which these Gospels uniformly attribute to Him, His selfassertion is the most striking phenomenon in all history; and if it had been assigned to any other man, however great, it would have been simply extravagant. But it fits in with exquisite harmony with all the other divine aspects of His character, and can only be explained on the principle that He felt within Him the direct self-consciousness of the presence of the divine. Hence it was that throughout His teaching He referred to no other authority than His own. As He is uniformly depicted by the Synoptics, His consciousness of the Divine was immediate and direct, and He felt within Himself an inherent worthiness before which every merely human tie must yield. This trait, which underlies the entire structure of the Synoptics, is not only in strict conformity with the great utterance above referred to, but pre-supposes its truth. I might easily adduce a far larger mass of evidence on this subject; but I submit that what I have brought forward is abundantly sufficient for my purpose, and proves beyond all question that according to the views of the writers of the New Testament, the person and work of Jesus Christ constitute the very centre and essence of Christianity, and that the Christian revelation is made in His divine person.

SUPPLEMENT II.

A vast amount of confusion has been introduced into the controversy about miracles by the vague use of such terms as "Nature," "Natural," "Supernatural," "The Order of Nature," "Law," "Force," &c., without any attempt to assign to them a definite and consistent meaning. In a controversy of this kind, involving as it must a large number of abstract reasonings, it is of the utmost importance to keep the signification of the chief terms which we employ in it free from ambiguity. These terms, however, have a great variety

of meaning, and yet they are habitually used as if they were terms of the utmost precision. Webster's Dictionary assigns no less than twelve distinct meanings to the word " Nature,” fourteen to "Natural," and twenty-seven to "Law." The Duke of Argyll tells us that even in scientific treatises the term "law" is used in not less than five different senses, viz. :—

First,-When applied simply to an observed order of

facts.

Secondly,-To that order as involving the action of some force, or forces, of which nothing more can be known.

Thirdly,-As applied to individual forces, the measure of whose operation has been more or less clearly defined or ascertained.

Fourthly,-As applied to those combinations of forces which have reference to the fulfilment of purpose or the discharge of functions.

Fifthly,-As appplied to abstract conceptions of the mind, not corresponding with any actual phenomena, but deduced therefrom as axioms of thought, necessary to an understanding of them. Law in this sense is a reduction of the phenomena not merely to an order of facts but to an order of thought.

Such are the various senses in which this word is employed even by scientific men; yet the Duke is not certain that he has enumerated them all. As this term enters as one of the most important factors into the discussion about miracles, we need not wonder that its ambiguity has opened wide the gate for the introduction of a large number of fallacies,

Equally ambiguous is the term "Nature" and its compounds. As however only two or three of its various significations enter largely into this question, it will be unnecessary to enumerate the others.

First, The term "Nature" is used to denote the material Universe, its necessary forces and laws. This is a class of phenomena definite and distinct, and if its use were confined to them it would be free from ambiguity.

But it is also used to denote another class of phenomena, separated from these by the widest interval, viz., man, his intellectual and moral nature, including his volition. Thus phenomena become complicated together under a common term, which differ from one another as widely as freedom. and necessity, the material and moral worlds, with the laws which regulate their action. It is even not unfrequently used to include everything which exists.

When the same term is indiscriminately used to denote phenomena thus widely differing in character, inaccurary of reasoning is the inevitable result. But when two terms as ambiguous as "nature" and "law" become complicated together, as is so frequently the case in this discussion, the confusion is greatly increased. The whole controversy is chiefly made up of questions respecting the Natural and the Supernatural; whether miracles are the results of a power within, or without nature; whether they are contrary to the laws of nature, or are violations, or suspensions of them, or are violations of its order; or involve the action of some higher natural law; or the introduction of a new force into nature, or whether on these or any other grounds miracles are impossible, irrational, or incredible. This being so, it is evident that if we include under the same terms things so widely different in conception as the phenomena of the material and the moral worlds, nothing but hopeless confusion of thought can be the result. The whole question in fact turns on the meaning which we attach to the terms "Nature," "Natural," "Supernatural," "Order of Nature," "Force," and "Law." This last term is constantly used to cover two conceptions which are radically distinct. The first of these is when the word is used to denote an invariable sequence of events. This is unquestionably the more correct meaning to attach to it; and if its use was rigidly limited to it, it would save both theologians and men of science no small amount of useless discussion. The term "law" in its primary meaning is only applicable to man and his actions. It denotes a rule

of conduct which he is bound to obey. Hence it has been applied by analogy to the orderly sequences of events in the material universe, which are said to observe a certain law. This simply means, that they occur in an invariable order, which we call the law of their recurrence. But nothing is more common in this controversy than to speak of the laws of nature as if they possessed an efficient power, or in other words to introduce into the conception of law the idea of causation. Yet nothing can be more certain than that in the proper sense of the term, the laws of nature are incapable of effecting any result whatever. They simply denote the invariable sequences of natural phenomena, and nothing more. They are wholly distinct from the causes of things, and those active energies in the universe which we designate forces. Its forces are the efficient causes; its laws, the invariable sequences of the phenomena which result from the action of its forces. Thus the force of gravitation is quite distinct from the law of gravitation. The force is the active energy; the law is the invariable order of phenomena.

From this simple and obvious meaning the term "law" has become complicated with the conception of cause or force; and thus the laws of nature are habitually spoken of even by scientific men as though they were efficient causes, and language is used respecting them which amounts to little short of their personification. This confusion of thought is brought about as follows:-there is a principle in our minds (how it has originated is immaterial to the subject we are now considering) which irresistibly leads us to believe in the continuity of phenomena; and that a set of sequences which have invariably occurred in times past, will recur in times future. This principle lies at the foundation of the inductive process, and its validity depends on the assumption of its truth. It has been expressed in various forms, the most simple of which is that which affirms the truth of the principle of the

continuity of nature; or that like causes must produce like effects. For example, we infer because the sun has risen every day in times past, that it will rise every day in times future; and we designate the sun's rising and setting for all future time a law of nature. In this way the conception of necessity, causation, or efficiency becomes mixed up with that of law, instead of simply denoting what it really is, a succession of invariable sequences. Hence when a particular class of events is spoken of as a law of nature, the idea of necessity is superadded to that of invariable sequence.

Thus it is said to be a law of nature that all men must die. What does such an affirmation mean? It affirms as an observed fact that all men have died; and infers on the principle of continuity that what has taken place in the past, will take place in the future. In consequence of this inference, the proposition becomes altered in form from "all men have died," to "all men must die;" and thus the conceptions of necessity and causation become confused with the simple one of law as an observed order of phenomena. The proposition "All men must die " involves several assumptions, among the most important of which is, that the same causes must produce like effects in the future, unless other forces interpose which are capable of modifying their action. In this manner the term "law" has been extensively employed both by theologians and men of science to denote not only a set of invariable sequences of phenomena, but the causes which produce them, and the forces which energize in them. In this way it is that great confusion of thought has been introduced into the controversy about miracles. We are told that the laws of nature have effected this or that result: that they act with irresistible power; and a multitude of similar expressions are habitually applied to them, whereas the only active energies are, not the laws, but the forces of nature, and the laws by themselves effect nothing. Even in the primary sense of the word, law, as a rule of