in delusions, for their influence for good has been greater than that of all the self-sacrifice of the wisest and the best of men. This is the alternative which unbelief presents to us; and I say it is an alternative terrible to contemplate. If so, all is vanity: the present life is a dream; the life to come a blank; and man's only hope-shall I not rather say, his best hope to be speedily swallowed up in that eternal silence out of which he has come, to which he is hastening, and from which there will be no awakening. This is the prospect we are asked to accept in exchange for our Christianity and our belief in that God who is the merciful Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and whose dominion endureth throughout all ages; in whose presence there is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand there must be pleasures for evermore.

SUPPLEMENT I.

The question of the evidential value of miracles as necessary proofs of a revelation is in some degree complicated with that of special providences and answers to prayer. Professor Mozley allows that these are unseen miracles, only differing from visible ones in that their manifestation of special purpose is more or less imperfect. It is obvious that if a miracle be viewed simply as an occurrence in the physical Universe, it is impossible clearly to distinguish it from a special providence, because both alike involve such an interference with the order of nature, that a different order of events must have taken place but for the fact of such interference. The idea of a special providence is that the order of events has been diverted for a special purpose, and a new order of sequences introduced, which otherwise would not have existed. I use this language because it is the best that I can employ, although it is unquestionably inaccurate, since the very affirmation that God interferes with the order of the Universe in acts of His special provi

dence amounts almost to a denial that He is always energizing in the production of its usual order; or in other words, that those events which are designated special providences are the effects of God's action in the Universe, while ordinary providences are not. Having thus pointed out the inaccuracy of the term, I may proceed to use it in its ordinary acceptation.

If special providences and miracles are alike interferences with the order of the Universe, they can only be brought about by some modification in the action of its forces; for the order of nature is nothing else than the sequences which are the results of their activity. In this respect special providences and miracles are alike; and only distinguishable from one another as far as the one may be a more clear manifestation of purpose than the other. It follows therefore that the evidential value of a miracle as an attestation to a revelation is diminished in proportion to the difficulty of discriminating between the special purpose involved in a miracle, and that which is manifested in what is called an act of God's special providence: for it is clear that if the same event could subserve two purposes, it could no longer be the distinguishing mark of either.

But a distinction may be laid down between a miracle and a special providence, if the word "miracle" is used only to denote such occurrences as are preceded by a prediction that they are going to happen. Such a prediction would make the purpose of the event apparent as centring in a particular person, and thus constitute a special attestation to him. But here the question becomes complicated with events which are brought about as answers to prayer; and hence the difficulty of discriminating between them and miracles. A special answer to a special prayer, if the petition be for something other than the exertion of an influence on the mind, although the answer may be brought about through the agency of the existing forces of the Universe, necessarily involves some special modification of their action, because the supposition pre-supposes an order of events

introduced in answer to the prayer different from that which would have happened if the petition had not been offered. But the event occurring in answer to a petition is almost as clear a manifestation of purpose as an event occurring after a prediction that it is going to happen, which we call a miracle. Both the one and the other cause the event to point to a particular person; in the one case, to the person who offers the petition and obtains the answer; and in the other, to the person who uttered the prediction on which the miracle followed as the result. In each case it would constitute an attestation to that particular individual, showing that the order of nature has been changed in his favour. Several of the Scriptural miracles are in fact described as answers to prayer; and this increases the difficulty of clearly discriminating between palpable answers to prayer, and what are usually called evidential miracles.

One distinction between them has been laid down, that to constitute an event an evidential miracle, it must be brought about instantaneously; whereas an answer to prayer may be a slow and gradual operation. I doubt, however, whether the distinction is one of real importance, because a series of definite and unquestionable answers to prayer occurring to the same person would be as clear a manifestation of purpose in reference to that individual as any miracle could be, and would prove that God marked him out for His special favour by deviating from His usual course of action at his request. A series of such answers would constitute such a special divine intervention as the Scriptures designate a sign (onμeiov). It is true that in some of the Scripture miracles which are described as taking place in answer to prayer, a special command was given that the event should happen after the prayer had been offered, though this is not always the case, as in the resurrections wrought by Elijah and Elisha; and, in fact, many of their other miracles were unaccompanied by a prediction. It is difficult to see how a series of such answers can be distinguished as to its evidential value from a miracle.

This difficulty is increased when a person professes to have been favoured with a long series of answers, all of which are brought about in favour of a particular institution. It is difficult to see how such do not constitute a direct divine attestation in its behalf. I cannot better illustrate my meaning than by referring to the well-known case of Mr. Müller's Orphan Asylum at Bristol. This institution has been in existence for a considerable number of years, and is one which from a small beginning has grown to very large dimensions. Its founder believes that it owes its support exclusively to the influence of faith and prayer. He disclaims the use of those means by which other religious societies are supported; he makes none of the usual appeals for funds, holds no public meetings, inserts no advertisements, and refuses to employ any organization for the purpose of obtaining pecuniary support. On the contrary, when funds are wanted, prayer is offered for them; and they are believed to come in consequence; and he affirms that this has never failed to supply them in their greatest straits.

But further not only does Mr. Müller believe that this has supplied him with all the necessary funds for the support of his establishment, but he narrates a considerable number of occurrences as having taken place in answer to his prayers, involving not mere influences exerted on the mind, but direct interferences with the order of nature; as, to adduce a single example, the change of a north wind into a south wind, when in consequence of the failure of his warming apparatus, and the difficulty of repairing it, the children were in danger of suffering from cold. Taking the whole series of these events, and supposing them to have been brought about in the manner in which Mr. Müller believes them to have been, as definite answers to no less definite prayers, they constitute as distinct a divine attestation to the Orphan Asylum as could be given by any series of miracles.

I have cited the Orphan Asylum as a crucial example,

because it is so remarkable an institution as to have attracted the attention of unbelievers. Mr. Wallace, who has some claims to be called the originator of the Darwinian theory of evolution, has referred to it in his work on Spiritualism, as a proof of the reality of spiritual influences. He pronounces a just condemnation on Sir W. Thomson's and Professor Tyndall's proposal to bring answers to prayer to an experimental test by separating off two hospitals, one of which should receive the benefit of the united prayers of Christians, and the other should not, and testing the efficacy of such prayers by the results as manifested by the number of recoveries. Accepting the facts in connection with the Orphan Asylum, precisely as they appear to Mr. Müller's mind, he urges them on their consideration as an unquestionable proof of the efficacy of prayer. He then propounds his own theory as to their origin. He does not consider them as answers to prayer in any Christian sense of the term; but that Mr. Müller by the fervour of his devotions congregates around him a large number of kindred spirits, who suggest to other men and women of similar feelings, and possessing adequate means, to supply the wants of the Institution. To similar influences Mr. Wallace ascribes no inconsiderable number of the miracles recorded in the Bible, and those which are reported in Church and other histories.

On the discussion of Mr. Wallace's theories in connection with this subject, I cannot enter here. I have only to do. with the facts of the Orphan Institution, as bearing on the evidential value of miracles. I have no intention to dispute the general truth of the facts as stated by Mr. Müller, although it is highly probable that they have received some colouring from his own peculiar opinions. To accept his testimony to the facts is one thing; to accept his views as to the agency which has brought them about is altogether another. If his views on this point are correct, the conclusion is inevitable that the Orphan Asylum has as definite a divine attestation in its favour as it would if its wants were supplied by the most direct form of miracle. In fact, a