Opinion of the Court. 332 U.S. confession was entirely undisputed in the record. But it also found that petitioner had steadfastly testified, both at the preliminary hearing and at the trial on the merits before the jury, that he did not in fact admit to the city detectives that he had committed the crime. The court then stated: "If the accused had not denied having made any confession at all, we would feel constrained to reverse the conviction herein because of the fact that his testimony as to the threat made to him during the forenoon by the plain clothes men is wholly undisputed, the jailer not having been, asked about this threat, and having testified only that he was not struck by anyone in his presence after his arrest for this crime. But, we think that one accused of crime cannot be heard to say that he did not make a confession at all, and at the same time contend that an alleged confession was made under the inducement of fear." 201 Miss. 423, 435, 30 So. 2d 74, 75. The suggestion of error was accordingly overruled. The incomplete record before us precludes our determination of whether petitioner did deny in the trial court that he had confessed the crime.' But assuming that he did so testify, we cannot agree with the court below that he was thereby estopped from asserting his constitutional right to due process of law. The important fact is that the oral confession was introduced, admitted and used as evidence of petitioner's guilt. Not 1 The transcript of the trial on the merits is not before us. At the preliminary hearing on the voluntariness of the confession, the transcript of which is before us, petitioner stated in regard to the alleged confession: "I don't know what all he asked and all I said, but I didn't admit I did it." He also denied having confessed various details of the crime. Such testimony, however, might be construed as nothing more than a layman's inexact way of stating that his answers did not amount to a voluntary confession. But in the absence of the complete record, we express no opinion on the matter. 742 Opinion of the Court. only may this confession have been influential in inducing the jury's verdict, but it formed an essential part of the evidentiary basis of the conviction now under review. His alleged denial of the confession went only to the original issue of whether he actually made the confession, an issue that is no longer open. That question was at most a disputed one; but the jury resolved the matter against petitioner and, like the court below, we accept that determination. The sole concern now is with the validity of the conviction based upon the use of the oral confession. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment invalidates a state court conviction grounded in whole or in part upon a confession which is the product of other than reasoned and voluntary choice. A conviction resulting from such use of a coerced confession, however, is no less void because the accused testified at some point in the proceeding that he had never in fact confessed, voluntarily or involuntarily. Testimony of that nature can hardly legalize a procedure which conflicts with the accepted principles of due process. And since our constitutional system permits a conviction to be sanctioned only if in conformity with those principles, inconsistent testimony as to the confession should not and cannot preclude the accused from raising the due process issue in an appropriate manner. White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530, 531-532. Indeed, such a foreclosure of the right to complain "of a 2 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227; Canty v. Alabama, 309 U. S. 629; White v. Texas, 309 U. S. 631, 310 U. S. 530; Lomax v. Texas, 313 U. S. 544; Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 547; Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219; Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 327 U. S. 274; Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596; Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596. See, in general, Boskey and Pickering, "Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure," 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 266, 282-295. Opinion of the Court. 332 U.S. wrong so fundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and sentence wholly void," Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 286, would itself be a denial of due process of law. The judgment below must be reversed. Since the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the conviction solely because it thought petitioner was not entitled to raise the constitutional issue, we remand the case to that court so that it may definitively express its views on that issue. Reversed. DECISIONS PER CURIAM AND ORDERS FROM JUNE 24, 1947, THROUGH JANUARY 19, 1948. CASES DISMISSED IN VACATION. No. 62. UNITED STATES v. INTERNATIONAL SALT Co., INC. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. August 19, 1947. Dismissed in vacation pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of this Court. Acting Solicitor General Washington for the United States. Henry B. Twombly for appellee. Reported below: 6 F. R. D. 302. No. 246. CONTINENTAL DISTILLING SALES Co. v. TEXAS LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD. Appeal from the Court of Civil Appeals, 5th Supreme Judicial District, of Texas. September 26, 1947. Dismissed in vacation pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of this Court. O. O. Touchstone and Lloyd N. Cutler for appellant. Price Daniel, Attorney General of Texas, for appellee. Reported below: 199 S. W. 2d 1009. OCTOBER 6, 1947. Miscellaneous Orders. No. 81, October Term, 1946. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. CHENERY CORPORATION ET AL.; and No. 82, October Term, 1946. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. FEDERAL WATER & GAS CORP. MR. JUsTICE JACKSON announced that he has filed an opinion, in which MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER joins, setting forth the detailed grounds for his dissent from the opinion and judgment of the Court entered June 23, 1947 in these cases. Opinion of the Court and dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE JACKSON reported at 332 U. S. 194, 209. No. 306. CONNELL V. BOARD OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS OF THE TOWNSHIP OF KENNETT ET AL. Appeal from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Dismissed on motion of counsel for the appellant. Walter Schachtel for appellant. Robert T. McCracken for appellees. Reported below: 356 Pa. 585, 52 A. 2d 645. OCTOBER 13, 1947. Per Curiam Decisions. No. 21. BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN & ENGINEMEN, LOCAL LODGE No. 926, ET AL. v. TOLEDO, PEORIA & WESTERN RAILROAD ET AL.; and No. 42. FARMERS GRAIN Co. et al. v. BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN & ENGINEMEN, LOCAL LODGE No. 926, ET AL. Certiorari, 330 U. S. 816, to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Per Curiam: The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is vacated and the cases are remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint as moot, on motion of the respondent, Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad, it appearing that counsel for the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen et al. agree that the cause is moot. Louis F. Knoblock, Harold C. Heiss and Russell B. Day for petitioners in No. 21. John E. Cassidy for the Farmers Grain Co. et al., petitioners in No. 42 and respondents in No. 21. Guy A. Gladson, George W. Ott and Donald A. Morgan for the Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., respondent in Nos. 21 and 42. Reported below: 158 F.2d 109. No. 76. GRENZ v. STATE OF WASHINGTON. Appeal from the Supreme Court of Washington. Per Curiam: The appeal is dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 12 of the Rules of this Court. Reported below: 26 Wash. 2d 764, 175 P. 2d 633. |