Even within this framework the predictability and rationality of the system is low; the rule of law is essentially absent.

An answer to your request to identify the most important human rights problems in Africa might lead to a rather different list, emphasizing larger, more powerful or better known violators such as Ethiopia, Zaire and South Africa. Zaire is only marginally different from the least free states listed above. Like them its people often suffer widespread starvation or malnutrition in addition to deprivations of freedom. All three states have conflicting ethnic groups, many of which do not accept, and have little reason to accept, rule by the people now in charge of the government. These states are empires in miniature in which decolonization has not yet taken place. This human rights problem of inadequate group self-determination is widespread in Africa and one that the American Government has not yet come to grips with in its promotion of human rights.

The problem of human rights violations in South Africa is important because of the wide publicity it has received and because of the real denial of rights that has characterized South Africa. However, for several reasons South Africa is not considered by the Survey to be as serious a violator as many of the foregoing countries. First, political rights at a high level are granted the 17 percent of the population that is white. Second, the other communities-black, Indían, and colored-are allowed a limited degree of political power.

As to civil liberties, the white community again has broad guarantees, although occasional restrictions and censorship suggest limitations. The nonwhite communities are restricted in many ways-especially by movement and residence restrictions. But nonwhite demonstrations and speeches against the system do occur, often peacefully; there are even regular black publications that make clear their opposition to the system. Most recently lifting of restrictions on black union organization has improved civil liberties, but true freedom lies many steps beyond this.

Many blacks remain in prison for their political activities. Although some of these prisoners have committed or been associated with violent activities, many should be classified as prisoners of conscience. As an aside, it should be remarked that the inequalities that remain in Zimbabwe Rhodesia are far less onerous than those in South Africa.

To understand this relativistic view of South Africa, the conditions of freedom and race there may be compared with those in Burundi, a small country lying between Tanzania and Zaire. Here 14 percent of the people, the socially and racially distinct Tutsi, rule over the Hutu who make up 84 percent of the population. Historically, the Hutu have been held down by bloody slaughters. Today the Government takes care that the Hutu do not rise to positions of influence in any sphere. No organization of opposition or expression of dissenting opinion is countenanced. Most recently Burundi's authoritarian regime expelled 52 missionaries on the charge of fomenting rebellion.

It may be noted that I have not mentioned the problem of the Western Sahara. This is an important foreign policy problem involving questions of self-determination but the problem is less pressing in human rights terms for three reasons. First, the numbers are small, a few hundred thousand at most. Second, there is considerable justice in the Moroccan claim-certainly more, for example, than in Zaire's claim to Katanga or Ethiopia's to Eritrea. Some people in

the area support the Moroccans; tribal groups in Western Sahara overlap those in Morocco. Third, Morocco, a partly free country, has granted political rights other than independence to the people within the Western Sahara on a basis equal to that enjoyed by other Moroccans.

The State Department's monitoring of human rights provides a valuable resource for evaluating conditions in the world. We often check our impressions with the State Department and we use their country reports as a basic reference. Their reports have become fuller and have improved with experience and seriousness. There remains the problem that Foreign Service officers asked to provide critical information on the countries in which they serve and State Department personnel evaluating this information are both led by their other responsibilities to present as desirable a picture as they can without denying the facts. Although we expect the State Department to continue to develop the factual base of its reports, the favorable tendency of Department interpretation is inevitable. For this reason outside monitors with fewer conflicting obligations and a different perspective are necessary to complement State's work.

Our ratings are prepared on the basis of the flow of information that comes to us. In addition to reports by private human rights organizations and departments of government this includes newspaper reports, particularly as these are provided by research services for the world or the African Continent. Of course we also use other sources, such as standard references, journals, monographs on particular countries, and contacts with area specialists.

The resulting ratings, and country descriptions in the yearbooks, are certainly not comprehensive, but I believe they have a range of error of not more than one position on our scales; that is, a rating of 5 on a 7-point scale might be changed to a 4 or a 6 by another observer with the same or more comprehensive information, if he employed our criteria. Errors are eliminated over time by the fact that errors in 1 year are picked up as we receive disconfirming information. during the next. In doubtful cases we often query area or country specialists for additional information. Occasional outside critiques of particular ratings are, of course, invaluable. The basic "check" is to continually review comparatively whether the evidence justifies placing a particular state above or below another on the relevant scale. American pressures for human rights have probably by themselves produced few changes in Africa, a continent where they appear relatively ineffective.

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Gastil, at this point we will recess briefly so that the members can vote.

The subcommittees will stand in recess for 10 minutes. [Whereupon a short recess was taken.]

Mr. BONKER. The subcommittees will come to order.

Mr. Gastil, I think you were about to complete your statement. Mr. GASTIL. Thank you Mr. Chairman. American pressures for human rights have probably by themselves produced a few changes in Africa, a continent where they appear relatively ineffective. In some cases, such as Guinea, Egypt, Zaire, or Liberia or the white redoubts of southern Africa we appear to play a role in modifying policy, although the effect is often minimal or cosmetic. The State Department could no doubt trace more precise relationships.

However, in judging the effect of human rights policies we must not forget that the values these policies represent reflect an important segment of international opinion, the ideology of a significant sector of African elites and the yearning for greater freedom and self-determination of most peoples everywhere. Clearly our policy added to the general international pressure that helped to make possible changes in Uganda and the Central African Empire [now Republic], or in Zimbabwe Rhodesia, South Africa, and Namibia.

In terms of political and civil liberties, when Ghana and Nigeria struggled to reestablish democratic systems, as they did this year, or Ugandans and Ethiopians struggled violently for the most elementary of human rights, or Tunisians, Zambians, and South Africans tried to expand the numbers of those permitted political rights, these peoples were encouraged to the degree they saw a continuing commitment by the United States to support democratic freedoms in Africa.

Yet was this commitment enough? In my opinion the American commitment to democracy in Africa has been unnecessarily weak or insubstantial.

To understand this criticism of U.S. policy it is necessary to review the position of democracy in Africa. At the beginning of this year the few relatively "free" countries in Africa-Botswana, Gambia, and Upper Volta-were poor, their democratic institutions imperfect and U.S. assistance or interest not particularly remarkable. Nigeria should probably be placed among the democracies after this summer's elections, although past experience and continuing military power makes us cautious. If Nigeria does show itself to be a functioning democracy, this will be a dramatic gain for freedom. Nigeria is by far the largest and potentially most powerful state on the continent. At a lower level of freedom are what we label "partly free" states. In Africa these include a number of relatively large states: Toward the free end of the spectrum are Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, and Zimbabwe and toward the less free end Egypt, Ivory Coast, Kenya, South Africa, Sudan, and Zambia. There is finally a large number of "not free" states such as those listed initially in which no opposition voices are allowed to raise their head. Many of these are quite small countries. Unlike our policy in Europe, Latin America, or much of Asia, America's action policy seems to define human rights for Africans primarily in terms of atrocities, racial discrimination, and economic and social development. Without denying the importance of these issues, it seems to me that the record for continuing African struggle for more general political and civil liberties, this year seen most dramatically in Ghana and Nigeria and echoed throughout the continent from Cameroon to Egypt, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, suggests that these liberties should be an equal concern of American policymakers. They certainly are the concern of African people and many of their leaders.

These people do not believe there is a tradeoff between democracy and food. Since democracy in Africa does not correlate with income, we cannot believe the desire for democracy shows such a correlation. On the other hand, since economic progress, even the economic condition of the poorest half of the population, does not correlate with the degree of tyranny in African countries we see no reason for American leaders to endorse tyrannies such as that in Guinea or sup

port states such as Zaire out of mistaken belief that tyranny is in any way desirable in the development of African states. Nor do we see why the United States apparently failed to effectively support the enemies of Amin's barbarism or to support those struggling against the barbarities of the Ethiopian government with its thousands of political prisoners.

But my main suggestion is a positive one. Those democracies or near democracies that emerge in Africa should receive an exceptional amount of American attention and interest. In particular, Ghana and Nigeria must now be at the top of our agenda.

The OAU has had a poor record addressing the violations of human rights with which we are concerned here. African countries cannot seriously address continental rights problems as long as they deny these rights to their own citizens. From this viewpoint a free Nigeria is critical to the future of African human rights for it can throw its weight honestly behind a continental effort to restrict tyranny. Nigeria's own structure can also help to resolve a critical problem for both America in Africa and Africa itself-the right of peoples without a state of their own to self-determination. It can do this by holding out the example to others of a democratic form of federalism that might eventually be essential to the free development of Uganda, Ethiopia, Chad, Zaire, Cameroon, and many other states. For without democracy many of these states must remain tyrannies in the Africa devoted to "national integrity."

American aid to particular countries must represent more than human rights considerations, particularly human rights as defined by the behavior of the government in power. This is widely understood. But where other considerations are weak or where the type of aid particularly supports the power of a tyrannical clique, its continuation does hurt us morally and politically. This damage must add to the cynicism of our own representatives, State Department staffs and the general public. We are equally hurt when we do not positively prefer by our statements and foreign aid programs regimes that have maintained or are developing democratic institutions allowing African peoples to enjoy those freedoms we expect as the common right of all peoples.

Thank you.

Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Gastil.

At the outset you made reference to a situation in Ethiopia. When Senator Tsongas and I were there, we were the first U.S. officials to meet with Colonel Mengistu which was mentioned in your statement, Mr. McGee. In the course of our discussion with Colonel Mengistu, Paul Tsongas and I both raised the question of human rights. We went through the streets of Addis Ababa and we saw at least 50 bodies, just on-the-spot observations as the embassy personnel took us around the city.

Mengistu had a shocked expression on his face and he wanted to know if he heard us correctly, that we were asking about human rights in Ethiopia. We said:

Yes, that is correct. We are concerned about what we saw in the city.
He said:

Gentlemen, a few years ago when Haile Selassie was in power and was so oppressive to the people of this country, even to a point when a drought had oc

curred in the country and several hundred thousand people died, Selassie proceeded to cover up the bad experience. The United States was in complicity with the Selassie regime and didn't do a thing about it, and now because the Derg was trying to develop a stability in the government and in the country and trying to purge the counterrevolutionaries of true revolution similar to what Russia and France did in earlier years, how on earth could we question the view of our own failure to address those problems in earlier years.

In a sense he had a point, as shocked as we were with what we saw in the city, we viewed it as a revolution that needed to be carried out and the country stabilized. Yet we did ignore the widespread oppression and human rights violations when Haile Selassie was in power.

I guess I am just commenting and not asking a question, but it is very difficult to put in the proper context, what the human rights policy should be. I think you mentioned that, Mr. McGee. In your statement you say that, where there exists a popular awareness of the existence of human rights, there is an expectation that basic rights should not be violated, and these dictators or governments don't really define human rights, so it is hard for them to observe them.

Mr. MCGEE. Mr. Bonker, I think your comments underline the difficulties and also perhaps the wisdom of Amnesty International's strong position throughout the world to steer clear of endorsing a particular government but to attempt to apply the standards of our limited mandate within the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights across the board. Often even in recent history we have been in a situation of opposing the policies of one government and opposing within several months equal or varied kinds of oppression by the government that has succeeded it. Fortunately, from our poiont of view, we don't have the complexity of being the representative of a government. It is also why Amnesty International has the policy throughout the world that no national section works on the cases of individuals in its own country. That is not to say that in the United States we do not work against the death penalty but we do not attempt within the United States as AIUSA to identify prisoners of conscience or to work on their individual cases. For example, in my own instance during the Vietnam period I was an adopted prisoner of conscience and while I was spending 11 months in the U.S. prisons because of a position which I took as a Catholic pacifist as a noncooperator on Vietnam, my case was worked on entirely in Western Europe and the Orient.

Mr. BONKER. You are saying then that Amnesty's policy is to apply human rights standards nonpolitically across the board.

That would lead to my second question to Mr. Gastil. I find many disturbing things in your statement and I won't be able to cover very many, but on page 2 you list the countries that you would rank at the bottom in both equal rights and civil liberties, and then you go on to list what appears to be most of the countries that are on the left of the political spectrum in Africa. You don't however mention countries like Zaire, Morocco, Zimbabwe, or Cameroon, and the testimony we have had today singles out or at least attempts to identify these other countries as gross violators of human rights. You go on to say why you list the countries you do, but I don't see the human rights conditions being any worse in Angola than they are in Zaire or in Mozambique than they are in Zimbabwe.

Mr. GASTIL. Well, let me respond to several parts of that. The listing comes directly out of the survey criteria. I simply took the countries that had the lowest scores and put them down here. They are cer