Nature and Thought: An Introduction to a Natural PhilosophyK. Paul, Trench, & Company, 1882 - 261 pagini |
Alte ediții - Afișează-le pe toate
Nature and Thought: An Introduction to a Natural Philosophy St. George Jackson Mivart Vizualizare completă - 1882 |
Nature and Thought: An Introduction to a Natural Philosophy St. George Jackson Mivart Vizualizare completă - 1882 |
Nature and Thought: An Introduction to a Natural Philosophy St. George Jackson Mivart Vizualizare completă - 1885 |
Termeni și expresii frecvente
absolute cause absurd accept action activity admit affirm agnostic agnosticism animal anthropomorphism apprehend argument assertion beauty believe body certainly colour common sense conceive consciousness contradiction course creatures declarations declarations of Conscience deny distinct doubt dream Eastbourne effects emotions evidence existence experience expression external world fact faculties feelings force harmony Herbert Spencer human idea images imagine inference intel intellectual John Stuart Mill judgment kind knowledge less matter mean memory mental merely mind moral motion motives mylodon natural selection nature necessary never objective organ past perceive perception phenomena philosophical scepticism philosophy physical science pleasure possible present principle principle of contradiction propositions qualities question rational reason recognise recollect reductio ad absurdum reflection regard relativity of knowledge scepticism seems self-evident sensations sensuous soul subjective concepts suppose sure tell theism things thought tion true truth ultimate universe whole word
Pasaje populare
Pagina 78 - ... nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them ? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while ? This, therefore, is nothing to the purpose.
Pagina 79 - I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance.
Pagina 78 - ... that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, IT IS NECESSARY THAT YOU CONCEIVE THEM EXISTING UNCONCEIVED OR UNTHOUGHT OF, WHICH IS A MANIFEST REPUGNANCY.
Pagina 77 - I am content to put the whole upon this issue. — If you can but conceive it possible for one extended movable substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause.
Pagina 216 - I am told that whether I decide to do or to abstain, I feel that I could have decided the other way. I ask my consciousness what I do feel, and I find, indeed, that I feel (or am convinced) that I could...
Pagina 79 - Whether others mean anything by the term reality different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own thoughts and see. 37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word substance be taken in the vulgar sense, for a combination of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like : this we cannot be accused of taking away. But if it be taken in a philosophic sense, for the...
Pagina 209 - It would be incompatible with everything we know of the cerebral action, to suppose that the physical chain ends abruptly in a physical void, occupied by an immaterial substance ; which immaterial substance, after working alone, imparts its results to the other edge of the physical break, and determines the active response — two shores of the material with an intervening ocean of the immaterial.
Pagina 150 - So that no school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever name — gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception. It is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition.
Pagina 77 - I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot either give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist. I say, the bare possibility of your opinion's being true shall pass for an argument that it is so.
Pagina 79 - I chose to mark them by the word idea, which implies those properties. 40 But say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so, assert the evidence of sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same. That what I see, hear and feel doth exist, that is to say, is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see how the...