to the signing of the Treaty regarding the locations, numbers, and characteristics of each Party's intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems as of November 1, 1987;

The Protocol on Elimination, which sets forth the detailed procedures for eliminating missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment subject to the Treaty; and

The Protocol on Inspection, which sets forth the detailed procedures for conducting on-site inspections, including, "shortnotice" inspections, "baseline" inspections, "close-out" inspections, "elimination" inspections, and continuous portal monitoring.

REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS

The Treaty provides that each Party must eliminate all of its intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems. Intermediaterange missiles have a range capability between 1000 and 5500 kilometers; shorter-range missiles have a range capability between 500 and 1000 kilometers.

The existing types of intermediate-range shorter-range missiles are listed in Article III of the Treaty. For the United States, these are the Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missile, the BGM109G intermediate-range cruise missile, and the Pershing IA shorter-range ballistic missile. For the Soviet Union, the existing types of missiles are the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-4 intermediaterange ballistic missile, the SS-12 shorter-range ballistic missile, and SS-23 shorter-range ballistic missile. All intermediate-range missile systems must be eliminated within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. All shorter-range missile systems must be eliminated within 18 months. For ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles not listed in Article III as "existing types," range

capability is determined in accordance with criteria set forth in paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Treaty.

Upon entry into force of the Treaty, neither Party may produce or flight-test any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or launchers of such missiles. The Parties are prohibited from conducting any launches of shorter-range missiles. During the first six months following entry into force of the Treaty, however, each Party may launch up to 100 intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of destroying them. Once all intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems have been eliminated, neither Party may thereafter possess any intermediaterange or shorter-range missile systems.

Also, the Treaty takes account of the fact that the first stage of the Soviet SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile, which is not subject to the Treaty, is outwardly similar to the first stage of the SS20 intermediate-range ballistic missile, which is subject to the Treaty. The Parties are permitted to produce a ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM), having a range such that it is not subject to the Treaty, that uses one stage, and only one stage, outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile that is subject to the Treaty. However, to strengthen the ban on missile production, the Parties are prohibited from producing any other stage that is similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of any existing type of intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile. In order to help verify compliance with this provision, the United States has the right to establish a portal monitoring system, including resident inspectors, to monitor continuously the portal of each facility at which SS-25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled. Currently there is one such facility at Votkinsk. For its part, the Soviet Union has the right to establish a continuous portal monitoring system at a former U.S. intermediate-range GLBM production facility at Magna, Utah.

VERIFICATION OBLIGATIONS

The scope and intrusiveness of verification called for in this Treaty are unprecedented in the history of arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Verification obligations fall under five basic categories:

-locational restrictions

-elimination requirements

-national technical means of verification

-data exchanges

-on-site inspections.

LOCATIONAL RESTRICTIONS

In order to facilitate verification, the Treaty imposes a number of restrictions on activities relating to intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems during the elimination periods. For example, pending elimination:

-All intermediate-range missiles and their launchers must be located in deployment areas or at support facilities, such as storage or repair facilities, or be in notified transit between them.

All such areas and facilities must be named and their locations described. An intermediate-range missile or launcher located elsewhere (and not in a notified transit) would thus be in violation of the Treaty. -Within 90 days after the Treaty enters into force, all deployed shorter-range missiles, as well as deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles, must be moved to elimination facilities. The remaining non-deployed shorter-range missiles must be moved to elimination facilities within one year. Until their removal to elimination facilities, shorter-range missiles and their launchers must be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit. -Transit of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles between permitted locations must be completed within 25 days and, following the completion of transit, information regarding the transit must be provided within 48 hours.

ELIMINATION REQUIREMENTS

Article X of the Treaty sets forth the basic requirements regarding the elimination of specific items and facilities and obligates the Parties to carry out the required elimination activities in accordance with the specific procedures set forth in the Treaty and the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection. The locations at which elimination takes place are specified in the MOU or in subsequent updated data. The Protocol on Elimination sets forth detailed procedures for the elimination of missiles, launchers, launch canisters, shelters, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, launch stands, propellant tanks, and training items, as appropriate, for each Party. Techniques such as burning, demolition, crushing, and flattening are specified for eliminating transportable items at designated elimination facilities. Techniques for eliminating fixed structures in situ are specified, including dismantlement, excavation, and demolition. Provisions governing elimination of missiles through launch, static display, and loss or accidental destruction are also included.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

The Treaty recognizes the utility of national technical means of verification, such as reconnaissance satellites, and each Party agrees not to interfere with such means of verification. With a view to enhancing the utility of national technical means, concealment measures are strictly limited. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is required, up to six times a year during the period of elimination, to open on short notice the roofs of SS-25 garages in order to help U.S. national technical means ensure that SS-20s are not deployed at SS-25 strategic missile bases that are not subject to on-site inspections.

DATA EXCHANGES

The Treaty requires detailed exchanges of data and notifications. Each Party is required to notify the other each time a missile or launcher is moved and of any changes in the data base originally

set forth in the MOU. Each Party must advise the other of the scheduled date of elimination activities, the movement of items that are to be eliminated from the area specified in the MOU to elimination facilities, and the completion of elimination activities. Such notifications are required to be made through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987. The notifications are designed to provide a continuously updated data base, which will serve as a baseline against which other observations can be measured.

ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

The Treaty provides for a wide variety of on-site inspections. The scope of the inspection measures is unprecedented in the history of arms control agreements. The on-site inspections to be carried out

include:

-"baseline" inspections, between 30 and 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, to help verify the initial update of data contained in the categories set forth in the MOU;

-"close-out" inspections to verify the elimination of specified facilities;

-"elimination" inspections to observe actual elimination of missiles, launchers, and support equipment at elimination facilities;

-"elimination" inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination with respect to items lost or accidentally destroyed or placed on static display and with respect to training equipment;

-"short-notice" inspections of certain declared and formerly declared facilities, during the three-year elimination period and for a ten-year period thereafter, to aid in verifying that all Treaty-prohibited activity has ceased; and -"continuous portal monitoring" by the United States at the designated portal and perimeter of the facility at Votkinsk, at which SS-25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled, to ensure that stages of the SS-20 are not covertly manufactured as stages of the SS-25 ICBM. The Soviet Union may install continuous portal monitoring at the designated portal and perimeter of the Hercules Plant #1 located in Magna, Utah, at which stages of Pershing II missiles formerly were produced. If, at any time after the initial two years of the Treaty, assembly of SS-258 ceases at Votkinsk, continuous portal monitoring would continue for another 12 months and then cease along with the monitoring of the plant at Magna, Utah. The United States could reestablish continuous portal monitoring if the Soviets resumed SS-25 missile assembly at Votkinsk or anywhere else.

The specific procedures for the conduct of these inspections, including provisions governing access for on-site inspections and the infrastructure for a continuous portal monitoring system, are set forth in the Protocol on Inspection.

Inspectors and their supporting aircrews will be designated by each Party in advance by means of lists submitted to the other Party. Specific grounds on which a Party may object to a particular individual are set forth. The Annex to the Protocol on Inspection specifies the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members during the inspection process, including immunity from criminal prosecution and inviolability of their person. The Protocol on Inspection designates certain "points of entry" for each country in which missile systems subject to the Treaty are located. A Party intending to carry out an inspection must notify the other Party, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, not less than a specified number of hours before the inspection team will reach the point of entry. Within a specified time after arrival at the point of entry, the Inspecting Party must indicate the specific site to be inspected. An inspection team must depart the point of entry for the inspection site within a specified number of hours from its arrival at the point of entry. The Inspected Party must provide transport for the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site. In the case of "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections, the Inspected Party must ensure that the inspection team arrives at the site within nine hours of its specification of the inspection site.

In general, one hour after notification of a specific inspection site has been provided, the Inspected Party may not remove any Treaty-limited item from that site prior to inspection. Except for continuous portal monitoring and "elemination" inspections, the period of time an inspection team may remain at an inspection site for a given inspection is 24 hours, with one eight hour extension if agreed to by the Inspected Party. There is a limit on the number of inspections that may be conducted simultaneously. Inspection procedures vary depending upon the specific type of inspection involved.

RATIFICATION

The Treaty will enter into force when the constitutional procedures for ratification of the United States and the Soviet Union have been satisfied and the instruments of ratification have been exchanged. The MOU, the Protocol on Elimination, and the Protocol on Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty and upon exchange of the instruments of ratification will enter into force as party of the Treaty. The U.S.-GDR and U.S.-Czechoslovak Notes, which are included herewith for the information of the Senate, will also enter into force simultaneously with the Treaty. The Basing Country Agreement will do so as well, following completion of the constitutional procedures of each of the Parties to it and notification thereof to all other Parties.

AMENDMENTS

Amendments to the Treaty are subject to the same ratification procedures as the Treaty itself. However, some of the provisions and procedures contained in the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection are highly detailed and technical. It is recognized that it may be necessary to adjust some of them to take into account un