REED, J., dissenting.

MR. JUSTICE REED, dissenting.

332 U.S.

I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the Court. My reason for disagreement is that § 506 (a) (1) of the Communications Act is too indefinite in its description of the prohibited acts to support an information or indictment for violation of its provisions. My objection is not to the words in the first paragraph of § 506 that make unlawful in labor matters the use of threats, force, violence, intimidation or duress against an employer. There is a background of experience and common understanding that ordinarily gives such words, when used in criminal statutes, sufficient definiteness to acquaint the public with the limits of the proscribed acts. When such words are used, they place upon those affected the risk of estimating incorrectly the sort of action that may ultimately be held to violate the statutes. Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373.

My objection is to the indefiniteness of the statutory description of the thing for which force must not be used that is, "to compel" a licensee under the Communications Act "to employ . . . any person or persons in excess of the number of employees needed by such licensee to perform actual services."

This criminal statute is the product of legislation directed at the control of acts deemed evil by Congress. It is one of the many regulatory acts that legislative bodies have passed in recent years to make unlawful certain practices in the field of economics that seemed contrary to the public interest. These statutes made new crimes. Deeds theretofore not subject to punishment fall within the general scope of their prohibition. Common expe

1 Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 33, § 205 (b), 50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. V, 1946) § 925 (b); Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1069, § 16 (a), 29 U. S. C. § 216 (a); National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 456, § 12, 29 U. S. C. § 162; Federal Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, 57 Stat. 167, § 9, 50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. V, 1946) § 1509.

rience has not created a general understanding of their criminality. Consequently, in order to adequately inform the public of the limitations on conduct, a more precise definition of the crime is necessary to meet constitutional requirements."

Anglo-American law does not punish citizens for violations of vague and uncertain statutes. There is no place in our criminal law for acts defined as detrimental to the interests of the state. A statute is invalid when "so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning." 269 U. S. at 391. It seems to me that this vice exists in this section of the challenged act. How can a man or a jury possibly know how many men are "needed" "to perform actual services" in broadcasting? What must the quality of the program be? How skillful are the employees in the performance of their task? Does one weigh the capacity of the employee or the managerial ability of the employer? Is the desirability of short hours to spread the work to be evaluated? Or is the standard the advantage in take-home pay for overtime work?

The Government seeks to avoid the difficulty by interpreting the section. Their brief says, after considering the legislative history, "the bill was not intended to apply to mere differences of opinion as to whether men were overworked; it only fits deliberate demands for payment to additional employees made in complete disregard for the employer's need and without any justification from the viewpoint of actually getting the employer's business done.... If Paragraph (1) is read in its context, along with the succeeding paragraphs, it is clear what Congress was driving at when it characterized the Act

2 United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 J. S. 81; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385. See Gorin v. United States, 312 U. S. 19, 26.

as one to prevent extortion, as distinct from bona fide demands relating to conditions of employment." This interpretation seems to me to fly in the face of § 506 (1). There is another subsection to which the language might apply. This clearly defines the prohibited acts. If the Congress wishes to fix the maximum number of employees that a licensee may employ in stations of various sizes, it may, of course, be done. Or, if it is impractical for Congress to act because of the varying situations, the number may be left to regulations of the Federal Communications Commission or other regulatory body.

This is a criminal statute. The principle that such statutes must be so written that intelligent men may know what acts of theirs will jeopardize their life, liberty or property is of importance to all. That principle requires, I think, a determination that this section of the Communications Act is invalid.

MR. JUSTICE MURPHY and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE join in this dissent.

3 60 Stat. 89, § 506 (a) (4):

"to pay or give or agree to pay or give any money or other thing of value for services, in connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee, which are not to be performed;

Syllabus.

UNITED STATES v. CALIFORNIA.

NO. 12, ORIGINAL.

Argued March 13-14, 1947.-Decided June 23, 1947.*

1. The complaint filed in this Court by the United States against the State of California to determine which government owns, or has paramount rights in and power over, the submerged land off the coast of California between the low-water mark and the three-mile limit and has a superior right to take or authorize the taking of the vast quantities of oil and gas underneath that land (much of which has already been, and more of which is about to be, taken by or under authority of the State) presents a case or controversy under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution. Pp. 24-25.

2. The fact that the coastal line is indefinite and that its exact location will involve many complexities and difficulties presents no insuperable obstacle to the exercise of the highly important jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Article III, § 2, of the Constitution. Pp. 25–26.

3. Congress has neither explicitly nor by implication stripped the Attorney General of the power to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court in this federal-state controversy, pursuant to his broad authority under 5 U. S. C. §§ 291, 309, to protect the Government's interests through the courts. Pp. 26-29.

4. California is not the owner of the three-mile marginal belt along its coast; and the Federal Government rather than the State has paramount rights in and power over that belt, an incident to which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area, including oil. Pp. 29-39.

(a) There is no substantial support in history for the view that the thirteen original colonies separately acquired ownership of the three-mile belt beyond the low-water mark or the soil under it, even if they did acquire elements of the sovereignty of the English Crown by their revolution against it. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,

3 How. 212, distinguished. Pp. 29-33.

(b) Acquisition of the three-mile belt has been accomplished by the National Government, and protection and control of it has been and is a function of national external sovereignty. Pp. 33–35.

*For order and decree entered October 27, 1947, see post, p. 804.

(c) The assertion by the political agencies of this Nation of broad dominion and control over the three-mile marginal belt is binding upon this Court. Pp. 33-34.

(d) The fact that the State has been authorized to exercise local police power functions in the part of the marginal belt within its declared boundaries does not detract from the Federal Government's paramount rights in and power over this area. P. 36.

(e) Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240; Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1; The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166, distinguished. Pp. 36-38.

5. The Federal Government's paramount rights in the three-mile belt have not been lost by reason of the conduct of its agents, nor by this conduct is the Government barred from enforcing its rights by reason of principles similar to laches, estoppel or adverse possession. Pp. 39-40.

(a) The Government, which holds its interests here as elsewhere in trust for all the people, is not to be deprived of those interests by the ordinary court rules designed particularly for private disputes over individually owned pieces of property. P. 40.

(b) Officers of the Government who have no authority at all to dispose of Government property cannot by their conduct cause the Government to lose its valuable rights by their acquiescence, laches, or failure to act. P. 40.

6. The great national question whether the State or the Nation has paramount rights in and power over the three-mile belt is not dependent upon what expenses may have been incurred by public or private agencies upon mistaken assumptions. P. 40.

7. It is not to be assumed that Congress, which has constitutional control over Government property, will so execute its powers as to bring about injustices to states, their subdivisions, or persons acting pursuant to their permission. P. 40.

8. The United States is entitled to a decree declaring its rights in the area in question as against California and enjoining California and all persons claiming under it from continuing to trespass upon the area in violation of the rights of the United States. Pp. 22-23, 41.

The case is stated in the first paragraph of the opinion, and the conclusion that the United States is entitled to the relief prayed for is reported at page 41.

Attorney General Clark and J. Howard McGrath, then Solicitor General, were for the United States on the motion