foreseen situations. Accordingly, the Protocols provide that the Parties may, in the Special Verification Commission established by the Treaty, agree upon measures necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocols. The Protocols provide that such measures, which would be technical in nature and would not affect the Parties' basic obligations, would not be considered to be amendments and thus would not require ratification.

NON-CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS

The Parties commit themselves not to assume any international obligation or undertaking that would conflict with the provisions of the Treaty. This provision will not in any way affect existing or future patterns of defense cooperation with U.S. Allies in other areas, including strategic forces, short-range nuclear forces (with a range capability below 500 kilometers), or conventional forces.

DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

The Treaty is of unlimited duration. As an exercise of its national sovereignty, a Party may withdraw following six months' notice to the other Party if it determines that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

THE BASING COUNTRY AGREEMENT

The Basing Country Agreement is a necessary complement to the Treaty. The Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection provide for onsite inspection to verify compliance with the provisions of the Treaty not only in U.S. and Soviet territory, but also in the countries in which U.S. and Soviet missile systems are located. Many of the items that the United States must eliminate are within the territory of our Western European Allies. By means of the Basing Country Agreement, the five Allied Basing Countries, on whose territory U.S. systems subject to the Treaty are located, consent to inspections at facilities subject to the Treaty within their territory by Soviet inspectors conducted in accordance with the Treaty and its Protocols. This formal consent on the part of the Allied Basing Countries provides the legal basis for the United States to make its commitment to the Soviet Union that Soviet inspections can be carried out on the territory of the Allied Basing Countries.

EXCHANGES OF NOTES

Each Basing Country is exchanging diplomatic Notes with the Party that will conduct inspections within its territory. The Notes record the acknowledgement of each Basing Country and the Inspecting Party that the Basing Country has agreed to inspections within its territory conducted in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, including the Protocol on Inspection, and that the Inspecting Party has obligated itself to comply with the terms of the Treaty and to respect the laws and regulations of the Basing Country during the inspections. The Notes state that they do not in any way affect the reciprocal obligations between the United States and the Soviet Union under the Treaty. The countries that base U.S.

systems subject to the Treaty are Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; the Basing Countries for Soviet systems are the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

INSPECTIONS OF SS-14 SILOS

In addition to the Treaty documents discussed above, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to an exchange of letters between Ambassadors Glitman and Obukhov, dated December 7, 1987, relating to the U.S. inspections of silo launchers for Soviet SS-4 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This agreement gives the United States the right to conduct a total of up to six on-site inspections of former silo launchers of SS-4 missiles. Organizational matters relating to such inspections will be arranged through the Special Verification Commission, which was estalbished by the Treaty.

CONCLUSION

Accompanying this Report is an article-by-article analysis of the Treaty, including the MOU and the two Protocols. Also, attached is an article-by-article analysis of the Basing Country Agreement.

I believe this Treaty will significantly enhance the security of the United States and our Allies. It will eliminate an entire class of weapon-delivery systems in which the Soviet Union has established a clear advantage. I therefore strongly recommend that the Treaty be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification at the earliest possible date.

Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE P. SHULTZ.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

STRUCTURE OF THE TREATY

The Treaty consists of a Preamble and 17 Articles. The associated Memorandum of Understanding on Data (the MOU), Protocol on Elimination, and Protocol on Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty.

THE PREAMBLE

The Preamble identifies the United States and the Soviet Union as the Parties to the treaty and contains four paragraphs that set forth the general goals and objectives that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed are advanced by the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems.

The first paragraph recognizes that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind.

The second paragraph notes that the Parties are guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability.

The third paragraph states the Parties' conviction that the measures set forth in the Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security.

The fourth paragraph acknowledges the obligations of the Parties set forth in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.1

ARTICLE I-BASIC OBLIGATIONS

Article I sets forth the basic obligations of the Parties to eliminate their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems in accordance with the Treaty's provisions, not to have such systems after their elimination, and to carry out the other obligations set forth in the Treaty. This Article also establishes that the MOU and the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty.

ARTICLE II-DEFINITIONS

Article II sets forth the definitions of terms used in the Treaty. Definitions are provided for the following terms: (1) ballistic missile and ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM), (2) cruise missile and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), (3) GLBM launcher, (4) GLCM launcher, (5) intermediate-range missile, (6) shorter-range missile, (7) deployment area, (8) missile operating base, (9) missile

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT), done at London, Moscow and Washington, July 1, 1968, 21 UST 483, TIAS 6839. The United States and the Soviet Union

are both parties to the NPT.

support facility, (10) transit, (11) deployed missile, (12) non-deployed missile, (13) deployed launcher, (14) non-deployed launcher, and (15) basing country.

Paragraph 1 of Article II defines a "ballistic missile" as a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. In addition, "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" is defined as a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

There are three factors that determine whether a ballistic missile is subject to the Treaty. The first factor is whether the ballistic missile is ground-launched. The second factor is whether the ballistic missile is a weapon-delivery vehicle. The counting rule set forth in paragraph 1 of Article VII specifies that all ballistic missiles of a type that has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery are considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Thus, GLBMs are those types of ground-launched ballist missiles that have been flighttested or deployed for weapon-delivery, i.e., flight-tested or deployed with any type of warhead device or simulation thereof. The third factor is whether the ballistic missile has a range equal to or greater than 500 kilometers but not greater than 5500 kilometers. Paragraph 4 of Article VII sets forth the criteria for establishing the range capability of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs. The technical data for each existing type of GLBM subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 2 of Article II defines a "cruise missile" as a missile that is an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. In addition, a "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" is defined as a ground-launched missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

There are three factors that determine whether a cruise missile is subject to the Treaty. The first factor is whether the cruise missile is ground-launched. The second factor is whether the cruise missile is a weapon-delivery vehicle. The counting rule set forth in paragraph 1 of Article VII specifies that all cruise missiles of a type that has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery are considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Thus, GLCMs are those types of ground-launched cruise missiles that have been flighttested or deployed for weapon-delivery, i.e., flight-tested or deployed with any type of warhead device or simulation thereof. The third factor is whether the cruise missile has a range equal to or greater than 500 kilometers but not greater than 5500 kilometers. Paragraph 4 of Article VII sets forth the criteria for establishing the range capability for intermediate-range and shorter-range GLCMS. The technical data for each existing type of GLCM subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 3 of Article II defines a "GLBM launcher" as either a fixed launcher (i.e., non-mobile) or a mobile land-based transportererector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM. Paragraph 7 of Article VII further states that if a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs. Paragraph 8 of Article VII specifies that if a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM. The technical

data for each type of GLBM launcher subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 4 of Article II defines a "GLCM launcher" as either a fixed launcher (i.e., non-mobile) or a mobile land-based transportererector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM. Paragraph 7 of Article VII further states that if a launcher has been tested for launching a GLCM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLCMs. Paragraph 8 of Article VII specifies that if a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLCM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLCM. The technical data for each type of GLCM launcher subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 5 of Article II defines an "intermediate-range missile" as a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers. The existing_types of intermediate-range missiles are specified in paragraph 1 of Article III. Their numbers, locations, and characteristics are listed in Sections II, III, and VI, respectively, of the MOU. The criteria for determining the range capability of intermediate-range GLBMs and GLCMs that are not specified as existing types are described in paragraph 4 of Article VIII.

Paragraph 6 of Article II defines a "shorter-range missile" as a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers. The existing types of shorter-range missiles of the Parties are specified in paragraph 2 of Article III. Their numbers, locations, and characteristics are listed in Sections II, IV, and VI, respectively, of the MOU. Criteria for determining the range capability of shorter-range GLBMs and GLCMs that are not specified as existing types are described in paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Treaty.

Paragraph 7 of Article II defines a "deployment area" as a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles, and launchers of such missiles, may operate and within which one or more missile operating based are located. All deployment areas of intermediate-range missiles contain, by definition, at least one missile operating base. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII requires that all deployment areas be specified in the MOU and that their locations or numbers cannot be changed, except as a result of their elimination as provided for in paragraph 8 of Article X. Each deployment area is described by name and boundaries in Section III of the MOU. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article II, an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area is considered to be deployed. An intermediate-range missile located outside of a deployment area is considered to be a non-deployed missile in accordance with paragraph 12 of Article II. As provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VIII, intermediate-range missiles and their launchers, as well as stages of such missiles, must be located in deployment areas, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit. Thus, an intermediate-range missile, stage of such a missile, or launcher of such a missile in any other location would be a violation of the Treaty.

There are no "deployment areas" for shorter-range missiles; rather, such missiles are deployed only at missile operating bases in order to restrict them to much smaller geographical areas and