the Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Such inspections are required and include the obligation to inspect the elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching. Inspections made pursuant to this paragraph are for the purpose of determining whether the specified elimination processes have, in fact, been carried out. As stated above, the "elimination" inspections provided for in paragraph 7 are the only required on-site inspections specified in Article XI. Such "elimination" inspections are required in order to help ensure agreement between the Parties concerning the elimination of items and the status of the inventory of items subject to the Treaty. The procedures for an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 are set forth in Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 8 of Article XI establishes the right of the Parties to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of items that are eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination. Section V of the Protocol on Elimination sets forth the procedures for elimination by loss or accidental destruction as well as by static display. Paragraph 8 also establishes the right of the Parties to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers that ae eliminated pursuant to Section II, IV, and V of that Protocol. The procedures for an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8 are set forth in Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection.

ARTICLE XII-NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

Paragraph 1 of Article XII states that, to help ensure compliance with the treaty, each Party will use the national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

National technical means include a broad range of systems for collecting intelligence. Such systems include reconnaissance satellites, ships and aircraft that are used to monitor Soviet missile tests, and ground stations, such as the United States large phasedarray radar on Shemya Island in Alaska.

In subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2, the Parties state their commitment not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

In subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2, the Parties are prohibited from using any concealment measures that impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the Treaty. This provision is broader than similar provisions in earlier U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements, which merely prohibited deliberate concealment measures. This prohibition does not apply to cover or concealment practices that both occur within a deployment area and are associated with normal training, maintenance, and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

Paragraph 3 of Article XII provides a unique measure to enhance observation by national technical means of verification. It establishes the right of each Party to request, and the obligation of the

other Party to carry out, certain cooperative measures to improve verification by reconnaissance satellites. This right will exist until either a strategic offensive arms reduction and limitation agreement enters into force between the Parties or three years after entry into force of the Treaty, whichever occurs first. The cooperative measures relate to deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs capable of a range in excess of 5500 kilometers (and thus not limited by the Treaty), which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X and subsequently converted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article X. The Party making a request for cooperative measures must inform the other Party of the deployment base at which such measures shall be implemented. The following measures must be carried out by the Party whose base is to be observed:

(a) not later than six hours after a request, the Party must have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, must have completely removed all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures, and must have displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and

(b) the Party must leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until 12 hours after receipt of a request for such an observation.

Paragraph 3 further provides that each Party may make six such requests for cooperative measures per calendar year, and that only one deployment base may be subject to such cooperative measures at any one time. Paragraph 3 is designed to help verify that mobile SS-20 intermediate-range missiles are not covertly deployed at bases for mobile SS-25 ICBMs. Under the terms of the Treaty, SS25 bases that were not formerly declared SS-20 bases are not subject to on-site inspection. SS-25 bases that were formerly declared SS-20 bases will be subject to on-site inspection. The United States currently does not have bases that would be affected by this provi

sion.

ARTICLE XIII—SPECIAL VERIFICATION COMMISSION

Paragraph 1 of Article XIII provides that, in order to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties have established the Special Verification Commission. At the request of either Party, the Parties will meet, within the framework of that Commission, to: (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty, and (b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Article XIII provides that the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers be used by the Parties to: (a) exchange data and provide notifications (as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Article IX of the Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination); (b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of the Treaty (relating to the conversion of a missile operating base); (c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection;

and (d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of the Treaty.

ARTICLE XIV-NO CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS

Article XIV records the Parties' undertaking to comply with the Treaty and not to assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with the provisions of the Treaty. This provision thus reflects the duty of each Party under customary international law to comply with the Treaty (i.e., pacta sunt servanda). This provision does not impose any additional obligation on the Parties, nor does it broaden the interpretation of other obligations in the Treaty. This provision refers only to the assumption of obligations in the future, and existing agreements are therefore unaffected. Article XIV will not affect existing patterns of defense collaboration or cooperation with our Allies. Nor with this provision preclude cooperation with our Allies in modernization.

ARTICLE XV-DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

Paragraph 1 of Article XV provides that the Treaty is of unlimited duration. The Treaty is of unlimited duration because it eliminates two entire classes of weapon-delivery systems, rather than merely place limitations on them for a specified period of time.

Paragraph 2 of Article XV contains the "supreme interests" withdrawal clause that is a standard provision in most modern arms control agreements. It establishes the right of a Party to withdraw from the Treaty if it concludes that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Withdrawal under this provision requires a sixmonth advance notification and a statement of the extraordinary events that the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. This right of withdrawal is in addition to any other rights a Party has under customary interational law regarding termination or suspension of the Treaty, including its rights in the event of a material breach of the Treaty.

ARTICLE XVI-AMENDMENTS

Article XVI provides that each Party may propose amendments to the Treaty and that any agreed amendments will enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of the Treaty. In this regard, it should be noted that the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection provide that technical changes to those Protocols necessary to improve their viability and effectiveness shall not be considered amendments to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XVII-ENTRY INTO FORCE

Paragraph 1 of Article XVII provides that the Treaty, including the MOU and the two Protocols (which are integral parts of the Treaty), is subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party and will enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Paragraph 2 of Article XVII states that the Treaty will be registered with the United Nations pursuant to Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

FINAL PROVISIONS

The final paragraph of the Treaty records that the Treaty was done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE Data Base FOR THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

The Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) consists of a Preamble and seven Sections.

The MOU provides the detailed data that are required to be exchanged between the Parties pursuant to Article IX of the Treaty. It is arranged by categories, and lists the location of deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities, as well as the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment at those locations. The MOU also lists the technical parameters of each missile system, providing information on missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment limited by the Treaty.

The data that appear in the MOU reflect the intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems of the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article IX of the Treaty, the initial update of this data will occur within 30 days of the entry into force of the Treaty, and will be subject to "baseline" onsite inspections provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty. Thereafter regular updates will occur at six-month intervals. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article IX of the Treaty, a variety of other notifications will be exchanged as Treaty-regulated events

occur.

The data exchange in the MOU surpasses other such exchanges in previous U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements. Given its scope and detail, the data exchange reflected in the MOU is itself an achievement.

THE PREAMBLE

The Preamble states that, pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data, current as of November 1, 1987, on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and their launchers, as well as on support structures and support equipment associated with those missiles and launchers.

SECTION I-DEFINITIONS

Section I sets forth the definitions of certain terms used in the MOU, the Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination, and the Protocol on

Inspection. Section I provides definitions for the following terms: (1) missile production facility, (2) missile repair facility, (3) launcher production facility, (4) launcher repair facility, (5) test range, (6) training facility, (7) missile storage facility, (8) launcher storage facility, (9) elimination facility, (10) support equipment, (11) support structure, and (12) research and development launch site. Each of these terms represents a type of facility, structure, or site that is referred to in the MOU.

Paragraph 1 of Section I defines a "missile production facility" as a facility for the assembly or production of solid-propellant intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs, or existing types of GLCMs. Production of missiles subject to the Treaty is prohibited by paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII, missiles subject to the Treaty or stages of such missiles may not be located at missile production facilities 30 days after the entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a missile production facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Missile production facilities are not subject to inspections except-in certain cases-for continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI.

Paragraph 2 of Section I defines a "missile repair facility" as a facility at which repair or maintenance of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place, other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base. This definition is necessary because missiles undergoing repair are nevertheless subject to the limitations of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a missile repair facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Missile repair facilities are subject to "baseline," "closeout," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 3 of Section I defines a "launcher production facility” as a facility for final assembly of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. This paragraph is the corollary of paragraph 1 of this Section, except that it defines production facilities for launchers rather than for missiles. Production of launchers subject to the Treaty is prohibited by paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII, launchers may not be located at launcher production facilities 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a launcher production facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Launcher production facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 4 of Section I defines a "launcher repair facility" as a facility at which repair or maintenance of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place. The definition excludes a missile operating base in which inspection and maintenance is conducted. This paragraph is a corollary to paragraph 2 of