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mystery, if I say, Christ was God; and Christ was man. He had a nature human and divine. One person indeed, in the sense in which Abraham was, he is not. Nor is there any created object, to which the union of Godhead with humanity can be compared. But shall we deny the possibility of it, on this account? Or shall we tax with absurdity, that which it is utterly beyond our reach to scan? I shrink from such an undertaking, and place myself in the attitude of listening to what the voice of Revelation may dictate, in regard to this. It becomes us here to do so; to prostrate ourselves before the Father of Lights, and say, Speak, Lord, for thy servants hear. Lord, what wilt thou have us to believe! You may indeed find fault with us, that we speak of three persons in the Godhead, where there is but one nature; and yet of but one person, in Christ, where there are two natures. I admit that it is an apparent inconsistency in the use of language; and cannot but wish, that it had not, originally, been adopted. Still, it is capable of some explana tion. In the first case, person simply designates the idea, that there is some real distinction in the Godhead, in opposition to the opinion that it is merely nominal. In the second, it designates Christ as he appears to us in the New Testament, clothed with a human body, and yet acting, (as we suppose,) not only as possessing the attributes of a man, but as also possessing divine power. We see the attributes of human nature, in such intimate conjunction with those of the divine, that we cannot separate the agents; at least, we know not where to draw the line of separation, because we do not know the manner in which the union is effected, or continued. We speak therefore of one person-i. e. ohe agent. And when we say that the two natures of Christ are united in one person, we mean to say that Divinity and humanity are brought into such a connexion in this case, that we cannot separate them, so as to make two entirely distinct and separate agents.

The present generation of Trinitarians, however, do not feel responsible for the introduction of such technical terms, in senses so 'diverse from the common ideas attached to them. They merely take them as they find them. For my own part, I have no attachment to them; I think them injudicionsly chosen, and heartily wish they were by general consent entirely exploded. They serve, perhaps, in most

cases, principally to keep up the form of words without definite ideas; and I fear, they have been the occasion of many disputes in the Church. The things, which are aimed at by these terms, I would strenuously retain; because I believe in the divine origin and authority of the Bible, and that its language, fairly interpreted, does inculcate these things. And candor, on your part, will certainly admit, that things only are worth any dispute. Logomachy is too trifling for a lover of truth.

LETTER III.

Reverend and Dear Sir,

My great object, hitherto, has been to show, that the real question at issue between us, in regard to a distinction in the Godhead and the divinity of the Saviour, cannot be decided, independently of the Scriptures. There is no such absurdity or inconsistency in either of these doctrines, as will justify us in rejecting them without investigation. The question whether they are true or not, belongs entirely and purely to Revelation. If you admit this; then the simple question between us is, what does Revelation teach? We are agreed that the Bible is the word of God; that whatever "Christ taught, either during his personal ministry, or by his inspired apostles, is of divine authority." We are agreed as to principles of interpretation, in most things that are of importance. We both concede, that the principles by which all books are to be interpreted, are those which apply to the interpretation of the Bible; for the very plain reason which you have given, that when God condescends to speak and write, for men, it is according to the established rules of human language.What better than an enigma would the Scriptures be, if such were not the fact? An inspired interpreter would be as necessary to explain, as an inspired prophet or apostle was to compose the books of Scripture.

From this great and fundamental principle of the Scriptural writing, viz. that they are composed agreeably to the common laws of human language, it results, that the gram.

matical analysis of the words of any passage; i. e. an investigation of their usual and general meaning, of their syntactical connexion, of their idiom, and of their relation to the context, must be the essential process, in determining the sense of any text or part of Scripture. On this fundamental process, depends the interpretation of all the classics, and of all other books. In conformity to this process, rules of interpretation are prescribed, which cannot be violated, without at once plunging into the dark and boundless field of conjectural exegesis. I may obtain aid from many sources, to throw light upon the meaning of words and sentences. From a knowledge of the geography of any country, of its climate, soil, productions, mountains, rivers, and other natural objects, as well as of the manners, customs, laws, history, &c. of its inhabitants, I may obtain assistance to explain its language, and must obtain it, if I mean to make out a satisfactory interpretation. But I can never dispense with the laws of grammatical analysis. These laws are vindicated by the simple fact, that every writer wishes and expects to be understood by his cotemporaries, and therefore may be expected to use lan guage as they do. We presume this of the Sacred Writers; and therefore apply to their productions, as to those of classic authors, the common rules of grammatical interpretation.

Admitting these rules to be the best and surest guide to the meaning of language, we cannot supersede them, by supposing, or conjecturing peculiarities in a writer. It is only when these peculiarities are proved, or, at least, rendered probable, that they can be admitted to influence our interpretation of any passage. Without such proof, we cannot violate the obvious principles of grammatical interpretation, for the sake of vindicating from inconsistency, absurdity, or contradiction, any author, even a Scriptural

one.

I must here explain myself, however, in order to prevent mistake in regard to my meaning. The Scriptures certainly stand on different ground, from that on which any other book rests, on account of their claim to be received as a Revelation from God. What other book can plead well authenticated miracles, for its support; or can produce declarations of a prophetic nature, that have been ful

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filled; or can glory in such an exhibition of the principles of piety and virtue-of love to God, and of benevolence and beneficence to men? Just in proportion then, as these evidences influence my mind to believe that the Bible is of divine origin, in the same proportion it becomes improbable to me, that this Bible contains absurdities, errors or contradictions. When any apparent error or contradiction attracts my attention, I hesitate to pronounce it such as it appears to be. My reason for so doing is, the strength of the evidence in favour of its divine origin; which is such, that I must do violence to my convictions, if I admit that the book contains either what is erroneous or contradictory. I am then slow to attribute, in any case, such a sense to words in the Scriptures, as would make a passage speak either absurdity or contradiction. But if, after all the light which I could gain, it should appear still to be a plain case, that there is either absurdity or contradiction in the sacred text; then I must find a different reading; or give up the passage; or renounce the whole book. I may suspend an opinion while I live, as to doubtful cases. My convictions respecting the nature and design of the Holy Scriptures; the imperfection of my knowledge; diffidence in myself all demand that I should act in this manner. But in any clear case; where the meaning of a sacred writer, or what he originally designed to say, can be definitely ascertained by the common laws of interpretation; and it appears plainly that this meaning is erroneous, or contradicts some other passage; I have no right to put a constructive sense upon the words, and do violence to the passage, in order to avoid any consequences that may follow. I cannot honestly do it. The same common sense and reason, which prescribe the laws of exegesis, decide that the meaning of a writer must be that, which those laws determine it to be. Of course, if I put a gloss upon any passage, which represents it as conveying a meaning different from that which the laws of interpretation would assign to it, I may deceive others, or I may serve the interests of party; but I violate the reason which God has given me by so doing, and act a part dishonest, and unworthy of an inquirer after truth.

If the fundamental maxims of exegesis lead to the belief, that a writer of the New Testament has contradicted himself, or another sacred writer; then I must revert at once

to the question, Is the book divine? Can it be so, if there is contradiction? This question I may settle, (on my responsibility to God,) as I please. But I have no right to violate the fundamental rules of language, by forcing a meaning upon the writer to make him consistent, which it is obvious, on the universal principles of explaining language, he never designed to convey. In determining the question, whether the writers of the New Testament were inspired, I must always, in attending to the internal evidence of the books, consider whether they have contradicted each other. To determine this question, I cannot violate the simple rules of grammatical exegesis. I must read this book, as I do all other books. Then, if there evidently be contradiction, I must reject its claims; if there be not, and I think the evidence is sufficient that they are well founded, I must admit them. But at any period subsequent to this, when I have admitted the book to be inspired, I am not at liberty to aver, that the writers could never have taught some particular doctrine, which I may dislike; and therefore to do violence to the rules of grammatical interpretation, in order to explain away a doctrine of this nature, which they seem to inculcate. My simple inquiry must be, what sentiment does the language of this or that passage convey, without violence or perversion of rule? When this question is settled philologically, (not philosophically,) then I either believe what is taught, or else reject the claim of divine authority. What can my own theories and reasonings, about the absurdity or reasonableness of any particular doctrine, avail in determining whether a writer of the New Testa ment has taught this doctrine or not? My investigation must be conducted independently of my philosophy, by my philology. And when I have obtained his meaning, by the simple and universal rules of expounding language, I choose the course I will take; I must believe his assertion, or reject his authority.

If these be not sound maxims of interpretation, I confess myself a stranger to the subject; nor can 1 help thinking that you will accord with me, at once, in the views just expressed.

Guided then by these principles, let us now come to the investigation of a few passages in the New Testament, which concern the divine nature of Christ. I take this

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