of prior investigations of the assassination must be fully
explored. The Department of Justice Task Force report,

at page 100, states that Jerry Ray was interviewed to inquire
about the source of James' funds and that he had no knowledge
of family members supplying James any funds.
John Ray
apparently refused to talk to members of the Task Force.
Nevertheless, when the Task Force was in progress, John
Ray had been convicted of one bank robbery, and carried
as a suspect in several of the others which he presently
denies participating in. Apparently, however, the fact
of these robberies, the similarity of these robberies to
the Alton robbery and the refusal of John to talk to members
of the Task Force did not lead the Task Force to explore
the possibility that John Ray participated in the Alton
robbery and that this could have had a bearing on the method
of James Earl Ray's finances. An examination of such a
deficiency is important to the fulfillment of the Committee's
legislative mandate. The failure of the Bureau to make any
connection between the robberies is equally significant to the
Committee's inquiry. John Ray's participation, in fact,
in these robberies is consequently extremely material for
the Committee to be able to assess the adequacy of prior
investigations into the involvement of other members of
the Ray family, in any manner, in the assassination of
Dr. King.

In this last connection, the fact that John Ray was not informed of all the many reasons his testimony may have been material does not preclude the inquiry from being material on this ground within the requirements of the perjury statute. A failure to warn a witness of legal facts hardly justifies false testimony. (See, e.g., United States v. Mandijano, 425 U. S. 564 (1976), United States v. Wong, 431 U. S. 174 (1976) (failure to warn a witness of rights does not excuse a witness who has committed perjury).

IV.

It is apparent that John Ray's testimony before the Committee concerning his participation in bank robberies is extremely material to the Select Committee's inquiry

for numerous reasons.

His character is of paramount

importance both as to the conclusions which may be drawn concerning his participation in the Bank of Alton robbery as well as the credibility of all his testimony before the Committee. In addition, the Committee must fully explore the failure of the Bureau and Department Task Force to investigate fully John Ray's participation in the Bank of Alton robbery. This will necessarily require determining whether the Bureau and Task Force should have explored John Ray's participation in these subsequent robberies as evidence of his participation in the Alton robbery. The Committee must determine whether John Ray participated in these robberies to fully assess the performance of the agencies and departments of the United States Government, and consequently fulfill its legislative mandate.

John Ray's testimony before the Select Committee is material because it significantly affects the ability of a Congressional Committee to conduct a "full and complete investigation." Since there are no policy reasons in this instance for not advancing such a goal, John Ray should be prosecuted for lying to a Committee of Congress.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blichers

G. Robert Blakey

Chief Counsel and Director

GRB: jwc
Enclosure

CC:

Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Mr. Earl J. Silbert

SUBJECT:

Perjury and Contempt as Applicable Sanctions in á Congres-
sional Proceeding: Reliance upon a Secrecy Agreement for
which a Release Has Been Executed by the Appropriate Au-
thority as a Defense to Prosecution

This will respond to your inquiry of October 14, 1977, regarding the above subject.

For the purposes of the following discussion, these facts will be presumed: (1) execution during employment with a United States intelligence agency of a legally binding secrecy agreement by a prospective congressional witness; (2) receipt by that individual, prior to testimony, of a written release from such agreement or any other similar agreement the individual may believe he has entered into with the agency; (3) grant of the release by the same authority which entered into the initial agreement; (4) subsequent false testimony under oath or refusal to respond to questions before a properly constituted and fully authorized congressional proceeding. Analyzed here is the legal sufficiency of a defense to prosecution for perjury or contempt in such circumstances, based upon the initial agreement's continued effect or upon an assertion of "reasonable reliance on apparent authority," It should be noted that the validity of such agreements absent any release, and reliance generally upon "national security" restrictions in refusals to testify fully (either in the judicial or legislative context) are not addressed here.

It is our conclusion that a properly executed release will operate to nullify the original agreement and will place the individual in such position as he would have been had no agreement been entered into at the time of employment. It also seems clear that, regardless of the nature of the letter of release or its effectiveness, the proper remedy for the witness who feels he can or should not testify would be either (1) assertion before. the questioning body of a recognized privilege (e.g, the privilege against self-incrimination), or (2) refusal to testify followed by defense of such refusal in a contempt proceeding. That is, even a valid basis for refusal to respond fully and accurately will not operate as a defense to a prosecution for perjurious conduct.

The Congress of the United States has the power to investigate, to compel testimony, and to punish for contempt. "The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad." Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). The investigatory power of either House may be delegated to a committee either by the standing rules of each body or by special resolution,

An essential

and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function is the process to enforce that power of inquiry, McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S, 135, 174 (1927),

Thus the issuance of subpoenas has long been held to be a legitimate use

by Congress of its power to investigate, Eastland v. United States Serviceman's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975). And if the particular investigation at issue is related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of the Congress, it has been said by the Supreme Court that "[i]t is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with the Congress in its efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action, It is their unremitting

obligation to respond to subpoenas, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its committees and to testify fully with respect to matters within the province of proper investigation," (Watkins; at 187–188),

In qualification of this stated obligation of the citizenry to respond to a congressional call for information, the Court in Watkins added that "[t]his, of course, assumes that the constitutional rights of witnesses will be respected by the Congress as they are in a court of justice. The Bill of Rights is as applicable to investigations as to all forms of governmental action, Witnesses cannot be compelled to give evidence against themselves, They cannot be subjected to unreasonable search and seizure. Nor can the First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, religion, or political belief and association be abridged." (Watkins, at 188). See also, Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959). While the application of some common law testimonial privileges may be a matter of discretion to be decided by the legislative body conducting an investigation, other privileges drawn from the Constitution and limits imposed by a committee or House are applicable as a matter of right, Among these are (1) the privilege against self-incrimination (Watkins, supra); (2) refusal to answer on grounds that the question is not pertinent to a valid legislative inquiry (Id.); (3) refusal on grounds that First Amendment rights would be violated (Barenblatt, supra); (4) assertion that the question is so vague "that the witness is unable to answer with knowledge of its meaning" (O'Connor v. United States, 240 F. 2d 404, 405 (D,C, Cir. 1956)); (5) refusal based upon the allegation that the committee has failed to adhere to its

own rules or those of the legislative body (Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963)).