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the return for a joint assumption of burden and responsibility, yet the British contention is that since a certain privilege was obtained through joining in protection this privilege must continue even though Great Britain is relieved from this expensive and burdensome responsibility. That is, in absence of explicit yielding to Great Britain, our rights are to be limited or destroyed by implication. But happily the wording of the HayPauncefote Treaty is clear upon this point. Is it "equal treatment" or “neutrality” that is carried over from Article VIII! The preamble

? to the Articles of the Treaty says: “the objections that may arise from the Clayton-Bulwer Convention to the construction of the Canal are to be removed without impairing the general principle of 'neutralization established in Article VIII.' We supersede the Treaty in every other respect."

The preamble to rule I of Article III of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty says that the United States adopts as the basis of neutralization certain rules substantially as embodied in the Suez Canal Treaty. And further light is thrown upon the meaning by the fact that in modifying the Suez rules only such parts as provided for neutralization were retained and all references to equal treatment thrown out. We shall examine these rules further on.

But Great Britain, and some American supporters of her protest, says that so long as she is

not permitted to join in protection that neutrality secured by our protection becomes the same as equal treatment secured by joint protection. It shows the demoralization of the public mind on this question when such preposterous conclusions are taken seriously. I should be the last one to decry British diplomatic capacity, nor do I find anything wrong in their diplomats making the best case possible for their Government. They certainly act upon Madame de Staël's saying that: “The patriotism of nations ought to be selfish.” It has long been a favorite expedient of

. British diplomatist to lay claims long in advance through pourparlers. So the ingenious attempts up to the last minute to retain a partnership or contract participation in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty were to be expected.

The Treaty of Ghent, which some of those not knowing of its provisions are anxious to celebrate, signed fifteen days before the Battle of New Orleans, provided for the restoration of all territory, places and possessions taken by either nation from the other during the war, with certain unimportant exceptions.

But the minutes of the Conference at Ghent kept by Albert Gallatin represent the English Commissioners as declaring in exact words through Mr. Goulburn:

We do not admit Bonaparte's construction of the law of nations. We cannot accept it in relation to any subject matter before us.

While the American Commissioners did appreciate the meaning, it became known afterwards that the British Ministry did not intend the Treaty of Ghent to apply to the Louisiana Purchase at all. From 1803 to 1815, Pitt, the Duke of Portland, Grenville, Perceval, Lord Liverpool and Castlereagh, denied the right of Napoleon to sell the territory to us.

The words used by Mr. Goulburn were meant to lay the foundation for a claim on the Louisiana Purchase entirely external to the provisions of the Treaty of Ghent. And if Pakenham had not been defeated we should have been deprived of this territory and should have had no canal. Of course no one considers extraneous matter as pertinent except those who cannot gain their ends through the plain terms of a contract.

When the Treaty of 1824 between the United States and Russia was about to be exchanged the Russian Minister informed Secretary of State Adams that he was instructed by his Government to file an explanatory note at the time of the exchange of ratifications, stating the views of his Government as to the meaning and effect of certain articles of the Treaty. Mr. Adams informed him that such a note could have no effect whatever on the Treaty unless it was sent to the Senate with the Treaty and received its approval.

We had a similar prior filing by Sir Henry Bulwer of a statement that the British Government did not understand the engagements of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention to apply to British settlements at Honduras or its dependencies.

Fortunately, though, in the case of the HayPauncefote Treaty the negotiations support all the American contentions as the letters exchanged clear up all points in dispute, and clearly restrict the sphere of operation of the rules to a field in which they affect all persons and vessels alike.

I have already referred to the different paragraphs of Article VIII, but Mr. Hay is so freely quoted in what he might say were he alive that I wish to advance the evidence of his written ideas at the time of the negotiations. In the memorandum prepared by him we find in referring to Article IV of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty: “ It is thought to do entire justice to the reasonable demands of Great Britain in preserving the general principle of neutralization and at the same time to relieve the United States of the vague, indefinite, and embarrassing obligations imposed by the eighth article of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention."

And yet, while plainly done away with by Mr. Hay, who in good faith preserves the general principle of neutrality, we find Senator Root in his Senate Speech endeavoring to revive these same vague, indefinite and embarrassing obligations of Article VIII.

The Suez Canal had been neutralized in 1888 by certain rules and under the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty certain rules were adopted to secure the

free navigation of the Canal that were in many respects like those of the Suez and it was said these rules were to preserve and maintain the general principle of neutralization of Article VIII of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention, not the latter part of Article VIII as Sir Edward Grey labors to prove by a process of elimination, which eliminates the general principle of neutrality altogether and substitutes for it equal rights.

No one can deny that neutrality was secured by joint protection in the Clayton-Bulwer pact, just as was equal treatment. We were willing to carry on the neutrality of the Canal and it is definitely pledged and the rules by which we shall permit its neutral use are clearly set forth in rules given in Article III the protection being given by us alone.

Surely if we had been desirous of giving equal / treatment as well it would have been so stated. It is certainly not implied but on the contrary is definitely refused as we shall see when we trace the origin of the rules.

Do not assume for an instant that we could not have built a canal without Great Britain's permission. This all too general assumption confesses a loyal subserviency abhorrent to Americans—at least to the far greater part of them. The Clayton-Bulwer Convention had been violated by Great Britain, but we were not goaded to abrogate it even though justified.

Sir Edward Grey says that if we had built the

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