land waters" ports, harbors, bays, rivers, and lakes. Pointing out the numerous difficulties in fixing the point where these inland waters end and the marginal sea begins, the state argues that the pleadings are therefore wholly devoid of a basis for a definite decree, the kind of decree essential to disposition of a case like this. Therefore, California concludes, all that is prayed for is an abstract declaration of rights concerning an unidentified three-mile belt, which could only be used as a basis for subsequent actions in which specific relief could be granted as to particular localities.

We may assume that location of the exact coastal line will involve many complexities and difficulties. But that does not make this any the less a justiciable controversy. Certainly demarcation of the boundary is not an impossibility. Despite difficulties this Court has previously adjudicated controversies concerning submerged land boundaries. See New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U. S. 361, 295 U. S. 694; Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 21-27; Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U. S. 70, 602. And there is no reason why, after determining in general who owns the three-mile belt here involved, the Court might not later, if necessary, have more detailed hearings in order to determine with greater definiteness particular segments of the boundary. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574, 582. Such practice is commonplace in actions similar to this which are in the nature of equitable proceedings. See e. g. Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U. S. 602, 608-609; 260 U. S. 606, 625, 261 U. S. 340. California's contention concerning the indefiniteness of the claim presents no insuperable obstacle to the exercise of the highly important jurisdiction conferred on us by Article III of the Constitution.

Second. It is contended that we should dismiss this action on the ground that the Attorney General has not been granted power either to file or to maintain it. It is

not denied that Congress has given a very broad authority to the Attorney General to institute and conduct litigation in order to establish and safeguard government rights and properties. The argument is that Congress has for a long period of years acted in such a way as to manifest a clear policy to the effect that the states, not the Federal Government, have legal title to the land under the threemile belt. Although Congress has not expressly declared such a policy, we are asked to imply it from certain conduct of Congress and other governmental agencies charged with responsibilities concerning the national domain. And, in effect, we are urged to infer that Congress has by implication amended its long-existing statutes which grant the Attorney General broad powers to institute and maintain court proceedings in order to safeguard national interests.

An Act passed by Congress and signed by the President could, of course, limit the power previously granted the Attorney General to prosecute claims for the Government. For Article IV, § 3, Cl. 2 of the Constitution vests in Congress "Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . We have said that the constitutional power of Congress in this respect is without limitation. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 29-30. Thus neither the courts nor the executive agencies could proceed contrary to an Act of Congress in this congressional area of national power.

But no Act of Congress has amended the statutes which impose on the Attorney General the authority and the duty to protect the Government's interests through the

35 U. S. C. §§ 291, 309; United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273, 279, 284; Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 147, 154-55; Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U. S. 405, 425-426; see also In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 584; United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1, 24; United States v. Wyoming, 323 U. S. 669, 329 U. S. 670.

courts. See In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 502-503. That Congress twice failed to grant the Attorney General specific authority to file suit against California, is not a sufficient basis upon which to rest a restriction of the Attorney General's statutory authority. And no more can we reach such a conclusion because both Houses of Congress passed a joint resolution quitclaiming to the adjacent states a three-mile belt of all land situated under the ocean beyond the low water mark, except those which the Government had previously acquired by purchase, condemnation, or donation. This joint resolution was vetoed by the President. His veto was sustained." Plainly, the resolution does not represent an exercise of the constitutional power of Congress to dispose of public property under Article IV, § 3, Cl. 2.

Neither the matters to which we have specifically referred, nor any others relied on by California, afford support for a holding that Congress has either explicitly or by implication stripped the Attorney General of his statu

S. J. Res. 208, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); S. J. Res. 83 and 92, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). S. J. Res. 208 passed the Senate, 81 Cong. Rec. 9326 (1937), was favorably reported by the House Judiciary Committee, H. R. Rep. 2378, 75th Cong., 3d Sess (1938), but was never acted on in the House. Hearings were held on S. J. Res. 83 and 92 before the Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, but no further action was taken. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys on S. J. Res. 83 and 92, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). In both hearings objections to the resolutions were repeatedly made on the ground that passage of the resolutions was unnecessary since the Attorney General already had statutory authority to institute the proceedings. See Hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary on S. J. Res. 208, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 42-45, 59-61 (1938); Hearings on S. J. Res. 83 and 92, supra, 27-30.

5 H. J. Res. 225, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); 92 Cong. Rec. 9642, 10316 (1946).

692 Cong. Rec. 10660 (1946). 792 Cong. Rec. 10745 (1946).

torily granted power to invoke our jurisdiction in this federal-state controversy. This brings us to the merits of the case.

Third. The crucial question on the merits is not merely who owns the bare legal title to the lands under the marginal sea. The United States here asserts rights in two capacities transcending those of a mere property owner. In one capacity it asserts the right and responsibility to exercise whatever power and dominion are necessary to protect this country against dangers to the security and tranquility of its people incident to the fact that the United States is located immediately adjacent to the ocean. The Government also appears in its capacity as a member of the family of nations. In that capacity it is responsible for conducting United States relations with other nations. It asserts that proper exercise of these constitutional responsibilities requires that it have power, unencumbered by state commitments, always to determine what agreements will be made concerning the control and use of the marginal sea and the land under it. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 403-408; United States v. Minnesota, 270 U. S. 181, 194. In the light of the foregoing, our question is whether the state or the Federal Government has the paramount right and power to determine in the first instance when, how, and by what agencies, foreign or domestic, the oil and other resources of the soil of the marginal sea, known or hereafter discovered, may be exploited.

California claims that it owns the resources of the soil under the three-mile marginal belt as an incident to those elements of sovereignty which it exercises in that water area. The state points out that its original Constitution, adopted in 1849 before that state was admitted to the Union, included within the state's boundary the water area extending three English miles from the shore, Cal. Const. (1849) Art. XII; that the Enabling Act which

admitted California to the Union ratified the territorial boundary thus defined; and that California was admitted "on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever," 9 Stat. 452. With these premises admitted, California contends that its ownership follows from the rule originally announced in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; see also Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410. In the Pollard case it was held, in effect, that the original states owned in trust for their people the navigable tidewaters between high and low water mark within each state's boundaries, and the soil under them, as an inseparable attribute of state sovereignty. Consequently, it was decided that Alabama, because admitted into the Union on "an equal footing" with the other states, had thereby become the owner of the tidelands within its boundaries. Thus the title of Alabama's tidelands grantee was sustained as valid against that of a claimant holding under a United States grant made subsequent to Alabama's admission as a state.

9

8

The Government does not deny that under the Pollard rule, as explained in later cases, California has a qualified ownership of lands under inland navigable waters such as rivers, harbors, and even tidelands down to the low water mark. It does question the validity of the rationale in the Pollard case that ownership of such water areas, any

8 See e. g., Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240; Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1; The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166. See also United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U. S. 391; Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10.

Although the Pollard case has thus been generally approved many times, the case of Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 47-48, 58, held, contrary to implications of the Pollard opinion, that the United States could lawfully dispose of tidelands while holding a future state's land "in trust" as a territory.

391;

See United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U. S. 386, 390, Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 159, 160, 163; Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y.. R. Co., 32 F. 9, 20; see also United States v. ChandlerDunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53.