Great wealth is a prerequisite; what else is necessary is kept a state secret not known to any outside a small official circle, but pretty well guessed at by the public. Leaving aside as of a bygone generation Lord Haliburton ("Sam Slick's" son), a valuable Under Secretary for War, we see in this generation Sir Donald Smith become Lord Strathcona, and Sir George Stephen become Lord Mount Stephen. Both of these were concerned in building the Canadian Pacific Railway. Sir Thomas Shaughnessy, the President of the same gigantic institution, became Lord Shaughnessy, while his predecessor was satisfied with being a simple knight, Sir William Van Horne. Both of them were Americans of very great ability, and both rendered most valuable service in their position in the Canadian Pacific Railway, but neither took any open part in the politics or the government of Canada. Sir Max Aitken became Lord Beaverbrook for services rendered the Imperial Government in time of war, and Sir Hugh Graham became Lord Atholstan; he is a wealthy newspaper proprietor in Montreal, and only he and Lord Shaughnessy of those named reside in Canada. These peerages play no part in Canadian life; they give certain social prestige in some circles and are probably a source of satisfaction to their possessors and their families, but otherwise are negligible; they certainly would prove a heavy handicap to any one desiring to be elected to any Parliament. Canada has no constitutional prohibition like that in Article I, section 9, of the Constitution of the United States, providing that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States," but it is quite certain that there will never be any granted by Canada; and it is equally certain that the day of any hereditary title whatever has passed in this democratic country. country. While the House of Commons has pronounced against even the non-hereditary honor of knighthood, it may be doubted whether public opinion at large is wholly in accord with the House on this subject. The Essentials of a State Constitution By Linton Satterthwaite Hopeful signs of an increasing interest in constitutional government are not wanting. With general alarm at the spread of loose notions of government, involving disregard of the personal guaranties, a renewed devotion to fundamental principles is a natural reaction. A revival of respect for the limitations of a written constitution gives opportunity to impress on the popular mind what is the legitimate scope of its provisions. That a general disregard of the proper bounds has generally characterized the framing and making of our state constitutions will scarcely be denied by any intelligent student of government. And it may aid us to determine what may properly be the range of constitutional provisions if we consider briefly the question why there should be any written state constitutions at all. Why then should we have a state constitution? It is easy to understand why a federal constitution was absolutely necessary. It was felt that there was need for a national government, but no national government existed; it was to be created. There was urgent call for the formulation of some scheme for a "more perfect union." Hence a written framework of government had to be created. The result was what Mr. Gladstone called "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a ples of the different states, who possessed all the attributes of the fullest sovereignty, unlike the state governments, naturally and inevitably became one of limited powers. Since its creators took out of their store-house of sovereign powers what they chose to bestow upon their handiwork, only such portions of the absolute popular sovereignty as were consciously given could be possessed by the government thus set up. However much it may be claimed that the courts have enlarged the apparent powers of the federal government, it is probable that what seemed to the strict constructionists to be an extension of power was for the most part merely a development of the powers actually granted. For it is undoubtedly sound construction to hold that when the makers of the Constitution conferred powers on the government they were forming, they meant that those powers should be effective throughout the changes of time and circumstance wrought by invention, by science, and by social growth. It is therefore easy to comprehend why our federal system was invented. "Invention" is the proper term; for in the words of De Tocqueville, it was based upon "a wholly novel theory which may be regarded as a great discovery in modern political science." And here, as always, necessity was the mother of invention, since a federal system was to be created out of an historical void. But there was, there is, no such com given time by the brain and purpose of man." And the government thus formed by the deliberate act of the peo- pelling reason for a state constitution. The early immigrants brought with them the common law of England, and with it the elements from which the unwritten British constitution had been evolved. It was to defend their rights as Englishmen that the colonists revolted. There would therefore seem to have been no powerful underlying reason why each state should not have developed a system of representation and parliamentary government similar to that which has grown up in England. Under such a system, the legislative body would be under no restraint of action except that imposed by public sentiment. Written constitutions, however, became the order of the day. What was the fundamental reason for them? The protection of minorities might perhaps explain, in a single phrase, the prime reason for a written state constitution. This may sound like strange doctrine to those who have had instilled in their minds a superficial conception of the right of the majority to rule. Yet it is not too much to say that the paramount duty of government is to safeguard the individual against the tyranny of the majority. To one whose mind has grasped the fundamentals of government there is no sacredness in the majority voice as such. The absolute rights of individuals, according to the standards of the eighteenth century, were three-the right of personal security, of liberty of movement, and of private property. To these may be added, without question, freedom of speech, with all that that implies, and freedom of worship. The protection of these five fundamental rights, inherent and absolute in every individual who has not forfeited them by crime, must be the first concern of every government worthy to be called free. For a government to deny these rights is to invite change by revolution. We may, then, without great exaggeration, imagine a people assembled en masse as they gather in fact by representatives to agree upon a chart by which their future governmental course is to be guided. They are measurably free from passion; by common consent partisanship is temporarily banished from their counsels; for the moment, the thoughts of all are turned towards constructing a set of rules under which they will subsequently strive with each other for control of their government and for the success of policies. Each recognizes the fact that he may at any time be in a minority in such contests, and realizes further that, when in the majority, he will be liable to be influenced by mass emotion, mass passion, mass psychology, to disregard and override the rights of those in the minority. Each therefore willingly places a limit on his own powers to work injustice, in order that he may be protected against injustice from his fellows. In a word, collectively they reverse the process of appealing from Philip drunk to Philip sober. They make, in their calm and sober moments, constitutional provision against their own reckless legislation affecting the rights of individuals at such times as they may be intoxicated with power and inflamed by the passions and prejudices incident to party strife. In this illustration, it is submitted, is to be found the true philosophy of our written constitutions. individual rights from legislative encroachment, the other fixing the chief parts of the governmental machinery. Should a state constitution go farther? Abstractly, no. For there is no need to confer powers on the state government, as it was imperative to give to the federal government out of the sovereign powers of the states all that it could ever claim to possess. The state government, on the contrary, represents all the powers of a sovereign people which remained after the grants made to the national government. In the absence of constitutional restraint the state legislature would be supreme. It could run the entire gamut of legislation so long as it did not enter the field already conceded by the state to the national government. The vital parts of a state constitution must therefore be, not grants, but restrictions. There can hardly, in any true sense, be a grant of power in a state constitution. A power conferred must be in the shape of the removal of a restriction previously imposed. The foregoing considerations deal a state constitution, one safeguarding with the fundamentals of individual freedom and link our constitutions with Magna Charta itself. But there is another reason for a written constitution, and one that appeals to our sense of the practical rather than to our imagination. If a self-governing people are to work their government successfully they must know its general frame-work. The masses can learn the frame of their government only by practice in its working. Some stability of form is therefore essential. Were the division of powers, the form of the executive, the functions of the legislative, and the scope of the judicial branch of the government subject to frequent, perhaps whimsical, change through statutory enactment, it might well be that confusion of mind would so distract the ordinary citizen as to make it impossible for him to function intelligently and independently as a participant in the self-governing activities of the state. The character, the tenure, and the mode of selection of the principal functionaries of the state should therefore be prescribed by the constitution. Minor and subordinate positions may well be left to legislative discretion. But the general scheme of government should be stable and subject to change only by the comparatively slow and wholesomely difficult method of constitutional amendment. Changes made by such means are not likely at any time to be sweeping, and even the less alert part of the electorate will become familiar with them as they occur. Thus we may conclude that two general lines of provisions are desirable in It would logically follow from the above outline of the need for, and proper scope of, a state constitution that all other matters of legislative concern should be left exclusively to statutory treatment and control. Just as the common law or lex non scripta became established by recording the findings of the judges as to the prevailing standards and customs, thus permitting normal and healthy growth as these standards were modified, with resulting change in custom, so the statutory law or lex scripta should from time to time reflect the existing public sentiment with regard to the subject-matters of legislation. In the natural and beneficial working of free representative government, public sentiment first becomes crystallized through the manifold processes of discussion and debate, and then, by legislative enactment, it passes organically into public will. This sentiment is subject to change and growth, to ebb and flow, and there should be no arbitrary, no insurmountable, obstacle to its legalized expression as the will of the state. No matter whether the dominant opinion be wise or unwise, if it has been formed after due consideration, it is expedient that opportunity should be given to test it out. Less than this is incompatible with the genius of free representative government. However wrong the prevailing thought may be and public sentiment is always wrong on some subject, or progress would be impossible a believer in democratic government will at all times be serenely confident that, given freedom of action, a democracy will profit by its mistakes and will perforce return to the paths of sanity after experimenting in the realms of fallacies and illusions. For "Truth shall conquer at the last, For round and round we run; And ever the Right comes uppermost, And ever is Justice done." Nevertheless it may be conceded that there is one kind of legislation which should be the subject of constitutional restriction, though not in the stricter sense affecting the absolute rights of individuals. Unlike Unlike ordinary enactments, statutes of this class cannot be repealed so as to restore substantially the conditions which preceded their passage. Reference is intended to laws providing for the expenditure of public funds and for the creation of public debts. The obligation once incurred, the state cannot recede without flat repudiation. Without a curb on the power to incur financial liability, it would easily be possible, in time of general excitement, reckless enthusiasm, and economic delusion, to commit the state to a calmitous outlay which would cripple its proper social functioning for a generation. It is therefore well-it is in fact essential-that in addition to the bar to infringements on individual rights and to the prescribing of the machinery of government, there should be a conservative limitation on the power of creating financial obligations. To the two classes of constitutional limitations mentioned there should, then, be added a third, a restriction of the debtcreating power. Further than this constitution-making should not go. If confined to subjects which fairly may be brought within the three classes mentioned, a constitution (unlike nearly all if not all of the existing state constitutions) would be so simplified that the average man or woman could with reasonable effort master its provisions. Dealing only with general principles, it would command the unqualified respect of all who accept and believe in those principles. A regard, even a reverence for it might be created which no instrument in the nature of a statute ever can command. And it is of the highest importance that a reverential attitude towards our constitutions, as repositories of the safeguards of indi |