of the search without warrant before Lustig and Reynolds had returned. The ruling in Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, does not come into play. Neither is it material that Greene may have been informed as to what he was likely to find before he joined the searchers. Vindicated anticipation of what an illegal search may reveal does not validate a search otherwise illegal. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 708-9. With every respect for the rulings of the lower court, we find that the unquestioned facts disclose that the evidence on which the conviction rests was illicit and the motion to suppress it should have been granted.

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the judgment of the Court substantially for reasons set out in his dissent in Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487, 494.

MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE join, concurring.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER finds it unnecessary to decide whether an illegal search by state officers bars the introduction of the fruits of the search in a federal court. I join in his opinion, and in the judgment of reversal. But my dissenting views in Wolf v. Colorado, ante, p. 25, decided this day, make clear my position on the question he reserves. In my opinion the important consideration is the presence of an illegal search. Whether state or federal officials did the searching is of no consequence to the defendant, and it should make no difference to us.

MR. JUSTICE REED, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE JACKSON and MR. JUSTICE BURTON join, dissenting.

My understanding of the rule as to the use of evidence in a federal criminal trial obtained by state officers through

a search and seizure conducted by them under state authority is this.

"While it is true that the mere participation in a state search of one who is a federal officer does not render it a federal undertaking, the court must be vigilant to scrutinize the attendant facts with an eye to detect and a hand to prevent violations of the Constitution by circuitous and indirect methods." Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 32. In the Byars opinion this Court went on to say that the federal government had the right "to avail itself of evidence improperly seized by state officers operating entirely upon their own account. But the rule is otherwise when the federal government itself, through its agents acting as such, participates in the wrongful search and seizure." P. 33. This is the rule which the

Court reaffirms today.

It is the application of that rule to the facts of this case which causes me to dissent. Although it may seem only a difference of view as to the facts of a particular case, it becomes important in the administration of the criminal law. If federal peace officers are to be restricted in their duties to the extent indicated in the opinion, they should have full warning so that their work in detecting crime will not be frustrated through the officer's inadvertence in accepting evidence turned over to him by state officers. The trial court found that Greene did not participate in the search and seizure. We should accept that finding. If we undertake to reexamine the testimony to see whether there was participation by Greene, I should reach the same conclusion as the lower courts did.

In my view Secret Service Agent Greene did not participate in this search and seizure and the motion to suppress the evidence obtained was properly overruled in the trial court, and the trial court's action was properly sustained in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

The Court accepts "as a fact that Greene did not request the search, that, beyond indicating to the local police that there was something wrong, he was not the moving force of the search, and that the search was not undertaken by the police to help enforcement of a federal law." The record shows clearly to me that Agent Greene did not participate in the search and seizure.

Only state police entered the room of Lustig, opened his brief cases and found all the articles useful in counterfeiting. It was not until after all the articles were found that were offered in evidence that Agent Greene was called. It was stated thus in the brief for appellant: "When he arrived at the hotel, all of the material that had been taken out of the brief case was on the bed. Capt. Koerner and Sgt. Murphy then put the exhibits back in the brief cases." This was Greene's testimony. Greene examined the articles that had been taken by the state police from the satchels. He then left the room and returned as Lustig and his companion Reynolds were in the act of opening the door to Room 402 where the state officers were. The state officers then arrested Reynolds and Lustig on a warrant for a state offense. The prisoners were searched. On Reynolds a $100 bill was found that was shown to Agent Greene by Captain

1 Testimony of Captain Koerner:

"Q. After you discovered these articles, what did you do?

"A. I called agent Greene, of the United States Secret Service.

"Greene came over in the neighborhood of five o'clock after we made a thorough search and found all this evidence I have presented." Testimony of Sergeant Murphy:

"Q. When did Mr. Greene come there?

"A. After we searched the room, seeing what was in it, and finding the three notes, I talked to Captain Koerner and I told him we had enough to charge him with a Federal violation, and I called Mr. Greene from the hotel and explained to him over the telephone just about what we had found, and he came over later."

Koerner. The $100 bill had not been tampered with, was not evidence against Lustig and has nothing to do with the case against him.

3

Unless the fact that Agent Greene looked at the evidence secured by the state police before it was removed from the room involves the United States in the search and seizure, the lower courts were correct in holding that Agent Greene had no part in the search and seizure. Greene did not "share in the critical examination of the uncovered articles as the physical search proceeded." " The search had ended before he came into the room. The subsequent arrest, examination, and the $100 bill found on Reynolds had nothing to do with the alleged unlawful search and seizure. The search and seizure had run its course and we should not hold that the appearance of a federal officer at the place of unlawful search and seizure after evidence has been found makes him a participant in the act. This evidence should not be suppressed and the conviction of Lustig should be affirmed.

2 Testimony of Agent Greene:

"Q. There was a hundred dollar bill found on Mr. Reynolds? "A. Well, a new one.

"Q. Did you match the hundred dollar bill with that impression? "A. No, sir. I observed that the ink on this new hundred dollar bill had not been tampered with. In other words, the bill was new in appearance and I concluded it was not the pattern bill from which this hundred dollars was made.

"Q. You gave the hundred dollars did you to Mr. Reynolds?

"A. No, sir. At the time I looked at the bill it was in Captain Koerner's possession."

3 Opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, ante, p. 78.

Syllabus.

338 U.S.

CHRISTOFFEL v. UNITED STATES.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.

No. 528. Argued April 20, 1949. Decided June 27, 1949.

For alleged perjurious testimony before a Committee of the House of Representatives, petitioner was convicted under the perjury statute of the District of Columbia (§ 22-2501 of the D. C. Code), which makes it an essential element of the offense that it shall have been committed before "a competent tribunal." The Committee in question had a membership of twenty-five. Although evidence was adduced at the trial from which a jury might have concluded that, at the time of the alleged perjurious testimony, less than a quorum of the Committee were in attendance, the trial court in its charge allowed the jury to find a quorum present simply by finding that thirteen or more members were in attendance when the Committee was convened. Held: So much of the instructions to the jury as allowed them to find a quorum present without reference to the facts at the time of the alleged perjurious testimony was erroneous, and the judgment of conviction must be reversed. Pp. 85–90.

84 U. S. App. D. C. 132, 171 F. 2d 1004, reversed.

Petitioner was convicted of perjury under the perjury statute of the District of Columbia (§ 22-2501 of the D. C. Code), for alleged perjurious testimony before a Committee of the House of Representatives. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 84 U. S. App. D. C. 132, 171 F. 2d 1004. This Court granted certiorari. 336 U.S. 934. Reversed, p. 90.

O. John Rogge argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

Assistant Attorney General Campbell argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Robert S. Erdahl, Harold D. Cohen and Philip R. Monahan.